eCryptfs: file->private_data is always valid

When accessing the lower_file pointer located in private_data of
eCryptfs files, there is no need to check to see if the private_data
pointer has been initialized to a non-NULL value. The file->private_data
and file->private_data->lower_file pointers are always initialized to
non-NULL values in ecryptfs_open().

This change quiets a Smatch warning:

  CHECK   /var/scm/kernel/linux/fs/ecryptfs/file.c
fs/ecryptfs/file.c:321 ecryptfs_unlocked_ioctl() error: potential NULL dereference 'lower_file'.
fs/ecryptfs/file.c:335 ecryptfs_compat_ioctl() error: potential NULL dereference 'lower_file'.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Geyslan G. Bem <geyslan@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

fs/ecryptfs/file.c

@@ -313,11 +313,9 @@ static int ecryptfs_fasync(int fd, struct file *file, int flag)
 static long
 ecryptfs_unlocked_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 {
-	struct file *lower_file = NULL;
+	struct file *lower_file = ecryptfs_file_to_lower(file);
 	long rc = -ENOTTY;
 
-	if (ecryptfs_file_to_private(file))
-		lower_file = ecryptfs_file_to_lower(file);
 	if (lower_file->f_op->unlocked_ioctl)
 		rc = lower_file->f_op->unlocked_ioctl(lower_file, cmd, arg);
 	return rc;
@@ -327,11 +325,9 @@ ecryptfs_unlocked_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 static long
 ecryptfs_compat_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 {
-	struct file *lower_file = NULL;
+	struct file *lower_file = ecryptfs_file_to_lower(file);
 	long rc = -ENOIOCTLCMD;
 
-	if (ecryptfs_file_to_private(file))
-		lower_file = ecryptfs_file_to_lower(file);
 	if (lower_file->f_op && lower_file->f_op->compat_ioctl)
 		rc = lower_file->f_op->compat_ioctl(lower_file, cmd, arg);
 	return rc;