Commit 1d98bf4f authored by Johan Hedberg's avatar Johan Hedberg Committed by Marcel Holtmann

Bluetooth: Remove LTK re-encryption procedure

Due to several devices being unable to handle this procedure reliably
(resulting in forced disconnections before pairing completes) it's
better to remove it altogether.
Signed-off-by: default avatarJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
parent a82505c7
......@@ -556,20 +556,6 @@ static void random_work(struct work_struct *work)
smp_failure(conn, reason);
}
static void smp_reencrypt(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct smp_chan *smp = container_of(work, struct smp_chan,
reencrypt.work);
struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
struct smp_ltk *ltk = smp->ltk;
BT_DBG("");
hci_le_start_enc(hcon, ltk->ediv, ltk->rand, ltk->val);
hcon->enc_key_size = ltk->enc_size;
}
static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
{
struct smp_chan *smp;
......@@ -580,7 +566,6 @@ static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
INIT_WORK(&smp->confirm, confirm_work);
INIT_WORK(&smp->random, random_work);
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&smp->reencrypt, smp_reencrypt);
smp->conn = conn;
conn->smp_chan = smp;
......@@ -598,8 +583,6 @@ void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
BUG_ON(!smp);
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->reencrypt);
complete = test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->smp_flags);
mgmt_smp_complete(conn->hcon, complete);
......@@ -1276,7 +1259,6 @@ int smp_distribute_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
bool ltk_encrypt;
__u8 *keydist;
BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
......@@ -1376,32 +1358,12 @@ int smp_distribute_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
if ((smp->remote_key_dist & 0x07))
return 0;
/* Check if we should try to re-encrypt the link with the LTK.
* SMP_FLAG_LTK_ENCRYPT flag is used to track whether we've
* already tried this (in which case we shouldn't try again).
*
* The request will trigger an encryption key refresh event
* which will cause a call to auth_cfm and eventually lead to
* l2cap_core.c calling this smp_distribute_keys function again
* and thereby completing the process.
*/
if (smp->ltk)
ltk_encrypt = !test_and_set_bit(SMP_FLAG_LTK_ENCRYPT,
&smp->smp_flags);
else
ltk_encrypt = false;
/* Re-encrypt the link with LTK if possible */
if (ltk_encrypt && hcon->out) {
queue_delayed_work(hdev->req_workqueue, &smp->reencrypt,
SMP_REENCRYPT_TIMEOUT);
} else {
clear_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags);
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&conn->security_timer);
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->smp_flags);
smp_notify_keys(conn);
smp_chan_destroy(conn);
}
return 0;
}
......@@ -118,11 +118,8 @@ struct smp_cmd_security_req {
#define SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID 1
#define SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING 2
#define SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH 3
#define SMP_FLAG_LTK_ENCRYPT 4
#define SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE 5
#define SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR 6
#define SMP_REENCRYPT_TIMEOUT msecs_to_jiffies(500)
#define SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE 4
#define SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR 5
struct smp_chan {
struct l2cap_conn *conn;
......@@ -145,7 +142,6 @@ struct smp_chan {
unsigned long smp_flags;
struct work_struct confirm;
struct work_struct random;
struct delayed_work reencrypt;
};
/* SMP Commands */
......
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