Commit 9181d6f8 authored by Eric Dumazet's avatar Eric Dumazet Committed by David S. Miller

net: add more sanity check in virtio_net_hdr_to_skb()

syzbot/KMSAN reports access to uninitialized data from gso_features_check() [1]

The repro use af_packet, injecting a gso packet and hdrlen == 0.

We could fix the issue making gso_features_check() more careful
while dealing with NETIF_F_TSO_MANGLEID in fast path.

Or we can make sure virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() pulls minimal network and
transport headers as intended.

Note that for GSO packets coming from untrusted sources, SKB_GSO_DODGY
bit forces a proper header validation (and pull) before the packet can
hit any device ndo_start_xmit(), thus we do not need a precise disection
at virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() stage.

[1]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in skb_gso_segment include/net/gso.h:83 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in validate_xmit_skb+0x10f2/0x1930 net/core/dev.c:3629
 skb_gso_segment include/net/gso.h:83 [inline]
 validate_xmit_skb+0x10f2/0x1930 net/core/dev.c:3629
 __dev_queue_xmit+0x1eac/0x5130 net/core/dev.c:4341
 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3134 [inline]
 packet_xmit+0x9c/0x6b0 net/packet/af_packet.c:276
 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3087 [inline]
 packet_sendmsg+0x8b1d/0x9f30 net/packet/af_packet.c:3119
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
 __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x9c2/0xd60 net/socket.c:2584
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x28d/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2638
 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2667 [inline]
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2676 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x490 net/socket.c:2674
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x44/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b

Uninit was created at:
 slab_post_alloc_hook+0x129/0xa70 mm/slab.h:768
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3478 [inline]
 kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x5e9/0xb10 mm/slub.c:3523
 kmalloc_reserve+0x13d/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:560
 __alloc_skb+0x318/0x740 net/core/skbuff.c:651
 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1286 [inline]
 alloc_skb_with_frags+0xc8/0xbd0 net/core/skbuff.c:6334
 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xa80/0xbf0 net/core/sock.c:2780
 packet_alloc_skb net/packet/af_packet.c:2936 [inline]
 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3030 [inline]
 packet_sendmsg+0x70e8/0x9f30 net/packet/af_packet.c:3119
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
 __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x9c2/0xd60 net/socket.c:2584
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x28d/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2638
 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2667 [inline]
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2676 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x490 net/socket.c:2674
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x44/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b

CPU: 0 PID: 5025 Comm: syz-executor279 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc7-syzkaller-00003-gfbafc3e6 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/17/2023

Reported-by: syzbot+7f4d0ea3df4d4fa9a65f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/0000000000005abd7b060eb160cd@google.com/
Fixes: 9274124f ("net: stricter validation of untrusted gso packets")
Signed-off-by: default avatarEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarWillem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
parent e18405d0
...@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ ...@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@
#define _LINUX_VIRTIO_NET_H #define _LINUX_VIRTIO_NET_H
#include <linux/if_vlan.h> #include <linux/if_vlan.h>
#include <linux/ip.h>
#include <linux/ipv6.h>
#include <linux/udp.h> #include <linux/udp.h>
#include <uapi/linux/tcp.h> #include <uapi/linux/tcp.h>
#include <uapi/linux/virtio_net.h> #include <uapi/linux/virtio_net.h>
...@@ -49,6 +51,7 @@ static inline int virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, ...@@ -49,6 +51,7 @@ static inline int virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct virtio_net_hdr *hdr, const struct virtio_net_hdr *hdr,
bool little_endian) bool little_endian)
{ {
unsigned int nh_min_len = sizeof(struct iphdr);
unsigned int gso_type = 0; unsigned int gso_type = 0;
unsigned int thlen = 0; unsigned int thlen = 0;
unsigned int p_off = 0; unsigned int p_off = 0;
...@@ -65,6 +68,7 @@ static inline int virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, ...@@ -65,6 +68,7 @@ static inline int virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(struct sk_buff *skb,
gso_type = SKB_GSO_TCPV6; gso_type = SKB_GSO_TCPV6;
ip_proto = IPPROTO_TCP; ip_proto = IPPROTO_TCP;
thlen = sizeof(struct tcphdr); thlen = sizeof(struct tcphdr);
nh_min_len = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr);
break; break;
case VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP: case VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP:
gso_type = SKB_GSO_UDP; gso_type = SKB_GSO_UDP;
...@@ -100,7 +104,8 @@ static inline int virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, ...@@ -100,7 +104,8 @@ static inline int virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(struct sk_buff *skb,
if (!skb_partial_csum_set(skb, start, off)) if (!skb_partial_csum_set(skb, start, off))
return -EINVAL; return -EINVAL;
p_off = skb_transport_offset(skb) + thlen; nh_min_len = max_t(u32, nh_min_len, skb_transport_offset(skb));
p_off = nh_min_len + thlen;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, p_off)) if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, p_off))
return -EINVAL; return -EINVAL;
} else { } else {
...@@ -140,7 +145,7 @@ static inline int virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, ...@@ -140,7 +145,7 @@ static inline int virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(struct sk_buff *skb,
skb_set_transport_header(skb, keys.control.thoff); skb_set_transport_header(skb, keys.control.thoff);
} else if (gso_type) { } else if (gso_type) {
p_off = thlen; p_off = nh_min_len + thlen;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, p_off)) if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, p_off))
return -EINVAL; return -EINVAL;
} }
......
Markdown is supported
0%
or
You are about to add 0 people to the discussion. Proceed with caution.
Finish editing this message first!
Please register or to comment