Commit 1a37079c authored by Stephen Smalley's avatar Stephen Smalley Committed by Paul Moore

selinux: revert "stop passing MAY_NOT_BLOCK to the AVC upon follow_link"

This reverts commit e46e01ee ("selinux: stop passing MAY_NOT_BLOCK
to the AVC upon follow_link"). The correct fix is to instead fall
back to ref-walk if audit is required irrespective of the specific
audit data type.  This is done in the next commit.

Fixes: e46e01ee ("selinux: stop passing MAY_NOT_BLOCK to the AVC upon follow_link")
Reported-by: default avatarWill Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: default avatarPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
parent 59438b46
...@@ -862,8 +862,9 @@ static int avc_update_node(struct selinux_avc *avc, ...@@ -862,8 +862,9 @@ static int avc_update_node(struct selinux_avc *avc,
* permissive mode that only appear when in enforcing mode. * permissive mode that only appear when in enforcing mode.
* *
* See the corresponding handling in slow_avc_audit(), and the * See the corresponding handling in slow_avc_audit(), and the
* logic in selinux_inode_permission for the MAY_NOT_BLOCK flag, * logic in selinux_inode_follow_link and selinux_inode_permission
* which is transliterated into AVC_NONBLOCKING. * for the VFS MAY_NOT_BLOCK flag, which is transliterated into
* AVC_NONBLOCKING for avc_has_perm_noaudit().
*/ */
if (flags & AVC_NONBLOCKING) if (flags & AVC_NONBLOCKING)
return 0; return 0;
...@@ -1205,6 +1206,25 @@ int avc_has_perm(struct selinux_state *state, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, ...@@ -1205,6 +1206,25 @@ int avc_has_perm(struct selinux_state *state, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
return rc; return rc;
} }
int avc_has_perm_flags(struct selinux_state *state,
u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
struct common_audit_data *auditdata,
int flags)
{
struct av_decision avd;
int rc, rc2;
rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,
(flags & MAY_NOT_BLOCK) ? AVC_NONBLOCKING : 0,
&avd);
rc2 = avc_audit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc,
auditdata, flags);
if (rc2)
return rc2;
return rc;
}
u32 avc_policy_seqno(struct selinux_state *state) u32 avc_policy_seqno(struct selinux_state *state)
{ {
return state->avc->avc_cache.latest_notif; return state->avc->avc_cache.latest_notif;
......
...@@ -3004,8 +3004,9 @@ static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, ...@@ -3004,8 +3004,9 @@ static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
if (IS_ERR(isec)) if (IS_ERR(isec))
return PTR_ERR(isec); return PTR_ERR(isec);
return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, return avc_has_perm_flags(&selinux_state,
sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad); sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad,
rcu ? MAY_NOT_BLOCK : 0);
} }
static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
......
...@@ -153,6 +153,11 @@ int avc_has_perm(struct selinux_state *state, ...@@ -153,6 +153,11 @@ int avc_has_perm(struct selinux_state *state,
u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 requested, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
struct common_audit_data *auditdata); struct common_audit_data *auditdata);
int avc_has_perm_flags(struct selinux_state *state,
u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 requested,
struct common_audit_data *auditdata,
int flags);
int avc_has_extended_perms(struct selinux_state *state, int avc_has_extended_perms(struct selinux_state *state,
u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
......
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