Commit 4cec9293 authored by Linus Torvalds's avatar Linus Torvalds

Merge tag 'integrity-v5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity

Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
 "The nicest change is the IMA policy rule checking. The other changes
  include allowing the kexec boot cmdline line measure policy rules to
  be defined in terms of the inode associated with the kexec kernel
  image, making the IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM, which governs the IMA
  appraise mode (log, fix, enforce), a runtime decision based on the
  secure boot mode of the system, and including errno in the audit log"

* tag 'integrity-v5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
  integrity: remove redundant initialization of variable ret
  ima: move APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM dependency on ARCH_POLICY to runtime
  ima: AppArmor satisfies the audit rule requirements
  ima: Rename internal filter rule functions
  ima: Support additional conditionals in the KEXEC_CMDLINE hook function
  ima: Use the common function to detect LSM conditionals in a rule
  ima: Move comprehensive rule validation checks out of the token parser
  ima: Use correct type for the args_p member of ima_rule_entry.lsm elements
  ima: Shallow copy the args_p member of ima_rule_entry.lsm elements
  ima: Fail rule parsing when appraise_flag=blacklist is unsupportable
  ima: Fail rule parsing when the KEY_CHECK hook is combined with an invalid cond
  ima: Fail rule parsing when the KEXEC_CMDLINE hook is combined with an invalid cond
  ima: Fail rule parsing when buffer hook functions have an invalid action
  ima: Free the entire rule if it fails to parse
  ima: Free the entire rule when deleting a list of rules
  ima: Have the LSM free its audit rule
  IMA: Add audit log for failure conditions
  integrity: Add errno field in audit message
parents e3243e2a 3db0d0c2
......@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id);
extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry);
extern int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size);
extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size);
extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size);
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image);
......@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ static inline int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size) {}
static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) {}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA */
#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
......
......@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,
goto out;
}
ima_kexec_cmdline(image->cmdline_buf,
ima_kexec_cmdline(kernel_fd, image->cmdline_buf,
image->cmdline_buf_len - 1);
}
......
......@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
struct public_key_signature pks;
struct signature_v2_hdr *hdr = (struct signature_v2_hdr *)sig;
struct key *key;
int ret = -ENOMEM;
int ret;
if (siglen <= sizeof(*hdr))
return -EBADMSG;
......
......@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ config IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX
config IMA_LSM_RULES
bool
depends on IMA && AUDIT && (SECURITY_SELINUX || SECURITY_SMACK)
depends on IMA && AUDIT && (SECURITY_SELINUX || SECURITY_SMACK || SECURITY_APPARMOR)
default y
help
Disabling this option will disregard LSM based policy rules.
......@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_POLICY_SIGS
config IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
bool "ima_appraise boot parameter"
depends on IMA_APPRAISE && !IMA_ARCH_POLICY
depends on IMA_APPRAISE
default y
help
This option enables the different "ima_appraise=" modes
......
......@@ -187,26 +187,42 @@ static inline unsigned int ima_hash_key(u8 *digest)
}
#define __ima_hooks(hook) \
hook(NONE) \
hook(FILE_CHECK) \
hook(MMAP_CHECK) \
hook(BPRM_CHECK) \
hook(CREDS_CHECK) \
hook(POST_SETATTR) \
hook(MODULE_CHECK) \
hook(FIRMWARE_CHECK) \
hook(KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK) \
hook(KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK) \
hook(POLICY_CHECK) \
hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE) \
hook(KEY_CHECK) \
hook(MAX_CHECK)
#define __ima_hook_enumify(ENUM) ENUM,
hook(NONE, none) \
hook(FILE_CHECK, file) \
hook(MMAP_CHECK, mmap) \
hook(BPRM_CHECK, bprm) \
hook(CREDS_CHECK, creds) \
hook(POST_SETATTR, post_setattr) \
hook(MODULE_CHECK, module) \
hook(FIRMWARE_CHECK, firmware) \
hook(KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, kexec_kernel) \
hook(KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK, kexec_initramfs) \
hook(POLICY_CHECK, policy) \
hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE, kexec_cmdline) \
hook(KEY_CHECK, key) \
hook(MAX_CHECK, none)
#define __ima_hook_enumify(ENUM, str) ENUM,
#define __ima_stringify(arg) (#arg)
#define __ima_hook_measuring_stringify(ENUM, str) \
(__ima_stringify(measuring_ ##str)),
enum ima_hooks {
__ima_hooks(__ima_hook_enumify)
};
static const char * const ima_hooks_measure_str[] = {
__ima_hooks(__ima_hook_measuring_stringify)
};
static inline const char *func_measure_str(enum ima_hooks func)
{
if (func >= MAX_CHECK)
return ima_hooks_measure_str[NONE];
return ima_hooks_measure_str[func];
}
extern const char *const func_tokens[];
struct modsig;
......@@ -249,7 +265,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr,
struct ima_template_desc *template_desc);
void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
int pcr, const char *keyring);
void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
......@@ -356,7 +372,6 @@ static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG
bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func);
int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t buf_len,
struct modsig **modsig);
void ima_collect_modsig(struct modsig *modsig, const void *buf, loff_t size);
......@@ -366,11 +381,6 @@ int ima_get_raw_modsig(const struct modsig *modsig, const void **data,
u32 *data_len);
void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig);
#else
static inline bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func)
{
return false;
}
static inline int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf,
loff_t buf_len, struct modsig **modsig)
{
......@@ -403,18 +413,23 @@ static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig)
/* LSM based policy rules require audit */
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
#define security_filter_rule_init security_audit_rule_init
#define security_filter_rule_match security_audit_rule_match
#define ima_filter_rule_init security_audit_rule_init
#define ima_filter_rule_free security_audit_rule_free
#define ima_filter_rule_match security_audit_rule_match
#else
static inline int security_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
void **lsmrule)
{
return -EINVAL;
}
static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
{
}
static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
void *lsmrule)
{
return -EINVAL;
......
......@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
/**
* ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy.
* @inode: pointer to inode to measure
* @inode: pointer to the inode associated with the object being validated
* @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate
* @secid: secid of the task being validated
* @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC,
......
......@@ -19,6 +19,12 @@
static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
if (arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
pr_info("Secure boot enabled: ignoring ima_appraise=%s boot parameter option",
str);
return 1;
}
if (strncmp(str, "off", 3) == 0)
ima_appraise = 0;
else if (strncmp(str, "log", 3) == 0)
......@@ -328,7 +334,7 @@ int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
rc = is_binary_blacklisted(digest, digestsize);
if ((rc == -EPERM) && (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURE))
process_buffer_measurement(digest, digestsize,
process_buffer_measurement(NULL, digest, digestsize,
"blacklisted-hash", NONE,
pcr, NULL);
}
......
......@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
* if the IMA policy is configured to measure a key linked
* to the given keyring.
*/
process_buffer_measurement(payload, payload_len,
process_buffer_measurement(NULL, payload, payload_len,
keyring->description, KEY_CHECK, 0,
keyring->description);
}
......@@ -726,6 +726,7 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
/*
* process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer to ima log.
* @inode: inode associated with the object being measured (NULL for KEY_CHECK)
* @buf: pointer to the buffer that needs to be added to the log.
* @size: size of buffer(in bytes).
* @eventname: event name to be used for the buffer entry.
......@@ -735,11 +736,12 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
*
* Based on policy, the buffer is measured into the ima log.
*/
void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
int pcr, const char *keyring)
{
int ret = 0;
const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
struct ima_template_entry *entry = NULL;
struct integrity_iint_cache iint = {};
struct ima_event_data event_data = {.iint = &iint,
......@@ -767,7 +769,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
*/
if (func) {
security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
action = ima_get_action(NULL, current_cred(), secid, 0, func,
action = ima_get_action(inode, current_cred(), secid, 0, func,
&pcr, &template, keyring);
if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE))
return;
......@@ -794,37 +796,54 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
iint.ima_hash->length = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];
ret = ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, iint.ima_hash);
if (ret < 0)
if (ret < 0) {
audit_cause = "hashing_error";
goto out;
}
ret = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, template);
if (ret < 0)
if (ret < 0) {
audit_cause = "alloc_entry";
goto out;
}
ret = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, buf, pcr);
if (ret < 0)
if (ret < 0) {
audit_cause = "store_entry";
ima_free_template_entry(entry);
}
out:
if (ret < 0)
pr_devel("%s: failed, result: %d\n", __func__, ret);
integrity_audit_message(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, NULL, eventname,
func_measure_str(func),
audit_cause, ret, 0, ret);
return;
}
/**
* ima_kexec_cmdline - measure kexec cmdline boot args
* @kernel_fd: file descriptor of the kexec kernel being loaded
* @buf: pointer to buffer
* @size: size of buffer
*
* Buffers can only be measured, not appraised.
*/
void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size)
void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)
{
if (buf && size != 0)
process_buffer_measurement(buf, size, "kexec-cmdline",
KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0, NULL);
struct fd f;
if (!buf || !size)
return;
f = fdget(kernel_fd);
if (!f.file)
return;
process_buffer_measurement(file_inode(f.file), buf, size,
"kexec-cmdline", KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0, NULL);
fdput(f);
}
static int __init init_ima(void)
......
......@@ -32,26 +32,6 @@ struct modsig {
u8 raw_pkcs7[];
};
/**
* ima_hook_supports_modsig - can the policy allow modsig for this hook?
*
* modsig is only supported by hooks using ima_post_read_file(), because only
* they preload the contents of the file in a buffer. FILE_CHECK does that in
* some cases, but not when reached from vfs_open(). POLICY_CHECK can support
* it, but it's not useful in practice because it's a text file so deny.
*/
bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func)
{
switch (func) {
case KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK:
case KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK:
case MODULE_CHECK:
return true;
default:
return false;
}
}
/*
* ima_read_modsig - Read modsig from buf.
*
......
This diff is collapsed.
......@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ static struct ima_key_entry *ima_alloc_key_entry(struct key *keyring,
size_t payload_len)
{
int rc = 0;
const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
struct ima_key_entry *entry;
entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
......@@ -88,6 +89,10 @@ static struct ima_key_entry *ima_alloc_key_entry(struct key *keyring,
out:
if (rc) {
integrity_audit_message(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, NULL,
keyring->description,
func_measure_str(KEY_CHECK),
audit_cause, rc, 0, rc);
ima_free_key_entry(entry);
entry = NULL;
}
......@@ -153,7 +158,7 @@ void ima_process_queued_keys(void)
list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_keys, list) {
if (!timer_expired)
process_buffer_measurement(entry->payload,
process_buffer_measurement(NULL, entry->payload,
entry->payload_len,
entry->keyring_name,
KEY_CHECK, 0,
......
......@@ -239,6 +239,11 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
const char *cause, int result, int info);
void integrity_audit_message(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
const char *cause, int result, int info,
int errno);
static inline struct audit_buffer *
integrity_audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask, int type)
{
......@@ -253,6 +258,14 @@ static inline void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
{
}
static inline void integrity_audit_message(int audit_msgno,
struct inode *inode,
const unsigned char *fname,
const char *op, const char *cause,
int result, int info, int errno)
{
}
static inline struct audit_buffer *
integrity_audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask, int type)
{
......
......@@ -28,6 +28,15 @@ __setup("integrity_audit=", integrity_audit_setup);
void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
const char *cause, int result, int audit_info)
{
integrity_audit_message(audit_msgno, inode, fname, op, cause,
result, audit_info, 0);
}
void integrity_audit_message(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
const char *cause, int result, int audit_info,
int errno)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
char name[TASK_COMM_LEN];
......@@ -53,6 +62,6 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, inode->i_sb->s_id);
audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%lu", inode->i_ino);
}
audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d", !result);
audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d errno=%d", !result, errno);
audit_log_end(ab);
}
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