Commit 0b243d00 authored by Vakul Garg's avatar Vakul Garg Committed by David S. Miller

net/tls: Combined memory allocation for decryption request

For preparing decryption request, several memory chunks are required
(aead_req, sgin, sgout, iv, aad). For submitting the decrypt request to
an accelerator, it is required that the buffers which are read by the
accelerator must be dma-able and not come from stack. The buffers for
aad and iv can be separately kmalloced each, but it is inefficient.
This patch does a combined allocation for preparing decryption request
and then segments into aead_req || sgin || sgout || iv || aad.
Signed-off-by: default avatarVakul Garg <vakul.garg@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
parent 78cbac64
......@@ -124,10 +124,6 @@ struct tls_sw_context_rx {
struct sk_buff *recv_pkt;
u8 control;
bool decrypted;
char rx_aad_ciphertext[TLS_AAD_SPACE_SIZE];
char rx_aad_plaintext[TLS_AAD_SPACE_SIZE];
};
struct tls_record_info {
......
......@@ -48,19 +48,13 @@ static int tls_do_decryption(struct sock *sk,
struct scatterlist *sgout,
char *iv_recv,
size_t data_len,
struct sk_buff *skb,
gfp_t flags)
struct aead_request *aead_req)
{
struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
struct aead_request *aead_req;
int ret;
aead_req = aead_request_alloc(ctx->aead_recv, flags);
if (!aead_req)
return -ENOMEM;
aead_request_set_tfm(aead_req, ctx->aead_recv);
aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, TLS_AAD_SPACE_SIZE);
aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, sgin, sgout,
data_len + tls_ctx->rx.tag_size,
......@@ -69,8 +63,6 @@ static int tls_do_decryption(struct sock *sk,
crypto_req_done, &ctx->async_wait);
ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req), &ctx->async_wait);
aead_request_free(aead_req);
return ret;
}
......@@ -657,8 +649,132 @@ static struct sk_buff *tls_wait_data(struct sock *sk, int flags,
return skb;
}
/* This function decrypts the input skb into either out_iov or in out_sg
* or in skb buffers itself. The input parameter 'zc' indicates if
* zero-copy mode needs to be tried or not. With zero-copy mode, either
* out_iov or out_sg must be non-NULL. In case both out_iov and out_sg are
* NULL, then the decryption happens inside skb buffers itself, i.e.
* zero-copy gets disabled and 'zc' is updated.
*/
static int decrypt_internal(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct iov_iter *out_iov,
struct scatterlist *out_sg,
int *chunk, bool *zc)
{
struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
int n_sgin, n_sgout, nsg, mem_size, aead_size, err, pages = 0;
struct aead_request *aead_req;
struct sk_buff *unused;
u8 *aad, *iv, *mem = NULL;
struct scatterlist *sgin = NULL;
struct scatterlist *sgout = NULL;
const int data_len = rxm->full_len - tls_ctx->rx.overhead_size;
if (*zc && (out_iov || out_sg)) {
if (out_iov)
n_sgout = iov_iter_npages(out_iov, INT_MAX) + 1;
else
n_sgout = sg_nents(out_sg);
} else {
n_sgout = 0;
*zc = false;
}
n_sgin = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &unused);
if (n_sgin < 1)
return -EBADMSG;
/* Increment to accommodate AAD */
n_sgin = n_sgin + 1;
nsg = n_sgin + n_sgout;
aead_size = sizeof(*aead_req) + crypto_aead_reqsize(ctx->aead_recv);
mem_size = aead_size + (nsg * sizeof(struct scatterlist));
mem_size = mem_size + TLS_AAD_SPACE_SIZE;
mem_size = mem_size + crypto_aead_ivsize(ctx->aead_recv);
/* Allocate a single block of memory which contains
* aead_req || sgin[] || sgout[] || aad || iv.
* This order achieves correct alignment for aead_req, sgin, sgout.
*/
mem = kmalloc(mem_size, sk->sk_allocation);
if (!mem)
return -ENOMEM;
/* Segment the allocated memory */
aead_req = (struct aead_request *)mem;
sgin = (struct scatterlist *)(mem + aead_size);
sgout = sgin + n_sgin;
aad = (u8 *)(sgout + n_sgout);
iv = aad + TLS_AAD_SPACE_SIZE;
/* Prepare IV */
err = skb_copy_bits(skb, rxm->offset + TLS_HEADER_SIZE,
iv + TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_SALT_SIZE,
tls_ctx->rx.iv_size);
if (err < 0) {
kfree(mem);
return err;
}
memcpy(iv, tls_ctx->rx.iv, TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_SALT_SIZE);
/* Prepare AAD */
tls_make_aad(aad, rxm->full_len - tls_ctx->rx.overhead_size,
tls_ctx->rx.rec_seq, tls_ctx->rx.rec_seq_size,
ctx->control);
/* Prepare sgin */
sg_init_table(sgin, n_sgin);
sg_set_buf(&sgin[0], aad, TLS_AAD_SPACE_SIZE);
err = skb_to_sgvec(skb, &sgin[1],
rxm->offset + tls_ctx->rx.prepend_size,
rxm->full_len - tls_ctx->rx.prepend_size);
if (err < 0) {
kfree(mem);
return err;
}
if (n_sgout) {
if (out_iov) {
sg_init_table(sgout, n_sgout);
sg_set_buf(&sgout[0], aad, TLS_AAD_SPACE_SIZE);
*chunk = 0;
err = zerocopy_from_iter(sk, out_iov, data_len, &pages,
chunk, &sgout[1],
(n_sgout - 1), false);
if (err < 0)
goto fallback_to_reg_recv;
} else if (out_sg) {
memcpy(sgout, out_sg, n_sgout * sizeof(*sgout));
} else {
goto fallback_to_reg_recv;
}
} else {
fallback_to_reg_recv:
sgout = sgin;
pages = 0;
*chunk = 0;
*zc = false;
}
/* Prepare and submit AEAD request */
err = tls_do_decryption(sk, sgin, sgout, iv, data_len, aead_req);
/* Release the pages in case iov was mapped to pages */
for (; pages > 0; pages--)
put_page(sg_page(&sgout[pages]));
kfree(mem);
return err;
}
static int decrypt_skb_update(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct scatterlist *sgout, bool *zc)
struct iov_iter *dest, int *chunk, bool *zc)
{
struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
......@@ -671,7 +787,7 @@ static int decrypt_skb_update(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
return err;
#endif
if (!ctx->decrypted) {
err = decrypt_skb(sk, skb, sgout);
err = decrypt_internal(sk, skb, dest, NULL, chunk, zc);
if (err < 0)
return err;
} else {
......@@ -690,54 +806,10 @@ static int decrypt_skb_update(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
int decrypt_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct scatterlist *sgout)
{
struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
char iv[TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_SALT_SIZE + MAX_IV_SIZE];
struct scatterlist sgin_arr[MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 2];
struct scatterlist *sgin = &sgin_arr[0];
struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
int ret, nsg = ARRAY_SIZE(sgin_arr);
struct sk_buff *unused;
ret = skb_copy_bits(skb, rxm->offset + TLS_HEADER_SIZE,
iv + TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_SALT_SIZE,
tls_ctx->rx.iv_size);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
memcpy(iv, tls_ctx->rx.iv, TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_SALT_SIZE);
if (!sgout) {
nsg = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &unused) + 1;
sgin = kmalloc_array(nsg, sizeof(*sgin), sk->sk_allocation);
sgout = sgin;
}
sg_init_table(sgin, nsg);
sg_set_buf(&sgin[0], ctx->rx_aad_ciphertext, TLS_AAD_SPACE_SIZE);
nsg = skb_to_sgvec(skb, &sgin[1],
rxm->offset + tls_ctx->rx.prepend_size,
rxm->full_len - tls_ctx->rx.prepend_size);
if (nsg < 0) {
ret = nsg;
goto out;
}
tls_make_aad(ctx->rx_aad_ciphertext,
rxm->full_len - tls_ctx->rx.overhead_size,
tls_ctx->rx.rec_seq,
tls_ctx->rx.rec_seq_size,
ctx->control);
ret = tls_do_decryption(sk, sgin, sgout, iv,
rxm->full_len - tls_ctx->rx.overhead_size,
skb, sk->sk_allocation);
out:
if (sgin != &sgin_arr[0])
kfree(sgin);
bool zc = true;
int chunk;
return ret;
return decrypt_internal(sk, skb, NULL, sgout, &chunk, &zc);
}
static bool tls_sw_advance_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
......@@ -816,44 +888,18 @@ int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk,
}
if (!ctx->decrypted) {
int page_count;
int to_copy;
page_count = iov_iter_npages(&msg->msg_iter,
MAX_SKB_FRAGS);
to_copy = rxm->full_len - tls_ctx->rx.overhead_size;
if (!is_kvec && to_copy <= len && page_count < MAX_SKB_FRAGS &&
likely(!(flags & MSG_PEEK))) {
struct scatterlist sgin[MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1];
int pages = 0;
int to_copy = rxm->full_len - tls_ctx->rx.overhead_size;
if (!is_kvec && to_copy <= len &&
likely(!(flags & MSG_PEEK)))
zc = true;
sg_init_table(sgin, MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1);
sg_set_buf(&sgin[0], ctx->rx_aad_plaintext,
TLS_AAD_SPACE_SIZE);
err = zerocopy_from_iter(sk, &msg->msg_iter,
to_copy, &pages,
&chunk, &sgin[1],
MAX_SKB_FRAGS, false);
if (err < 0)
goto fallback_to_reg_recv;
err = decrypt_skb_update(sk, skb, sgin, &zc);
for (; pages > 0; pages--)
put_page(sg_page(&sgin[pages]));
if (err < 0) {
tls_err_abort(sk, EBADMSG);
goto recv_end;
}
} else {
fallback_to_reg_recv:
err = decrypt_skb_update(sk, skb, NULL, &zc);
err = decrypt_skb_update(sk, skb, &msg->msg_iter,
&chunk, &zc);
if (err < 0) {
tls_err_abort(sk, EBADMSG);
goto recv_end;
}
}
ctx->decrypted = true;
}
......@@ -903,7 +949,7 @@ ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock, loff_t *ppos,
int err = 0;
long timeo;
int chunk;
bool zc;
bool zc = false;
lock_sock(sk);
......@@ -920,7 +966,7 @@ ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock, loff_t *ppos,
}
if (!ctx->decrypted) {
err = decrypt_skb_update(sk, skb, NULL, &zc);
err = decrypt_skb_update(sk, skb, NULL, &chunk, &zc);
if (err < 0) {
tls_err_abort(sk, EBADMSG);
......
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