Merge tag 'perf-urgent-for-mingo-4.17-20180602' of...

Merge tag 'perf-urgent-for-mingo-4.17-20180602' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/acme/linux into perf/urgent

Pull perf/urgent fixes from Carvalho de Melo:

- Update prctl and cpufeatures.h tools/ copies with the kernel sources
  originals, which makes 'perf trace' know about the new prctl options
  for speculation control and silences the build warnings (Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo)

- Update insn.h in Intel-PT instruction decoder with its original from from the
  kernel sources, to silence build warnings, no effect on the actual tools this
  time around (Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo)
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h

@@ -198,7 +198,6 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_CAT_L2		( 7*32+ 5) /* Cache Allocation Technology L2 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_CDP_L3		( 7*32+ 6) /* Code and Data Prioritization L3 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_INVPCID_SINGLE	( 7*32+ 7) /* Effectively INVPCID && CR4.PCIDE=1 */
-
 #define X86_FEATURE_HW_PSTATE		( 7*32+ 8) /* AMD HW-PState */
 #define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK	( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SME			( 7*32+10) /* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */
@@ -207,13 +206,19 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD	( 7*32+13) /* "" AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN		( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */
 #define X86_FEATURE_CDP_L2		( 7*32+15) /* Code and Data Prioritization L2 */
-
+#define X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL	( 7*32+16) /* "" MSR SPEC_CTRL is implemented */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SSBD		( 7*32+17) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
 #define X86_FEATURE_MBA			( 7*32+18) /* Memory Bandwidth Allocation */
 #define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW		( 7*32+19) /* "" Fill RSB on context switches */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SEV			( 7*32+20) /* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization */
-
 #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB		( 7*32+21) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled */
 #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW		( 7*32+22) /* "" Use IBRS during runtime firmware calls */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE	( 7*32+23) /* "" Disable Speculative Store Bypass. */
+#define X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD		( 7*32+24)  /* "" AMD SSBD implementation via LS_CFG MSR */
+#define X86_FEATURE_IBRS		( 7*32+25) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
+#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB		( 7*32+26) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
+#define X86_FEATURE_STIBP		( 7*32+27) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
+#define X86_FEATURE_ZEN			( 7*32+28) /* "" CPU is AMD family 0x17 (Zen) */
 
 /* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW		( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */
@@ -274,9 +279,10 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_CLZERO		(13*32+ 0) /* CLZERO instruction */
 #define X86_FEATURE_IRPERF		(13*32+ 1) /* Instructions Retired Count */
 #define X86_FEATURE_XSAVEERPTR		(13*32+ 2) /* Always save/restore FP error pointers */
-#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB		(13*32+12) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
-#define X86_FEATURE_IBRS		(13*32+14) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
-#define X86_FEATURE_STIBP		(13*32+15) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB		(13*32+12) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS		(13*32+14) /* "" Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP		(13*32+15) /* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
+#define X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD		(13*32+25) /* Virtualized Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
 
 /* Thermal and Power Management Leaf, CPUID level 0x00000006 (EAX), word 14 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_DTHERM		(14*32+ 0) /* Digital Thermal Sensor */
@@ -334,6 +340,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL		(18*32+26) /* "" Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */
 #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP		(18*32+27) /* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
 #define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES	(18*32+29) /* IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR (Intel) */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD	(18*32+31) /* "" Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
 
 /*
  * BUG word(s)
@@ -363,5 +370,6 @@
 #define X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN		X86_BUG(14) /* CPU is affected by meltdown attack and needs kernel page table isolation */
 #define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1		X86_BUG(15) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 1 attack with conditional branches */
 #define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2		X86_BUG(16) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 2 attack with indirect branches */
+#define X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS	X86_BUG(17) /* CPU is affected by speculative store bypass attack */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */

tools/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h

@@ -207,4 +207,16 @@ struct prctl_mm_map {
 # define PR_SVE_VL_LEN_MASK		0xffff
 # define PR_SVE_VL_INHERIT		(1 << 17) /* inherit across exec */
 
+/* Per task speculation control */
+#define PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL		52
+#define PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL		53
+/* Speculation control variants */
+# define PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS		0
+/* Return and control values for PR_SET/GET_SPECULATION_CTRL */
+# define PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED		0
+# define PR_SPEC_PRCTL			(1UL << 0)
+# define PR_SPEC_ENABLE			(1UL << 1)
+# define PR_SPEC_DISABLE		(1UL << 2)
+# define PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE		(1UL << 3)
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */

tools/perf/trace/beauty/prctl_option.sh

 #!/bin/sh
 
-header_dir=$1
+[ $# -eq 1 ] && header_dir=$1 || header_dir=tools/include/uapi/linux/
 
 printf "static const char *prctl_options[] = {\n"
 regex='^#define[[:space:]]+PR_([GS]ET\w+)[[:space:]]*([[:xdigit:]]+).*'

tools/perf/util/intel-pt-decoder/insn.h

@@ -208,4 +208,22 @@ static inline int insn_offset_immediate(struct insn *insn)
 	return insn_offset_displacement(insn) + insn->displacement.nbytes;
 }
 
+#define POP_SS_OPCODE 0x1f
+#define MOV_SREG_OPCODE 0x8e
+
+/*
+ * Intel SDM Vol.3A 6.8.3 states;
+ * "Any single-step trap that would be delivered following the MOV to SS
+ * instruction or POP to SS instruction (because EFLAGS.TF is 1) is
+ * suppressed."
+ * This function returns true if @insn is MOV SS or POP SS. On these
+ * instructions, single stepping is suppressed.
+ */
+static inline int insn_masking_exception(struct insn *insn)
+{
+	return insn->opcode.bytes[0] == POP_SS_OPCODE ||
+		(insn->opcode.bytes[0] == MOV_SREG_OPCODE &&
+		 X86_MODRM_REG(insn->modrm.bytes[0]) == 2);
+}
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_INSN_H */