sock: redo the psock vs ULP protection check

Commit 8a59f9d1 ("sock: Introduce sk->sk_prot->psock_update_sk_prot()")
has moved the inet_csk_has_ulp(sk) check from sk_psock_init() to
the new tcp_bpf_update_proto() function. I'm guessing that this
was done to allow creating psocks for non-inet sockets.

Unfortunately the destruction path for psock includes the ULP
unwind, so we need to fail the sk_psock_init() itself.
Otherwise if ULP is already present we'll notice that later,
and call tcp_update_ulp() with the sk_proto of the ULP
itself, which will most likely result in the ULP looping
its callbacks.

Fixes: 8a59f9d1 ("sock: Introduce sk->sk_prot->psock_update_sk_prot()")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Tested-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220620191353.1184629-2-kuba@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>

include/net/inet_sock.h

@@ -253,6 +253,11 @@ struct inet_sock {
 #define IP_CMSG_CHECKSUM	BIT(7)
 #define IP_CMSG_RECVFRAGSIZE	BIT(8)
 
+static inline bool sk_is_inet(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	return sk->sk_family == AF_INET || sk->sk_family == AF_INET6;
+}
+
 /**
  * sk_to_full_sk - Access to a full socket
  * @sk: pointer to a socket

net/core/skmsg.c

@@ -699,6 +699,11 @@ struct sk_psock *sk_psock_init(struct sock *sk, int node)
 
 	write_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
 
+	if (sk_is_inet(sk) && inet_csk_has_ulp(sk)) {
+		psock = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
 	if (sk->sk_user_data) {
 		psock = ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
 		goto out;

net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c

@@ -611,9 +611,6 @@ int tcp_bpf_update_proto(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, bool restore)
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	if (inet_csk_has_ulp(sk))
-		return -EINVAL;
-
 	if (sk->sk_family == AF_INET6) {
 		if (tcp_bpf_assert_proto_ops(psock->sk_proto))
 			return -EINVAL;

net/tls/tls_main.c

@@ -921,6 +921,8 @@ static void tls_update(struct sock *sk, struct proto *p,
 {
 	struct tls_context *ctx;
 
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(sk->sk_prot == p);
+
 	ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
 	if (likely(ctx)) {
 		ctx->sk_write_space = write_space;