Commit f0d8690a authored by Linus Torvalds's avatar Linus Torvalds

Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm

Pull KVM fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
 "This includes a fix for two oopses, one on PPC and on x86.

  The rest is fixes for bugs with newer Intel processors"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
  kvm/fpu: Enable eager restore kvm FPU for MPX
  Revert "KVM: x86: drop fpu_activate hook"
  kvm: fix crash in kvm_vcpu_reload_apic_access_page
  KVM: MMU: fix SMAP virtualization
  KVM: MMU: fix CR4.SMEP=1, CR0.WP=0 with shadow pages
  KVM: MMU: fix smap permission check
  KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix list traversal in error case
parents 2f8126e3 c447e76b
......@@ -169,6 +169,10 @@ Shadow pages contain the following information:
Contains the value of cr4.smep && !cr0.wp for which the page is valid
(pages for which this is true are different from other pages; see the
treatment of cr0.wp=0 below).
role.smap_andnot_wp:
Contains the value of cr4.smap && !cr0.wp for which the page is valid
(pages for which this is true are different from other pages; see the
treatment of cr0.wp=0 below).
gfn:
Either the guest page table containing the translations shadowed by this
page, or the base page frame for linear translations. See role.direct.
......@@ -344,10 +348,16 @@ on fault type:
(user write faults generate a #PF)
In the first case there is an additional complication if CR4.SMEP is
enabled: since we've turned the page into a kernel page, the kernel may now
execute it. We handle this by also setting spte.nx. If we get a user
fetch or read fault, we'll change spte.u=1 and spte.nx=gpte.nx back.
In the first case there are two additional complications:
- if CR4.SMEP is enabled: since we've turned the page into a kernel page,
the kernel may now execute it. We handle this by also setting spte.nx.
If we get a user fetch or read fault, we'll change spte.u=1 and
spte.nx=gpte.nx back.
- if CR4.SMAP is disabled: since the page has been changed to a kernel
page, it can not be reused when CR4.SMAP is enabled. We set
CR4.SMAP && !CR0.WP into shadow page's role to avoid this case. Note,
here we do not care the case that CR4.SMAP is enabled since KVM will
directly inject #PF to guest due to failed permission check.
To prevent an spte that was converted into a kernel page with cr0.wp=0
from being written by the kernel after cr0.wp has changed to 1, we make
......
......@@ -1952,7 +1952,7 @@ static void post_guest_process(struct kvmppc_vcore *vc)
*/
static noinline void kvmppc_run_core(struct kvmppc_vcore *vc)
{
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, *vnext;
int i;
int srcu_idx;
......@@ -1982,7 +1982,8 @@ static noinline void kvmppc_run_core(struct kvmppc_vcore *vc)
*/
if ((threads_per_core > 1) &&
((vc->num_threads > threads_per_subcore) || !on_primary_thread())) {
list_for_each_entry(vcpu, &vc->runnable_threads, arch.run_list) {
list_for_each_entry_safe(vcpu, vnext, &vc->runnable_threads,
arch.run_list) {
vcpu->arch.ret = -EBUSY;
kvmppc_remove_runnable(vc, vcpu);
wake_up(&vcpu->arch.cpu_run);
......
......@@ -207,6 +207,7 @@ union kvm_mmu_page_role {
unsigned nxe:1;
unsigned cr0_wp:1;
unsigned smep_andnot_wp:1;
unsigned smap_andnot_wp:1;
};
};
......@@ -400,6 +401,7 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch {
struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache mmu_page_header_cache;
struct fpu guest_fpu;
bool eager_fpu;
u64 xcr0;
u64 guest_supported_xcr0;
u32 guest_xstate_size;
......@@ -743,6 +745,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
void (*cache_reg)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_reg reg);
unsigned long (*get_rflags)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void (*set_rflags)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long rflags);
void (*fpu_activate)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void (*fpu_deactivate)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void (*tlb_flush)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
......
......@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/i387.h> /* For use_eager_fpu. Ugh! */
#include <asm/fpu-internal.h> /* For use_eager_fpu. Ugh! */
#include <asm/user.h>
#include <asm/xsave.h>
#include "cpuid.h"
......@@ -95,6 +97,8 @@ int kvm_update_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (best && (best->eax & (F(XSAVES) | F(XSAVEC))))
best->ebx = xstate_required_size(vcpu->arch.xcr0, true);
vcpu->arch.eager_fpu = guest_cpuid_has_mpx(vcpu);
/*
* The existing code assumes virtual address is 48-bit in the canonical
* address checks; exit if it is ever changed.
......
......@@ -117,4 +117,12 @@ static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_rtm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 7, 0);
return best && (best->ebx & bit(X86_FEATURE_RTM));
}
static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_mpx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 7, 0);
return best && (best->ebx & bit(X86_FEATURE_MPX));
}
#endif
......@@ -3736,7 +3736,7 @@ static void reset_rsvds_bits_mask_ept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
}
}
void update_permission_bitmask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
static void update_permission_bitmask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_mmu *mmu, bool ept)
{
unsigned bit, byte, pfec;
......@@ -3918,6 +3918,7 @@ static void init_kvm_tdp_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
void kvm_init_shadow_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
bool smep = kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_SMEP);
bool smap = kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_SMAP);
struct kvm_mmu *context = &vcpu->arch.mmu;
MMU_WARN_ON(VALID_PAGE(context->root_hpa));
......@@ -3936,6 +3937,8 @@ void kvm_init_shadow_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
context->base_role.cr0_wp = is_write_protection(vcpu);
context->base_role.smep_andnot_wp
= smep && !is_write_protection(vcpu);
context->base_role.smap_andnot_wp
= smap && !is_write_protection(vcpu);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_init_shadow_mmu);
......@@ -4207,12 +4210,18 @@ void kvm_mmu_pte_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
const u8 *new, int bytes)
{
gfn_t gfn = gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT;
union kvm_mmu_page_role mask = { .word = 0 };
struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
LIST_HEAD(invalid_list);
u64 entry, gentry, *spte;
int npte;
bool remote_flush, local_flush, zap_page;
union kvm_mmu_page_role mask = (union kvm_mmu_page_role) {
.cr0_wp = 1,
.cr4_pae = 1,
.nxe = 1,
.smep_andnot_wp = 1,
.smap_andnot_wp = 1,
};
/*
* If we don't have indirect shadow pages, it means no page is
......@@ -4238,7 +4247,6 @@ void kvm_mmu_pte_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
++vcpu->kvm->stat.mmu_pte_write;
kvm_mmu_audit(vcpu, AUDIT_PRE_PTE_WRITE);
mask.cr0_wp = mask.cr4_pae = mask.nxe = 1;
for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(vcpu->kvm, sp, gfn) {
if (detect_write_misaligned(sp, gpa, bytes) ||
detect_write_flooding(sp)) {
......
......@@ -71,8 +71,6 @@ enum {
int handle_mmio_page_fault_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr, bool direct);
void kvm_init_shadow_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void kvm_init_shadow_ept_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool execonly);
void update_permission_bitmask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
bool ept);
static inline unsigned int kvm_mmu_available_pages(struct kvm *kvm)
{
......@@ -166,6 +164,8 @@ static inline bool permission_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
int index = (pfec >> 1) +
(smap >> (X86_EFLAGS_AC_BIT - PFERR_RSVD_BIT + 1));
WARN_ON(pfec & PFERR_RSVD_MASK);
return (mmu->permissions[index] >> pte_access) & 1;
}
......
......@@ -718,6 +718,13 @@ static int FNAME(page_fault)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t addr, u32 error_code,
mmu_is_nested(vcpu));
if (likely(r != RET_MMIO_PF_INVALID))
return r;
/*
* page fault with PFEC.RSVD = 1 is caused by shadow
* page fault, should not be used to walk guest page
* table.
*/
error_code &= ~PFERR_RSVD_MASK;
};
r = mmu_topup_memory_caches(vcpu);
......
......@@ -4381,6 +4381,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops = {
.cache_reg = svm_cache_reg,
.get_rflags = svm_get_rflags,
.set_rflags = svm_set_rflags,
.fpu_activate = svm_fpu_activate,
.fpu_deactivate = svm_fpu_deactivate,
.tlb_flush = svm_flush_tlb,
......
......@@ -10185,6 +10185,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops = {
.cache_reg = vmx_cache_reg,
.get_rflags = vmx_get_rflags,
.set_rflags = vmx_set_rflags,
.fpu_activate = vmx_fpu_activate,
.fpu_deactivate = vmx_fpu_deactivate,
.tlb_flush = vmx_flush_tlb,
......
......@@ -702,8 +702,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_set_xcr);
int kvm_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
{
unsigned long old_cr4 = kvm_read_cr4(vcpu);
unsigned long pdptr_bits = X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_PSE |
X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_SMEP;
unsigned long pdptr_bits = X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_PSE | X86_CR4_PAE |
X86_CR4_SMEP | X86_CR4_SMAP;
if (cr4 & CR4_RESERVED_BITS)
return 1;
......@@ -744,9 +745,6 @@ int kvm_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
(!(cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE) && (old_cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE)))
kvm_mmu_reset_context(vcpu);
if ((cr4 ^ old_cr4) & X86_CR4_SMAP)
update_permission_bitmask(vcpu, vcpu->arch.walk_mmu, false);
if ((cr4 ^ old_cr4) & X86_CR4_OSXSAVE)
kvm_update_cpuid(vcpu);
......@@ -6197,6 +6195,8 @@ void kvm_vcpu_reload_apic_access_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return;
page = gfn_to_page(vcpu->kvm, APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE >> PAGE_SHIFT);
if (is_error_page(page))
return;
kvm_x86_ops->set_apic_access_page_addr(vcpu, page_to_phys(page));
/*
......@@ -7060,7 +7060,9 @@ void kvm_put_guest_fpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
fpu_save_init(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu);
__kernel_fpu_end();
++vcpu->stat.fpu_reload;
if (!vcpu->arch.eager_fpu)
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_DEACTIVATE_FPU, vcpu);
trace_kvm_fpu(0);
}
......@@ -7076,11 +7078,21 @@ void kvm_arch_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
struct kvm_vcpu *kvm_arch_vcpu_create(struct kvm *kvm,
unsigned int id)
{
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
if (check_tsc_unstable() && atomic_read(&kvm->online_vcpus) != 0)
printk_once(KERN_WARNING
"kvm: SMP vm created on host with unstable TSC; "
"guest TSC will not be reliable\n");
return kvm_x86_ops->vcpu_create(kvm, id);
vcpu = kvm_x86_ops->vcpu_create(kvm, id);
/*
* Activate fpu unconditionally in case the guest needs eager FPU. It will be
* deactivated soon if it doesn't.
*/
kvm_x86_ops->fpu_activate(vcpu);
return vcpu;
}
int kvm_arch_vcpu_setup(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
......
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