- 29 Sep, 2018 40 commits
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Steve Muckle authored
commit d0cdb3ce upstream. When a task which previously ran on a given CPU is remotely queued to wake up on that same CPU, there is a period where the task's state is TASK_WAKING and its vruntime is not normalized. This is not accounted for in vruntime_normalized() which will cause an error in the task's vruntime if it is switched from the fair class during this time. For example if it is boosted to RT priority via rt_mutex_setprio(), rq->min_vruntime will not be subtracted from the task's vruntime but it will be added again when the task returns to the fair class. The task's vruntime will have been erroneously doubled and the effective priority of the task will be reduced. Note this will also lead to inflation of all vruntimes since the doubled vruntime value will become the rq's min_vruntime when other tasks leave the rq. This leads to repeated doubling of the vruntime and priority penalty. Fix this by recognizing a WAKING task's vruntime as normalized only if sched_remote_wakeup is true. This indicates a migration, in which case the vruntime would have been normalized in migrate_task_rq_fair(). Based on a similar patch from John Dias <joaodias@google.com>. Suggested-by:
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Tested-by:
Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
Steve Muckle <smuckle@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Eric Biggers authored
commit 338affb5 upstream. When in effect, add "test_dummy_encryption" to _ext4_show_options() so that it is shown in /proc/mounts and other relevant procfs files. Signed-off-by:
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Li Dongyang authored
commit fe18d649 upstream. Marking mmp bh dirty before writing it will make writeback pick up mmp block later and submit a write, we don't want the duplicate write as kmmpd thread should have full control of reading and writing the mmp block. Another reason is we will also have random I/O error on the writeback request when blk integrity is enabled, because kmmpd could modify the content of the mmp block(e.g. setting new seq and time) while the mmp block is under I/O requested by writeback. Signed-off-by:
Li Dongyang <dongyangli@ddn.com> Signed-off-by:
Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Theodore Ts'o authored
commit 5f8c1093 upstream. An online resize of a file system with the bigalloc feature enabled and a 1k block size would be refused since ext4_resize_begin() did not understand s_first_data_block is 0 for all bigalloc file systems, even when the block size is 1k. Signed-off-by:
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Theodore Ts'o authored
commit f0a459de upstream. Avoid growing the file system to an extent so that the last block group is too small to hold all of the metadata that must be stored in the block group. This problem can be triggered with the following reproducer: umount /mnt mke2fs -F -m0 -b 4096 -t ext4 -O resize_inode,^has_journal \ -E resize=1073741824 /tmp/foo.img 128M mount /tmp/foo.img /mnt truncate --size 1708M /tmp/foo.img resize2fs /dev/loop0 295400 umount /mnt e2fsck -fy /tmp/foo.img Reported-by:
Torsten Hilbrich <torsten.hilbrich@secunet.com> Signed-off-by:
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Theodore Ts'o authored
commit 4274f516 upstream. When mounting the superblock, ext4_fill_super() calculates the free blocks and free inodes and stores them in the superblock. It's not strictly necessary, since we don't use them any more, but it's nice to keep them roughly aligned to reality. Since it's not critical for file system correctness, the code doesn't call ext4_commit_super(). The problem is that it's in ext4_commit_super() that we recalculate the superblock checksum. So if we're not going to call ext4_commit_super(), we need to call ext4_superblock_csum_set() to make sure the superblock checksum is consistent. Most of the time, this doesn't matter, since we end up calling ext4_commit_super() very soon thereafter, and definitely by the time the file system is unmounted. However, it doesn't work in this sequence: mke2fs -Fq -t ext4 /dev/vdc 128M mount /dev/vdc /vdc cp xfstests/git-versions /vdc godown /vdc umount /vdc mount /dev/vdc tune2fs -l /dev/vdc With this commit, the "tune2fs -l" no longer fails. Reported-by:
Chengguang Xu <cgxu519@gmx.com> Signed-off-by:
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Theodore Ts'o authored
commit bcd8e91f upstream. A maliciously crafted file system can cause an overflow when the results of a 64-bit calculation is stored into a 32-bit length parameter. https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200623Signed-off-by:
Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Theodore Ts'o authored
commit 4d982e25 upstream. A specially crafted file system can trick empty_inline_dir() into reading past the last valid entry in a inline directory, and then run into the end of xattr marker. This will trigger a divide by zero fault. Fix this by using the size of the inline directory instead of dir->i_size. Also clean up error reporting in __ext4_check_dir_entry so that the message is clearer and more understandable --- and avoids the division by zero trap if the size passed in is zero. (I'm not sure why we coded it that way in the first place; printing offset % size is actually more confusing and less useful.) https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200933Signed-off-by:
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Theodore Ts'o authored
commit b50282f3 upstream. If the destination of the rename(2) system call exists, the inode's link count (i_nlinks) must be non-zero. If it is, the inode can end up on the orphan list prematurely, leading to all sorts of hilarity, including a use-after-free. https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200931Signed-off-by:
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Gustavo A. R. Silva authored
commit e97267cb upstream. vsa.console is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:711 vt_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'vc_cons' [r] Fix this by sanitizing vsa.console before using it to index vc_cons Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Reviewed-by:
Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Alex Deucher authored
commit 30f3984e upstream. Add new pci id. Reviewed-by:
Rex Zhu <Rex.Zhu@amd.com> Signed-off-by:
Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Emil Lundmark authored
commit fcb74da1 upstream. This fixes a NULL pointer dereference that can happen if the UDL driver is unloaded before the framebuffer is initialized. This can happen e.g. if the USB device is unplugged right after it was plugged in. As explained by Stéphane Marchesin: It happens when fbdev is disabled (which is the case for Chrome OS). Even though intialization of the fbdev part is optional (it's done in udlfb_create which is the callback for fb_probe()), the teardown isn't optional (udl_driver_unload -> udl_fbdev_cleanup -> udl_fbdev_destroy). Note that udl_fbdev_cleanup *tries* to be conditional (you can see it does if (!udl->fbdev)) but that doesn't work, because udl->fbdev is always set during udl_fbdev_init. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Suggested-by:
Sean Paul <seanpaul@chromium.org> Reviewed-by:
Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Signed-off-by:
Emil Lundmark <lndmrk@chromium.org> Signed-off-by:
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Boris Brezillon authored
commit 658d8cbd upstream. When there's no scaling requested ->is_unity should be true no matter the format. Also, when no scaling is requested and we have a multi-planar YUV format, we should leave ->y_scaling[0] to VC4_SCALING_NONE and only set ->x_scaling[0] to VC4_SCALING_PPF. Doing this fixes an hardly visible artifact (seen when using modetest and a rather big overlay plane in YUV420). Fixes: fc04023f ("drm/vc4: Add support for YUV planes.") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@bootlin.com> Reviewed-by:
Eric Anholt <eric@anholt.net> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20180725122907.13702-1-boris.brezillon@bootlin.comSigned-off-by:
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Lyude Paul authored
commit 79e765ad upstream. On most systems with ACPI hotplugging support, it seems that we always receive a hotplug event once we re-enable EC interrupts even if the GPU hasn't even been resumed yet. This can cause problems since even though we schedule hpd_work to handle connector reprobing for us, hpd_work synchronizes on pm_runtime_get_sync() to wait until the device is ready to perform reprobing. Since runtime suspend/resume callbacks are disabled before the PM core calls ->suspend(), any calls to pm_runtime_get_sync() during this period will grab a runtime PM ref and return immediately with -EACCES. Because we schedule hpd_work from our ACPI HPD handler, and hpd_work synchronizes on pm_runtime_get_sync(), this causes us to launch a connector reprobe immediately even if the GPU isn't actually resumed just yet. This causes various warnings in dmesg and occasionally, also prevents some displays connected to the dedicated GPU from coming back up after suspend. Example: usb 1-4: USB disconnect, device number 14 usb 1-4.1: USB disconnect, device number 15 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 838 at drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/include/nvkm/subdev/i2c.h:170 nouveau_dp_detect+0x17e/0x370 [nouveau] CPU: 0 PID: 838 Comm: kworker/0:6 Not tainted 4.17.14-201.Lyude.bz1477182.V3.fc28.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: LENOVO 20EQS64N00/20EQS64N00, BIOS N1EET77W (1.50 ) 03/28/2018 Workqueue: events nouveau_display_hpd_work [nouveau] RIP: 0010:nouveau_dp_detect+0x17e/0x370 [nouveau] RSP: 0018:ffffa15143933cf0 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8cb4f656c400 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffffa1514500e4e4 RSI: ffffa1514500e4e4 RDI: 0000000001009002 RBP: ffff8cb4f4a8a800 R08: ffffa15143933cfd R09: ffffa15143933cfc R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8cb4fb57a000 R13: ffff8cb4fb57a000 R14: ffff8cb4f4a8f800 R15: ffff8cb4f656c418 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8cb51f400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f78ec938000 CR3: 000000073720a003 CR4: 00000000003606f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30 nouveau_connector_detect+0x2ce/0x520 [nouveau] ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30 ? ww_mutex_lock+0x12/0x40 drm_helper_probe_detect_ctx+0x8b/0xe0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_helper_hpd_irq_event+0xa8/0x120 [drm_kms_helper] nouveau_display_hpd_work+0x2a/0x60 [nouveau] process_one_work+0x187/0x340 worker_thread+0x2e/0x380 ? pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0xd0/0xd0 kthread+0x112/0x130 ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 Code: 4c 8d 44 24 0d b9 00 05 00 00 48 89 ef ba 09 00 00 00 be 01 00 00 00 e8 e1 09 f8 ff 85 c0 0f 85 b2 01 00 00 80 7c 24 0c 03 74 02 <0f> 0b 48 89 ef e8 b8 07 f8 ff f6 05 51 1b c8 ff 02 0f 84 72 ff ---[ end trace 55d811b38fc8e71a ]--- So, to fix this we attempt to grab a runtime PM reference in the ACPI handler itself asynchronously. If the GPU is already awake (it will have normal hotplugging at this point) or runtime PM callbacks are currently disabled on the device, we drop our reference without updating the autosuspend delay. We only schedule connector reprobes when we successfully managed to queue up a resume request with our asynchronous PM ref. This also has the added benefit of preventing redundant connector reprobes from ACPI while the GPU is runtime resumed! Signed-off-by:
Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Karol Herbst <kherbst@redhat.com> Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1477182#c41Signed-off-by:
Ben Skeggs <bskeggs@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Lyude Paul authored
commit 6833fb1e upstream. It's true we can't resume the device from poll workers in nouveau_connector_detect(). We can however, prevent the autosuspend timer from elapsing immediately if it hasn't already without risking any sort of deadlock with the runtime suspend/resume operations. So do that instead of entirely avoiding grabbing a power reference. Signed-off-by:
Karol Herbst <kherbst@redhat.com> Acked-by:
Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Signed-off-by:
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Lyude Paul authored
commit d77ef138 upstream. Turns out this part is my fault for not noticing when reviewing 9a2eba33 ("drm/nouveau: Fix drm poll_helper handling"). Currently we call drm_kms_helper_poll_enable() from nouveau_display_hpd_work(). This makes basically no sense however, because that means we're calling drm_kms_helper_poll_enable() every time we schedule the hotplug detection work. This is also against the advice mentioned in drm_kms_helper_poll_enable()'s documentation: Note that calls to enable and disable polling must be strictly ordered, which is automatically the case when they're only call from suspend/resume callbacks. Of course, hotplugs can't really be ordered. They could even happen immediately after we called drm_kms_helper_poll_disable() in nouveau_display_fini(), which can lead to all sorts of issues. Additionally; enabling polling /after/ we call drm_helper_hpd_irq_event() could also mean that we'd miss a hotplug event anyway, since drm_helper_hpd_irq_event() wouldn't bother trying to probe connectors so long as polling is disabled. So; simply move this back into nouveau_display_init() again. The race condition that both of these patches attempted to work around has already been fixed properly in d61a5c10 ("drm/nouveau: Fix deadlock on runtime suspend") Fixes: 9a2eba33 ("drm/nouveau: Fix drm poll_helper handling") Signed-off-by:
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Lyude Paul authored
commit 2f7ca781 upstream. Currently, there's nothing in nouveau that actually cancels this work struct. So, cancel it on suspend/unload. Otherwise, if we're unlucky enough hpd_work might try to keep running up until the system is suspended. Signed-off-by:
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Lyude Paul authored
commit 3e1a1275 upstream. When we disable hotplugging on the GPU, we need to be able to synchronize with each connector's hotplug interrupt handler before the interrupt is finally disabled. This can be a problem however, since nouveau_connector_detect() currently grabs a runtime power reference when handling connector probing. This will deadlock the runtime suspend handler like so: [ 861.480896] INFO: task kworker/0:2:61 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 861.483290] Tainted: G O 4.18.0-rc6Lyude-Test+ #1 [ 861.485158] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 861.486332] kworker/0:2 D 0 61 2 0x80000000 [ 861.487044] Workqueue: events nouveau_display_hpd_work [nouveau] [ 861.487737] Call Trace: [ 861.488394] __schedule+0x322/0xaf0 [ 861.489070] schedule+0x33/0x90 [ 861.489744] rpm_resume+0x19c/0x850 [ 861.490392] ? finish_wait+0x90/0x90 [ 861.491068] __pm_runtime_resume+0x4e/0x90 [ 861.491753] nouveau_display_hpd_work+0x22/0x60 [nouveau] [ 861.492416] process_one_work+0x231/0x620 [ 861.493068] worker_thread+0x44/0x3a0 [ 861.493722] kthread+0x12b/0x150 [ 861.494342] ? wq_pool_ids_show+0x140/0x140 [ 861.494991] ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70 [ 861.495648] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [ 861.496304] INFO: task kworker/6:2:320 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 861.496968] Tainted: G O 4.18.0-rc6Lyude-Test+ #1 [ 861.497654] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 861.498341] kworker/6:2 D 0 320 2 0x80000080 [ 861.499045] Workqueue: pm pm_runtime_work [ 861.499739] Call Trace: [ 861.500428] __schedule+0x322/0xaf0 [ 861.501134] ? wait_for_completion+0x104/0x190 [ 861.501851] schedule+0x33/0x90 [ 861.502564] schedule_timeout+0x3a5/0x590 [ 861.503284] ? mark_held_locks+0x58/0x80 [ 861.503988] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x2c/0x40 [ 861.504710] ? wait_for_completion+0x104/0x190 [ 861.505417] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xf4/0x190 [ 861.506136] ? wait_for_completion+0x104/0x190 [ 861.506845] wait_for_completion+0x12c/0x190 [ 861.507555] ? wake_up_q+0x80/0x80 [ 861.508268] flush_work+0x1c9/0x280 [ 861.508990] ? flush_workqueue_prep_pwqs+0x1b0/0x1b0 [ 861.509735] nvif_notify_put+0xb1/0xc0 [nouveau] [ 861.510482] nouveau_display_fini+0xbd/0x170 [nouveau] [ 861.511241] nouveau_display_suspend+0x67/0x120 [nouveau] [ 861.511969] nouveau_do_suspend+0x5e/0x2d0 [nouveau] [ 861.512715] nouveau_pmops_runtime_suspend+0x47/0xb0 [nouveau] [ 861.513435] pci_pm_runtime_suspend+0x6b/0x180 [ 861.514165] ? pci_has_legacy_pm_support+0x70/0x70 [ 861.514897] __rpm_callback+0x7a/0x1d0 [ 861.515618] ? pci_has_legacy_pm_support+0x70/0x70 [ 861.516313] rpm_callback+0x24/0x80 [ 861.517027] ? pci_has_legacy_pm_support+0x70/0x70 [ 861.517741] rpm_suspend+0x142/0x6b0 [ 861.518449] pm_runtime_work+0x97/0xc0 [ 861.519144] process_one_work+0x231/0x620 [ 861.519831] worker_thread+0x44/0x3a0 [ 861.520522] kthread+0x12b/0x150 [ 861.521220] ? wq_pool_ids_show+0x140/0x140 [ 861.521925] ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70 [ 861.522622] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [ 861.523299] INFO: task kworker/6:0:1329 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 861.523977] Tainted: G O 4.18.0-rc6Lyude-Test+ #1 [ 861.524644] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 861.525349] kworker/6:0 D 0 1329 2 0x80000000 [ 861.526073] Workqueue: events nvif_notify_work [nouveau] [ 861.526751] Call Trace: [ 861.527411] __schedule+0x322/0xaf0 [ 861.528089] schedule+0x33/0x90 [ 861.528758] rpm_resume+0x19c/0x850 [ 861.529399] ? finish_wait+0x90/0x90 [ 861.530073] __pm_runtime_resume+0x4e/0x90 [ 861.530798] nouveau_connector_detect+0x7e/0x510 [nouveau] [ 861.531459] ? ww_mutex_lock+0x47/0x80 [ 861.532097] ? ww_mutex_lock+0x47/0x80 [ 861.532819] ? drm_modeset_lock+0x88/0x130 [drm] [ 861.533481] drm_helper_probe_detect_ctx+0xa0/0x100 [drm_kms_helper] [ 861.534127] drm_helper_hpd_irq_event+0xa4/0x120 [drm_kms_helper] [ 861.534940] nouveau_connector_hotplug+0x98/0x120 [nouveau] [ 861.535556] nvif_notify_work+0x2d/0xb0 [nouveau] [ 861.536221] process_one_work+0x231/0x620 [ 861.536994] worker_thread+0x44/0x3a0 [ 861.537757] kthread+0x12b/0x150 [ 861.538463] ? wq_pool_ids_show+0x140/0x140 [ 861.539102] ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70 [ 861.539815] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [ 861.540521] Showing all locks held in the system: [ 861.541696] 2 locks held by kworker/0:2/61: [ 861.542406] #0: 000000002dbf8af5 ((wq_completion)"events"){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b3/0x620 [ 861.543071] #1: 0000000076868126 ((work_completion)(&drm->hpd_work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b3/0x620 [ 861.543814] 1 lock held by khungtaskd/64: [ 861.544535] #0: 0000000059db4b53 (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x23/0x185 [ 861.545160] 3 locks held by kworker/6:2/320: [ 861.545896] #0: 00000000d9e1bc59 ((wq_completion)"pm"){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b3/0x620 [ 861.546702] #1: 00000000c9f92d84 ((work_completion)(&dev->power.work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b3/0x620 [ 861.547443] #2: 000000004afc5de1 (drm_connector_list_iter){.+.+}, at: nouveau_display_fini+0x96/0x170 [nouveau] [ 861.548146] 1 lock held by dmesg/983: [ 861.548889] 2 locks held by zsh/1250: [ 861.549605] #0: 00000000348e3cf6 (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}, at: ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 [ 861.550393] #1: 000000007009a7a8 (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: n_tty_read+0xc1/0x870 [ 861.551122] 6 locks held by kworker/6:0/1329: [ 861.551957] #0: 000000002dbf8af5 ((wq_completion)"events"){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b3/0x620 [ 861.552765] #1: 00000000ddb499ad ((work_completion)(¬ify->work)#2){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b3/0x620 [ 861.553582] #2: 000000006e013cbe (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.}, at: drm_helper_hpd_irq_event+0x6c/0x120 [drm_kms_helper] [ 861.554357] #3: 000000004afc5de1 (drm_connector_list_iter){.+.+}, at: drm_helper_hpd_irq_event+0x78/0x120 [drm_kms_helper] [ 861.555227] #4: 0000000044f294d9 (crtc_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}, at: drm_helper_probe_detect_ctx+0x3d/0x100 [drm_kms_helper] [ 861.556133] #5: 00000000db193642 (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}, at: drm_modeset_lock+0x4b/0x130 [drm] [ 861.557864] ============================================= [ 861.559507] NMI backtrace for cpu 2 [ 861.560363] CPU: 2 PID: 64 Comm: khungtaskd Tainted: G O 4.18.0-rc6Lyude-Test+ #1 [ 861.561197] Hardware name: LENOVO 20EQS64N0B/20EQS64N0B, BIOS N1EET78W (1.51 ) 05/18/2018 [ 861.561948] Call Trace: [ 861.562757] dump_stack+0x8e/0xd3 [ 861.563516] nmi_cpu_backtrace.cold.3+0x14/0x5a [ 861.564269] ? lapic_can_unplug_cpu.cold.27+0x42/0x42 [ 861.565029] nmi_trigger_cpumask_backtrace+0xa1/0xae [ 861.565789] arch_trigger_cpumask_backtrace+0x19/0x20 [ 861.566558] watchdog+0x316/0x580 [ 861.567355] kthread+0x12b/0x150 [ 861.568114] ? reset_hung_task_detector+0x20/0x20 [ 861.568863] ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70 [ 861.569598] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [ 861.570370] Sending NMI from CPU 2 to CPUs 0-1,3-7: [ 861.571426] NMI backtrace for cpu 6 skipped: idling at intel_idle+0x7f/0x120 [ 861.571429] NMI backtrace for cpu 7 skipped: idling at intel_idle+0x7f/0x120 [ 861.571432] NMI backtrace for cpu 3 skipped: idling at intel_idle+0x7f/0x120 [ 861.571464] NMI backtrace for cpu 5 skipped: idling at intel_idle+0x7f/0x120 [ 861.571467] NMI backtrace for cpu 0 skipped: idling at intel_idle+0x7f/0x120 [ 861.571469] NMI backtrace for cpu 4 skipped: idling at intel_idle+0x7f/0x120 [ 861.571472] NMI backtrace for cpu 1 skipped: idling at intel_idle+0x7f/0x120 [ 861.572428] Kernel panic - not syncing: hung_task: blocked tasks So: fix this by making it so that normal hotplug handling /only/ happens so long as the GPU is currently awake without any pending runtime PM requests. In the event that a hotplug occurs while the device is suspending or resuming, we can simply defer our response until the GPU is fully runtime resumed again. Changes since v4: - Use a new trick I came up with using pm_runtime_get() instead of the hackish junk we had before Signed-off-by:
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Junxiao Bi authored
commit 234b69e3 upstream. While reading block, it is possible that io error return due to underlying storage issue, in this case, BH_NeedsValidate was left in the buffer head. Then when reading the very block next time, if it was already linked into journal, that will trigger the following panic. [203748.702517] kernel BUG at fs/ocfs2/buffer_head_io.c:342! [203748.702533] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP [203748.702561] Modules linked in: ocfs2 ocfs2_dlmfs ocfs2_stack_o2cb ocfs2_dlm ocfs2_nodemanager ocfs2_stackglue configfs sunrpc dm_switch dm_queue_length dm_multipath bonding be2iscsi iscsi_boot_sysfs bnx2i cnic uio cxgb4i iw_cxgb4 cxgb4 cxgb3i libcxgbi iw_cxgb3 cxgb3 mdio ib_iser rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm ib_sa ib_mad ib_core ib_addr ipv6 iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ipmi_devintf iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support dcdbas ipmi_ssif i2c_core ipmi_si ipmi_msghandler acpi_pad pcspkr sb_edac edac_core lpc_ich mfd_core shpchp sg tg3 ptp pps_core ext4 jbd2 mbcache2 sr_mod cdrom sd_mod ahci libahci megaraid_sas wmi dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [203748.703024] CPU: 7 PID: 38369 Comm: touch Not tainted 4.1.12-124.18.6.el6uek.x86_64 #2 [203748.703045] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R620/0PXXHP, BIOS 2.5.2 01/28/2015 [203748.703067] task: ffff880768139c00 ti: ffff88006ff48000 task.ti: ffff88006ff48000 [203748.703088] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa05e9f09>] [<ffffffffa05e9f09>] ocfs2_read_blocks+0x669/0x7f0 [ocfs2] [203748.703130] RSP: 0018:ffff88006ff4b818 EFLAGS: 00010206 [203748.703389] RAX: 0000000008620029 RBX: ffff88006ff4b910 RCX: 0000000000000000 [203748.703885] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000023079fe [203748.704382] RBP: ffff88006ff4b8d8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8807578c25b0 [203748.704877] R10: 000000000f637376 R11: 000000003030322e R12: 0000000000000000 [203748.705373] R13: ffff88006ff4b910 R14: ffff880732fe38f0 R15: 0000000000000000 [203748.705871] FS: 00007f401992c700(0000) GS:ffff880bfebc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [203748.706370] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [203748.706627] CR2: 00007f4019252440 CR3: 00000000a621e000 CR4: 0000000000060670 [203748.707124] Stack: [203748.707371] ffff88006ff4b828 ffffffffa0609f52 ffff88006ff4b838 0000000000000001 [203748.707885] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff880bf67c3800 ffffffffa05eca00 [203748.708399] 00000000023079ff ffffffff81c58b80 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [203748.708915] Call Trace: [203748.709175] [<ffffffffa0609f52>] ? ocfs2_inode_cache_io_unlock+0x12/0x20 [ocfs2] [203748.709680] [<ffffffffa05eca00>] ? ocfs2_empty_dir_filldir+0x80/0x80 [ocfs2] [203748.710185] [<ffffffffa05ec0cb>] ocfs2_read_dir_block_direct+0x3b/0x200 [ocfs2] [203748.710691] [<ffffffffa05f0fbf>] ocfs2_prepare_dx_dir_for_insert.isra.57+0x19f/0xf60 [ocfs2] [203748.711204] [<ffffffffa065660f>] ? ocfs2_metadata_cache_io_unlock+0x1f/0x30 [ocfs2] [203748.711716] [<ffffffffa05f4f3a>] ocfs2_prepare_dir_for_insert+0x13a/0x890 [ocfs2] [203748.712227] [<ffffffffa05f442e>] ? ocfs2_check_dir_for_entry+0x8e/0x140 [ocfs2] [203748.712737] [<ffffffffa061b2f2>] ocfs2_mknod+0x4b2/0x1370 [ocfs2] [203748.713003] [<ffffffffa061c385>] ocfs2_create+0x65/0x170 [ocfs2] [203748.713263] [<ffffffff8121714b>] vfs_create+0xdb/0x150 [203748.713518] [<ffffffff8121b225>] do_last+0x815/0x1210 [203748.713772] [<ffffffff812192e9>] ? path_init+0xb9/0x450 [203748.714123] [<ffffffff8121bca0>] path_openat+0x80/0x600 [203748.714378] [<ffffffff811bcd45>] ? handle_pte_fault+0xd15/0x1620 [203748.714634] [<ffffffff8121d7ba>] do_filp_open+0x3a/0xb0 [203748.714888] [<ffffffff8122a767>] ? __alloc_fd+0xa7/0x130 [203748.715143] [<ffffffff81209ffc>] do_sys_open+0x12c/0x220 [203748.715403] [<ffffffff81026ddb>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase1+0x11b/0x180 [203748.715668] [<ffffffff816f0c9f>] ? system_call_after_swapgs+0xe9/0x190 [203748.715928] [<ffffffff8120a10e>] SyS_open+0x1e/0x20 [203748.716184] [<ffffffff816f0d5e>] system_call_fastpath+0x18/0xd7 [203748.716440] Code: 00 00 48 8b 7b 08 48 83 c3 10 45 89 f8 44 89 e1 44 89 f2 4c 89 ee e8 07 06 11 e1 48 8b 03 48 85 c0 75 df 8b 5d c8 e9 4d fa ff ff <0f> 0b 48 8b 7d a0 e8 dc c6 06 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 [203748.717505] RIP [<ffffffffa05e9f09>] ocfs2_read_blocks+0x669/0x7f0 [ocfs2] [203748.717775] RSP <ffff88006ff4b818> Joesph ever reported a similar panic. Link: https://oss.oracle.com/pipermail/ocfs2-devel/2013-May/008931.html Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180912063207.29484-1-junxiao.bi@oracle.comSigned-off-by:
Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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Richard Weinberger authored
commit f061c1cc upstream. This reverts commit 11a6fc3d. UBIFS wants to assert that xattr operations are only issued on files with positive link count. The said patch made this operations return -ENOENT for unlinked files such that the asserts will no longer trigger. This was wrong since xattr operations are perfectly fine on unlinked files. Instead the assertions need to be fixed/removed. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Fixes: 11a6fc3d ("ubifs: xattr: Don't operate on deleted inodes") Reported-by:
Koen Vandeputte <koen.vandeputte@ncentric.com> Tested-by:
Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au> Signed-off-by:
Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Signed-off-by:
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Vincent Pelletier authored
commit 8c39e269 upstream. Signed-off-by:
Vincent Pelletier <plr.vincent@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
Mike Christie <mchristi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
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Vincent Pelletier authored
commit 18164943 upstream. This change has the following effects, in order of descreasing importance: 1) Prevent a stack buffer overflow 2) Do not append an unnecessary NULL to an anyway binary buffer, which is writing one byte past client_digest when caller is: chap_string_to_hex(client_digest, chap_r, strlen(chap_r)); The latter was found by KASAN (see below) when input value hes expected size (32 hex chars), and further analysis revealed a stack buffer overflow can happen when network-received value is longer, allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to smash up to 17 bytes after destination buffer (16 bytes attacker-controlled and one null). As switching to hex2bin requires specifying destination buffer length, and does not internally append any null, it solves both issues. This addresses CVE-2018-14633. Beyond this: - Validate received value length and check hex2bin accepted the input, to log this rejection reason instead of just failing authentication. - Only log received CHAP_R and CHAP_C values once they passed sanity checks. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in chap_string_to_hex+0x32/0x60 [iscsi_target_mod] Write of size 1 at addr ffff8801090ef7c8 by task kworker/0:0/1021 CPU: 0 PID: 1021 Comm: kworker/0:0 Tainted: G O 4.17.8kasan.sess.connops+ #2 Hardware name: To be filled by O.E.M. To be filled by O.E.M./Aptio CRB, BIOS 5.6.5 05/19/2014 Workqueue: events iscsi_target_do_login_rx [iscsi_target_mod] Call Trace: dump_stack+0x71/0xac print_address_description+0x65/0x22e ? chap_string_to_hex+0x32/0x60 [iscsi_target_mod] kasan_report.cold.6+0x241/0x2fd chap_string_to_hex+0x32/0x60 [iscsi_target_mod] chap_server_compute_md5.isra.2+0x2cb/0x860 [iscsi_target_mod] ? chap_binaryhex_to_asciihex.constprop.5+0x50/0x50 [iscsi_target_mod] ? ftrace_caller_op_ptr+0xe/0xe ? __orc_find+0x6f/0xc0 ? unwind_next_frame+0x231/0x850 ? kthread+0x1a0/0x1c0 ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 ? iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod] ? deref_stack_reg+0xd0/0xd0 ? iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod] ? is_module_text_address+0xa/0x11 ? kernel_text_address+0x4c/0x110 ? __save_stack_trace+0x82/0x100 ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 ? save_stack+0x8c/0xb0 ? 0xffffffffc1660000 ? iscsi_target_do_login+0x155/0x8d0 [iscsi_target_mod] ? iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod] ? process_one_work+0x35c/0x640 ? worker_thread+0x66/0x5d0 ? kthread+0x1a0/0x1c0 ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 ? iscsi_update_param_value+0x80/0x80 [iscsi_target_mod] ? iscsit_release_cmd+0x170/0x170 [iscsi_target_mod] chap_main_loop+0x172/0x570 [iscsi_target_mod] ? chap_server_compute_md5.isra.2+0x860/0x860 [iscsi_target_mod] ? rx_data+0xd6/0x120 [iscsi_target_mod] ? iscsit_print_session_params+0xd0/0xd0 [iscsi_target_mod] ? cyc2ns_read_begin.part.2+0x90/0x90 ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x25/0x50 ? memcmp+0x45/0x70 iscsi_target_do_login+0x875/0x8d0 [iscsi_target_mod] ? iscsi_target_check_first_request.isra.5+0x1a0/0x1a0 [iscsi_target_mod] ? del_timer+0xe0/0xe0 ? memset+0x1f/0x40 ? flush_sigqueue+0x29/0xd0 iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod] ? iscsi_target_nego_release+0x80/0x80 [iscsi_target_mod] ? iscsi_target_restore_sock_callbacks+0x130/0x130 [iscsi_target_mod] process_one_work+0x35c/0x640 worker_thread+0x66/0x5d0 ? flush_rcu_work+0x40/0x40 kthread+0x1a0/0x1c0 ? kthread_bind+0x30/0x30 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea0004243bc0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 flags: 0x17fffc000000000() raw: 017fffc000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff raw: ffffea0004243c20 ffffea0004243ba0 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8801090ef680: f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 01 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 ffff8801090ef700: f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 02 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 >ffff8801090ef780: 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 ^ ffff8801090ef800: 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 02 f2 f2 f2 f2 ffff8801090ef880: f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 ================================================================== Signed-off-by:
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Lubomir Rintel authored
commit 8c0f9f5b upstream. This changes UAPI, breaking iwd and libell: ell/key.c: In function 'kernel_dh_compute': ell/key.c:205:38: error: 'struct keyctl_dh_params' has no member named 'private'; did you mean 'dh_private'? struct keyctl_dh_params params = { .private = private, ^~~~~~~ dh_private This reverts commit 8a2336e5. Fixes: 8a2336e5 ("uapi/linux/keyctl.h: don't use C++ reserved keyword as a struct member name") Signed-off-by:
Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk> Signed-off-by:
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> cc: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com> cc: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> cc: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com> cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by:
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
This reverts commit 1ed3a930 which is commit fe782aff upstream Rafael reports that this patch causes problems: > -rc2 looks good. There is a problem on dragonboard during boot that was > introduced in v4.14.71 that I didn't notice last week. We'll bisect it > and report back later this week. dragonboard on the other branches (4.9, > 4.18, mainline) looks fine. As Dan pointed out, during validation, we have bisected this issue on a dragonboard 410c (can't find root device) to the following commit for v4.14: [1ed3a930] rpmsg: core: add support to power domains for devices There is an on-going discussion on "[PATCH] rpmsg: core: add support to power domains for devices" about this patch having other dependencies and breaking something else on v4.14 as well. so drop it. Reported-by:
Rafael Tinoco <rafael.tinoco@linaro.org> Cc: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org> Cc: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org> Cc: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by:
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Joel Fernandes (Google) authored
commit b45d71fb upstream. Directories and inodes don't necessarily need to be in the same lockdep class. For ex, hugetlbfs splits them out too to prevent false positives in lockdep. Annotate correctly after new inode creation. If its a directory inode, it will be put into a different class. This should fix a lockdep splat reported by syzbot: > ====================================================== > WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected > 4.18.0-rc8-next-20180810+ #36 Not tainted > ------------------------------------------------------ > syz-executor900/4483 is trying to acquire lock: > 00000000d2bfc8fe (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9){++++}, at: inode_lock > include/linux/fs.h:765 [inline] > 00000000d2bfc8fe (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9){++++}, at: > shmem_fallocate+0x18b/0x12e0 mm/shmem.c:2602 > > but task is already holding lock: > 0000000025208078 (ashmem_mutex){+.+.}, at: ashmem_shrink_scan+0xb4/0x630 > drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c:448 > > which lock already depends on the new lock. > > -> #2 (ashmem_mutex){+.+.}: > __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:925 [inline] > __mutex_lock+0x171/0x1700 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1073 > mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1088 > ashmem_mmap+0x55/0x520 drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c:361 > call_mmap include/linux/fs.h:1844 [inline] > mmap_region+0xf27/0x1c50 mm/mmap.c:1762 > do_mmap+0xa10/0x1220 mm/mmap.c:1535 > do_mmap_pgoff include/linux/mm.h:2298 [inline] > vm_mmap_pgoff+0x213/0x2c0 mm/util.c:357 > ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x4da/0x660 mm/mmap.c:1585 > __do_sys_mmap arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:100 [inline] > __se_sys_mmap arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:91 [inline] > __x64_sys_mmap+0xe9/0x1b0 arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:91 > do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe > > -> #1 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}: > __might_fault+0x155/0x1e0 mm/memory.c:4568 > _copy_to_user+0x30/0x110 lib/usercopy.c:25 > copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:155 [inline] > filldir+0x1ea/0x3a0 fs/readdir.c:196 > dir_emit_dot include/linux/fs.h:3464 [inline] > dir_emit_dots include/linux/fs.h:3475 [inline] > dcache_readdir+0x13a/0x620 fs/libfs.c:193 > iterate_dir+0x48b/0x5d0 fs/readdir.c:51 > __do_sys_getdents fs/readdir.c:231 [inline] > __se_sys_getdents fs/readdir.c:212 [inline] > __x64_sys_getdents+0x29f/0x510 fs/readdir.c:212 > do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe > > -> #0 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9){++++}: > lock_acquire+0x1e4/0x540 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3924 > down_write+0x8f/0x130 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:70 > inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:765 [inline] > shmem_fallocate+0x18b/0x12e0 mm/shmem.c:2602 > ashmem_shrink_scan+0x236/0x630 drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c:455 > ashmem_ioctl+0x3ae/0x13a0 drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c:797 > vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline] > file_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:501 [inline] > do_vfs_ioctl+0x1de/0x1720 fs/ioctl.c:685 > ksys_ioctl+0xa9/0xd0 fs/ioctl.c:702 > __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:709 [inline] > __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:707 [inline] > __x64_sys_ioctl+0x73/0xb0 fs/ioctl.c:707 > do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe > > other info that might help us debug this: > > Chain exists of: > &sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9 --> &mm->mmap_sem --> ashmem_mutex > > Possible unsafe locking scenario: > > CPU0 CPU1 > ---- ---- > lock(ashmem_mutex); > lock(&mm->mmap_sem); > lock(ashmem_mutex); > lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9); > > *** DEADLOCK *** > > 1 lock held by syz-executor900/4483: > #0: 0000000025208078 (ashmem_mutex){+.+.}, at: > ashmem_shrink_scan+0xb4/0x630 drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c:448 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180821231835.166639-1-joel@joelfernandes.orgSigned-off-by:
Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org> Reported-by:
syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Reviewed-by:
NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com> Suggested-by:
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Vaibhav Nagarnaik authored
commit 83f36555 upstream. When reducing ring buffer size, pages are removed by scheduling a work item on each CPU for the corresponding CPU ring buffer. After the pages are removed from ring buffer linked list, the pages are free()d in a tight loop. The loop does not give up CPU until all pages are removed. In a worst case behavior, when lot of pages are to be freed, it can cause system stall. After the pages are removed from the list, the free() can happen while the work is rescheduled. Call cond_resched() in the loop to prevent the system hangup. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180907223129.71994-1-vnagarnaik@google.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 83f40318 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic") Reported-by:
Jason Behmer <jbehmer@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Vaibhav Nagarnaik <vnagarnaik@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by:
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Mika Westerberg authored
commit 50ca031b upstream. This reverts f154a718 ("PCI: Add ACS quirk for Intel 300 series"). It turns out that erratum "PCH PCIe* Controller Root Port (ACSCTLR) Appear As Read Only" has been fixed in 300 series chipsets, even though the datasheet [1] claims otherwise. To make ACS work properly on 300 series root ports, revert the faulty commit. [1] https://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/specification-updates/300-series-c240-series-chipset-pch-spec-update.pdf Fixes: f154a718 ("PCI: Add ACS quirk for Intel 300 series") Signed-off-by:
Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.18+ Signed-off-by:
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Kirill Kapranov authored
commit 1a4327fb upstream. On systems where some controllers get a dynamic ID assigned and some have a fixed number (e.g. from ACPI tables), the current implementation might run into an IDR collision: in case of a fixed bus number is gotten by a driver (but not marked busy in IDR tree) and a driver with dynamic bus number gets the same ID and predictably fails. Fix this by means of checking-in fixed IDsin IDR as far as dynamic ones at the moment of the controller registration. Fixes: 9b61e302 (spi: Pick spi bus number from Linux idr or spi alias) Signed-off-by:
Kirill Kapranov <kirill.kapranov@compulab.co.il> Signed-off-by:
Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Boris Ostrovsky authored
commit 70513d58 upstream. Otherwise we may leak kernel stack for events that sample user registers. Reported-by:
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Reviewed-by:
Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Juergen Gross authored
commit ad4f15dc upstream. Commit 57f230ab ("xen/netfront: raise max number of slots in xennet_get_responses()") raised the max number of allowed slots by one. This seems to be problematic in some configurations with netback using a larger MAX_SKB_FRAGS value (e.g. old Linux kernel with MAX_SKB_FRAGS defined as 18 instead of nowadays 17). Instead of BUG_ON() in this case just fall back to retransmission. Fixes: 57f230ab ("xen/netfront: raise max number of slots in xennet_get_responses()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by:
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Mario Limonciello authored
commit ff0e9f26 upstream. An ACPI buffer that was allocated was not being freed after use. Signed-off-by:
Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@dell.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Darren Hart (VMware) <dvhart@infradead.org> Signed-off-by:
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Takashi Sakamoto authored
commit 498fe23a upstream. Although private data of sound card instance is usually allocated in the tail of the instance, drivers in ALSA firewire stack allocate the private data before allocating the instance. In this case, the private data should be released explicitly at .private_free callback of the instance. This commit fixes memory leak following to the above design. Fixes: 6c29230e ('ALSA: oxfw: delayed registration of sound card') Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.7+ Signed-off-by:
Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Signed-off-by:
Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
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Takashi Sakamoto authored
commit 1064bc68 upstream. After finishing discover of stream formats, ALSA OXFW driver has memory leak of allocated memory object at error path. This commit releases the memory object at the error path. Fixes: 6c29230e ('ALSA: oxfw: delayed registration of sound card') Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.7+ Signed-off-by:
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Takashi Sakamoto authored
commit ce925f08 upstream. After allocating model-dependent data, ALSA OXFW driver has memory leak of the data at error path. This commit releases the data at the error path. Fixes: 6c29230e ('ALSA: oxfw: delayed registration of sound card') Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.7+ Signed-off-by:
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Takashi Sakamoto authored
commit c3b55e2e upstream. After allocating memory object for response buffer, ALSA fireworks driver has leak of the memory object at error path. This commit releases the object at the error path. Fixes: 7d3c1d59('ALSA: fireworks: delayed registration of sound card') Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.7+ Signed-off-by:
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Takashi Sakamoto authored
commit 8d28277c upstream. Although private data of sound card instance is usually allocated in the tail of the instance, drivers in ALSA firewire stack allocate the private data before allocating the instance. In this case, the private data should be released explicitly at .private_free callback of the instance. This commit fixes memory leak following to the above design. Fixes: b610386c ('ALSA: firewire-tascam: deleyed registration of sound card') Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.7+ Signed-off-by:
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Takashi Sakamoto authored
commit a49a83ab upstream. Although private data of sound card instance is usually allocated in the tail of the instance, drivers in ALSA firewire stack allocate the private data before allocating the instance. In this case, the private data should be released explicitly at .private_free callback of the instance. This commit fixes memory leak following to the above design. Fixes: 86c8dd7f ('ALSA: firewire-digi00x: delayed registration of sound card') Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.7+ Signed-off-by:
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Takashi Sakamoto authored
commit 36f3a6e0 upstream. An allocated memory forgets to be released. Fixes: 76fdb3a9 ('ALSA: fireface: add support for Fireface 400') Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.12+ Signed-off-by:
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Willy Tarreau authored
commit 49434c6c upstream. snd_emu10k1_fx8010_ioctl(SNDRV_EMU10K1_IOCTL_INFO) allocates memory using kmalloc() and partially fills it by calling snd_emu10k1_fx8010_info() before returning the resulting structure to userspace, leaving uninitialized holes. Let's just use kzalloc() here. BugLink: http://blog.infosectcbr.com.au/2018/09/linux-kernel-infoleaks.htmlSigned-off-by:
Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Takashi Sakamoto authored
commit 493626f2 upstream. When executing 'fw_run_transaction()' with 'TCODE_WRITE_BLOCK_REQUEST', an address of 'payload' argument is used for streaming DMA mapping by 'firewire_ohci' module if 'size' argument is larger than 8 byte. Although in this case the address should not be on kernel stack, current implementation of ALSA bebob driver uses data in kernel stack for a cue to boot M-Audio devices. This often brings unexpected result, especially for a case of CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y. This commit fixes the bug. Reference: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=201021 Reference: https://forum.manjaro.org/t/firewire-m-audio-410-driver-wont-load-firmware/51165 Fixes: a2b2a779('ALSA: bebob: Send a cue to load firmware for M-Audio Firewire series') Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.16+ Signed-off-by:
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