Commit 676bcfec authored by Gustavo A. R. Silva's avatar Gustavo A. R. Silva Committed by David S. Miller

net: cxgb3_main: fix potential Spectre v1

t.qset_idx can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb3/cxgb3_main.c:2286 cxgb_extension_ioctl()
warn: potential spectre issue 'adapter->msix_info'

Fix this by sanitizing t.qset_idx before using it to index
adapter->msix_info

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: default avatarGustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
parent 107d01f5
......@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include "common.h"
#include "cxgb3_ioctl.h"
......@@ -2268,6 +2269,7 @@ static int cxgb_extension_ioctl(struct net_device *dev, void __user *useraddr)
if (t.qset_idx >= nqsets)
return -EINVAL;
t.qset_idx = array_index_nospec(t.qset_idx, nqsets);
q = &adapter->params.sge.qset[q1 + t.qset_idx];
t.rspq_size = q->rspq_size;
......
Markdown is supported
0%
or
You are about to add 0 people to the discussion. Proceed with caution.
Finish editing this message first!
Please register or to comment