Merge tag 'keys-next-20140722' of...

Merge tag 'keys-next-20140722' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs into next

Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt

@@ -566,6 +566,11 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
 			possible to determine what the correct size should be.
 			This option provides an override for these situations.
 
+	ca_keys=	[KEYS] This parameter identifies a specific key(s) on
+			the system trusted keyring to be used for certificate
+			trust validation.
+			format: { id:<keyid> | builtin }
+
 	ccw_timeout_log [S390]
 			See Documentation/s390/CommonIO for details.
 

Documentation/security/keys.txt

@@ -1150,20 +1150,24 @@ The structure has a number of fields, some of which are mandatory:
 		const void	*data;
 		size_t		datalen;
 		size_t		quotalen;
+		time_t		expiry;
 	};
 
      Before calling the method, the caller will fill in data and datalen with
      the payload blob parameters; quotalen will be filled in with the default
-     quota size from the key type and the rest will be cleared.
+     quota size from the key type; expiry will be set to TIME_T_MAX and the
+     rest will be cleared.
 
      If a description can be proposed from the payload contents, that should be
      attached as a string to the description field.  This will be used for the
      key description if the caller of add_key() passes NULL or "".
 
      The method can attach anything it likes to type_data[] and payload.  These
-     are merely passed along to the instantiate() or update() operations.
+     are merely passed along to the instantiate() or update() operations.  If
+     set, the expiry time will be applied to the key if it is instantiated from
+     this data.
 
-     The method should return 0 if success ful or a negative error code
+     The method should return 0 if successful or a negative error code
      otherwise.
 
      
@@ -1172,7 +1176,9 @@ The structure has a number of fields, some of which are mandatory:
      This method is only required if the preparse() method is provided,
      otherwise it is unused.  It cleans up anything attached to the
      description, type_data and payload fields of the key_preparsed_payload
-     struct as filled in by the preparse() method.
+     struct as filled in by the preparse() method.  It will always be called
+     after preparse() returns successfully, even if instantiate() or update()
+     succeed.
 
 
  (*) int (*instantiate)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);

crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig

@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ config ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
 
 config PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA
 	tristate "RSA public-key algorithm"
-	select MPILIB_EXTRA
 	select MPILIB
 	help
 	  This option enables support for the RSA algorithm (PKCS#1, RFC3447).
@@ -33,8 +32,39 @@ config X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
 	select ASN1
 	select OID_REGISTRY
 	help
-	  This option procides support for parsing X.509 format blobs for key
+	  This option provides support for parsing X.509 format blobs for key
 	  data and provides the ability to instantiate a crypto key from a
 	  public key packet found inside the certificate.
 
+config PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
+	tristate "PKCS#7 message parser"
+	depends on X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
+	select ASN1
+	select OID_REGISTRY
+	help
+	  This option provides support for parsing PKCS#7 format messages for
+	  signature data and provides the ability to verify the signature.
+
+config PKCS7_TEST_KEY
+	tristate "PKCS#7 testing key type"
+	depends on PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
+	select SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+	help
+	  This option provides a type of key that can be loaded up from a
+	  PKCS#7 message - provided the message is signed by a trusted key.  If
+	  it is, the PKCS#7 wrapper is discarded and reading the key returns
+	  just the payload.  If it isn't, adding the key will fail with an
+	  error.
+
+	  This is intended for testing the PKCS#7 parser.
+
+config SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION
+	bool "Support for PE file signature verification"
+	depends on PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER=y
+	select ASN1
+	select OID_REGISTRY
+	help
+	  This option provides support for verifying the signature(s) on a
+	  signed PE binary.
+
 endif # ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE

crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile

@@ -25,3 +25,40 @@ $(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.o: $(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.c $(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.h
 
 clean-files	+= x509-asn1.c x509-asn1.h
 clean-files	+= x509_rsakey-asn1.c x509_rsakey-asn1.h
+
+#
+# PKCS#7 message handling
+#
+obj-$(CONFIG_PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER) += pkcs7_message.o
+pkcs7_message-y := \
+	pkcs7-asn1.o \
+	pkcs7_parser.o \
+	pkcs7_trust.o \
+	pkcs7_verify.o
+
+$(obj)/pkcs7_parser.o: $(obj)/pkcs7-asn1.h
+$(obj)/pkcs7-asn1.o: $(obj)/pkcs7-asn1.c $(obj)/pkcs7-asn1.h
+
+clean-files	+= pkcs7-asn1.c pkcs7-asn1.h
+
+#
+# PKCS#7 parser testing key
+#
+obj-$(CONFIG_PKCS7_TEST_KEY) += pkcs7_test_key.o
+pkcs7_test_key-y := \
+	pkcs7_key_type.o
+
+#
+# Signed PE binary-wrapped key handling
+#
+obj-$(CONFIG_SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION) += verify_signed_pefile.o
+
+verify_signed_pefile-y := \
+	verify_pefile.o \
+	mscode_parser.o \
+	mscode-asn1.o
+
+$(obj)/mscode_parser.o: $(obj)/mscode-asn1.h $(obj)/mscode-asn1.h
+$(obj)/mscode-asn1.o: $(obj)/mscode-asn1.c $(obj)/mscode-asn1.h
+
+clean-files	+= mscode-asn1.c mscode-asn1.h

crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h

@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@
  * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
  */
 
+int asymmetric_keyid_match(const char *kid, const char *id);
+
 static inline const char *asymmetric_key_id(const struct key *key)
 {
 	return key->type_data.p[1];

crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c

@@ -22,6 +22,35 @@ MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
 static LIST_HEAD(asymmetric_key_parsers);
 static DECLARE_RWSEM(asymmetric_key_parsers_sem);
 
+/*
+ * Match asymmetric key id with partial match
+ * @id:		key id to match in a form "id:<id>"
+ */
+int asymmetric_keyid_match(const char *kid, const char *id)
+{
+	size_t idlen, kidlen;
+
+	if (!kid || !id)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* make it possible to use id as in the request: "id:<id>" */
+	if (strncmp(id, "id:", 3) == 0)
+		id += 3;
+
+	/* Anything after here requires a partial match on the ID string */
+	idlen = strlen(id);
+	kidlen = strlen(kid);
+	if (idlen > kidlen)
+		return 0;
+
+	kid += kidlen - idlen;
+	if (strcasecmp(id, kid) != 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asymmetric_keyid_match);
+
 /*
  * Match asymmetric keys on (part of) their name
  * We have some shorthand methods for matching keys.  We allow:
@@ -34,9 +63,8 @@ static int asymmetric_key_match(const struct key *key, const void *description)
 {
 	const struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key);
 	const char *spec = description;
-	const char *id, *kid;
+	const char *id;
 	ptrdiff_t speclen;
-	size_t idlen, kidlen;
 
 	if (!subtype || !spec || !*spec)
 		return 0;
@@ -55,23 +83,8 @@ static int asymmetric_key_match(const struct key *key, const void *description)
 	speclen = id - spec;
 	id++;
 
-	/* Anything after here requires a partial match on the ID string */
-	kid = asymmetric_key_id(key);
-	if (!kid)
-		return 0;
-
-	idlen = strlen(id);
-	kidlen = strlen(kid);
-	if (idlen > kidlen)
-		return 0;
-
-	kid += kidlen - idlen;
-	if (strcasecmp(id, kid) != 0)
-		return 0;
-
-	if (speclen == 2 &&
-	    memcmp(spec, "id", 2) == 0)
-		return 1;
+	if (speclen == 2 && memcmp(spec, "id", 2) == 0)
+		return asymmetric_keyid_match(asymmetric_key_id(key), id);
 
 	if (speclen == subtype->name_len &&
 	    memcmp(spec, subtype->name, speclen) == 0)
@@ -156,36 +169,13 @@ static void asymmetric_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 	pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
 
 	if (subtype) {
-		subtype->destroy(prep->payload);
+		subtype->destroy(prep->payload[0]);
 		module_put(subtype->owner);
 	}
 	kfree(prep->type_data[1]);
 	kfree(prep->description);
 }
 
-/*
- * Instantiate a asymmetric_key defined key.  The key was preparsed, so we just
- * have to transfer the data here.
- */
-static int asymmetric_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
-{
-	int ret;
-
-	pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
-
-	ret = key_payload_reserve(key, prep->quotalen);
-	if (ret == 0) {
-		key->type_data.p[0] = prep->type_data[0];
-		key->type_data.p[1] = prep->type_data[1];
-		key->payload.data = prep->payload;
-		prep->type_data[0] = NULL;
-		prep->type_data[1] = NULL;
-		prep->payload = NULL;
-	}
-	pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
-	return ret;
-}
-
 /*
  * dispose of the data dangling from the corpse of a asymmetric key
  */
@@ -205,7 +195,7 @@ struct key_type key_type_asymmetric = {
 	.name		= "asymmetric",
 	.preparse	= asymmetric_key_preparse,
 	.free_preparse	= asymmetric_key_free_preparse,
-	.instantiate	= asymmetric_key_instantiate,
+	.instantiate	= generic_key_instantiate,
 	.match		= asymmetric_key_match,
 	.destroy	= asymmetric_key_destroy,
 	.describe	= asymmetric_key_describe,

crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode.asn1

+--- Microsoft individual code signing data blob parser
+---
+--- Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+--- Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+---
+--- This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+--- modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+--- as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+--- 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+---
+
+MSCode ::= SEQUENCE {
+	type			SEQUENCE {
+		contentType	ContentType,
+		parameters	ANY
+	},
+	content			SEQUENCE {
+		digestAlgorithm	DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
+		digest		OCTET STRING ({ mscode_note_digest })
+	}
+}
+
+ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ mscode_note_content_type })
+
+DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
+	algorithm   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ mscode_note_digest_algo }),
+	parameters  ANY OPTIONAL
+}

crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c

+/* Parse a Microsoft Individual Code Signing blob
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2014 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "MSCODE: "fmt
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/oid_registry.h>
+#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
+#include "verify_pefile.h"
+#include "mscode-asn1.h"
+
+/*
+ * Parse a Microsoft Individual Code Signing blob
+ */
+int mscode_parse(struct pefile_context *ctx)
+{
+	const void *content_data;
+	size_t data_len;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = pkcs7_get_content_data(ctx->pkcs7, &content_data, &data_len, 1);
+
+	if (ret) {
+		pr_debug("PKCS#7 message does not contain data\n");
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	pr_devel("Data: %zu [%*ph]\n", data_len, (unsigned)(data_len),
+		 content_data);
+
+	return asn1_ber_decoder(&mscode_decoder, ctx, content_data, data_len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check the content type OID
+ */
+int mscode_note_content_type(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+			     unsigned char tag,
+			     const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	enum OID oid;
+
+	oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen);
+	if (oid == OID__NR) {
+		char buffer[50];
+
+		sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+		pr_err("Unknown OID: %s\n", buffer);
+		return -EBADMSG;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * pesign utility had a bug where it was putting
+	 * OID_msIndividualSPKeyPurpose instead of OID_msPeImageDataObjId
+	 * So allow both OIDs.
+	 */
+	if (oid != OID_msPeImageDataObjId &&
+	    oid != OID_msIndividualSPKeyPurpose) {
+		pr_err("Unexpected content type OID %u\n", oid);
+		return -EBADMSG;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the digest algorithm OID
+ */
+int mscode_note_digest_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+			    unsigned char tag,
+			    const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pefile_context *ctx = context;
+	char buffer[50];
+	enum OID oid;
+
+	oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen);
+	switch (oid) {
+	case OID_md4:
+		ctx->digest_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD4;
+		break;
+	case OID_md5:
+		ctx->digest_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5;
+		break;
+	case OID_sha1:
+		ctx->digest_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+		break;
+	case OID_sha256:
+		ctx->digest_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA256;
+		break;
+
+	case OID__NR:
+		sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+		pr_err("Unknown OID: %s\n", buffer);
+		return -EBADMSG;
+
+	default:
+		pr_err("Unsupported content type: %u\n", oid);
+		return -ENOPKG;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the digest we're guaranteeing with this certificate
+ */
+int mscode_note_digest(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+		       unsigned char tag,
+		       const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pefile_context *ctx = context;
+
+	ctx->digest = value;
+	ctx->digest_len = vlen;
+	return 0;
+}

crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1

+PKCS7ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+	contentType	ContentType,
+	content		[0] EXPLICIT SignedData OPTIONAL
+}
+
+ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID })
+
+SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
+	version			INTEGER,
+	digestAlgorithms	DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
+	contentInfo		ContentInfo,
+	certificates		CHOICE {
+		certSet		[0] IMPLICIT ExtendedCertificatesAndCertificates,
+		certSequence	[2] IMPLICIT Certificates
+	} OPTIONAL ({ pkcs7_note_certificate_list }),
+	crls CHOICE {
+		crlSet		[1] IMPLICIT CertificateRevocationLists,
+		crlSequence	[3] IMPLICIT CRLSequence
+	} OPTIONAL,
+	signerInfos		SignerInfos
+}
+
+ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+	contentType	ContentType,
+	content		[0] EXPLICIT Data OPTIONAL
+}
+
+Data ::= ANY ({ pkcs7_note_data })
+
+DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers ::= CHOICE {
+	daSet			SET OF DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
+	daSequence		SEQUENCE OF DigestAlgorithmIdentifier
+}
+
+DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
+	algorithm   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID }),
+	parameters  ANY OPTIONAL
+}
+
+--
+-- Certificates and certificate lists
+--
+ExtendedCertificatesAndCertificates ::= SET OF ExtendedCertificateOrCertificate
+
+ExtendedCertificateOrCertificate ::= CHOICE {
+  certificate		Certificate,				-- X.509
+  extendedCertificate	[0] IMPLICIT ExtendedCertificate	-- PKCS#6
+}
+
+ExtendedCertificate ::= Certificate -- cheating
+
+Certificates ::= SEQUENCE OF Certificate
+
+CertificateRevocationLists ::= SET OF CertificateList
+
+CertificateList ::= SEQUENCE OF Certificate -- This may be defined incorrectly
+
+CRLSequence ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList
+
+Certificate ::= ANY ({ pkcs7_extract_cert }) -- X.509
+
+--
+-- Signer information
+--
+SignerInfos ::= CHOICE {
+	siSet		SET OF SignerInfo,
+	siSequence	SEQUENCE OF SignerInfo
+}
+
+SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+	version			INTEGER,
+	issuerAndSerialNumber	IssuerAndSerialNumber,
+	digestAlgorithm		DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ({ pkcs7_sig_note_digest_algo }),
+	authenticatedAttributes	CHOICE {
+		aaSet		[0] IMPLICIT SetOfAuthenticatedAttribute
+					({ pkcs7_sig_note_set_of_authattrs }),
+		aaSequence	[2] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF AuthenticatedAttribute
+			-- Explicit because easier to compute digest on
+			-- sequence of attributes and then reuse encoded
+			-- sequence in aaSequence.
+	} OPTIONAL,
+	digestEncryptionAlgorithm
+				DigestEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier ({ pkcs7_sig_note_pkey_algo }),
+	encryptedDigest		EncryptedDigest,
+	unauthenticatedAttributes CHOICE {
+		uaSet		[1] IMPLICIT SET OF UnauthenticatedAttribute,
+		uaSequence	[3] IMPLICIT SEQUENCE OF UnauthenticatedAttribute
+	} OPTIONAL
+} ({ pkcs7_note_signed_info })
+
+IssuerAndSerialNumber ::= SEQUENCE {
+	issuer			Name ({ pkcs7_sig_note_issuer }),
+	serialNumber		CertificateSerialNumber ({ pkcs7_sig_note_serial })
+}
+
+CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER
+
+SetOfAuthenticatedAttribute ::= SET OF AuthenticatedAttribute
+
+AuthenticatedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {
+	type			OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID }),
+	values			SET OF ANY ({ pkcs7_sig_note_authenticated_attr })
+}
+
+UnauthenticatedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {
+	type			OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID }),
+	values			SET OF ANY
+}
+
+DigestEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
+	algorithm		OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID }),
+	parameters		ANY OPTIONAL
+}
+
+EncryptedDigest ::= OCTET STRING ({ pkcs7_sig_note_signature })
+
+---
+--- X.500 Name
+---
+Name ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName
+
+RelativeDistinguishedName ::= SET OF AttributeValueAssertion
+
+AttributeValueAssertion ::= SEQUENCE {
+	attributeType		OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID }),
+	attributeValue		ANY
+}

crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c

+/* Testing module to load key from trusted PKCS#7 message
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2014 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PKCS7key: "fmt
+#include <linux/key.h>
+#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
+#include <keys/user-type.h>
+#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
+#include "pkcs7_parser.h"
+
+/*
+ * Preparse a PKCS#7 wrapped and validated data blob.
+ */
+static int pkcs7_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
+	const void *data, *saved_prep_data;
+	size_t datalen, saved_prep_datalen;
+	bool trusted;
+	int ret;
+
+	kenter("");
+
+	saved_prep_data = prep->data;
+	saved_prep_datalen = prep->datalen;
+	pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(saved_prep_data, saved_prep_datalen);
+	if (IS_ERR(pkcs7)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(pkcs7);
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error_free;
+
+	ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, system_trusted_keyring, &trusted);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error_free;
+	if (!trusted)
+		pr_warn("PKCS#7 message doesn't chain back to a trusted key\n");
+
+	ret = pkcs7_get_content_data(pkcs7, &data, &datalen, false);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error_free;
+
+	prep->data = data;
+	prep->datalen = datalen;
+	ret = user_preparse(prep);
+	prep->data = saved_prep_data;
+	prep->datalen = saved_prep_datalen;
+
+error_free:
+	pkcs7_free_message(pkcs7);
+error:
+	kleave(" = %d", ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * user defined keys take an arbitrary string as the description and an
+ * arbitrary blob of data as the payload
+ */
+struct key_type key_type_pkcs7 = {
+	.name			= "pkcs7_test",
+	.def_lookup_type	= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
+	.preparse		= pkcs7_preparse,
+	.free_preparse		= user_free_preparse,
+	.instantiate		= generic_key_instantiate,
+	.match			= user_match,
+	.revoke			= user_revoke,
+	.destroy		= user_destroy,
+	.describe		= user_describe,
+	.read			= user_read,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Module stuff
+ */
+static int __init pkcs7_key_init(void)
+{
+	return register_key_type(&key_type_pkcs7);
+}
+
+static void __exit pkcs7_key_cleanup(void)
+{
+	unregister_key_type(&key_type_pkcs7);
+}
+
+module_init(pkcs7_key_init);
+module_exit(pkcs7_key_cleanup);

crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c

+/* PKCS#7 parser
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PKCS7: "fmt
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/oid_registry.h>
+#include "public_key.h"
+#include "pkcs7_parser.h"
+#include "pkcs7-asn1.h"
+
+struct pkcs7_parse_context {
+	struct pkcs7_message	*msg;		/* Message being constructed */
+	struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;	/* SignedInfo being constructed */
+	struct pkcs7_signed_info **ppsinfo;
+	struct x509_certificate *certs;		/* Certificate cache */
+	struct x509_certificate **ppcerts;
+	unsigned long	data;			/* Start of data */
+	enum OID	last_oid;		/* Last OID encountered */
+	unsigned	x509_index;
+	unsigned	sinfo_index;
+};
+
+/**
+ * pkcs7_free_message - Free a PKCS#7 message
+ * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message to free
+ */
+void pkcs7_free_message(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
+{
+	struct x509_certificate *cert;
+	struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;
+
+	if (pkcs7) {
+		while (pkcs7->certs) {
+			cert = pkcs7->certs;
+			pkcs7->certs = cert->next;
+			x509_free_certificate(cert);
+		}
+		while (pkcs7->crl) {
+			cert = pkcs7->crl;
+			pkcs7->crl = cert->next;
+			x509_free_certificate(cert);
+		}
+		while (pkcs7->signed_infos) {
+			sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos;
+			pkcs7->signed_infos = sinfo->next;
+			mpi_free(sinfo->sig.mpi[0]);
+			kfree(sinfo->sig.digest);
+			kfree(sinfo);
+		}
+		kfree(pkcs7);
+	}
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_free_message);
+
+/**
+ * pkcs7_parse_message - Parse a PKCS#7 message
+ * @data: The raw binary ASN.1 encoded message to be parsed
+ * @datalen: The size of the encoded message
+ */
+struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7_parse_message(const void *data, size_t datalen)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx;
+	struct pkcs7_message *msg;
+	long ret;
+
+	ret = -ENOMEM;
+	msg = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_message), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!msg)
+		goto error_no_sig;
+	ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_parse_context), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ctx)
+		goto error_no_ctx;
+	ctx->sinfo = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_signed_info), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ctx->sinfo)
+		goto error_no_sinfo;
+
+	ctx->msg = msg;
+	ctx->data = (unsigned long)data;
+	ctx->ppcerts = &ctx->certs;
+	ctx->ppsinfo = &ctx->msg->signed_infos;
+
+	/* Attempt to decode the signature */
+	ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&pkcs7_decoder, ctx, data, datalen);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error_decode;
+
+	while (ctx->certs) {
+		struct x509_certificate *cert = ctx->certs;
+		ctx->certs = cert->next;
+		x509_free_certificate(cert);
+	}
+	mpi_free(ctx->sinfo->sig.mpi[0]);
+	kfree(ctx->sinfo->sig.digest);
+	kfree(ctx->sinfo);
+	kfree(ctx);
+	return msg;
+
+error_decode:
+	mpi_free(ctx->sinfo->sig.mpi[0]);
+	kfree(ctx->sinfo->sig.digest);
+	kfree(ctx->sinfo);
+error_no_sinfo:
+	kfree(ctx);
+error_no_ctx:
+	pkcs7_free_message(msg);
+error_no_sig:
+	return ERR_PTR(ret);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_parse_message);
+
+/**
+ * pkcs7_get_content_data - Get access to the PKCS#7 content
+ * @pkcs7: The preparsed PKCS#7 message to access
+ * @_data: Place to return a pointer to the data
+ * @_data_len: Place to return the data length
+ * @want_wrapper: True if the ASN.1 object header should be included in the data
+ *
+ * Get access to the data content of the PKCS#7 message, including, optionally,
+ * the header of the ASN.1 object that contains it.  Returns -ENODATA if the
+ * data object was missing from the message.
+ */
+int pkcs7_get_content_data(const struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+			   const void **_data, size_t *_data_len,
+			   bool want_wrapper)
+{
+	size_t wrapper;
+
+	if (!pkcs7->data)
+		return -ENODATA;
+
+	wrapper = want_wrapper ? pkcs7->data_hdrlen : 0;
+	*_data = pkcs7->data - wrapper;
+	*_data_len = pkcs7->data_len + wrapper;
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_get_content_data);
+
+/*
+ * Note an OID when we find one for later processing when we know how
+ * to interpret it.
+ */
+int pkcs7_note_OID(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+		   unsigned char tag,
+		   const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+	ctx->last_oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen);
+	if (ctx->last_oid == OID__NR) {
+		char buffer[50];
+		sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+		printk("PKCS7: Unknown OID: [%lu] %s\n",
+		       (unsigned long)value - ctx->data, buffer);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the digest algorithm for the signature.
+ */
+int pkcs7_sig_note_digest_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+			       unsigned char tag,
+			       const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+	switch (ctx->last_oid) {
+	case OID_md4:
+		ctx->sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD4;
+		break;
+	case OID_md5:
+		ctx->sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5;
+		break;
+	case OID_sha1:
+		ctx->sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+		break;
+	case OID_sha256:
+		ctx->sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA256;
+		break;
+	default:
+		printk("Unsupported digest algo: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
+		return -ENOPKG;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the public key algorithm for the signature.
+ */
+int pkcs7_sig_note_pkey_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+			     unsigned char tag,
+			     const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+	switch (ctx->last_oid) {
+	case OID_rsaEncryption:
+		ctx->sinfo->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
+		break;
+	default:
+		printk("Unsupported pkey algo: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
+		return -ENOPKG;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Extract a certificate and store it in the context.
+ */
+int pkcs7_extract_cert(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+		       unsigned char tag,
+		       const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+	struct x509_certificate *x509;
+
+	if (tag != ((ASN1_UNIV << 6) | ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SEQ)) {
+		pr_debug("Cert began with tag %02x at %lu\n",
+			 tag, (unsigned long)ctx - ctx->data);
+		return -EBADMSG;
+	}
+
+	/* We have to correct for the header so that the X.509 parser can start
+	 * from the beginning.  Note that since X.509 stipulates DER, there
+	 * probably shouldn't be an EOC trailer - but it is in PKCS#7 (which
+	 * stipulates BER).
+	 */
+	value -= hdrlen;
+	vlen += hdrlen;
+
+	if (((u8*)value)[1] == 0x80)
+		vlen += 2; /* Indefinite length - there should be an EOC */
+
+	x509 = x509_cert_parse(value, vlen);
+	if (IS_ERR(x509))
+		return PTR_ERR(x509);
+
+	pr_debug("Got cert for %s\n", x509->subject);
+	pr_debug("- fingerprint %s\n", x509->fingerprint);
+
+	x509->index = ++ctx->x509_index;
+	*ctx->ppcerts = x509;
+	ctx->ppcerts = &x509->next;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Save the certificate list
+ */
+int pkcs7_note_certificate_list(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+				unsigned char tag,
+				const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+	pr_devel("Got cert list (%02x)\n", tag);
+
+	*ctx->ppcerts = ctx->msg->certs;
+	ctx->msg->certs = ctx->certs;
+	ctx->certs = NULL;
+	ctx->ppcerts = &ctx->certs;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Extract the data from the message and store that and its content type OID in
+ * the context.
+ */
+int pkcs7_note_data(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+		    unsigned char tag,
+		    const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+	pr_debug("Got data\n");
+
+	ctx->msg->data = value;
+	ctx->msg->data_len = vlen;
+	ctx->msg->data_hdrlen = hdrlen;
+	ctx->msg->data_type = ctx->last_oid;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse authenticated attributes
+ */
+int pkcs7_sig_note_authenticated_attr(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+				      unsigned char tag,
+				      const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+	pr_devel("AuthAttr: %02x %zu [%*ph]\n", tag, vlen, (unsigned)vlen, value);
+
+	switch (ctx->last_oid) {
+	case OID_messageDigest:
+		if (tag != ASN1_OTS)
+			return -EBADMSG;
+		ctx->sinfo->msgdigest = value;
+		ctx->sinfo->msgdigest_len = vlen;
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		return 0;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the set of auth attributes for digestion purposes [RFC2315 9.3]
+ */
+int pkcs7_sig_note_set_of_authattrs(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+				    unsigned char tag,
+				    const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+	/* We need to switch the 'CONT 0' to a 'SET OF' when we digest */
+	ctx->sinfo->authattrs = value - (hdrlen - 1);
+	ctx->sinfo->authattrs_len = vlen + (hdrlen - 1);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the issuing certificate serial number
+ */
+int pkcs7_sig_note_serial(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+			  unsigned char tag,
+			  const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+	ctx->sinfo->raw_serial = value;
+	ctx->sinfo->raw_serial_size = vlen;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the issuer's name
+ */
+int pkcs7_sig_note_issuer(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+			  unsigned char tag,
+			  const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+	ctx->sinfo->raw_issuer = value;
+	ctx->sinfo->raw_issuer_size = vlen;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the signature data
+ */
+int pkcs7_sig_note_signature(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+			     unsigned char tag,
+			     const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+	MPI mpi;
+
+	BUG_ON(ctx->sinfo->sig.pkey_algo != PKEY_ALGO_RSA);
+
+	mpi = mpi_read_raw_data(value, vlen);
+	if (!mpi)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ctx->sinfo->sig.mpi[0] = mpi;
+	ctx->sinfo->sig.nr_mpi = 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note a signature information block
+ */
+int pkcs7_note_signed_info(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+			   unsigned char tag,
+			   const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+	ctx->sinfo->index = ++ctx->sinfo_index;
+	*ctx->ppsinfo = ctx->sinfo;
+	ctx->ppsinfo = &ctx->sinfo->next;
+	ctx->sinfo = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_signed_info), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ctx->sinfo)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	return 0;
+}

crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h

+/* PKCS#7 crypto data parser internal definitions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/oid_registry.h>
+#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
+#include "x509_parser.h"
+
+#define kenter(FMT, ...) \
+	pr_devel("==> %s("FMT")\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#define kleave(FMT, ...) \
+	pr_devel("<== %s()"FMT"\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+
+struct pkcs7_signed_info {
+	struct pkcs7_signed_info *next;
+	struct x509_certificate *signer; /* Signing certificate (in msg->certs) */
+	unsigned index;
+	bool trusted;
+
+	/* Message digest - the digest of the Content Data (or NULL) */
+	const void	*msgdigest;
+	unsigned	msgdigest_len;
+
+	/* Authenticated Attribute data (or NULL) */
+	unsigned	authattrs_len;
+	const void	*authattrs;
+
+	/* Issuing cert serial number and issuer's name */
+	const void	*raw_serial;
+	unsigned	raw_serial_size;
+	unsigned	raw_issuer_size;
+	const void	*raw_issuer;
+
+	/* Message signature.
+	 *
+	 * This contains the generated digest of _either_ the Content Data or
+	 * the Authenticated Attributes [RFC2315 9.3].  If the latter, one of
+	 * the attributes contains the digest of the the Content Data within
+	 * it.
+	 */
+	struct public_key_signature sig;
+};
+
+struct pkcs7_message {
+	struct x509_certificate *certs;	/* Certificate list */
+	struct x509_certificate *crl;	/* Revocation list */
+	struct pkcs7_signed_info *signed_infos;
+
+	/* Content Data (or NULL) */
+	enum OID	data_type;	/* Type of Data */
+	size_t		data_len;	/* Length of Data */
+	size_t		data_hdrlen;	/* Length of Data ASN.1 header */
+	const void	*data;		/* Content Data (or 0) */
+};

crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c

+/* Validate the trust chain of a PKCS#7 message.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PKCS7: "fmt
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/asn1.h>
+#include <linux/key.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
+#include "public_key.h"
+#include "pkcs7_parser.h"
+
+/*
+ * Request an asymmetric key.
+ */
+static struct key *pkcs7_request_asymmetric_key(
+	struct key *keyring,
+	const char *signer, size_t signer_len,
+	const char *authority, size_t auth_len)
+{
+	key_ref_t key;
+	char *id;
+
+	kenter(",%zu,,%zu", signer_len, auth_len);
+
+	/* Construct an identifier. */
+	id = kmalloc(signer_len + 2 + auth_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!id)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	memcpy(id, signer, signer_len);
+	id[signer_len + 0] = ':';
+	id[signer_len + 1] = ' ';
+	memcpy(id + signer_len + 2, authority, auth_len);
+	id[signer_len + 2 + auth_len] = 0;
+
+	pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id);
+
+	key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1),
+			     &key_type_asymmetric, id);
+	if (IS_ERR(key))
+		pr_debug("Request for module key '%s' err %ld\n",
+			 id, PTR_ERR(key));
+	kfree(id);
+
+	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+		switch (PTR_ERR(key)) {
+			/* Hide some search errors */
+		case -EACCES:
+		case -ENOTDIR:
+		case -EAGAIN:
+			return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
+		default:
+			return ERR_CAST(key);
+		}
+	}
+
+	pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [%x]\n", __func__, key_serial(key_ref_to_ptr(key)));
+	return key_ref_to_ptr(key);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check the trust on one PKCS#7 SignedInfo block.
+ */
+int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+			     struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo,
+			     struct key *trust_keyring)
+{
+	struct public_key_signature *sig = &sinfo->sig;
+	struct x509_certificate *x509, *last = NULL, *p;
+	struct key *key;
+	bool trusted;
+	int ret;
+
+	kenter(",%u,", sinfo->index);
+
+	for (x509 = sinfo->signer; x509; x509 = x509->signer) {
+		if (x509->seen) {
+			if (x509->verified) {
+				trusted = x509->trusted;
+				goto verified;
+			}
+			kleave(" = -ENOKEY [cached]");
+			return -ENOKEY;
+		}
+		x509->seen = true;
+
+		/* Look to see if this certificate is present in the trusted
+		 * keys.
+		 */
+		key = pkcs7_request_asymmetric_key(
+			trust_keyring,
+			x509->subject, strlen(x509->subject),
+			x509->fingerprint, strlen(x509->fingerprint));
+		if (!IS_ERR(key))
+			/* One of the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message
+			 * is apparently the same as one we already trust.
+			 * Verify that the trusted variant can also validate
+			 * the signature on the descendant.
+			 */
+			goto matched;
+		if (key == ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM))
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		 /* Self-signed certificates form roots of their own, and if we
+		  * don't know them, then we can't accept them.
+		  */
+		if (x509->next == x509) {
+			kleave(" = -ENOKEY [unknown self-signed]");
+			return -ENOKEY;
+		}
+
+		might_sleep();
+		last = x509;
+		sig = &last->sig;
+	}
+
+	/* No match - see if the root certificate has a signer amongst the
+	 * trusted keys.
+	 */
+	if (!last || !last->issuer || !last->authority) {
+		kleave(" = -ENOKEY [no backref]");
+		return -ENOKEY;
+	}
+
+	key = pkcs7_request_asymmetric_key(
+		trust_keyring,
+		last->issuer, strlen(last->issuer),
+		last->authority, strlen(last->authority));
+	if (IS_ERR(key))
+		return PTR_ERR(key) == -ENOMEM ? -ENOMEM : -ENOKEY;
+	x509 = last;
+
+matched:
+	ret = verify_signature(key, sig);
+	trusted = test_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED, &key->flags);
+	key_put(key);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		if (ret == -ENOMEM)
+			return ret;
+		kleave(" = -EKEYREJECTED [verify %d]", ret);
+		return -EKEYREJECTED;
+	}
+
+verified:
+	x509->verified = true;
+	for (p = sinfo->signer; p != x509; p = p->signer) {
+		p->verified = true;
+		p->trusted = trusted;
+	}
+	sinfo->trusted = trusted;
+	kleave(" = 0");
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * pkcs7_validate_trust - Validate PKCS#7 trust chain
+ * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 certificate to validate
+ * @trust_keyring: Signing certificates to use as starting points
+ * @_trusted: Set to true if trustworth, false otherwise
+ *
+ * Validate that the certificate chain inside the PKCS#7 message intersects
+ * keys we already know and trust.
+ *
+ * Returns, in order of descending priority:
+ *
+ *  (*) -EKEYREJECTED if a signature failed to match for which we have a valid
+ *	key, or:
+ *
+ *  (*) 0 if at least one signature chain intersects with the keys in the trust
+ *	keyring, or:
+ *
+ *  (*) -ENOPKG if a suitable crypto module couldn't be found for a check on a
+ *	chain.
+ *
+ *  (*) -ENOKEY if we couldn't find a match for any of the signature chains in
+ *	the message.
+ *
+ * May also return -ENOMEM.
+ */
+int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+			 struct key *trust_keyring,
+			 bool *_trusted)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;
+	struct x509_certificate *p;
+	int cached_ret = 0, ret;
+
+	for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next)
+		p->seen = false;
+
+	for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) {
+		ret = pkcs7_validate_trust_one(pkcs7, sinfo, trust_keyring);
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			if (ret == -ENOPKG) {
+				cached_ret = -ENOPKG;
+			} else if (ret == -ENOKEY) {
+				if (cached_ret == 0)
+					cached_ret = -ENOKEY;
+			} else {
+				return ret;
+			}
+		}
+		*_trusted |= sinfo->trusted;
+	}
+
+	return cached_ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_validate_trust);

crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c

+/* Verify the signature on a PKCS#7 message.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PKCS7: "fmt
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/asn1.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include "public_key.h"
+#include "pkcs7_parser.h"
+
+/*
+ * Digest the relevant parts of the PKCS#7 data
+ */
+static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+			struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
+{
+	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+	struct shash_desc *desc;
+	size_t digest_size, desc_size;
+	void *digest;
+	int ret;
+
+	kenter(",%u,%u", sinfo->index, sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo);
+
+	if (sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo >= PKEY_HASH__LAST ||
+	    !hash_algo_name[sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo])
+		return -ENOPKG;
+
+	/* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
+	 * big the hash operational data will be.
+	 */
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo],
+				 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+		return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? -ENOPKG : PTR_ERR(tfm);
+
+	desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
+	sinfo->sig.digest_size = digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+
+	ret = -ENOMEM;
+	digest = kzalloc(digest_size + desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!digest)
+		goto error_no_desc;
+
+	desc = digest + digest_size;
+	desc->tfm   = tfm;
+	desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
+
+	/* Digest the message [RFC2315 9.3] */
+	ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error;
+	ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, pkcs7->data, pkcs7->data_len, digest);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error;
+	pr_devel("MsgDigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, digest);
+
+	/* However, if there are authenticated attributes, there must be a
+	 * message digest attribute amongst them which corresponds to the
+	 * digest we just calculated.
+	 */
+	if (sinfo->msgdigest) {
+		u8 tag;
+
+		if (sinfo->msgdigest_len != sinfo->sig.digest_size) {
+			pr_debug("Sig %u: Invalid digest size (%u)\n",
+				 sinfo->index, sinfo->msgdigest_len);
+			ret = -EBADMSG;
+			goto error;
+		}
+
+		if (memcmp(digest, sinfo->msgdigest, sinfo->msgdigest_len) != 0) {
+			pr_debug("Sig %u: Message digest doesn't match\n",
+				 sinfo->index);
+			ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
+			goto error;
+		}
+
+		/* We then calculate anew, using the authenticated attributes
+		 * as the contents of the digest instead.  Note that we need to
+		 * convert the attributes from a CONT.0 into a SET before we
+		 * hash it.
+		 */
+		memset(digest, 0, sinfo->sig.digest_size);
+
+		ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto error;
+		tag = ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SET;
+		ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, &tag, 1);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto error;
+		ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, sinfo->authattrs,
+					 sinfo->authattrs_len, digest);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto error;
+		pr_devel("AADigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, digest);
+	}
+
+	sinfo->sig.digest = digest;
+	digest = NULL;
+
+error:
+	kfree(digest);
+error_no_desc:
+	crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+	kleave(" = %d", ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Find the key (X.509 certificate) to use to verify a PKCS#7 message.  PKCS#7
+ * uses the issuer's name and the issuing certificate serial number for
+ * matching purposes.  These must match the certificate issuer's name (not
+ * subject's name) and the certificate serial number [RFC 2315 6.7].
+ */
+static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+			  struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
+{
+	struct x509_certificate *x509;
+	unsigned certix = 1;
+
+	kenter("%u,%u,%u",
+	       sinfo->index, sinfo->raw_serial_size, sinfo->raw_issuer_size);
+
+	for (x509 = pkcs7->certs; x509; x509 = x509->next, certix++) {
+		/* I'm _assuming_ that the generator of the PKCS#7 message will
+		 * encode the fields from the X.509 cert in the same way in the
+		 * PKCS#7 message - but I can't be 100% sure of that.  It's
+		 * possible this will need element-by-element comparison.
+		 */
+		if (x509->raw_serial_size != sinfo->raw_serial_size ||
+		    memcmp(x509->raw_serial, sinfo->raw_serial,
+			   sinfo->raw_serial_size) != 0)
+			continue;
+		pr_devel("Sig %u: Found cert serial match X.509[%u]\n",
+			 sinfo->index, certix);
+
+		if (x509->raw_issuer_size != sinfo->raw_issuer_size ||
+		    memcmp(x509->raw_issuer, sinfo->raw_issuer,
+			   sinfo->raw_issuer_size) != 0) {
+			pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 subject and PKCS#7 issuer don't match\n",
+				sinfo->index);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (x509->pub->pkey_algo != sinfo->sig.pkey_algo) {
+			pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 algo and PKCS#7 sig algo don't match\n",
+				sinfo->index);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		sinfo->signer = x509;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	pr_warn("Sig %u: Issuing X.509 cert not found (#%*ph)\n",
+		sinfo->index, sinfo->raw_serial_size, sinfo->raw_serial);
+	return -ENOKEY;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify the internal certificate chain as best we can.
+ */
+static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+				  struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
+{
+	struct x509_certificate *x509 = sinfo->signer, *p;
+	int ret;
+
+	kenter("");
+
+	for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next)
+		p->seen = false;
+
+	for (;;) {
+		pr_debug("verify %s: %s\n", x509->subject, x509->fingerprint);
+		x509->seen = true;
+		ret = x509_get_sig_params(x509);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return ret;
+
+		if (x509->issuer)
+			pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", x509->issuer);
+		if (x509->authority)
+			pr_debug("- authkeyid %s\n", x509->authority);
+
+		if (!x509->authority ||
+		    (x509->subject &&
+		     strcmp(x509->subject, x509->issuer) == 0)) {
+			/* If there's no authority certificate specified, then
+			 * the certificate must be self-signed and is the root
+			 * of the chain.  Likewise if the cert is its own
+			 * authority.
+			 */
+			pr_debug("- no auth?\n");
+			if (x509->raw_subject_size != x509->raw_issuer_size ||
+			    memcmp(x509->raw_subject, x509->raw_issuer,
+				   x509->raw_issuer_size) != 0)
+				return 0;
+
+			ret = x509_check_signature(x509->pub, x509);
+			if (ret < 0)
+				return ret;
+			x509->signer = x509;
+			pr_debug("- self-signed\n");
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		/* Look through the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message's
+		 * list to see if the next one is there.
+		 */
+		pr_debug("- want %s\n", x509->authority);
+		for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) {
+			pr_debug("- cmp [%u] %s\n", p->index, p->fingerprint);
+			if (p->raw_subject_size == x509->raw_issuer_size &&
+			    strcmp(p->fingerprint, x509->authority) == 0 &&
+			    memcmp(p->raw_subject, x509->raw_issuer,
+				   x509->raw_issuer_size) == 0)
+				goto found_issuer;
+		}
+
+		/* We didn't find the root of this chain */
+		pr_debug("- top\n");
+		return 0;
+
+	found_issuer:
+		pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", p->subject);
+		if (p->seen) {
+			pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 chain contains loop\n",
+				sinfo->index);
+			return 0;
+		}
+		ret = x509_check_signature(p->pub, x509);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return ret;
+		x509->signer = p;
+		if (x509 == p) {
+			pr_debug("- self-signed\n");
+			return 0;
+		}
+		x509 = p;
+		might_sleep();
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify one signed information block from a PKCS#7 message.
+ */
+static int pkcs7_verify_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+			    struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	kenter(",%u", sinfo->index);
+
+	/* First of all, digest the data in the PKCS#7 message and the
+	 * signed information block
+	 */
+	ret = pkcs7_digest(pkcs7, sinfo);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	/* Find the key for the signature */
+	ret = pkcs7_find_key(pkcs7, sinfo);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	pr_devel("Using X.509[%u] for sig %u\n",
+		 sinfo->signer->index, sinfo->index);
+
+	/* Verify the PKCS#7 binary against the key */
+	ret = public_key_verify_signature(sinfo->signer->pub, &sinfo->sig);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	pr_devel("Verified signature %u\n", sinfo->index);
+
+	/* Verify the internal certificate chain */
+	return pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(pkcs7, sinfo);
+}
+
+/**
+ * pkcs7_verify - Verify a PKCS#7 message
+ * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message to be verified
+ */
+int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;
+	struct x509_certificate *x509;
+	int ret, n;
+
+	kenter("");
+
+	for (n = 0, x509 = pkcs7->certs; x509; x509 = x509->next, n++) {
+		ret = x509_get_sig_params(x509);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return ret;
+		pr_debug("X.509[%u] %s\n", n, x509->authority);
+	}
+
+	for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) {
+		ret = pkcs7_verify_one(pkcs7, sinfo);
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			kleave(" = %d", ret);
+			return ret;
+		}
+	}
+
+	kleave(" = 0");
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_verify);

crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c

+/* Parse a signed PE binary
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2014 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PEFILE: "fmt
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/pe.h>
+#include <linux/asn1.h>
+#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include "verify_pefile.h"
+
+/*
+ * Parse a PE binary.
+ */
+static int pefile_parse_binary(const void *pebuf, unsigned int pelen,
+			       struct pefile_context *ctx)
+{
+	const struct mz_hdr *mz = pebuf;
+	const struct pe_hdr *pe;
+	const struct pe32_opt_hdr *pe32;
+	const struct pe32plus_opt_hdr *pe64;
+	const struct data_directory *ddir;
+	const struct data_dirent *dde;
+	const struct section_header *secs, *sec;
+	size_t cursor, datalen = pelen;
+
+	kenter("");
+
+#define chkaddr(base, x, s)						\
+	do {								\
+		if ((x) < base || (s) >= datalen || (x) > datalen - (s)) \
+			return -ELIBBAD;				\
+	} while (0)
+
+	chkaddr(0, 0, sizeof(*mz));
+	if (mz->magic != MZ_MAGIC)
+		return -ELIBBAD;
+	cursor = sizeof(*mz);
+
+	chkaddr(cursor, mz->peaddr, sizeof(*pe));
+	pe = pebuf + mz->peaddr;
+	if (pe->magic != PE_MAGIC)
+		return -ELIBBAD;
+	cursor = mz->peaddr + sizeof(*pe);
+
+	chkaddr(0, cursor, sizeof(pe32->magic));
+	pe32 = pebuf + cursor;
+	pe64 = pebuf + cursor;
+
+	switch (pe32->magic) {
+	case PE_OPT_MAGIC_PE32:
+		chkaddr(0, cursor, sizeof(*pe32));
+		ctx->image_checksum_offset =
+			(unsigned long)&pe32->csum - (unsigned long)pebuf;
+		ctx->header_size = pe32->header_size;
+		cursor += sizeof(*pe32);
+		ctx->n_data_dirents = pe32->data_dirs;
+		break;
+
+	case PE_OPT_MAGIC_PE32PLUS:
+		chkaddr(0, cursor, sizeof(*pe64));
+		ctx->image_checksum_offset =
+			(unsigned long)&pe64->csum - (unsigned long)pebuf;
+		ctx->header_size = pe64->header_size;
+		cursor += sizeof(*pe64);
+		ctx->n_data_dirents = pe64->data_dirs;
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		pr_debug("Unknown PEOPT magic = %04hx\n", pe32->magic);
+		return -ELIBBAD;
+	}
+
+	pr_debug("checksum @ %x\n", ctx->image_checksum_offset);
+	pr_debug("header size = %x\n", ctx->header_size);
+
+	if (cursor >= ctx->header_size || ctx->header_size >= datalen)
+		return -ELIBBAD;
+
+	if (ctx->n_data_dirents > (ctx->header_size - cursor) / sizeof(*dde))
+		return -ELIBBAD;
+
+	ddir = pebuf + cursor;
+	cursor += sizeof(*dde) * ctx->n_data_dirents;
+
+	ctx->cert_dirent_offset =
+		(unsigned long)&ddir->certs - (unsigned long)pebuf;
+	ctx->certs_size = ddir->certs.size;
+
+	if (!ddir->certs.virtual_address || !ddir->certs.size) {
+		pr_debug("Unsigned PE binary\n");
+		return -EKEYREJECTED;
+	}
+
+	chkaddr(ctx->header_size, ddir->certs.virtual_address,
+		ddir->certs.size);
+	ctx->sig_offset = ddir->certs.virtual_address;
+	ctx->sig_len = ddir->certs.size;
+	pr_debug("cert = %x @%x [%*ph]\n",
+		 ctx->sig_len, ctx->sig_offset,
+		 ctx->sig_len, pebuf + ctx->sig_offset);
+
+	ctx->n_sections = pe->sections;
+	if (ctx->n_sections > (ctx->header_size - cursor) / sizeof(*sec))
+		return -ELIBBAD;
+	ctx->secs = secs = pebuf + cursor;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check and strip the PE wrapper from around the signature and check that the
+ * remnant looks something like PKCS#7.
+ */
+static int pefile_strip_sig_wrapper(const void *pebuf,
+				    struct pefile_context *ctx)
+{
+	struct win_certificate wrapper;
+	const u8 *pkcs7;
+
+	if (ctx->sig_len < sizeof(wrapper)) {
+		pr_debug("Signature wrapper too short\n");
+		return -ELIBBAD;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(&wrapper, pebuf + ctx->sig_offset, sizeof(wrapper));
+	pr_debug("sig wrapper = { %x, %x, %x }\n",
+		 wrapper.length, wrapper.revision, wrapper.cert_type);
+
+	/* Both pesign and sbsign round up the length of certificate table
+	 * (in optional header data directories) to 8 byte alignment.
+	 */
+	if (round_up(wrapper.length, 8) != ctx->sig_len) {
+		pr_debug("Signature wrapper len wrong\n");
+		return -ELIBBAD;
+	}
+	if (wrapper.revision != WIN_CERT_REVISION_2_0) {
+		pr_debug("Signature is not revision 2.0\n");
+		return -ENOTSUPP;
+	}
+	if (wrapper.cert_type != WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA) {
+		pr_debug("Signature certificate type is not PKCS\n");
+		return -ENOTSUPP;
+	}
+
+	/* Looks like actual pkcs signature length is in wrapper->length.
+	 * size obtained from data dir entries lists the total size of
+	 * certificate table which is also aligned to octawrod boundary.
+	 *
+	 * So set signature length field appropriately.
+	 */
+	ctx->sig_len = wrapper.length;
+	ctx->sig_offset += sizeof(wrapper);
+	ctx->sig_len -= sizeof(wrapper);
+	if (ctx->sig_len == 0) {
+		pr_debug("Signature data missing\n");
+		return -EKEYREJECTED;
+	}
+
+	/* What's left should a PKCS#7 cert */
+	pkcs7 = pebuf + ctx->sig_offset;
+	if (pkcs7[0] == (ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SEQ)) {
+		if (pkcs7[1] == 0x82 &&
+		    pkcs7[2] == (((ctx->sig_len - 4) >> 8) & 0xff) &&
+		    pkcs7[3] ==  ((ctx->sig_len - 4)       & 0xff))
+			return 0;
+		if (pkcs7[1] == 0x80)
+			return 0;
+		if (pkcs7[1] > 0x82)
+			return -EMSGSIZE;
+	}
+
+	pr_debug("Signature data not PKCS#7\n");
+	return -ELIBBAD;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compare two sections for canonicalisation.
+ */
+static int pefile_compare_shdrs(const void *a, const void *b)
+{
+	const struct section_header *shdra = a;
+	const struct section_header *shdrb = b;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (shdra->data_addr > shdrb->data_addr)
+		return 1;
+	if (shdrb->data_addr > shdra->data_addr)
+		return -1;
+
+	if (shdra->virtual_address > shdrb->virtual_address)
+		return 1;
+	if (shdrb->virtual_address > shdra->virtual_address)
+		return -1;
+
+	rc = strcmp(shdra->name, shdrb->name);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (shdra->virtual_size > shdrb->virtual_size)
+		return 1;
+	if (shdrb->virtual_size > shdra->virtual_size)
+		return -1;
+
+	if (shdra->raw_data_size > shdrb->raw_data_size)
+		return 1;
+	if (shdrb->raw_data_size > shdra->raw_data_size)
+		return -1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Load the contents of the PE binary into the digest, leaving out the image
+ * checksum and the certificate data block.
+ */
+static int pefile_digest_pe_contents(const void *pebuf, unsigned int pelen,
+				     struct pefile_context *ctx,
+				     struct shash_desc *desc)
+{
+	unsigned *canon, tmp, loop, i, hashed_bytes;
+	int ret;
+
+	/* Digest the header and data directory, but leave out the image
+	 * checksum and the data dirent for the signature.
+	 */
+	ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, pebuf, ctx->image_checksum_offset);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	tmp = ctx->image_checksum_offset + sizeof(uint32_t);
+	ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, pebuf + tmp,
+				  ctx->cert_dirent_offset - tmp);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	tmp = ctx->cert_dirent_offset + sizeof(struct data_dirent);
+	ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, pebuf + tmp, ctx->header_size - tmp);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	canon = kcalloc(ctx->n_sections, sizeof(unsigned), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!canon)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* We have to canonicalise the section table, so we perform an
+	 * insertion sort.
+	 */
+	canon[0] = 0;
+	for (loop = 1; loop < ctx->n_sections; loop++) {
+		for (i = 0; i < loop; i++) {
+			if (pefile_compare_shdrs(&ctx->secs[canon[i]],
+						 &ctx->secs[loop]) > 0) {
+				memmove(&canon[i + 1], &canon[i],
+					(loop - i) * sizeof(canon[0]));
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		canon[i] = loop;
+	}
+
+	hashed_bytes = ctx->header_size;
+	for (loop = 0; loop < ctx->n_sections; loop++) {
+		i = canon[loop];
+		if (ctx->secs[i].raw_data_size == 0)
+			continue;
+		ret = crypto_shash_update(desc,
+					  pebuf + ctx->secs[i].data_addr,
+					  ctx->secs[i].raw_data_size);
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			kfree(canon);
+			return ret;
+		}
+		hashed_bytes += ctx->secs[i].raw_data_size;
+	}
+	kfree(canon);
+
+	if (pelen > hashed_bytes) {
+		tmp = hashed_bytes + ctx->certs_size;
+		ret = crypto_shash_update(desc,
+					  pebuf + hashed_bytes,
+					  pelen - tmp);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return ret;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Digest the contents of the PE binary, leaving out the image checksum and the
+ * certificate data block.
+ */
+static int pefile_digest_pe(const void *pebuf, unsigned int pelen,
+			    struct pefile_context *ctx)
+{
+	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+	struct shash_desc *desc;
+	size_t digest_size, desc_size;
+	void *digest;
+	int ret;
+
+	kenter(",%u", ctx->digest_algo);
+
+	/* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
+	 * big the hash operational data will be.
+	 */
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[ctx->digest_algo], 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+		return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? -ENOPKG : PTR_ERR(tfm);
+
+	desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
+	digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+
+	if (digest_size != ctx->digest_len) {
+		pr_debug("Digest size mismatch (%zx != %x)\n",
+			 digest_size, ctx->digest_len);
+		ret = -EBADMSG;
+		goto error_no_desc;
+	}
+	pr_debug("Digest: desc=%zu size=%zu\n", desc_size, digest_size);
+
+	ret = -ENOMEM;
+	desc = kzalloc(desc_size + digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!desc)
+		goto error_no_desc;
+
+	desc->tfm   = tfm;
+	desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
+	ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error;
+
+	ret = pefile_digest_pe_contents(pebuf, pelen, ctx, desc);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error;
+
+	digest = (void *)desc + desc_size;
+	ret = crypto_shash_final(desc, digest);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error;
+
+	pr_debug("Digest calc = [%*ph]\n", ctx->digest_len, digest);
+
+	/* Check that the PE file digest matches that in the MSCODE part of the
+	 * PKCS#7 certificate.
+	 */
+	if (memcmp(digest, ctx->digest, ctx->digest_len) != 0) {
+		pr_debug("Digest mismatch\n");
+		ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
+	} else {
+		pr_debug("The digests match!\n");
+	}
+
+error:
+	kfree(desc);
+error_no_desc:
+	crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+	kleave(" = %d", ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * verify_pefile_signature - Verify the signature on a PE binary image
+ * @pebuf: Buffer containing the PE binary image
+ * @pelen: Length of the binary image
+ * @trust_keyring: Signing certificates to use as starting points
+ * @_trusted: Set to true if trustworth, false otherwise
+ *
+ * Validate that the certificate chain inside the PKCS#7 message inside the PE
+ * binary image intersects keys we already know and trust.
+ *
+ * Returns, in order of descending priority:
+ *
+ *  (*) -ELIBBAD if the image cannot be parsed, or:
+ *
+ *  (*) -EKEYREJECTED if a signature failed to match for which we have a valid
+ *	key, or:
+ *
+ *  (*) 0 if at least one signature chain intersects with the keys in the trust
+ *	keyring, or:
+ *
+ *  (*) -ENOPKG if a suitable crypto module couldn't be found for a check on a
+ *	chain.
+ *
+ *  (*) -ENOKEY if we couldn't find a match for any of the signature chains in
+ *	the message.
+ *
+ * May also return -ENOMEM.
+ */
+int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
+			    struct key *trusted_keyring, bool *_trusted)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
+	struct pefile_context ctx;
+	const void *data;
+	size_t datalen;
+	int ret;
+
+	kenter("");
+
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+	ret = pefile_parse_binary(pebuf, pelen, &ctx);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = pefile_strip_sig_wrapper(pebuf, &ctx);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(pebuf + ctx.sig_offset, ctx.sig_len);
+	if (IS_ERR(pkcs7))
+		return PTR_ERR(pkcs7);
+	ctx.pkcs7 = pkcs7;
+
+	ret = pkcs7_get_content_data(ctx.pkcs7, &data, &datalen, false);
+	if (ret < 0 || datalen == 0) {
+		pr_devel("PKCS#7 message does not contain data\n");
+		ret = -EBADMSG;
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	ret = mscode_parse(&ctx);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error;
+
+	pr_debug("Digest: %u [%*ph]\n",
+		 ctx.digest_len, ctx.digest_len, ctx.digest);
+
+	/* Generate the digest and check against the PKCS7 certificate
+	 * contents.
+	 */
+	ret = pefile_digest_pe(pebuf, pelen, &ctx);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error;
+
+	ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error;
+
+	ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, trusted_keyring, _trusted);
+
+error:
+	pkcs7_free_message(ctx.pkcs7);
+	return ret;
+}

crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.h

+/* PE Binary parser bits
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2014 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/verify_pefile.h>
+#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
+
+struct pefile_context {
+	unsigned	header_size;
+	unsigned	image_checksum_offset;
+	unsigned	cert_dirent_offset;
+	unsigned	n_data_dirents;
+	unsigned	n_sections;
+	unsigned	certs_size;
+	unsigned	sig_offset;
+	unsigned	sig_len;
+	const struct section_header *secs;
+	struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
+
+	/* PKCS#7 MS Individual Code Signing content */
+	const void	*digest;		/* Digest */
+	unsigned	digest_len;		/* Digest length */
+	enum hash_algo	digest_algo;		/* Digest algorithm */
+};
+
+#define kenter(FMT, ...)					\
+	pr_devel("==> %s("FMT")\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#define kleave(FMT, ...) \
+	pr_devel("<== %s()"FMT"\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+
+/*
+ * mscode_parser.c
+ */
+extern int mscode_parse(struct pefile_context *ctx);

crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ Certificate ::= SEQUENCE {
 
 TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
 	version           [ 0 ]	Version DEFAULT,
-	serialNumber		CertificateSerialNumber,
+	serialNumber		CertificateSerialNumber ({ x509_note_serial }),
 	signature		AlgorithmIdentifier ({ x509_note_pkey_algo }),
 	issuer			Name ({ x509_note_issuer }),
 	validity		Validity,

crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 
 #define pr_fmt(fmt) "X.509: "fmt
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/oid_registry.h>
@@ -52,6 +53,7 @@ void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert)
 		kfree(cert);
 	}
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_free_certificate);
 
 /*
  * Parse an X.509 certificate
@@ -97,6 +99,7 @@ struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen)
 error_no_cert:
 	return ERR_PTR(ret);
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_cert_parse);
 
 /*
  * Note an OID when we find one for later processing when we know how
@@ -210,6 +213,19 @@ int x509_note_signature(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Note the certificate serial number
+ */
+int x509_note_serial(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+		     unsigned char tag,
+		     const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
+	ctx->cert->raw_serial = value;
+	ctx->cert->raw_serial_size = vlen;
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /*
  * Note some of the name segments from which we'll fabricate a name.
  */
@@ -322,6 +338,8 @@ int x509_note_issuer(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
 		     const void *value, size_t vlen)
 {
 	struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
+	ctx->cert->raw_issuer = value;
+	ctx->cert->raw_issuer_size = vlen;
 	return x509_fabricate_name(ctx, hdrlen, tag, &ctx->cert->issuer, vlen);
 }
 
@@ -330,6 +348,8 @@ int x509_note_subject(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
 		      const void *value, size_t vlen)
 {
 	struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
+	ctx->cert->raw_subject = value;
+	ctx->cert->raw_subject_size = vlen;
 	return x509_fabricate_name(ctx, hdrlen, tag, &ctx->cert->subject, vlen);
 }
 

crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h

@@ -14,7 +14,9 @@
 
 struct x509_certificate {
 	struct x509_certificate *next;
+	struct x509_certificate *signer;	/* Certificate that signed this one */
 	struct public_key *pub;			/* Public key details */
+	struct public_key_signature sig;	/* Signature parameters */
 	char		*issuer;		/* Name of certificate issuer */
 	char		*subject;		/* Name of certificate subject */
 	char		*fingerprint;		/* Key fingerprint as hex */
@@ -25,7 +27,16 @@ struct x509_certificate {
 	unsigned	tbs_size;		/* Size of signed data */
 	unsigned	raw_sig_size;		/* Size of sigature */
 	const void	*raw_sig;		/* Signature data */
-	struct public_key_signature sig;	/* Signature parameters */
+	const void	*raw_serial;		/* Raw serial number in ASN.1 */
+	unsigned	raw_serial_size;
+	unsigned	raw_issuer_size;
+	const void	*raw_issuer;		/* Raw issuer name in ASN.1 */
+	const void	*raw_subject;		/* Raw subject name in ASN.1 */
+	unsigned	raw_subject_size;
+	unsigned	index;
+	bool		seen;			/* Infinite recursion prevention */
+	bool		verified;
+	bool		trusted;
 };
 
 /*

crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c

@@ -18,11 +18,80 @@
 #include <linux/asn1_decoder.h>
 #include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h>
 #include <keys/asymmetric-parser.h>
+#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
 #include <crypto/hash.h>
 #include "asymmetric_keys.h"
 #include "public_key.h"
 #include "x509_parser.h"
 
+static bool use_builtin_keys;
+static char *ca_keyid;
+
+#ifndef MODULE
+static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str)
+{
+	if (!str)		/* default system keyring */
+		return 1;
+
+	if (strncmp(str, "id:", 3) == 0)
+		ca_keyid = str;	/* owner key 'id:xxxxxx' */
+	else if (strcmp(str, "builtin") == 0)
+		use_builtin_keys = true;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("ca_keys=", ca_keys_setup);
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Find a key in the given keyring by issuer and authority.
+ */
+static struct key *x509_request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring,
+					       const char *signer,
+					       size_t signer_len,
+					       const char *authority,
+					       size_t auth_len)
+{
+	key_ref_t key;
+	char *id;
+
+	/* Construct an identifier. */
+	id = kmalloc(signer_len + 2 + auth_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!id)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	memcpy(id, signer, signer_len);
+	id[signer_len + 0] = ':';
+	id[signer_len + 1] = ' ';
+	memcpy(id + signer_len + 2, authority, auth_len);
+	id[signer_len + 2 + auth_len] = 0;
+
+	pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id);
+
+	key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1),
+			     &key_type_asymmetric, id);
+	if (IS_ERR(key))
+		pr_debug("Request for module key '%s' err %ld\n",
+			 id, PTR_ERR(key));
+	kfree(id);
+
+	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+		switch (PTR_ERR(key)) {
+			/* Hide some search errors */
+		case -EACCES:
+		case -ENOTDIR:
+		case -EAGAIN:
+			return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
+		default:
+			return ERR_CAST(key);
+		}
+	}
+
+	pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [%x]\n", __func__,
+		 key_serial(key_ref_to_ptr(key)));
+	return key_ref_to_ptr(key);
+}
+
 /*
  * Set up the signature parameters in an X.509 certificate.  This involves
  * digesting the signed data and extracting the signature.
@@ -102,6 +171,40 @@ int x509_check_signature(const struct public_key *pub,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_check_signature);
 
+/*
+ * Check the new certificate against the ones in the trust keyring.  If one of
+ * those is the signing key and validates the new certificate, then mark the
+ * new certificate as being trusted.
+ *
+ * Return 0 if the new certificate was successfully validated, 1 if we couldn't
+ * find a matching parent certificate in the trusted list and an error if there
+ * is a matching certificate but the signature check fails.
+ */
+static int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert,
+			       struct key *trust_keyring)
+{
+	struct key *key;
+	int ret = 1;
+
+	if (!trust_keyring)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_keyid_match(cert->authority, ca_keyid))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
+					  cert->issuer, strlen(cert->issuer),
+					  cert->authority,
+					  strlen(cert->authority));
+	if (!IS_ERR(key))  {
+		if (!use_builtin_keys
+		    || test_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key->flags))
+			ret = x509_check_signature(key->payload.data, cert);
+		key_put(key);
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
 /*
  * Attempt to parse a data blob for a key as an X509 certificate.
  */
@@ -155,9 +258,13 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 	/* Check the signature on the key if it appears to be self-signed */
 	if (!cert->authority ||
 	    strcmp(cert->fingerprint, cert->authority) == 0) {
-		ret = x509_check_signature(cert->pub, cert);
+		ret = x509_check_signature(cert->pub, cert); /* self-signed */
 		if (ret < 0)
 			goto error_free_cert;
+	} else if (!prep->trusted) {
+		ret = x509_validate_trust(cert, get_system_trusted_keyring());
+		if (!ret)
+			prep->trusted = 1;
 	}
 
 	/* Propose a description */
@@ -177,7 +284,7 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 	__module_get(public_key_subtype.owner);
 	prep->type_data[0] = &public_key_subtype;
 	prep->type_data[1] = cert->fingerprint;
-	prep->payload = cert->pub;
+	prep->payload[0] = cert->pub;
 	prep->description = desc;
 	prep->quotalen = 100;
 

fs/nfs/idmap.c

@@ -174,7 +174,9 @@ static int nfs_map_numeric_to_string(__u32 id, char *buf, size_t buflen)
 
 static struct key_type key_type_id_resolver = {
 	.name		= "id_resolver",
-	.instantiate	= user_instantiate,
+	.preparse	= user_preparse,
+	.free_preparse	= user_free_preparse,
+	.instantiate	= generic_key_instantiate,
 	.match		= user_match,
 	.revoke		= user_revoke,
 	.destroy	= user_destroy,
@@ -282,6 +284,8 @@ static struct key *nfs_idmap_request_key(const char *name, size_t namelen,
 						desc, "", 0, idmap);
 		mutex_unlock(&idmap->idmap_mutex);
 	}
+	if (!IS_ERR(rkey))
+		set_bit(KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL, &rkey->flags);
 
 	kfree(desc);
 	return rkey;
@@ -394,7 +398,9 @@ static const struct rpc_pipe_ops idmap_upcall_ops = {
 
 static struct key_type key_type_id_resolver_legacy = {
 	.name		= "id_legacy",
-	.instantiate	= user_instantiate,
+	.preparse	= user_preparse,
+	.free_preparse	= user_free_preparse,
+	.instantiate	= generic_key_instantiate,
 	.match		= user_match,
 	.revoke		= user_revoke,
 	.destroy	= user_destroy,

include/crypto/pkcs7.h

+/* PKCS#7 crypto data parser
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+struct key;
+struct pkcs7_message;
+
+/*
+ * pkcs7_parser.c
+ */
+extern struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7_parse_message(const void *data,
+						 size_t datalen);
+extern void pkcs7_free_message(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7);
+
+extern int pkcs7_get_content_data(const struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+				  const void **_data, size_t *_datalen,
+				  bool want_wrapper);
+
+/*
+ * pkcs7_trust.c
+ */
+extern int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+				struct key *trust_keyring,
+				bool *_trusted);
+
+/*
+ * pkcs7_verify.c
+ */
+extern int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7);

include/keys/big_key-type.h

@@ -16,7 +16,8 @@
 
 extern struct key_type key_type_big_key;
 
-extern int big_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
+extern int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
+extern void big_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
 extern void big_key_revoke(struct key *key);
 extern void big_key_destroy(struct key *key);
 extern void big_key_describe(const struct key *big_key, struct seq_file *m);

include/keys/system_keyring.h

@@ -17,7 +17,15 @@
 #include <linux/key.h>
 
 extern struct key *system_trusted_keyring;
-
+static inline struct key *get_system_trusted_keyring(void)
+{
+	return system_trusted_keyring;
+}
+#else
+static inline struct key *get_system_trusted_keyring(void)
+{
+	return NULL;
+}
 #endif
 
 #endif /* _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H */

include/keys/user-type.h

@@ -37,7 +37,8 @@ extern struct key_type key_type_logon;
 
 struct key_preparsed_payload;
 
-extern int user_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
+extern int user_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
+extern void user_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
 extern int user_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
 extern int user_match(const struct key *key, const void *criterion);
 extern void user_revoke(struct key *key);

include/linux/key-type.h

@@ -41,10 +41,11 @@ struct key_construction {
 struct key_preparsed_payload {
 	char		*description;	/* Proposed key description (or NULL) */
 	void		*type_data[2];	/* Private key-type data */
-	void		*payload;	/* Proposed payload */
+	void		*payload[2];	/* Proposed payload */
 	const void	*data;		/* Raw data */
 	size_t		datalen;	/* Raw datalen */
 	size_t		quotalen;	/* Quota length for proposed payload */
+	time_t		expiry;		/* Expiry time of key */
 	bool		trusted;	/* True if key is trusted */
 };
 
@@ -159,5 +160,7 @@ static inline int key_negate_and_link(struct key *key,
 	return key_reject_and_link(key, timeout, ENOKEY, keyring, instkey);
 }
 
+extern int generic_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 #endif /* _LINUX_KEY_TYPE_H */

include/linux/key.h

@@ -170,6 +170,8 @@ struct key {
 #define KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED	7	/* set if key has been invalidated */
 #define KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED	8	/* set if key is trusted */
 #define KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY	9	/* set if keyring only accepts links to trusted keys */
+#define KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN	10	/* set if key is builtin */
+#define KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL	11	/* set if key can be invalidated by root without permission */
 
 	/* the key type and key description string
 	 * - the desc is used to match a key against search criteria

include/linux/oid_registry.h

@@ -52,9 +52,15 @@ enum OID {
 	OID_md4,			/* 1.2.840.113549.2.4 */
 	OID_md5,			/* 1.2.840.113549.2.5 */
 
-	OID_certAuthInfoAccess,		/* 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1 */
+	/* Microsoft Authenticode & Software Publishing */
+	OID_msIndirectData,		/* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.4 */
+	OID_msPeImageDataObjId,		/* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.15 */
+	OID_msIndividualSPKeyPurpose,	/* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.21 */
 	OID_msOutlookExpress,		/* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.16.4 */
+
+	OID_certAuthInfoAccess,		/* 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1 */
 	OID_sha1,			/* 1.3.14.3.2.26 */
+	OID_sha256,			/* 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1 */
 
 	/* Distinguished Name attribute IDs [RFC 2256] */
 	OID_commonName,			/* 2.5.4.3 */

include/linux/pe.h

+/*
+ * Copyright 2011 Red Hat, Inc.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; version 2 of the License.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ *
+ * Author(s): Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
+ */
+#ifndef __LINUX_PE_H
+#define __LINUX_PE_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#define MZ_MAGIC	0x5a4d	/* "MZ" */
+
+struct mz_hdr {
+	uint16_t magic;		/* MZ_MAGIC */
+	uint16_t lbsize;	/* size of last used block */
+	uint16_t blocks;	/* pages in file, 0x3 */
+	uint16_t relocs;	/* relocations */
+	uint16_t hdrsize;	/* header size in "paragraphs" */
+	uint16_t min_extra_pps;	/* .bss */
+	uint16_t max_extra_pps;	/* runtime limit for the arena size */
+	uint16_t ss;		/* relative stack segment */
+	uint16_t sp;		/* initial %sp register */
+	uint16_t checksum;	/* word checksum */
+	uint16_t ip;		/* initial %ip register */
+	uint16_t cs;		/* initial %cs relative to load segment */
+	uint16_t reloc_table_offset;	/* offset of the first relocation */
+	uint16_t overlay_num;	/* overlay number.  set to 0. */
+	uint16_t reserved0[4];	/* reserved */
+	uint16_t oem_id;	/* oem identifier */
+	uint16_t oem_info;	/* oem specific */
+	uint16_t reserved1[10];	/* reserved */
+	uint32_t peaddr;	/* address of pe header */
+	char     message[64];	/* message to print */
+};
+
+struct mz_reloc {
+	uint16_t offset;
+	uint16_t segment;
+};
+
+#define PE_MAGIC		0x00004550	/* "PE\0\0" */
+#define PE_OPT_MAGIC_PE32	0x010b
+#define PE_OPT_MAGIC_PE32_ROM	0x0107
+#define PE_OPT_MAGIC_PE32PLUS	0x020b
+
+/* machine type */
+#define	IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_UNKNOWN	0x0000
+#define	IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_AM33		0x01d3
+#define	IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_AMD64	0x8664
+#define	IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_ARM		0x01c0
+#define	IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_ARMV7	0x01c4
+#define	IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_EBC		0x0ebc
+#define	IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_I386		0x014c
+#define	IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64		0x0200
+#define	IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_M32R		0x9041
+#define	IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_MIPS16	0x0266
+#define	IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_MIPSFPU	0x0366
+#define	IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_MIPSFPU16	0x0466
+#define	IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_POWERPC	0x01f0
+#define	IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_POWERPCFP	0x01f1
+#define	IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_R4000	0x0166
+#define	IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_SH3		0x01a2
+#define	IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_SH3DSP	0x01a3
+#define	IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_SH3E		0x01a4
+#define	IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_SH4		0x01a6
+#define	IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_SH5		0x01a8
+#define	IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_THUMB	0x01c2
+#define	IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_WCEMIPSV2	0x0169
+
+/* flags */
+#define IMAGE_FILE_RELOCS_STRIPPED           0x0001
+#define IMAGE_FILE_EXECUTABLE_IMAGE          0x0002
+#define IMAGE_FILE_LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED        0x0004
+#define IMAGE_FILE_LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED       0x0008
+#define IMAGE_FILE_AGGRESSIVE_WS_TRIM        0x0010
+#define IMAGE_FILE_LARGE_ADDRESS_AWARE       0x0020
+#define IMAGE_FILE_16BIT_MACHINE             0x0040
+#define IMAGE_FILE_BYTES_REVERSED_LO         0x0080
+#define IMAGE_FILE_32BIT_MACHINE             0x0100
+#define IMAGE_FILE_DEBUG_STRIPPED            0x0200
+#define IMAGE_FILE_REMOVABLE_RUN_FROM_SWAP   0x0400
+#define IMAGE_FILE_NET_RUN_FROM_SWAP         0x0800
+#define IMAGE_FILE_SYSTEM                    0x1000
+#define IMAGE_FILE_DLL                       0x2000
+#define IMAGE_FILE_UP_SYSTEM_ONLY            0x4000
+#define IMAGE_FILE_BYTES_REVERSED_HI         0x8000
+
+struct pe_hdr {
+	uint32_t magic;		/* PE magic */
+	uint16_t machine;	/* machine type */
+	uint16_t sections;	/* number of sections */
+	uint32_t timestamp;	/* time_t */
+	uint32_t symbol_table;	/* symbol table offset */
+	uint32_t symbols;	/* number of symbols */
+	uint16_t opt_hdr_size;	/* size of optional header */
+	uint16_t flags;		/* flags */
+};
+
+#define IMAGE_FILE_OPT_ROM_MAGIC	0x107
+#define IMAGE_FILE_OPT_PE32_MAGIC	0x10b
+#define IMAGE_FILE_OPT_PE32_PLUS_MAGIC	0x20b
+
+#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_UNKNOWN			 0
+#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_NATIVE			 1
+#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_WINDOWS_GUI		 2
+#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_WINDOWS_CUI		 3
+#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_POSIX_CUI		 7
+#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_WINDOWS_CE_GUI		 9
+#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_APPLICATION		10
+#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_BOOT_SERVICE_DRIVER	11
+#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_RUNTIME_DRIVER	12
+#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_ROM_IMAGE		13
+#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_XBOX			14
+
+#define IMAGE_DLL_CHARACTERISTICS_DYNAMIC_BASE          0x0040
+#define IMAGE_DLL_CHARACTERISTICS_FORCE_INTEGRITY       0x0080
+#define IMAGE_DLL_CHARACTERISTICS_NX_COMPAT             0x0100
+#define IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_NO_ISOLATION           0x0200
+#define IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_NO_SEH                 0x0400
+#define IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_NO_BIND                0x0800
+#define IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_WDM_DRIVER             0x2000
+#define IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE  0x8000
+
+/* the fact that pe32 isn't padded where pe32+ is 64-bit means union won't
+ * work right.  vomit. */
+struct pe32_opt_hdr {
+	/* "standard" header */
+	uint16_t magic;		/* file type */
+	uint8_t  ld_major;	/* linker major version */
+	uint8_t  ld_minor;	/* linker minor version */
+	uint32_t text_size;	/* size of text section(s) */
+	uint32_t data_size;	/* size of data section(s) */
+	uint32_t bss_size;	/* size of bss section(s) */
+	uint32_t entry_point;	/* file offset of entry point */
+	uint32_t code_base;	/* relative code addr in ram */
+	uint32_t data_base;	/* relative data addr in ram */
+	/* "windows" header */
+	uint32_t image_base;	/* preferred load address */
+	uint32_t section_align;	/* alignment in bytes */
+	uint32_t file_align;	/* file alignment in bytes */
+	uint16_t os_major;	/* major OS version */
+	uint16_t os_minor;	/* minor OS version */
+	uint16_t image_major;	/* major image version */
+	uint16_t image_minor;	/* minor image version */
+	uint16_t subsys_major;	/* major subsystem version */
+	uint16_t subsys_minor;	/* minor subsystem version */
+	uint32_t win32_version;	/* reserved, must be 0 */
+	uint32_t image_size;	/* image size */
+	uint32_t header_size;	/* header size rounded up to
+				   file_align */
+	uint32_t csum;		/* checksum */
+	uint16_t subsys;	/* subsystem */
+	uint16_t dll_flags;	/* more flags! */
+	uint32_t stack_size_req;/* amt of stack requested */
+	uint32_t stack_size;	/* amt of stack required */
+	uint32_t heap_size_req;	/* amt of heap requested */
+	uint32_t heap_size;	/* amt of heap required */
+	uint32_t loader_flags;	/* reserved, must be 0 */
+	uint32_t data_dirs;	/* number of data dir entries */
+};
+
+struct pe32plus_opt_hdr {
+	uint16_t magic;		/* file type */
+	uint8_t  ld_major;	/* linker major version */
+	uint8_t  ld_minor;	/* linker minor version */
+	uint32_t text_size;	/* size of text section(s) */
+	uint32_t data_size;	/* size of data section(s) */
+	uint32_t bss_size;	/* size of bss section(s) */
+	uint32_t entry_point;	/* file offset of entry point */
+	uint32_t code_base;	/* relative code addr in ram */
+	/* "windows" header */
+	uint64_t image_base;	/* preferred load address */
+	uint32_t section_align;	/* alignment in bytes */
+	uint32_t file_align;	/* file alignment in bytes */
+	uint16_t os_major;	/* major OS version */
+	uint16_t os_minor;	/* minor OS version */
+	uint16_t image_major;	/* major image version */
+	uint16_t image_minor;	/* minor image version */
+	uint16_t subsys_major;	/* major subsystem version */
+	uint16_t subsys_minor;	/* minor subsystem version */
+	uint32_t win32_version;	/* reserved, must be 0 */
+	uint32_t image_size;	/* image size */
+	uint32_t header_size;	/* header size rounded up to
+				   file_align */
+	uint32_t csum;		/* checksum */
+	uint16_t subsys;	/* subsystem */
+	uint16_t dll_flags;	/* more flags! */
+	uint64_t stack_size_req;/* amt of stack requested */
+	uint64_t stack_size;	/* amt of stack required */
+	uint64_t heap_size_req;	/* amt of heap requested */
+	uint64_t heap_size;	/* amt of heap required */
+	uint32_t loader_flags;	/* reserved, must be 0 */
+	uint32_t data_dirs;	/* number of data dir entries */
+};
+
+struct data_dirent {
+	uint32_t virtual_address;	/* relative to load address */
+	uint32_t size;
+};
+
+struct data_directory {
+	struct data_dirent exports;		/* .edata */
+	struct data_dirent imports;		/* .idata */
+	struct data_dirent resources;		/* .rsrc */
+	struct data_dirent exceptions;		/* .pdata */
+	struct data_dirent certs;		/* certs */
+	struct data_dirent base_relocations;	/* .reloc */
+	struct data_dirent debug;		/* .debug */
+	struct data_dirent arch;		/* reservered */
+	struct data_dirent global_ptr;		/* global pointer reg. Size=0 */
+	struct data_dirent tls;			/* .tls */
+	struct data_dirent load_config;		/* load configuration structure */
+	struct data_dirent bound_imports;	/* no idea */
+	struct data_dirent import_addrs;	/* import address table */
+	struct data_dirent delay_imports;	/* delay-load import table */
+	struct data_dirent clr_runtime_hdr;	/* .cor (object only) */
+	struct data_dirent reserved;
+};
+
+struct section_header {
+	char name[8];			/* name or "/12\0" string tbl offset */
+	uint32_t virtual_size;		/* size of loaded section in ram */
+	uint32_t virtual_address;	/* relative virtual address */
+	uint32_t raw_data_size;		/* size of the section */
+	uint32_t data_addr;		/* file pointer to first page of sec */
+	uint32_t relocs;		/* file pointer to relocation entries */
+	uint32_t line_numbers;		/* line numbers! */
+	uint16_t num_relocs;		/* number of relocations */
+	uint16_t num_lin_numbers;	/* srsly. */
+	uint32_t flags;
+};
+
+/* they actually defined 0x00000000 as well, but I think we'll skip that one. */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_RESERVED_0	0x00000001
+#define IMAGE_SCN_RESERVED_1	0x00000002
+#define IMAGE_SCN_RESERVED_2	0x00000004
+#define IMAGE_SCN_TYPE_NO_PAD	0x00000008 /* don't pad - obsolete */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_RESERVED_3	0x00000010
+#define IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE	0x00000020 /* .text */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA 0x00000040 /* .data */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_CNT_UNINITIALIZED_DATA 0x00000080 /* .bss */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_LNK_OTHER	0x00000100 /* reserved */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_LNK_INFO	0x00000200 /* .drectve comments */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_RESERVED_4	0x00000400
+#define IMAGE_SCN_LNK_REMOVE	0x00000800 /* .o only - scn to be rm'd*/
+#define IMAGE_SCN_LNK_COMDAT	0x00001000 /* .o only - COMDAT data */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_RESERVED_5	0x00002000 /* spec omits this */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_RESERVED_6	0x00004000 /* spec omits this */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_GPREL		0x00008000 /* global pointer referenced data */
+/* spec lists 0x20000 twice, I suspect they meant 0x10000 for one of them */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_MEM_PURGEABLE	0x00010000 /* reserved for "future" use */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_16BIT		0x00020000 /* reserved for "future" use */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_LOCKED	0x00040000 /* reserved for "future" use */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_PRELOAD	0x00080000 /* reserved for "future" use */
+/* and here they just stuck a 1-byte integer in the middle of a bitfield */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_1BYTES	0x00100000 /* it does what it says on the box */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_2BYTES	0x00200000
+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_4BYTES	0x00300000
+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_8BYTES	0x00400000
+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_16BYTES	0x00500000
+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_32BYTES	0x00600000
+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_64BYTES	0x00700000
+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_128BYTES 0x00800000
+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_256BYTES 0x00900000
+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_512BYTES 0x00a00000
+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_1024BYTES 0x00b00000
+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_2048BYTES 0x00c00000
+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_4096BYTES 0x00d00000
+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_8192BYTES 0x00e00000
+#define IMAGE_SCN_LNK_NRELOC_OVFL 0x01000000 /* extended relocations */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE 0x02000000 /* scn can be discarded */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_MEM_NOT_CACHED 0x04000000 /* cannot be cached */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_MEM_NOT_PAGED	0x08000000 /* not pageable */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_MEM_SHARED	0x10000000 /* can be shared */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE	0x20000000 /* can be executed as code */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ	0x40000000 /* readable */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE	0x80000000 /* writeable */
+
+enum x64_coff_reloc_type {
+	IMAGE_REL_AMD64_ABSOLUTE = 0,
+	IMAGE_REL_AMD64_ADDR64,
+	IMAGE_REL_AMD64_ADDR32,
+	IMAGE_REL_AMD64_ADDR32N,
+	IMAGE_REL_AMD64_REL32,
+	IMAGE_REL_AMD64_REL32_1,
+	IMAGE_REL_AMD64_REL32_2,
+	IMAGE_REL_AMD64_REL32_3,
+	IMAGE_REL_AMD64_REL32_4,
+	IMAGE_REL_AMD64_REL32_5,
+	IMAGE_REL_AMD64_SECTION,
+	IMAGE_REL_AMD64_SECREL,
+	IMAGE_REL_AMD64_SECREL7,
+	IMAGE_REL_AMD64_TOKEN,
+	IMAGE_REL_AMD64_SREL32,
+	IMAGE_REL_AMD64_PAIR,
+	IMAGE_REL_AMD64_SSPAN32,
+};
+
+enum arm_coff_reloc_type {
+	IMAGE_REL_ARM_ABSOLUTE,
+	IMAGE_REL_ARM_ADDR32,
+	IMAGE_REL_ARM_ADDR32N,
+	IMAGE_REL_ARM_BRANCH2,
+	IMAGE_REL_ARM_BRANCH1,
+	IMAGE_REL_ARM_SECTION,
+	IMAGE_REL_ARM_SECREL,
+};
+
+enum sh_coff_reloc_type {
+	IMAGE_REL_SH3_ABSOLUTE,
+	IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT16,
+	IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT32,
+	IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT8,
+	IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT8_WORD,
+	IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT8_LONG,
+	IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT4,
+	IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT4_WORD,
+	IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT4_LONG,
+	IMAGE_REL_SH3_PCREL8_WORD,
+	IMAGE_REL_SH3_PCREL8_LONG,
+	IMAGE_REL_SH3_PCREL12_WORD,
+	IMAGE_REL_SH3_STARTOF_SECTION,
+	IMAGE_REL_SH3_SIZEOF_SECTION,
+	IMAGE_REL_SH3_SECTION,
+	IMAGE_REL_SH3_SECREL,
+	IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT32_NB,
+	IMAGE_REL_SH3_GPREL4_LONG,
+	IMAGE_REL_SH3_TOKEN,
+	IMAGE_REL_SHM_PCRELPT,
+	IMAGE_REL_SHM_REFLO,
+	IMAGE_REL_SHM_REFHALF,
+	IMAGE_REL_SHM_RELLO,
+	IMAGE_REL_SHM_RELHALF,
+	IMAGE_REL_SHM_PAIR,
+	IMAGE_REL_SHM_NOMODE,
+};
+
+enum ppc_coff_reloc_type {
+	IMAGE_REL_PPC_ABSOLUTE,
+	IMAGE_REL_PPC_ADDR64,
+	IMAGE_REL_PPC_ADDR32,
+	IMAGE_REL_PPC_ADDR24,
+	IMAGE_REL_PPC_ADDR16,
+	IMAGE_REL_PPC_ADDR14,
+	IMAGE_REL_PPC_REL24,
+	IMAGE_REL_PPC_REL14,
+	IMAGE_REL_PPC_ADDR32N,
+	IMAGE_REL_PPC_SECREL,
+	IMAGE_REL_PPC_SECTION,
+	IMAGE_REL_PPC_SECREL16,
+	IMAGE_REL_PPC_REFHI,
+	IMAGE_REL_PPC_REFLO,
+	IMAGE_REL_PPC_PAIR,
+	IMAGE_REL_PPC_SECRELLO,
+	IMAGE_REL_PPC_GPREL,
+	IMAGE_REL_PPC_TOKEN,
+};
+
+enum x86_coff_reloc_type {
+	IMAGE_REL_I386_ABSOLUTE,
+	IMAGE_REL_I386_DIR16,
+	IMAGE_REL_I386_REL16,
+	IMAGE_REL_I386_DIR32,
+	IMAGE_REL_I386_DIR32NB,
+	IMAGE_REL_I386_SEG12,
+	IMAGE_REL_I386_SECTION,
+	IMAGE_REL_I386_SECREL,
+	IMAGE_REL_I386_TOKEN,
+	IMAGE_REL_I386_SECREL7,
+	IMAGE_REL_I386_REL32,
+};
+
+enum ia64_coff_reloc_type {
+	IMAGE_REL_IA64_ABSOLUTE,
+	IMAGE_REL_IA64_IMM14,
+	IMAGE_REL_IA64_IMM22,
+	IMAGE_REL_IA64_IMM64,
+	IMAGE_REL_IA64_DIR32,
+	IMAGE_REL_IA64_DIR64,
+	IMAGE_REL_IA64_PCREL21B,
+	IMAGE_REL_IA64_PCREL21M,
+	IMAGE_REL_IA64_PCREL21F,
+	IMAGE_REL_IA64_GPREL22,
+	IMAGE_REL_IA64_LTOFF22,
+	IMAGE_REL_IA64_SECTION,
+	IMAGE_REL_IA64_SECREL22,
+	IMAGE_REL_IA64_SECREL64I,
+	IMAGE_REL_IA64_SECREL32,
+	IMAGE_REL_IA64_DIR32NB,
+	IMAGE_REL_IA64_SREL14,
+	IMAGE_REL_IA64_SREL22,
+	IMAGE_REL_IA64_SREL32,
+	IMAGE_REL_IA64_UREL32,
+	IMAGE_REL_IA64_PCREL60X,
+	IMAGE_REL_IA64_PCREL60B,
+	IMAGE_REL_IA64_PCREL60F,
+	IMAGE_REL_IA64_PCREL60I,
+	IMAGE_REL_IA64_PCREL60M,
+	IMAGE_REL_IA64_IMMGPREL6,
+	IMAGE_REL_IA64_TOKEN,
+	IMAGE_REL_IA64_GPREL32,
+	IMAGE_REL_IA64_ADDEND,
+};
+
+struct coff_reloc {
+	uint32_t virtual_address;
+	uint32_t symbol_table_index;
+	union {
+		enum x64_coff_reloc_type  x64_type;
+		enum arm_coff_reloc_type  arm_type;
+		enum sh_coff_reloc_type   sh_type;
+		enum ppc_coff_reloc_type  ppc_type;
+		enum x86_coff_reloc_type  x86_type;
+		enum ia64_coff_reloc_type ia64_type;
+		uint16_t data;
+	};
+};
+
+/*
+ * Definitions for the contents of the certs data block
+ */
+#define WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA	0x0002
+#define WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_OKCS115	0x0EF0
+#define WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID		0x0EF1
+
+#define WIN_CERT_REVISION_1_0	0x0100
+#define WIN_CERT_REVISION_2_0	0x0200
+
+struct win_certificate {
+	uint32_t length;
+	uint16_t revision;
+	uint16_t cert_type;
+};
+
+#endif /* __LINUX_PE_H */

include/linux/verify_pefile.h

+/* Signed PE file verification
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2014 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H
+#define _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H
+
+extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
+				   struct key *trusted_keyring, bool *_trusted);
+
+#endif /* _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H */

kernel/system_keyring.c

@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ static __init int load_system_certificate_list(void)
 			pr_err("Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (%ld)\n",
 			       PTR_ERR(key));
 		} else {
+			set_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key_ref_to_ptr(key)->flags);
 			pr_notice("Loaded X.509 cert '%s'\n",
 				  key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description);
 			key_ref_put(key);

lib/Kconfig

@@ -451,7 +451,8 @@ config MPILIB
 
 config SIGNATURE
 	tristate
-	depends on KEYS && CRYPTO
+	depends on KEYS
+	select CRYPTO
 	select CRYPTO_SHA1
 	select MPILIB
 	help

net/ceph/crypto.c

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
 #include <linux/key-type.h>
 
 #include <keys/ceph-type.h>
+#include <keys/user-type.h>
 #include <linux/ceph/decode.h>
 #include "crypto.h"
 
@@ -423,8 +424,7 @@ int ceph_encrypt2(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret, void *dst, size_t *dst_len,
 	}
 }
 
-static int ceph_key_instantiate(struct key *key,
-				struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+static int ceph_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 {
 	struct ceph_crypto_key *ckey;
 	size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
@@ -435,10 +435,6 @@ static int ceph_key_instantiate(struct key *key,
 	if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
 		goto err;
 
-	ret = key_payload_reserve(key, datalen);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto err;
-
 	ret = -ENOMEM;
 	ckey = kmalloc(sizeof(*ckey), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!ckey)
@@ -450,7 +446,8 @@ static int ceph_key_instantiate(struct key *key,
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto err_ckey;
 
-	key->payload.data = ckey;
+	prep->payload[0] = ckey;
+	prep->quotalen = datalen;
 	return 0;
 
 err_ckey:
@@ -459,12 +456,15 @@ static int ceph_key_instantiate(struct key *key,
 	return ret;
 }
 
-static int ceph_key_match(const struct key *key, const void *description)
+static void ceph_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 {
-	return strcmp(key->description, description) == 0;
+	struct ceph_crypto_key *ckey = prep->payload[0];
+	ceph_crypto_key_destroy(ckey);
+	kfree(ckey);
 }
 
-static void ceph_key_destroy(struct key *key) {
+static void ceph_key_destroy(struct key *key)
+{
 	struct ceph_crypto_key *ckey = key->payload.data;
 
 	ceph_crypto_key_destroy(ckey);
@@ -473,8 +473,10 @@ static void ceph_key_destroy(struct key *key) {
 
 struct key_type key_type_ceph = {
 	.name		= "ceph",
-	.instantiate	= ceph_key_instantiate,
-	.match		= ceph_key_match,
+	.preparse	= ceph_key_preparse,
+	.free_preparse	= ceph_key_free_preparse,
+	.instantiate	= generic_key_instantiate,
+	.match		= user_match,
 	.destroy	= ceph_key_destroy,
 };
 

net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ const struct cred *dns_resolver_cache;
 #define	DNS_ERRORNO_OPTION	"dnserror"
 
 /*
- * Instantiate a user defined key for dns_resolver.
+ * Preparse instantiation data for a dns_resolver key.
  *
  * The data must be a NUL-terminated string, with the NUL char accounted in
  * datalen.
@@ -58,17 +58,15 @@ const struct cred *dns_resolver_cache;
  *        "ip1,ip2,...#foo=bar"
  */
 static int
-dns_resolver_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+dns_resolver_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 {
 	struct user_key_payload *upayload;
 	unsigned long derrno;
 	int ret;
-	size_t datalen = prep->datalen, result_len = 0;
+	int datalen = prep->datalen, result_len = 0;
 	const char *data = prep->data, *end, *opt;
 
-	kenter("%%%d,%s,'%*.*s',%zu",
-	       key->serial, key->description,
-	       (int)datalen, (int)datalen, data, datalen);
+	kenter("'%*.*s',%u", datalen, datalen, data, datalen);
 
 	if (datalen <= 1 || !data || data[datalen - 1] != '\0')
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -95,8 +93,7 @@ dns_resolver_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 			opt_len = next_opt - opt;
 			if (!opt_len) {
 				printk(KERN_WARNING
-				       "Empty option to dns_resolver key %d\n",
-				       key->serial);
+				       "Empty option to dns_resolver key\n");
 				return -EINVAL;
 			}
 
@@ -125,30 +122,28 @@ dns_resolver_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 					goto bad_option_value;
 
 				kdebug("dns error no. = %lu", derrno);
-				key->type_data.x[0] = -derrno;
+				prep->type_data[0] = ERR_PTR(-derrno);
 				continue;
 			}
 
 		bad_option_value:
 			printk(KERN_WARNING
-			       "Option '%*.*s' to dns_resolver key %d:"
+			       "Option '%*.*s' to dns_resolver key:"
 			       " bad/missing value\n",
-			       opt_nlen, opt_nlen, opt, key->serial);
+			       opt_nlen, opt_nlen, opt);
 			return -EINVAL;
 		} while (opt = next_opt + 1, opt < end);
 	}
 
 	/* don't cache the result if we're caching an error saying there's no
 	 * result */
-	if (key->type_data.x[0]) {
-		kleave(" = 0 [h_error %ld]", key->type_data.x[0]);
+	if (prep->type_data[0]) {
+		kleave(" = 0 [h_error %ld]", PTR_ERR(prep->type_data[0]));
 		return 0;
 	}
 
 	kdebug("store result");
-	ret = key_payload_reserve(key, result_len);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		return -EINVAL;
+	prep->quotalen = result_len;
 
 	upayload = kmalloc(sizeof(*upayload) + result_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!upayload) {
@@ -159,12 +154,22 @@ dns_resolver_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 	upayload->datalen = result_len;
 	memcpy(upayload->data, data, result_len);
 	upayload->data[result_len] = '\0';
-	rcu_assign_pointer(key->payload.data, upayload);
 
+	prep->payload[0] = upayload;
 	kleave(" = 0");
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Clean up the preparse data
+ */
+static void dns_resolver_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+	pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
+
+	kfree(prep->payload[0]);
+}
+
 /*
  * The description is of the form "[<type>:]<domain_name>"
  *
@@ -234,7 +239,9 @@ static long dns_resolver_read(const struct key *key,
 
 struct key_type key_type_dns_resolver = {
 	.name		= "dns_resolver",
-	.instantiate	= dns_resolver_instantiate,
+	.preparse	= dns_resolver_preparse,
+	.free_preparse	= dns_resolver_free_preparse,
+	.instantiate	= generic_key_instantiate,
 	.match		= dns_resolver_match,
 	.revoke		= user_revoke,
 	.destroy	= user_destroy,

net/dns_resolver/dns_query.c

@@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ int dns_query(const char *type, const char *name, size_t namelen,
 	}
 
 	down_read(&rkey->sem);
+	set_bit(KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL, &rkey->flags);
 	rkey->perm |= KEY_USR_VIEW;
 
 	ret = key_validate(rkey);

net/rxrpc/ar-key.c

@@ -26,8 +26,10 @@
 #include "ar-internal.h"
 
 static int rxrpc_vet_description_s(const char *);
-static int rxrpc_instantiate(struct key *, struct key_preparsed_payload *);
-static int rxrpc_instantiate_s(struct key *, struct key_preparsed_payload *);
+static int rxrpc_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *);
+static int rxrpc_preparse_s(struct key_preparsed_payload *);
+static void rxrpc_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *);
+static void rxrpc_free_preparse_s(struct key_preparsed_payload *);
 static void rxrpc_destroy(struct key *);
 static void rxrpc_destroy_s(struct key *);
 static void rxrpc_describe(const struct key *, struct seq_file *);
@@ -39,7 +41,9 @@ static long rxrpc_read(const struct key *, char __user *, size_t);
  */
 struct key_type key_type_rxrpc = {
 	.name		= "rxrpc",
-	.instantiate	= rxrpc_instantiate,
+	.preparse	= rxrpc_preparse,
+	.free_preparse	= rxrpc_free_preparse,
+	.instantiate	= generic_key_instantiate,
 	.match		= user_match,
 	.destroy	= rxrpc_destroy,
 	.describe	= rxrpc_describe,
@@ -54,7 +58,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_type_rxrpc);
 struct key_type key_type_rxrpc_s = {
 	.name		= "rxrpc_s",
 	.vet_description = rxrpc_vet_description_s,
-	.instantiate	= rxrpc_instantiate_s,
+	.preparse	= rxrpc_preparse_s,
+	.free_preparse	= rxrpc_free_preparse_s,
+	.instantiate	= generic_key_instantiate,
 	.match		= user_match,
 	.destroy	= rxrpc_destroy_s,
 	.describe	= rxrpc_describe,
@@ -81,13 +87,13 @@ static int rxrpc_vet_description_s(const char *desc)
  * parse an RxKAD type XDR format token
  * - the caller guarantees we have at least 4 words
  */
-static int rxrpc_instantiate_xdr_rxkad(struct key *key, const __be32 *xdr,
-				       unsigned int toklen)
+static int rxrpc_preparse_xdr_rxkad(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep,
+				    size_t datalen,
+				    const __be32 *xdr, unsigned int toklen)
 {
 	struct rxrpc_key_token *token, **pptoken;
 	size_t plen;
 	u32 tktlen;
-	int ret;
 
 	_enter(",{%x,%x,%x,%x},%u",
 	       ntohl(xdr[0]), ntohl(xdr[1]), ntohl(xdr[2]), ntohl(xdr[3]),
@@ -103,9 +109,7 @@ static int rxrpc_instantiate_xdr_rxkad(struct key *key, const __be32 *xdr,
 		return -EKEYREJECTED;
 
 	plen = sizeof(*token) + sizeof(*token->kad) + tktlen;
-	ret = key_payload_reserve(key, key->datalen + plen);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		return ret;
+	prep->quotalen = datalen + plen;
 
 	plen -= sizeof(*token);
 	token = kzalloc(sizeof(*token), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -146,16 +150,16 @@ static int rxrpc_instantiate_xdr_rxkad(struct key *key, const __be32 *xdr,
 		       token->kad->ticket[6], token->kad->ticket[7]);
 
 	/* count the number of tokens attached */
-	key->type_data.x[0]++;
+	prep->type_data[0] = (void *)((unsigned long)prep->type_data[0] + 1);
 
 	/* attach the data */
-	for (pptoken = (struct rxrpc_key_token **)&key->payload.data;
+	for (pptoken = (struct rxrpc_key_token **)&prep->payload[0];
 	     *pptoken;
 	     pptoken = &(*pptoken)->next)
 		continue;
 	*pptoken = token;
-	if (token->kad->expiry < key->expiry)
-		key->expiry = token->kad->expiry;
+	if (token->kad->expiry < prep->expiry)
+		prep->expiry = token->kad->expiry;
 
 	_leave(" = 0");
 	return 0;
@@ -418,8 +422,9 @@ static int rxrpc_krb5_decode_ticket(u8 **_ticket, u16 *_tktlen,
  * parse an RxK5 type XDR format token
  * - the caller guarantees we have at least 4 words
  */
-static int rxrpc_instantiate_xdr_rxk5(struct key *key, const __be32 *xdr,
-				      unsigned int toklen)
+static int rxrpc_preparse_xdr_rxk5(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep,
+				   size_t datalen,
+				   const __be32 *xdr, unsigned int toklen)
 {
 	struct rxrpc_key_token *token, **pptoken;
 	struct rxk5_key *rxk5;
@@ -432,9 +437,7 @@ static int rxrpc_instantiate_xdr_rxk5(struct key *key, const __be32 *xdr,
 
 	/* reserve some payload space for this subkey - the length of the token
 	 * is a reasonable approximation */
-	ret = key_payload_reserve(key, key->datalen + toklen);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		return ret;
+	prep->quotalen = datalen + toklen;
 
 	token = kzalloc(sizeof(*token), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!token)
@@ -520,14 +523,14 @@ static int rxrpc_instantiate_xdr_rxk5(struct key *key, const __be32 *xdr,
 	if (toklen != 0)
 		goto inval;
 
-	/* attach the payload to the key */
-	for (pptoken = (struct rxrpc_key_token **)&key->payload.data;
+	/* attach the payload */
+	for (pptoken = (struct rxrpc_key_token **)&prep->payload[0];
 	     *pptoken;
 	     pptoken = &(*pptoken)->next)
 		continue;
 	*pptoken = token;
-	if (token->kad->expiry < key->expiry)
-		key->expiry = token->kad->expiry;
+	if (token->kad->expiry < prep->expiry)
+		prep->expiry = token->kad->expiry;
 
 	_leave(" = 0");
 	return 0;
@@ -545,16 +548,17 @@ static int rxrpc_instantiate_xdr_rxk5(struct key *key, const __be32 *xdr,
  * attempt to parse the data as the XDR format
  * - the caller guarantees we have more than 7 words
  */
-static int rxrpc_instantiate_xdr(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen)
+static int rxrpc_preparse_xdr(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 {
-	const __be32 *xdr = data, *token;
+	const __be32 *xdr = prep->data, *token;
 	const char *cp;
 	unsigned int len, tmp, loop, ntoken, toklen, sec_ix;
+	size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
 	int ret;
 
 	_enter(",{%x,%x,%x,%x},%zu",
 	       ntohl(xdr[0]), ntohl(xdr[1]), ntohl(xdr[2]), ntohl(xdr[3]),
-	       datalen);
+	       prep->datalen);
 
 	if (datalen > AFSTOKEN_LENGTH_MAX)
 		goto not_xdr;
@@ -635,13 +639,13 @@ static int rxrpc_instantiate_xdr(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datal
 
 		switch (sec_ix) {
 		case RXRPC_SECURITY_RXKAD:
-			ret = rxrpc_instantiate_xdr_rxkad(key, xdr, toklen);
+			ret = rxrpc_preparse_xdr_rxkad(prep, datalen, xdr, toklen);
 			if (ret != 0)
 				goto error;
 			break;
 
 		case RXRPC_SECURITY_RXK5:
-			ret = rxrpc_instantiate_xdr_rxk5(key, xdr, toklen);
+			ret = rxrpc_preparse_xdr_rxk5(prep, datalen, xdr, toklen);
 			if (ret != 0)
 				goto error;
 			break;
@@ -665,8 +669,9 @@ static int rxrpc_instantiate_xdr(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datal
 }
 
 /*
- * instantiate an rxrpc defined key
- * data should be of the form:
+ * Preparse an rxrpc defined key.
+ *
+ * Data should be of the form:
  *	OFFSET	LEN	CONTENT
  *	0	4	key interface version number
  *	4	2	security index (type)
@@ -678,7 +683,7 @@ static int rxrpc_instantiate_xdr(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datal
  *
  * if no data is provided, then a no-security key is made
  */
-static int rxrpc_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+static int rxrpc_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 {
 	const struct rxrpc_key_data_v1 *v1;
 	struct rxrpc_key_token *token, **pp;
@@ -686,7 +691,7 @@ static int rxrpc_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep
 	u32 kver;
 	int ret;
 
-	_enter("{%x},,%zu", key_serial(key), prep->datalen);
+	_enter("%zu", prep->datalen);
 
 	/* handle a no-security key */
 	if (!prep->data && prep->datalen == 0)
@@ -694,7 +699,7 @@ static int rxrpc_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep
 
 	/* determine if the XDR payload format is being used */
 	if (prep->datalen > 7 * 4) {
-		ret = rxrpc_instantiate_xdr(key, prep->data, prep->datalen);
+		ret = rxrpc_preparse_xdr(prep);
 		if (ret != -EPROTO)
 			return ret;
 	}
@@ -743,9 +748,7 @@ static int rxrpc_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep
 		goto error;
 
 	plen = sizeof(*token->kad) + v1->ticket_length;
-	ret = key_payload_reserve(key, plen + sizeof(*token));
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto error;
+	prep->quotalen = plen + sizeof(*token);
 
 	ret = -ENOMEM;
 	token = kzalloc(sizeof(*token), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -762,15 +765,16 @@ static int rxrpc_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep
 	memcpy(&token->kad->session_key, &v1->session_key, 8);
 	memcpy(&token->kad->ticket, v1->ticket, v1->ticket_length);
 
-	/* attach the data */
-	key->type_data.x[0]++;
+	/* count the number of tokens attached */
+	prep->type_data[0] = (void *)((unsigned long)prep->type_data[0] + 1);
 
-	pp = (struct rxrpc_key_token **)&key->payload.data;
+	/* attach the data */
+	pp = (struct rxrpc_key_token **)&prep->payload[0];
 	while (*pp)
 		pp = &(*pp)->next;
 	*pp = token;
-	if (token->kad->expiry < key->expiry)
-		key->expiry = token->kad->expiry;
+	if (token->kad->expiry < prep->expiry)
+		prep->expiry = token->kad->expiry;
 	token = NULL;
 	ret = 0;
 
@@ -781,20 +785,55 @@ static int rxrpc_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep
 }
 
 /*
- * instantiate a server secret key
- * data should be a pointer to the 8-byte secret key
+ * Free token list.
  */
-static int rxrpc_instantiate_s(struct key *key,
-			       struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+static void rxrpc_free_token_list(struct rxrpc_key_token *token)
+{
+	struct rxrpc_key_token *next;
+
+	for (; token; token = next) {
+		next = token->next;
+		switch (token->security_index) {
+		case RXRPC_SECURITY_RXKAD:
+			kfree(token->kad);
+			break;
+		case RXRPC_SECURITY_RXK5:
+			if (token->k5)
+				rxrpc_rxk5_free(token->k5);
+			break;
+		default:
+			printk(KERN_ERR "Unknown token type %x on rxrpc key\n",
+			       token->security_index);
+			BUG();
+		}
+
+		kfree(token);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Clean up preparse data.
+ */
+static void rxrpc_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+	rxrpc_free_token_list(prep->payload[0]);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Preparse a server secret key.
+ *
+ * The data should be the 8-byte secret key.
+ */
+static int rxrpc_preparse_s(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 {
 	struct crypto_blkcipher *ci;
 
-	_enter("{%x},,%zu", key_serial(key), prep->datalen);
+	_enter("%zu", prep->datalen);
 
 	if (prep->datalen != 8)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	memcpy(&key->type_data, prep->data, 8);
+	memcpy(&prep->type_data, prep->data, 8);
 
 	ci = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("pcbc(des)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
 	if (IS_ERR(ci)) {
@@ -805,36 +844,26 @@ static int rxrpc_instantiate_s(struct key *key,
 	if (crypto_blkcipher_setkey(ci, prep->data, 8) < 0)
 		BUG();
 
-	key->payload.data = ci;
+	prep->payload[0] = ci;
 	_leave(" = 0");
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Clean up preparse data.
+ */
+static void rxrpc_free_preparse_s(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+	if (prep->payload[0])
+		crypto_free_blkcipher(prep->payload[0]);
+}
+
 /*
  * dispose of the data dangling from the corpse of a rxrpc key
  */
 static void rxrpc_destroy(struct key *key)
 {
-	struct rxrpc_key_token *token;
-
-	while ((token = key->payload.data)) {
-		key->payload.data = token->next;
-		switch (token->security_index) {
-		case RXRPC_SECURITY_RXKAD:
-			kfree(token->kad);
-			break;
-		case RXRPC_SECURITY_RXK5:
-			if (token->k5)
-				rxrpc_rxk5_free(token->k5);
-			break;
-		default:
-			printk(KERN_ERR "Unknown token type %x on rxrpc key\n",
-			       token->security_index);
-			BUG();
-		}
-
-		kfree(token);
-	}
+	rxrpc_free_token_list(key->payload.data);
 }
 
 /*

security/integrity/digsig.c

@@ -13,7 +13,9 @@
 #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
 
 #include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/rbtree.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
 #include <linux/key-type.h>
 #include <linux/digsig.h>
 
@@ -24,7 +26,11 @@ static struct key *keyring[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX];
 static const char *keyring_name[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX] = {
 	"_evm",
 	"_module",
+#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
 	"_ima",
+#else
+	".ima",
+#endif
 };
 
 int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
@@ -56,3 +62,25 @@ int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
 
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
+
+int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	int err = 0;
+
+	keyring[id] = keyring_alloc(keyring_name[id], KUIDT_INIT(0),
+				    KGIDT_INIT(0), cred,
+				    ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
+				     KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ |
+				     KEY_USR_WRITE | KEY_USR_SEARCH),
+				    KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
+	if (!IS_ERR(keyring[id]))
+		set_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &keyring[id]->flags);
+	else {
+		err = PTR_ERR(keyring[id]);
+		pr_info("Can't allocate %s keyring (%d)\n",
+			keyring_name[id], err);
+		keyring[id] = NULL;
+	}
+	return err;
+}

security/integrity/ima/Kconfig

@@ -123,3 +123,13 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE
 	  For more information on integrity appraisal refer to:
 	  <http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net>
 	  If unsure, say N.
+
+config IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+	bool "Require all keys on the .ima keyring be signed"
+	depends on IMA_APPRAISE && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+	depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+	select KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS
+	default y
+	help
+	   This option requires that all keys added to the .ima
+	   keyring be signed by a key on the system trusted keyring.

security/integrity/ima/ima.h

@@ -249,4 +249,16 @@ static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+static inline int ima_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
+{
+	return integrity_init_keyring(id);
+}
+#else
+static inline int ima_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING */
 #endif

security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c

@@ -325,8 +325,14 @@ static int __init init_ima(void)
 
 	hash_setup(CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH);
 	error = ima_init();
-	if (!error)
+	if (error)
+		goto out;
+
+	error = ima_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA);
+	if (error)
+		goto out;
 	ima_initialized = 1;
+out:
 	return error;
 }
 

security/integrity/integrity.h

@@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode);
 int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
 			    const char *digest, int digestlen);
 
+int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id);
 #else
 
 static inline int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id,
@@ -133,6 +134,10 @@ static inline int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id,
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
 
+static inline int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS

security/keys/big_key.c

@@ -34,7 +34,9 @@ MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
 struct key_type key_type_big_key = {
 	.name			= "big_key",
 	.def_lookup_type	= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
-	.instantiate		= big_key_instantiate,
+	.preparse		= big_key_preparse,
+	.free_preparse		= big_key_free_preparse,
+	.instantiate		= generic_key_instantiate,
 	.match			= user_match,
 	.revoke			= big_key_revoke,
 	.destroy		= big_key_destroy,
@@ -43,11 +45,11 @@ struct key_type key_type_big_key = {
 };
 
 /*
- * Instantiate a big key
+ * Preparse a big key
  */
-int big_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 {
-	struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data2;
+	struct path *path = (struct path *)&prep->payload;
 	struct file *file;
 	ssize_t written;
 	size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
@@ -58,11 +60,9 @@ int big_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 		goto error;
 
 	/* Set an arbitrary quota */
-	ret = key_payload_reserve(key, 16);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto error;
+	prep->quotalen = 16;
 
-	key->type_data.x[1] = datalen;
+	prep->type_data[1] = (void *)(unsigned long)datalen;
 
 	if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
 		/* Create a shmem file to store the data in.  This will permit the data
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ int big_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 		file = shmem_kernel_file_setup("", datalen, 0);
 		if (IS_ERR(file)) {
 			ret = PTR_ERR(file);
-			goto err_quota;
+			goto error;
 		}
 
 		written = kernel_write(file, prep->data, prep->datalen, 0);
@@ -93,23 +93,32 @@ int big_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 	} else {
 		/* Just store the data in a buffer */
 		void *data = kmalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (!data) {
-			ret = -ENOMEM;
-			goto err_quota;
-		}
+		if (!data)
+			return -ENOMEM;
 
-		key->payload.data = memcpy(data, prep->data, prep->datalen);
+		prep->payload[0] = memcpy(data, prep->data, prep->datalen);
 	}
 	return 0;
 
 err_fput:
 	fput(file);
-err_quota:
-	key_payload_reserve(key, 0);
 error:
 	return ret;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Clear preparsement.
+ */
+void big_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+	if (prep->datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
+		struct path *path = (struct path *)&prep->payload;
+		path_put(path);
+	} else {
+		kfree(prep->payload[0]);
+	}
+}
+
 /*
  * dispose of the links from a revoked keyring
  * - called with the key sem write-locked

security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c

@@ -811,7 +811,7 @@ static int encrypted_instantiate(struct key *key,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	rcu_assign_keypointer(key, epayload);
+	prep->payload[0] = epayload;
 out:
 	kfree(datablob);
 	return ret;

security/keys/key.c

@@ -437,6 +437,11 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
 			/* disable the authorisation key */
 			if (authkey)
 				key_revoke(authkey);
+
+			if (prep->expiry != TIME_T_MAX) {
+				key->expiry = prep->expiry;
+				key_schedule_gc(prep->expiry + key_gc_delay);
+			}
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -479,6 +484,7 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
 	prep.data = data;
 	prep.datalen = datalen;
 	prep.quotalen = key->type->def_datalen;
+	prep.expiry = TIME_T_MAX;
 	if (key->type->preparse) {
 		ret = key->type->preparse(&prep);
 		if (ret < 0)
@@ -488,7 +494,7 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
 	if (keyring) {
 		ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &key->index_key, &edit);
 		if (ret < 0)
-			goto error_free_preparse;
+			goto error;
 	}
 
 	ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, &prep, keyring, authkey, &edit);
@@ -496,10 +502,9 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
 	if (keyring)
 		__key_link_end(keyring, &key->index_key, edit);
 
-error_free_preparse:
+error:
 	if (key->type->preparse)
 		key->type->free_preparse(&prep);
-error:
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -811,11 +816,12 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 	prep.datalen = plen;
 	prep.quotalen = index_key.type->def_datalen;
 	prep.trusted = flags & KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED;
+	prep.expiry = TIME_T_MAX;
 	if (index_key.type->preparse) {
 		ret = index_key.type->preparse(&prep);
 		if (ret < 0) {
 			key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
-			goto error_put_type;
+			goto error_free_prep;
 		}
 		if (!index_key.description)
 			index_key.description = prep.description;
@@ -941,6 +947,7 @@ int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen)
 	prep.data = payload;
 	prep.datalen = plen;
 	prep.quotalen = key->type->def_datalen;
+	prep.expiry = TIME_T_MAX;
 	if (key->type->preparse) {
 		ret = key->type->preparse(&prep);
 		if (ret < 0)
@@ -956,9 +963,9 @@ int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen)
 
 	up_write(&key->sem);
 
+error:
 	if (key->type->preparse)
 		key->type->free_preparse(&prep);
-error:
 	return ret;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_update);
@@ -1023,6 +1030,38 @@ void key_invalidate(struct key *key)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_invalidate);
 
+/**
+ * generic_key_instantiate - Simple instantiation of a key from preparsed data
+ * @key: The key to be instantiated
+ * @prep: The preparsed data to load.
+ *
+ * Instantiate a key from preparsed data.  We assume we can just copy the data
+ * in directly and clear the old pointers.
+ *
+ * This can be pointed to directly by the key type instantiate op pointer.
+ */
+int generic_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
+
+	ret = key_payload_reserve(key, prep->quotalen);
+	if (ret == 0) {
+		key->type_data.p[0] = prep->type_data[0];
+		key->type_data.p[1] = prep->type_data[1];
+		rcu_assign_keypointer(key, prep->payload[0]);
+		key->payload.data2[1] = prep->payload[1];
+		prep->type_data[0] = NULL;
+		prep->type_data[1] = NULL;
+		prep->payload[0] = NULL;
+		prep->payload[1] = NULL;
+	}
+	pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(generic_key_instantiate);
+
 /**
  * register_key_type - Register a type of key.
  * @ktype: The new key type.

security/keys/keyctl.c

@@ -37,8 +37,6 @@ static int key_get_type_from_user(char *type,
 		return ret;
 	if (ret == 0 || ret >= len)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	if (type[0] == '.')
-		return -EPERM;
 	type[len - 1] = '\0';
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -86,6 +84,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type,
 		if (!*description) {
 			kfree(description);
 			description = NULL;
+		} else if ((description[0] == '.') &&
+			   (strncmp(type, "keyring", 7) == 0)) {
+			ret = -EPERM;
+			goto error2;
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -404,12 +406,25 @@ long keyctl_invalidate_key(key_serial_t id)
 	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_SEARCH);
 	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
+
+		/* Root is permitted to invalidate certain special keys */
+		if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+			key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, 0);
+			if (IS_ERR(key_ref))
 				goto error;
+			if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL,
+				     &key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->flags))
+				goto invalidate;
+			goto error_put;
 		}
 
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+invalidate:
 	key_invalidate(key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref));
 	ret = 0;
-
+error_put:
 	key_ref_put(key_ref);
 error:
 	kleave(" = %ld", ret);

security/keys/keyring.c

@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ static inline unsigned keyring_hash(const char *desc)
  * can be treated as ordinary keys in addition to having their own special
  * operations.
  */
+static int keyring_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
+static void keyring_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
 static int keyring_instantiate(struct key *keyring,
 			       struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
 static void keyring_revoke(struct key *keyring);
@@ -84,6 +86,8 @@ static long keyring_read(const struct key *keyring,
 struct key_type key_type_keyring = {
 	.name		= "keyring",
 	.def_datalen	= 0,
+	.preparse	= keyring_preparse,
+	.free_preparse	= keyring_free_preparse,
 	.instantiate	= keyring_instantiate,
 	.match		= user_match,
 	.revoke		= keyring_revoke,
@@ -122,6 +126,21 @@ static void keyring_publish_name(struct key *keyring)
 	}
 }
 
+/*
+ * Preparse a keyring payload
+ */
+static int keyring_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+	return prep->datalen != 0 ? -EINVAL : 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free a preparse of a user defined key payload
+ */
+static void keyring_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+}
+
 /*
  * Initialise a keyring.
  *
@@ -130,17 +149,10 @@ static void keyring_publish_name(struct key *keyring)
 static int keyring_instantiate(struct key *keyring,
 			       struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 {
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = -EINVAL;
-	if (prep->datalen == 0) {
 	assoc_array_init(&keyring->keys);
 	/* make the keyring available by name if it has one */
 	keyring_publish_name(keyring);
-		ret = 0;
-	}
-
-	return ret;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /*

security/keys/request_key_auth.c

@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@
 #include "internal.h"
 #include <keys/user-type.h>
 
+static int request_key_auth_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *);
+static void request_key_auth_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *);
 static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *,
 					struct key_preparsed_payload *);
 static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *, struct seq_file *);
@@ -33,6 +35,8 @@ static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *, char __user *, size_t);
 struct key_type key_type_request_key_auth = {
 	.name		= ".request_key_auth",
 	.def_datalen	= sizeof(struct request_key_auth),
+	.preparse	= request_key_auth_preparse,
+	.free_preparse	= request_key_auth_free_preparse,
 	.instantiate	= request_key_auth_instantiate,
 	.describe	= request_key_auth_describe,
 	.revoke		= request_key_auth_revoke,
@@ -40,6 +44,15 @@ struct key_type key_type_request_key_auth = {
 	.read		= request_key_auth_read,
 };
 
+int request_key_auth_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void request_key_auth_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+}
+
 /*
  * Instantiate a request-key authorisation key.
  */

security/keys/user_defined.c

@@ -27,7 +27,9 @@ static int logon_vet_description(const char *desc);
 struct key_type key_type_user = {
 	.name			= "user",
 	.def_lookup_type	= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
-	.instantiate		= user_instantiate,
+	.preparse		= user_preparse,
+	.free_preparse		= user_free_preparse,
+	.instantiate		= generic_key_instantiate,
 	.update			= user_update,
 	.match			= user_match,
 	.revoke			= user_revoke,
@@ -47,7 +49,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_user);
 struct key_type key_type_logon = {
 	.name			= "logon",
 	.def_lookup_type	= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
-	.instantiate		= user_instantiate,
+	.preparse		= user_preparse,
+	.free_preparse		= user_free_preparse,
+	.instantiate		= generic_key_instantiate,
 	.update			= user_update,
 	.match			= user_match,
 	.revoke			= user_revoke,
@@ -58,38 +62,37 @@ struct key_type key_type_logon = {
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_logon);
 
 /*
- * instantiate a user defined key
+ * Preparse a user defined key payload
  */
-int user_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+int user_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 {
 	struct user_key_payload *upayload;
 	size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
-	int ret;
 
-	ret = -EINVAL;
 	if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
-		goto error;
-
-	ret = key_payload_reserve(key, datalen);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto error;
+		return -EINVAL;
 
-	ret = -ENOMEM;
 	upayload = kmalloc(sizeof(*upayload) + datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!upayload)
-		goto error;
+		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	/* attach the data */
+	prep->quotalen = datalen;
+	prep->payload[0] = upayload;
 	upayload->datalen = datalen;
 	memcpy(upayload->data, prep->data, datalen);
-	rcu_assign_keypointer(key, upayload);
-	ret = 0;
-
-error:
-	return ret;
+	return 0;
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_preparse);
 
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_instantiate);
+/*
+ * Free a preparse of a user defined key payload
+ */
+void user_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+	kfree(prep->payload[0]);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_free_preparse);
 
 /*
  * update a user defined key