- 13 Jan, 2017 40 commits
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Deepa Dinamani authored
[ Upstream commit 822c8685 ] ICMP timestamp messages and IP source route options require timestamps to be in milliseconds modulo 24 hours from midnight UT format. Add inet_current_timestamp() function to support this. The function returns the required timestamp in network byte order. Timestamp calculation is also changed to call ktime_get_real_ts64() which uses struct timespec64. struct timespec64 is y2038 safe. Previously it called getnstimeofday() which uses struct timespec. struct timespec is not y2038 safe. Signed-off-by:
Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru> Cc: Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Acked-by:
YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> Acked-by:
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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Jesse Gross authored
[ Upstream commit b8cba75b ] ipip encapsulated packets can be merged together by GRO but the result does not have the proper GSO type set or even marked as being encapsulated at all. Later retransmission of these packets will likely fail if the device does not support ipip offloads. This is similar to the issue resolved in IPv6 sit in feec0cb3 ("ipv6: gro: support sit protocol"). Reported-by:
Patrick Boutilier <boutilpj@ednet.ns.ca> Fixes: 9667e9bb ("ipip: Add gro callbacks to ipip offload") Tested-by:
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Al Viro authored
[ Upstream commit 128394ef ] Both damn things interpret userland pointers embedded into the payload; worse, they are actually traversing those. Leaving aside the bad API design, this is very much _not_ safe to call with KERNEL_DS. Bail out early if that happens. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
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Aleksa Sarai authored
[ Upstream commit 613cc2b6 ] If you have a process that has set itself to be non-dumpable, and it then undergoes exec(2), any CLOEXEC file descriptors it has open are "exposed" during a race window between the dumpable flags of the process being reset for exec(2) and CLOEXEC being applied to the file descriptors. This can be exploited by a process by attempting to access /proc/<pid>/fd/... during this window, without requiring CAP_SYS_PTRACE. The race in question is after set_dumpable has been (for get_link, though the trace is basically the same for readlink): [vfs] -> proc_pid_link_inode_operations.get_link -> proc_pid_get_link -> proc_fd_access_allowed -> ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS); Which will return 0, during the race window and CLOEXEC file descriptors will still be open during this window because do_close_on_exec has not been called yet. As a result, the ordering of these calls should be reversed to avoid this race window. This is of particular concern to container runtimes, where joining a PID namespace with file descriptors referring to the host filesystem can result in security issues (since PRCTL_SET_DUMPABLE doesn't protect against access of CLOEXEC file descriptors -- file descriptors which may reference filesystem objects the container shouldn't have access to). Cc: dev@opencontainers.org Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.2+ Reported-by:
Michael Crosby <crosbymichael@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
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Bart Van Assche authored
[ Upstream commit fba332b0 ] Code that dereferences the struct net_device ip_ptr member must be protected with an in_dev_get() / in_dev_put() pair. Hence insert calls to these functions. Fixes: commit 7b85627b ("IB/cma: IBoE (RoCE) IP-based GID addressing") Signed-off-by:
Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@sandisk.com> Reviewed-by:
Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com> Cc: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com> Cc: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Takashi Iwai authored
[ Upstream commit f8114f85 ] This reverts commit 16200948. The commit was intended to cover the race condition, but it introduced yet another regression for devices with the implicit feedback, leading to a kernel panic due to NULL-dereference in an irq context. As the race condition that was addressed by the commit is very rare and the regression is much worse, let's revert the commit for rc1, and fix the issue properly in a later patch. Fixes: 16200948 ("ALSA: usb-audio: Fix race at stopping the stream") Reported-by:
Ioan-Adrian Ratiu <adi@adirat.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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Jim Mattson authored
[ Upstream commit ef85b673 ] When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions (#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions were forwarded to L1. Signed-off-by:
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Russell Currey authored
[ Upstream commit 298360af ] ast_get_dram_info() configures a window in order to access BMC memory. A BMC register can be configured to disallow this, and if so, causes an infinite loop in the ast driver which renders the system unusable. Fix this by erroring out if an error is detected. On powerpc systems with EEH, this leads to the device being fenced and the system continuing to operate. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.10+ Signed-off-by:
Russell Currey <ruscur@russell.cc> Reviewed-by:
Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au> Signed-off-by:
Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Link: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20161215051241.20815-1-ruscur@russell.ccSigned-off-by:
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Andy Grover authored
[ Upstream commit d0905ca7 ] Don't free the cmd in tcmu_check_expired_cmd, it's still referenced by an entry in our cmd_id->cmd idr. If userspace ever resumes processing, tcmu_handle_completions() will use the now-invalid cmd pointer. Instead, don't free cmd. It will be freed by tcmu_handle_completion() if userspace ever recovers, or tcmu_free_device if not. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by:
Bryant G Ly <bgly@us.ibm.com> Tested-by:
Andy Grover <agrover@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Douglas Anderson authored
[ Upstream commit 2d13bb64 ] We've got a delay loop waiting for secondary CPUs. That loop uses loops_per_jiffy. However, loops_per_jiffy doesn't actually mean how many tight loops make up a jiffy on all architectures. It is quite common to see things like this in the boot log: Calibrating delay loop (skipped), value calculated using timer frequency.. 48.00 BogoMIPS (lpj=24000) In my case I was seeing lots of cases where other CPUs timed out entering the debugger only to print their stack crawls shortly after the kdb> prompt was written. Elsewhere in kgdb we already use udelay(), so that should be safe enough to use to implement our timeout. We'll delay 1 ms for 1000 times, which should give us a full second of delay (just like the old code wanted) but allow us to notice that we're done every 1 ms. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: simplifications, per Daniel] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1477091361-2039-1-git-send-email-dianders@chromium.orgSigned-off-by:
Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Reviewed-by:
Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org> Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com> Cc: Brian Norris <briannorris@chromium.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [4.0+] Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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Wei Fang authored
[ Upstream commit d2a14525 ] A race between scanning and fc_remote_port_delete() may result in a permanent stop if the device gets blocked before scsi_sysfs_add_sdev() and unblocked after. The reason is that blocking a device sets both the SDEV_BLOCKED state and the QUEUE_FLAG_STOPPED. However, scsi_sysfs_add_sdev() unconditionally sets SDEV_RUNNING which causes the device to be ignored by scsi_target_unblock() and thus never have its QUEUE_FLAG_STOPPED cleared leading to a device which is apparently running but has a stopped queue. We actually have two places where SDEV_RUNNING is set: once in scsi_add_lun() which respects the blocked flag and once in scsi_sysfs_add_sdev() which doesn't. Since the second set is entirely spurious, simply remove it to fix the problem. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reported-by:
Zengxi Chen <chenzengxi@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
Wei Fang <fangwei1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by:
Ewan D. Milne <emilne@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
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Bart Van Assche authored
[ Upstream commit d3a2418e ] This patch avoids that Coverity complains about not checking the ib_find_pkey() return value. Fixes: commit 547af765 ("IB/multicast: Report errors on multicast groups if P_key changes") Signed-off-by:
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Bart Van Assche authored
[ Upstream commit 11b642b8 ] This patch avoids that Coverity reports the following: Using uninitialized value port_attr.state when calling printk Fixes: commit 94232d9c ("IPoIB: Start multicast join process only on active ports") Signed-off-by:
Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by:
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NeilBrown authored
[ Upstream commit bcc7f5b4 ] bdev->bd_contains is not stable before calling __blkdev_get(). When __blkdev_get() is called on a parition with ->bd_openers == 0 it sets bdev->bd_contains = bdev; which is not correct for a partition. After a call to __blkdev_get() succeeds, ->bd_openers will be > 0 and then ->bd_contains is stable. When FMODE_EXCL is used, blkdev_get() calls bd_start_claiming() -> bd_prepare_to_claim() -> bd_may_claim() This call happens before __blkdev_get() is called, so ->bd_contains is not stable. So bd_may_claim() cannot safely use ->bd_contains. It currently tries to use it, and this can lead to a BUG_ON(). This happens when a whole device is already open with a bd_holder (in use by dm in my particular example) and two threads race to open a partition of that device for the first time, one opening with O_EXCL and one without. The thread that doesn't use O_EXCL gets through blkdev_get() to __blkdev_get(), gains the ->bd_mutex, and sets bdev->bd_contains = bdev; Immediately thereafter the other thread, using FMODE_EXCL, calls bd_start_claiming() from blkdev_get(). This should fail because the whole device has a holder, but because bdev->bd_contains == bdev bd_may_claim() incorrectly reports success. This thread continues and blocks on bd_mutex. The first thread then sets bdev->bd_contains correctly and drops the mutex. The thread using FMODE_EXCL then continues and when it calls bd_may_claim() again in: BUG_ON(!bd_may_claim(bdev, whole, holder)); The BUG_ON fires. Fix this by removing the dependency on ->bd_contains in bd_may_claim(). As bd_may_claim() has direct access to the whole device, it can simply test if the target bdev is the whole device. Fixes: 6b4517a7 ("block: implement bd_claiming and claiming block") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (v2.6.35+) Signed-off-by:
NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com> Signed-off-by:
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Maxim Patlasov authored
[ Upstream commit 2939e1a8 ] Problem statement: unprivileged user who has read-write access to more than one btrfs subvolume may easily consume all kernel memory (eventually triggering oom-killer). Reproducer (./mkrmdir below essentially loops over mkdir/rmdir): [root@kteam1 ~]# cat prep.sh DEV=/dev/sdb mkfs.btrfs -f $DEV mount $DEV /mnt for i in `seq 1 16` do mkdir /mnt/$i btrfs subvolume create /mnt/SV_$i ID=`btrfs subvolume list /mnt |grep "SV_$i$" |cut -d ' ' -f 2` mount -t btrfs -o subvolid=$ID $DEV /mnt/$i chmod a+rwx /mnt/$i done [root@kteam1 ~]# sh prep.sh [maxim@kteam1 ~]$ for i in `seq 1 16`; do ./mkrmdir /mnt/$i 2000 2000 & done [root@kteam1 ~]# for i in `seq 1 4`; do grep "kmalloc-128" /proc/slabinfo | grep -v dma; sleep 60; done kmalloc-128 10144 10144 128 32 1 : tunables 0 0 0 : slabdata 317 317 0 kmalloc-128 9992352 9992352 128 32 1 : tunables 0 0 0 : slabdata 312261 312261 0 kmalloc-128 24226752 24226752 128 32 1 : tunables 0 0 0 : slabdata 757086 757086 0 kmalloc-128 42754240 42754240 128 32 1 : tunables 0 0 0 : slabdata 1336070 1336070 0 The huge numbers above come from insane number of async_work-s allocated and queued by btrfs_wq_run_delayed_node. The problem is caused by btrfs_wq_run_delayed_node() queuing more and more works if the number of delayed items is above BTRFS_DELAYED_BACKGROUND. The worker func (btrfs_async_run_delayed_root) processes at least BTRFS_DELAYED_BATCH items (if they are present in the list). So, the machinery works as expected while the list is almost empty. As soon as it is getting bigger, worker func starts to process more than one item at a time, it takes longer, and the chances to have async_works queued more than needed is getting higher. The problem above is worsened by another flaw of delayed-inode implementation: if async_work was queued in a throttling branch (number of items >= BTRFS_DELAYED_WRITEBACK), corresponding worker func won't quit until the number of items < BTRFS_DELAYED_BACKGROUND / 2. So, it is possible that the func occupies CPU infinitely (up to 30sec in my experiments): while the func is trying to drain the list, the user activity may add more and more items to the list. The patch fixes both problems in straightforward way: refuse queuing too many works in btrfs_wq_run_delayed_node and bail out of worker func if at least BTRFS_DELAYED_WRITEBACK items are processed. Changed in v2: remove support of thresh == NO_THRESHOLD. Signed-off-by:
Maxim Patlasov <mpatlasov@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by:
Chris Mason <clm@fb.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.15+ Signed-off-by:
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Shaohua Li authored
[ Upstream commit 5f33a080 ] Our system uses significantly more slab memory with memcg enabled with the latest kernel. With 3.10 kernel, slab uses 2G memory, while with 4.6 kernel, 6G memory is used. The shrinker has problem. Let's see we have two memcg for one shrinker. In do_shrink_slab: 1. Check cg1. nr_deferred = 0, assume total_scan = 700. batch size is 1024, then no memory is freed. nr_deferred = 700 2. Check cg2. nr_deferred = 700. Assume freeable = 20, then total_scan = 10 or 40. Let's assume it's 10. No memory is freed. nr_deferred = 10. The deferred share of cg1 is lost in this case. kswapd will free no memory even run above steps again and again. The fix makes sure one memcg's deferred share isn't lost. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/2414be961b5d25892060315fbb56bb19d81d0c07.1476227351.git.shli@fb.comSigned-off-by:
Shaohua Li <shli@fb.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [4.0+] Signed-off-by:
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Jingkui Wang authored
[ Upstream commit 5a8a6b89 ] We were assigning I2C bus controller instead of client as parent device. Besides being logically wrong, it messed up with devm handling of input device. As a result we were leaving input device and event node behind after rmmod-ing the driver, which lead to a kernel oops if one were to access the event node later. Let's remove the assignment and rely on devm_input_allocate_device() to set it up properly for us. Signed-off-by:
Jingkui Wang <jkwang@google.com> Fixes: 7132fe4f ("Input: drv260x - add TI drv260x haptics driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Ilya Dryomov authored
[ Upstream commit 5c056fdc ] After sending an authorizer (ceph_x_authorize_a + ceph_x_authorize_b), the client gets back a ceph_x_authorize_reply, which it is supposed to verify to ensure the authenticity and protect against replay attacks. The code for doing this is there (ceph_x_verify_authorizer_reply(), ceph_auth_verify_authorizer_reply() + plumbing), but it is never invoked by the the messenger. AFAICT this goes back to 2009, when ceph authentication protocols support was added to the kernel client in 4e7a5dcd ("ceph: negotiate authentication protocol; implement AUTH_NONE protocol"). The second param of ceph_connection_operations::verify_authorizer_reply is unused all the way down. Pass 0 to facilitate backporting, and kill it in the next commit. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jussi Laako authored
[ Upstream commit 995c6a7f ] Sampling rate changes after first set one are not reflected to the hardware, while driver and ALSA think the rate has been changed. Fix the problem by properly stopping the interface at the beginning of prepare call, allowing new rate to be set to the hardware. This keeps the hardware in sync with the driver. Signed-off-by:
Jussi Laako <jussi@sonarnerd.net> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Gerald Schaefer authored
[ Upstream commit 5457e03d ] The buffer for iucv_message_receive() needs to be below 2 GB. In __iucv_message_receive(), the buffer address is casted to an u32, which would result in either memory corruption or an addressing exception when using addresses >= 2 GB. Fix this by using GFP_DMA for the buffer allocation. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Ben Hutchings authored
[ Upstream commit 79e51b5c ] Currently it is impossible to edit the value of a config symbol with a prompt longer than (terminal width - 2) characters. dialog_inputbox() calculates a negative x-offset for the input window and newwin() fails as this is invalid. It also doesn't check for this failure, so it busy-loops calling wgetch(NULL) which immediately returns -1. The additions in the offset calculations also don't match the intended size of the window. Limit the window size and calculate the offset similarly to show_scroll_win(). Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Fixes: 692d97c3 ("kconfig: new configuration interface (nconfig)") Signed-off-by:
Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Signed-off-by:
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NeilBrown authored
[ Upstream commit 1cded9d2 ] There are two problems with refcounting of auth_gss messages. First, the reference on the pipe->pipe list (taken by a call to rpc_queue_upcall()) is not counted. It seems to be assumed that a message in pipe->pipe will always also be in pipe->in_downcall, where it is correctly reference counted. However there is no guaranty of this. I have a report of a NULL dereferences in rpc_pipe_read() which suggests a msg that has been freed is still on the pipe->pipe list. One way I imagine this might happen is: - message is queued for uid=U and auth->service=S1 - rpc.gssd reads this message and starts processing. This removes the message from pipe->pipe - message is queued for uid=U and auth->service=S2 - rpc.gssd replies to the first message. gss_pipe_downcall() calls __gss_find_upcall(pipe, U, NULL) and it finds the *second* message, as new messages are placed at the head of ->in_downcall, and the service type is not checked. - This second message is removed from ->in_downcall and freed by gss_release_msg() (even though it is still on pipe->pipe) - rpc.gssd tries to read another message, and dereferences a pointer to this message that has just been freed. I fix this by incrementing the reference count before calling rpc_queue_upcall(), and decrementing it if that fails, or normally in gss_pipe_destroy_msg(). It seems strange that the reply doesn't target the message more precisely, but I don't know all the details. In any case, I think the reference counting irregularity became a measureable bug when the extra arg was added to __gss_find_upcall(), hence the Fixes: line below. The second problem is that if rpc_queue_upcall() fails, the new message is not freed. gss_alloc_msg() set the ->count to 1, gss_add_msg() increments this to 2, gss_unhash_msg() decrements to 1, then the pointer is discarded so the memory never gets freed. Fixes: 9130b8db ("SUNRPC: allow for upcalls for same uid but different gss service") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://bugzilla.opensuse.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1011250Signed-off-by:
Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Signed-off-by:
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Dan Carpenter authored
[ Upstream commit 578620f4 ] We should set the error code if kzalloc() fails. Fixes: 67cf5b09 ("ext4: add the basic function for inline data support") Signed-off-by:
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Al Viro authored
[ Upstream commit c0cf3ef5 ] What matters when deciding if we should make a page uptodate is not how much we _wanted_ to copy, but how much we actually have copied. As it is, on architectures that do not zero tail on short copy we can leave uninitialized data in page marked uptodate. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Steven Rostedt (Red Hat) authored
[ Upstream commit 794de08a ] Both the wakeup and irqsoff tracers can use the function graph tracer when the display-graph option is set. The problem is that they ignore the notrace file, and record the entry of functions that would be ignored by the function_graph tracer. This causes the trace->depth to be recorded into the ring buffer. The set_graph_notrace uses a trick by adding a large negative number to the trace->depth when a graph function is to be ignored. On trace output, the graph function uses the depth to record a stack of functions. But since the depth is negative, it accesses the array with a negative number and causes an out of bounds access that can cause a kernel oops or corrupt data. Have the print functions handle cases where a tracer still records functions even when they are in set_graph_notrace. Also add warnings if the depth is below zero before accessing the array. Note, the function graph logic will still prevent the return of these functions from being recorded, which means that they will be left hanging without a return. For example: # echo '*spin*' > set_graph_notrace # echo 1 > options/display-graph # echo wakeup > current_tracer # cat trace [...] _raw_spin_lock() { preempt_count_add() { do_raw_spin_lock() { update_rq_clock(); Where it should look like: _raw_spin_lock() { preempt_count_add(); do_raw_spin_lock(); } update_rq_clock(); Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com> Fixes: 29ad23b0 ("ftrace: Add set_graph_notrace filter") Signed-off-by:
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
[ Upstream commit 9c164572 ] The clocksource delta to nanoseconds conversion is using signed math, but the delta is unsigned. This makes the conversion space smaller than necessary and in case of a multiplication overflow the conversion can become negative. The conversion is done with scaled math: s64 nsec_delta = ((s64)clkdelta * clk->mult) >> clk->shift; Shifting a signed integer right obvioulsy preserves the sign, which has interesting consequences: - Time jumps backwards - __iter_div_u64_rem() which is used in one of the calling code pathes will take forever to piecewise calculate the seconds/nanoseconds part. This has been reported by several people with different scenarios: David observed that when stopping a VM with a debugger: "It was essentially the stopped by debugger case. I forget exactly why, but the guest was being explicitly stopped from outside, it wasn't just scheduling lag. I think it was something in the vicinity of 10 minutes stopped." When lifting the stop the machine went dead. The stopped by debugger case is not really interesting, but nevertheless it would be a good thing not to die completely. But this was also observed on a live system by Liav: "When the OS is too overloaded, delta will get a high enough value for the msb of the sum delta * tkr->mult + tkr->xtime_nsec to be set, and so after the shift the nsec variable will gain a value similar to 0xffffffffff000000." Unfortunately this has been reintroduced recently with commit 6bd58f09 ("time: Add cycles to nanoseconds translation"). It had been fixed a year ago already in commit 35a4933a ("time: Avoid signed overflow in timekeeping_get_ns()"). Though it's not surprising that the issue has been reintroduced because the function itself and the whole call chain uses s64 for the result and the propagation of it. The change in this recent commit is subtle: s64 nsec; - nsec = (d * m + n) >> s: + nsec = d * m + n; + nsec >>= s; d being type of cycle_t adds another level of obfuscation. This wouldn't have happened if the previous change to unsigned computation would have made the 'nsec' variable u64 right away and a follow up patch had cleaned up the whole call chain. There have been patches submitted which basically did a revert of the above patch leaving everything else unchanged as signed. Back to square one. This spawned a admittedly pointless discussion about potential users which rely on the unsigned behaviour until someone pointed out that it had been fixed before. The changelogs of said patches added further confusion as they made finally false claims about the consequences for eventual users which expect signed results. Despite delta being cycle_t, aka. u64, it's very well possible to hand in a signed negative value and the signed computation will happily return the correct result. But nobody actually sat down and analyzed the code which was added as user after the propably unintended signed conversion. Though in sensitive code like this it's better to analyze it proper and make sure that nothing relies on this than hunting the subtle wreckage half a year later. After analyzing all call chains it stands that no caller can hand in a negative value (which actually would work due to the s64 cast) and rely on the signed math to do the right thing. Change the conversion function to unsigned math. The conversion of all call chains is done in a follow up patch. This solves the starvation issue, which was caused by the negative result, but it does not solve the underlying problem. It merily procrastinates it. When the timekeeper update is deferred long enough that the unsigned multiplication overflows, then time going backwards is observable again. It does neither solve the issue of clocksources with a small counter width which will wrap around possibly several times and cause random time stamps to be generated. But those are usually not found on systems used for virtualization, so this is likely a non issue. I took the liberty to claim authorship for this simply because analyzing all callsites and writing the changelog took substantially more time than just making the simple s/s64/u64/ change and ignore the rest. Fixes: 6bd58f09 ("time: Add cycles to nanoseconds translation") Reported-by:
David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> Reported-by:
Liav Rehana <liavr@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by:
Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Parit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Laurent Vivier <lvivier@redhat.com> Cc: "Christopher S. Hall" <christopher.s.hall@intel.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> Cc: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com> Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161208204228.688545601@linutronix.deSigned-off-by:
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Giuseppe Lippolis authored
[ Upstream commit d8a12b71 ] Adding registration for 3G modem DWM-158 in usb-serial-option Signed-off-by:
Giuseppe Lippolis <giu.lippolis@gmail.com> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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Daniele Palmas authored
[ Upstream commit 5b09eff0 ] This patch adds support for PIDs 0x1040, 0x1041 of Telit LE922A. Since the interface positions are the same than the ones used for other Telit compositions, previous defined blacklists are used. Signed-off-by:
Daniele Palmas <dnlplm@gmail.com> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Con Kolivas authored
[ Upstream commit 82ffb6fc ] The Logitech QuickCam Communicate Deluxe/S7500 microphone fails with the following warning. [ 6.778995] usb 2-1.2.2.2: Warning! Unlikely big volume range (=3072), cval->res is probably wrong. [ 6.778996] usb 2-1.2.2.2: [5] FU [Mic Capture Volume] ch = 1, val = 4608/7680/1 Adding it to the list of devices in volume_control_quirks makes it work properly, fixing related typo. Signed-off-by:
Con Kolivas <kernel@kolivas.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Benjamin Marzinski authored
[ Upstream commit 314c25c5 ] In dm_sm_metadata_create() we temporarily change the dm_space_map operations from 'ops' (whose .destroy function deallocates the sm_metadata) to 'bootstrap_ops' (whose .destroy function doesn't). If dm_sm_metadata_create() fails in sm_ll_new_metadata() or sm_ll_extend(), it exits back to dm_tm_create_internal(), which calls dm_sm_destroy() with the intention of freeing the sm_metadata, but it doesn't (because the dm_space_map operations is still set to 'bootstrap_ops'). Fix this by setting the dm_space_map operations back to 'ops' if dm_sm_metadata_create() fails when it is set to 'bootstrap_ops'. Signed-off-by:
Benjamin Marzinski <bmarzins@redhat.com> Acked-by:
Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Julien Grall authored
[ Upstream commit 24d5373d ] The function xen_guest_init is using __alloc_percpu with an alignment which are not power of two. However, the percpu allocator never supported alignments which are not power of two and has always behaved incorectly in thise case. Commit 3ca45a46 "percpu: ensure requested alignment is power of two" introduced a check which trigger a warning [1] when booting linux-next on Xen. But in reality this bug was always present. This can be fixed by replacing the call to __alloc_percpu with alloc_percpu. The latter will use an alignment which are a power of two. [1] [ 0.023921] illegal size (48) or align (48) for percpu allocation [ 0.024167] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 0.024344] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at linux/mm/percpu.c:892 pcpu_alloc+0x88/0x6c0 [ 0.024584] Modules linked in: [ 0.024708] [ 0.024804] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.9.0-rc7-next-20161128 #473 [ 0.025012] Hardware name: Foundation-v8A (DT) [ 0.025162] task: ffff80003d870000 task.stack: ffff80003d844000 [ 0.025351] PC is at pcpu_alloc+0x88/0x6c0 [ 0.025490] LR is at pcpu_alloc+0x88/0x6c0 [ 0.025624] pc : [<ffff00000818e678>] lr : [<ffff00000818e678>] pstate: 60000045 [ 0.025830] sp : ffff80003d847cd0 [ 0.025946] x29: ffff80003d847cd0 x28: 0000000000000000 [ 0.026147] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000000 [ 0.026348] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000 [ 0.026549] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 00000000024000c0 [ 0.026752] x21: ffff000008e97000 x20: 0000000000000000 [ 0.026953] x19: 0000000000000030 x18: 0000000000000010 [ 0.027155] x17: 0000000000000a3f x16: 00000000deadbeef [ 0.027357] x15: 0000000000000006 x14: ffff000088f79c3f [ 0.027573] x13: ffff000008f79c4d x12: 0000000000000041 [ 0.027782] x11: 0000000000000006 x10: 0000000000000042 [ 0.027995] x9 : ffff80003d847a40 x8 : 6f697461636f6c6c [ 0.028208] x7 : 6120757063726570 x6 : ffff000008f79c84 [ 0.028419] x5 : 0000000000000005 x4 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.028628] x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 000000000000017f [ 0.028840] x1 : ffff80003d870000 x0 : 0000000000000035 [ 0.029056] [ 0.029152] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 0.029297] Call trace: [ 0.029403] Exception stack(0xffff80003d847b00 to 0xffff80003d847c30) [ 0.029621] 7b00: 0000000000000030 0001000000000000 ffff80003d847cd0 ffff00000818e678 [ 0.029901] 7b20: 0000000000000002 0000000000000004 ffff000008f7c060 0000000000000035 [ 0.030153] 7b40: ffff000008f79000 ffff000008c4cd88 ffff80003d847bf0 ffff000008101778 [ 0.030402] 7b60: 0000000000000030 0000000000000000 ffff000008e97000 00000000024000c0 [ 0.030647] 7b80: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 0.030895] 7ba0: 0000000000000035 ffff80003d870000 000000000000017f 0000000000000000 [ 0.031144] 7bc0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000005 ffff000008f79c84 6120757063726570 [ 0.031394] 7be0: 6f697461636f6c6c ffff80003d847a40 0000000000000042 0000000000000006 [ 0.031643] 7c00: 0000000000000041 ffff000008f79c4d ffff000088f79c3f 0000000000000006 [ 0.031877] 7c20: 00000000deadbeef 0000000000000a3f [ 0.032051] [<ffff00000818e678>] pcpu_alloc+0x88/0x6c0 [ 0.032229] [<ffff00000818ece8>] __alloc_percpu+0x18/0x20 [ 0.032409] [<ffff000008d9606c>] xen_guest_init+0x174/0x2f4 [ 0.032591] [<ffff0000080830f8>] do_one_initcall+0x38/0x130 [ 0.032783] [<ffff000008d90c34>] kernel_init_freeable+0xe0/0x248 [ 0.032995] [<ffff00000899a890>] kernel_init+0x10/0x100 [ 0.033172] [<ffff000008082ec0>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50 Reported-by:
Wei Chen <wei.chen@arm.com> Link: https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/11/28/669Signed-off-by:
Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org> Reviewed-by:
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Alex Deucher authored
[ Upstream commit 8729675c ] New variant. Signed-off-by:
Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Michel Dänzer authored
[ Upstream commit 6b16cf77 ] Fixes hangs in that case under some circumstances. v2: * Only use non-0 x/yorigin if the cursor is (partially) outside of the top/left edge of the total surface with AVIVO/DCE Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1000433 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Michel Dänzer <michel.daenzer@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> (v1) Signed-off-by:
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Michel Dänzer authored
[ Upstream commit 4349bd77 ] We were storing viewport relative coordinates for AVIVO/DCE display engines. However, radeon_crtc_cursor_set2 and radeon_cursor_reset pass radeon_crtc->cursor_x/y as the x/y parameters of radeon_cursor_move_locked, which would break if the CRTC isn't located at (0, 0). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Michel Dänzer authored
[ Upstream commit dcab0fa6 ] The cursor size also affects the register programming. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Pavel Shilovsky authored
[ Upstream commit 53e0e11e ] We can not unlock/lock cifs_tcp_ses_lock while walking through ses and tcon lists because it can corrupt list iterator pointers and a tcon structure can be released if we don't hold an extra reference. Fix it by moving a reconnect process to a separate delayed work and acquiring a reference to every tcon that needs to be reconnected. Also do not send an echo request on newly established connections. CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by:
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Pavel Shilovsky authored
[ Upstream commit e3d240e9 ] If maxBuf is not 0 but less than a size of SMB2 lock structure we can end up with a memory corruption. Cc: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Pavel Shilovsky authored
[ Upstream commit 4772c795 ] Cc: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Acked-by:
Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Nathaniel Quillin authored
[ Upstream commit 30121604 ] Add device-id entry for GW Instek AFG-125, which has a byte swapped bInterfaceSubClass (0x20). Signed-off-by:
Nathaniel Quillin <ndq@google.com> Acked-by:
Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Adrian Hunter authored
[ Upstream commit 61e53bd0 ] Clearing the tuning bits should reset the tuning circuit. However there is more to do. Reset the command and data lines for good measure, and then for eMMC ensure the card is not still trying to process a tuning command by sending a stop command. Note the JEDEC eMMC specification says the stop command (CMD12) can be used to stop a tuning command (CMD21) whereas the SD specification is silent on the subject with respect to the SD tuning command (CMD19). Considering that CMD12 is not a valid SDIO command, the stop command is sent only when the tuning command is CMD21 i.e. for eMMC. That addresses cases seen so far which have been on eMMC. Note that this replaces the commit fe5fb2e3 ("mmc: sdhci: Reset cmd and data circuits after tuning failure") which is being reverted for v4.9+. Signed-off-by:
Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Tested-by:
Dan O'Donovan <dan@emutex.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
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