Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pablo/nf

Pablo Neira Ayuso says:

====================
The following patchset contains Netfilter fixes for your net tree, they are:

1) Fix a leak in IPVS, the sysctl table is not released accordingly when
   destroying a netns, patch from Tommi Rantala.

2) Fix a build error when TPROXY and socket are built-in but IPv6 defrag is
   compiled as module, from Florian Westphal.

3) Fix TCP tracket wrt. RFC5961 challenge ACK when in LAST_ACK state, patch
   from Jesper Dangaard Brouer.

4) Fix a bogus WARN_ON() in nf_tables when deleting a set element that stores
   a map, from Mirek Kratochvil.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

include/uapi/linux/netfilter/nf_conntrack_tcp.h

@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ enum tcp_conntrack {
 /* The field td_maxack has been set */
 #define IP_CT_TCP_FLAG_MAXACK_SET		0x20
 
+/* Marks possibility for expected RFC5961 challenge ACK */
+#define IP_CT_EXP_CHALLENGE_ACK 		0x40
+
 struct nf_ct_tcp_flags {
 	__u8 flags;
 	__u8 mask;

net/netfilter/Kconfig

@@ -863,6 +863,7 @@ config NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_TPROXY
 	depends on NETFILTER_XTABLES
 	depends on NETFILTER_ADVANCED
 	depends on (IPV6 || IPV6=n)
+	depends on (IP6_NF_IPTABLES || IP6_NF_IPTABLES=n)
 	depends on IP_NF_MANGLE
 	select NF_DEFRAG_IPV4
 	select NF_DEFRAG_IPV6 if IP6_NF_IPTABLES
@@ -1356,6 +1357,7 @@ config NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_SOCKET
 	depends on NETFILTER_ADVANCED
 	depends on !NF_CONNTRACK || NF_CONNTRACK
 	depends on (IPV6 || IPV6=n)
+	depends on (IP6_NF_IPTABLES || IP6_NF_IPTABLES=n)
 	select NF_DEFRAG_IPV4
 	select NF_DEFRAG_IPV6 if IP6_NF_IPTABLES
 	help

net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c

@@ -3823,6 +3823,9 @@ static void __net_exit ip_vs_control_net_cleanup_sysctl(struct net *net)
 	cancel_work_sync(&ipvs->defense_work.work);
 	unregister_net_sysctl_table(ipvs->sysctl_hdr);
 	ip_vs_stop_estimator(net, &ipvs->tot_stats);
+
+	if (!net_eq(net, &init_net))
+		kfree(ipvs->sysctl_tbl);
 }
 
 #else

net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c

@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ static const u8 tcp_conntracks[2][6][TCP_CONNTRACK_MAX] = {
  *	sES -> sES	:-)
  *	sFW -> sCW	Normal close request answered by ACK.
  *	sCW -> sCW
- *	sLA -> sTW	Last ACK detected.
+ *	sLA -> sTW	Last ACK detected (RFC5961 challenged)
  *	sTW -> sTW	Retransmitted last ACK. Remain in the same state.
  *	sCL -> sCL
  */
@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ static const u8 tcp_conntracks[2][6][TCP_CONNTRACK_MAX] = {
  *	sES -> sES	:-)
  *	sFW -> sCW	Normal close request answered by ACK.
  *	sCW -> sCW
- *	sLA -> sTW	Last ACK detected.
+ *	sLA -> sTW	Last ACK detected (RFC5961 challenged)
  *	sTW -> sTW	Retransmitted last ACK.
  *	sCL -> sCL
  */
@@ -906,6 +906,7 @@ static int tcp_packet(struct nf_conn *ct,
 					1 : ct->proto.tcp.last_win;
 			ct->proto.tcp.seen[ct->proto.tcp.last_dir].td_scale =
 				ct->proto.tcp.last_wscale;
+			ct->proto.tcp.last_flags &= ~IP_CT_EXP_CHALLENGE_ACK;
 			ct->proto.tcp.seen[ct->proto.tcp.last_dir].flags =
 				ct->proto.tcp.last_flags;
 			memset(&ct->proto.tcp.seen[dir], 0,
@@ -923,7 +924,9 @@ static int tcp_packet(struct nf_conn *ct,
 		 * may be in sync but we are not. In that case, we annotate
 		 * the TCP options and let the packet go through. If it is a
 		 * valid SYN packet, the server will reply with a SYN/ACK, and
-		 * then we'll get in sync. Otherwise, the server ignores it. */
+		 * then we'll get in sync. Otherwise, the server potentially
+		 * responds with a challenge ACK if implementing RFC5961.
+		 */
 		if (index == TCP_SYN_SET && dir == IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL) {
 			struct ip_ct_tcp_state seen = {};
 
@@ -939,6 +942,13 @@ static int tcp_packet(struct nf_conn *ct,
 				ct->proto.tcp.last_flags |=
 					IP_CT_TCP_FLAG_SACK_PERM;
 			}
+			/* Mark the potential for RFC5961 challenge ACK,
+			 * this pose a special problem for LAST_ACK state
+			 * as ACK is intrepretated as ACKing last FIN.
+			 */
+			if (old_state == TCP_CONNTRACK_LAST_ACK)
+				ct->proto.tcp.last_flags |=
+					IP_CT_EXP_CHALLENGE_ACK;
 		}
 		spin_unlock_bh(&ct->lock);
 		if (LOG_INVALID(net, IPPROTO_TCP))
@@ -970,6 +980,25 @@ static int tcp_packet(struct nf_conn *ct,
 			nf_log_packet(net, pf, 0, skb, NULL, NULL, NULL,
 				  "nf_ct_tcp: invalid state ");
 		return -NF_ACCEPT;
+	case TCP_CONNTRACK_TIME_WAIT:
+		/* RFC5961 compliance cause stack to send "challenge-ACK"
+		 * e.g. in response to spurious SYNs.  Conntrack MUST
+		 * not believe this ACK is acking last FIN.
+		 */
+		if (old_state == TCP_CONNTRACK_LAST_ACK &&
+		    index == TCP_ACK_SET &&
+		    ct->proto.tcp.last_dir != dir &&
+		    ct->proto.tcp.last_index == TCP_SYN_SET &&
+		    (ct->proto.tcp.last_flags & IP_CT_EXP_CHALLENGE_ACK)) {
+			/* Detected RFC5961 challenge ACK */
+			ct->proto.tcp.last_flags &= ~IP_CT_EXP_CHALLENGE_ACK;
+			spin_unlock_bh(&ct->lock);
+			if (LOG_INVALID(net, IPPROTO_TCP))
+				nf_log_packet(net, pf, 0, skb, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+				      "nf_ct_tcp: challenge-ACK ignored ");
+			return NF_ACCEPT; /* Don't change state */
+		}
+		break;
 	case TCP_CONNTRACK_CLOSE:
 		if (index == TCP_RST_SET
 		    && (ct->proto.tcp.seen[!dir].flags & IP_CT_TCP_FLAG_MAXACK_SET)

net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c

@@ -4472,9 +4472,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nft_data_init);
  */
 void nft_data_uninit(const struct nft_data *data, enum nft_data_types type)
 {
-	switch (type) {
-	case NFT_DATA_VALUE:
+	if (type < NFT_DATA_VERDICT)
 		return;
+	switch (type) {
 	case NFT_DATA_VERDICT:
 		return nft_verdict_uninit(data);
 	default: