Merge branch 'wireguard-fixes'

Jason A. Donenfeld says:

====================
wireguard fixes for 5.7-rc7

Hopefully these are the last fixes for 5.7:

1) A trivial bump in the selftest harness to support gcc-10.
   build.wireguard.com is still on gcc-9 but I'll probably switch to
   gcc-10 in the coming weeks.

2) A concurrency fix regarding userspace modifying the pre-shared key at
   the same time as packets are being processed, reported by Matt
   Dunwoodie.

3) We were previously clearing skb->hash on egress, which broke
   fq_codel, cake, and other things that actually make use of the flow
   hash for queueing, reported by Dave Taht and Toke Høiland-Jørgensen.

4) A fix for the increased memory usage caused by (3). This can be
   thought of as part of patch (3), but because of the separate
   reasoning and breadth of it I thought made it a bit cleaner to put in
   a standalone commit.

Fixes (2), (3), and (4) are -stable material.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

drivers/net/wireguard/messages.h

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ enum cookie_values {
 };
 
 enum counter_values {
-	COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL = 2048,
+	COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL = 8192,
 	COUNTER_REDUNDANT_BITS = BITS_PER_LONG,
 	COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE = COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL - COUNTER_REDUNDANT_BITS
 };

drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c

@@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ static struct noise_keypair *keypair_create(struct wg_peer *peer)
 
 	if (unlikely(!keypair))
 		return NULL;
+	spin_lock_init(&keypair->receiving_counter.lock);
 	keypair->internal_id = atomic64_inc_return(&keypair_counter);
 	keypair->entry.type = INDEX_HASHTABLE_KEYPAIR;
 	keypair->entry.peer = peer;
@@ -358,25 +359,16 @@ static void kdf(u8 *first_dst, u8 *second_dst, u8 *third_dst, const u8 *data,
 	memzero_explicit(output, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1);
 }
 
-static void symmetric_key_init(struct noise_symmetric_key *key)
-{
-	spin_lock_init(&key->counter.receive.lock);
-	atomic64_set(&key->counter.counter, 0);
-	memset(key->counter.receive.backtrack, 0,
-	       sizeof(key->counter.receive.backtrack));
-	key->birthdate = ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns();
-	key->is_valid = true;
-}
-
 static void derive_keys(struct noise_symmetric_key *first_dst,
 			struct noise_symmetric_key *second_dst,
 			const u8 chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN])
 {
+	u64 birthdate = ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns();
 	kdf(first_dst->key, second_dst->key, NULL, NULL,
 	    NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, 0, 0,
 	    chaining_key);
-	symmetric_key_init(first_dst);
-	symmetric_key_init(second_dst);
+	first_dst->birthdate = second_dst->birthdate = birthdate;
+	first_dst->is_valid = second_dst->is_valid = true;
 }
 
 static bool __must_check mix_dh(u8 chaining_key[NOISE_HASH_LEN],
@@ -715,6 +707,7 @@ wg_noise_handshake_consume_response(struct message_handshake_response *src,
 	u8 e[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN];
 	u8 ephemeral_private[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN];
 	u8 static_private[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN];
+	u8 preshared_key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN];
 
 	down_read(&wg->static_identity.lock);
 
@@ -733,6 +726,8 @@ wg_noise_handshake_consume_response(struct message_handshake_response *src,
 	memcpy(chaining_key, handshake->chaining_key, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
 	memcpy(ephemeral_private, handshake->ephemeral_private,
 	       NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
+	memcpy(preshared_key, handshake->preshared_key,
+	       NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN);
 	up_read(&handshake->lock);
 
 	if (state != HANDSHAKE_CREATED_INITIATION)
@@ -750,7 +745,7 @@ wg_noise_handshake_consume_response(struct message_handshake_response *src,
 		goto fail;
 
 	/* psk */
-	mix_psk(chaining_key, hash, key, handshake->preshared_key);
+	mix_psk(chaining_key, hash, key, preshared_key);
 
 	/* {} */
 	if (!message_decrypt(NULL, src->encrypted_nothing,
@@ -783,6 +778,7 @@ wg_noise_handshake_consume_response(struct message_handshake_response *src,
 	memzero_explicit(chaining_key, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
 	memzero_explicit(ephemeral_private, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
 	memzero_explicit(static_private, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
+	memzero_explicit(preshared_key, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN);
 	up_read(&wg->static_identity.lock);
 	return ret_peer;
 }

drivers/net/wireguard/noise.h

@@ -15,18 +15,14 @@
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
 #include <linux/kref.h>
 
-union noise_counter {
-	struct {
+struct noise_replay_counter {
 	u64 counter;
-		unsigned long backtrack[COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL / BITS_PER_LONG];
 	spinlock_t lock;
-	} receive;
-	atomic64_t counter;
+	unsigned long backtrack[COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL / BITS_PER_LONG];
 };
 
 struct noise_symmetric_key {
 	u8 key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN];
-	union noise_counter counter;
 	u64 birthdate;
 	bool is_valid;
 };
@@ -34,7 +30,9 @@ struct noise_symmetric_key {
 struct noise_keypair {
 	struct index_hashtable_entry entry;
 	struct noise_symmetric_key sending;
+	atomic64_t sending_counter;
 	struct noise_symmetric_key receiving;
+	struct noise_replay_counter receiving_counter;
 	__le32 remote_index;
 	bool i_am_the_initiator;
 	struct kref refcount;

drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h

@@ -87,12 +87,20 @@ static inline bool wg_check_packet_protocol(struct sk_buff *skb)
 	return real_protocol && skb->protocol == real_protocol;
 }
 
-static inline void wg_reset_packet(struct sk_buff *skb)
+static inline void wg_reset_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, bool encapsulating)
 {
+	u8 l4_hash = skb->l4_hash;
+	u8 sw_hash = skb->sw_hash;
+	u32 hash = skb->hash;
 	skb_scrub_packet(skb, true);
 	memset(&skb->headers_start, 0,
 	       offsetof(struct sk_buff, headers_end) -
 		       offsetof(struct sk_buff, headers_start));
+	if (encapsulating) {
+		skb->l4_hash = l4_hash;
+		skb->sw_hash = sw_hash;
+		skb->hash = hash;
+	}
 	skb->queue_mapping = 0;
 	skb->nohdr = 0;
 	skb->peeked = 0;

drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c

@@ -245,20 +245,20 @@ static void keep_key_fresh(struct wg_peer *peer)
 	}
 }
 
-static bool decrypt_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, struct noise_symmetric_key *key)
+static bool decrypt_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, struct noise_keypair *keypair)
 {
 	struct scatterlist sg[MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 8];
 	struct sk_buff *trailer;
 	unsigned int offset;
 	int num_frags;
 
-	if (unlikely(!key))
+	if (unlikely(!keypair))
 		return false;
 
-	if (unlikely(!READ_ONCE(key->is_valid) ||
-		  wg_birthdate_has_expired(key->birthdate, REJECT_AFTER_TIME) ||
-		  key->counter.receive.counter >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES)) {
-		WRITE_ONCE(key->is_valid, false);
+	if (unlikely(!READ_ONCE(keypair->receiving.is_valid) ||
+		  wg_birthdate_has_expired(keypair->receiving.birthdate, REJECT_AFTER_TIME) ||
+		  keypair->receiving_counter.counter >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES)) {
+		WRITE_ONCE(keypair->receiving.is_valid, false);
 		return false;
 	}
 
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ static bool decrypt_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, struct noise_symmetric_key *key)
 
 	if (!chacha20poly1305_decrypt_sg_inplace(sg, skb->len, NULL, 0,
 					         PACKET_CB(skb)->nonce,
-						 key->key))
+						 keypair->receiving.key))
 		return false;
 
 	/* Another ugly situation of pushing and pulling the header so as to
@@ -298,41 +298,41 @@ static bool decrypt_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, struct noise_symmetric_key *key)
 }
 
 /* This is RFC6479, a replay detection bitmap algorithm that avoids bitshifts */
-static bool counter_validate(union noise_counter *counter, u64 their_counter)
+static bool counter_validate(struct noise_replay_counter *counter, u64 their_counter)
 {
 	unsigned long index, index_current, top, i;
 	bool ret = false;
 
-	spin_lock_bh(&counter->receive.lock);
+	spin_lock_bh(&counter->lock);
 
-	if (unlikely(counter->receive.counter >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES + 1 ||
+	if (unlikely(counter->counter >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES + 1 ||
 		     their_counter >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES))
 		goto out;
 
 	++their_counter;
 
 	if (unlikely((COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE + their_counter) <
-		     counter->receive.counter))
+		     counter->counter))
 		goto out;
 
 	index = their_counter >> ilog2(BITS_PER_LONG);
 
-	if (likely(their_counter > counter->receive.counter)) {
-		index_current = counter->receive.counter >> ilog2(BITS_PER_LONG);
+	if (likely(their_counter > counter->counter)) {
+		index_current = counter->counter >> ilog2(BITS_PER_LONG);
 		top = min_t(unsigned long, index - index_current,
 			    COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL / BITS_PER_LONG);
 		for (i = 1; i <= top; ++i)
-			counter->receive.backtrack[(i + index_current) &
+			counter->backtrack[(i + index_current) &
 				((COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL / BITS_PER_LONG) - 1)] = 0;
-		counter->receive.counter = their_counter;
+		counter->counter = their_counter;
 	}
 
 	index &= (COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL / BITS_PER_LONG) - 1;
 	ret = !test_and_set_bit(their_counter & (BITS_PER_LONG - 1),
-				&counter->receive.backtrack[index]);
+				&counter->backtrack[index]);
 
 out:
-	spin_unlock_bh(&counter->receive.lock);
+	spin_unlock_bh(&counter->lock);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -472,19 +472,19 @@ int wg_packet_rx_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget)
 		if (unlikely(state != PACKET_STATE_CRYPTED))
 			goto next;
 
-		if (unlikely(!counter_validate(&keypair->receiving.counter,
+		if (unlikely(!counter_validate(&keypair->receiving_counter,
 					       PACKET_CB(skb)->nonce))) {
 			net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Packet has invalid nonce %llu (max %llu)\n",
 					    peer->device->dev->name,
 					    PACKET_CB(skb)->nonce,
-					    keypair->receiving.counter.receive.counter);
+					    keypair->receiving_counter.counter);
 			goto next;
 		}
 
 		if (unlikely(wg_socket_endpoint_from_skb(&endpoint, skb)))
 			goto next;
 
-		wg_reset_packet(skb);
+		wg_reset_packet(skb, false);
 		wg_packet_consume_data_done(peer, skb, &endpoint);
 		free = false;
 
@@ -511,8 +511,8 @@ void wg_packet_decrypt_worker(struct work_struct *work)
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
 
 	while ((skb = ptr_ring_consume_bh(&queue->ring)) != NULL) {
-		enum packet_state state = likely(decrypt_packet(skb,
-				&PACKET_CB(skb)->keypair->receiving)) ?
+		enum packet_state state =
+			likely(decrypt_packet(skb, PACKET_CB(skb)->keypair)) ?
 				PACKET_STATE_CRYPTED : PACKET_STATE_DEAD;
 		wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_napi(skb, state);
 		if (need_resched())

drivers/net/wireguard/selftest/counter.c

@@ -6,18 +6,24 @@
 #ifdef DEBUG
 bool __init wg_packet_counter_selftest(void)
 {
+	struct noise_replay_counter *counter;
 	unsigned int test_num = 0, i;
-	union noise_counter counter;
 	bool success = true;
 
+	counter = kmalloc(sizeof(*counter), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (unlikely(!counter)) {
+		pr_err("nonce counter self-test malloc: FAIL\n");
+		return false;
+	}
+
 #define T_INIT do {                                    \
-		memset(&counter, 0, sizeof(union noise_counter)); \
-		spin_lock_init(&counter.receive.lock);            \
+		memset(counter, 0, sizeof(*counter));  \
+		spin_lock_init(&counter->lock);        \
 	} while (0)
 #define T_LIM (COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE + 1)
 #define T(n, v) do {                                                  \
 		++test_num;                                           \
-		if (counter_validate(&counter, n) != (v)) {           \
+		if (counter_validate(counter, n) != (v)) {            \
 			pr_err("nonce counter self-test %u: FAIL\n",  \
 			       test_num);                             \
 			success = false;                              \
@@ -99,6 +105,7 @@ bool __init wg_packet_counter_selftest(void)
 
 	if (success)
 		pr_info("nonce counter self-tests: pass\n");
+	kfree(counter);
 	return success;
 }
 #endif

drivers/net/wireguard/send.c

@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ static void keep_key_fresh(struct wg_peer *peer)
 	rcu_read_lock_bh();
 	keypair = rcu_dereference_bh(peer->keypairs.current_keypair);
 	send = keypair && READ_ONCE(keypair->sending.is_valid) &&
-	       (atomic64_read(&keypair->sending.counter.counter) > REKEY_AFTER_MESSAGES ||
+	       (atomic64_read(&keypair->sending_counter) > REKEY_AFTER_MESSAGES ||
 		(keypair->i_am_the_initiator &&
 		 wg_birthdate_has_expired(keypair->sending.birthdate, REKEY_AFTER_TIME)));
 	rcu_read_unlock_bh();
@@ -167,6 +167,11 @@ static bool encrypt_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, struct noise_keypair *keypair)
 	struct sk_buff *trailer;
 	int num_frags;
 
+	/* Force hash calculation before encryption so that flow analysis is
+	 * consistent over the inner packet.
+	 */
+	skb_get_hash(skb);
+
 	/* Calculate lengths. */
 	padding_len = calculate_skb_padding(skb);
 	trailer_len = padding_len + noise_encrypted_len(0);
@@ -295,7 +300,7 @@ void wg_packet_encrypt_worker(struct work_struct *work)
 		skb_list_walk_safe(first, skb, next) {
 			if (likely(encrypt_packet(skb,
 					PACKET_CB(first)->keypair))) {
-				wg_reset_packet(skb);
+				wg_reset_packet(skb, true);
 			} else {
 				state = PACKET_STATE_DEAD;
 				break;
@@ -344,7 +349,6 @@ void wg_packet_purge_staged_packets(struct wg_peer *peer)
 
 void wg_packet_send_staged_packets(struct wg_peer *peer)
 {
-	struct noise_symmetric_key *key;
 	struct noise_keypair *keypair;
 	struct sk_buff_head packets;
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
@@ -364,10 +368,9 @@ void wg_packet_send_staged_packets(struct wg_peer *peer)
 	rcu_read_unlock_bh();
 	if (unlikely(!keypair))
 		goto out_nokey;
-	key = &keypair->sending;
-	if (unlikely(!READ_ONCE(key->is_valid)))
+	if (unlikely(!READ_ONCE(keypair->sending.is_valid)))
 		goto out_nokey;
-	if (unlikely(wg_birthdate_has_expired(key->birthdate,
+	if (unlikely(wg_birthdate_has_expired(keypair->sending.birthdate,
 					      REJECT_AFTER_TIME)))
 		goto out_invalid;
 
@@ -382,7 +385,7 @@ void wg_packet_send_staged_packets(struct wg_peer *peer)
 		 */
 		PACKET_CB(skb)->ds = ip_tunnel_ecn_encap(0, ip_hdr(skb), skb);
 		PACKET_CB(skb)->nonce =
-				atomic64_inc_return(&key->counter.counter) - 1;
+				atomic64_inc_return(&keypair->sending_counter) - 1;
 		if (unlikely(PACKET_CB(skb)->nonce >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES))
 			goto out_invalid;
 	}
@@ -394,7 +397,7 @@ void wg_packet_send_staged_packets(struct wg_peer *peer)
 	return;
 
 out_invalid:
-	WRITE_ONCE(key->is_valid, false);
+	WRITE_ONCE(keypair->sending.is_valid, false);
 out_nokey:
 	wg_noise_keypair_put(keypair, false);
 

tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/Makefile

@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ endef
 $(eval $(call tar_download,MUSL,musl,1.2.0,.tar.gz,https://musl.libc.org/releases/,c6de7b191139142d3f9a7b5b702c9cae1b5ee6e7f57e582da9328629408fd4e8))
 $(eval $(call tar_download,IPERF,iperf,3.7,.tar.gz,https://downloads.es.net/pub/iperf/,d846040224317caf2f75c843d309a950a7db23f9b44b94688ccbe557d6d1710c))
 $(eval $(call tar_download,BASH,bash,5.0,.tar.gz,https://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/bash/,b4a80f2ac66170b2913efbfb9f2594f1f76c7b1afd11f799e22035d63077fb4d))
-$(eval $(call tar_download,IPROUTE2,iproute2,5.4.0,.tar.xz,https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/net/iproute2/,fe97aa60a0d4c5ac830be18937e18dc3400ca713a33a89ad896ff1e3d46086ae))
+$(eval $(call tar_download,IPROUTE2,iproute2,5.6.0,.tar.xz,https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/net/iproute2/,1b5b0e25ce6e23da7526ea1da044e814ad85ba761b10dd29c2b027c056b04692))
 $(eval $(call tar_download,IPTABLES,iptables,1.8.4,.tar.bz2,https://www.netfilter.org/projects/iptables/files/,993a3a5490a544c2cbf2ef15cf7e7ed21af1845baf228318d5c36ef8827e157c))
 $(eval $(call tar_download,NMAP,nmap,7.80,.tar.bz2,https://nmap.org/dist/,fcfa5a0e42099e12e4bf7a68ebe6fde05553383a682e816a7ec9256ab4773faa))
 $(eval $(call tar_download,IPUTILS,iputils,s20190709,.tar.gz,https://github.com/iputils/iputils/archive/s20190709.tar.gz/#,a15720dd741d7538dd2645f9f516d193636ae4300ff7dbc8bfca757bf166490a))