Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20230626' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux

Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:

 - Thanks to help from the MPTCP folks, it looks like we have finally
   sorted out a proper solution to the MPTCP socket labeling issue, see
   the new security_mptcp_add_subflow() LSM hook.

 - Fix the labeled NFS handling such that a labeled NFS share mounted
   prior to the initial SELinux policy load is properly labeled once a
   policy is loaded; more information in the commit description.

 - Two patches to security/selinux/Makefile, the first took the cleanups
   in v6.4 a bit further and the second removed the grouped targets
   support as that functionality doesn't appear to be properly supported
   prior to make v4.3.

 - Deprecate the "fs" object context type in SELinux policies. The fs
   object context type was an old vestige that was introduced back in
   v2.6.12-rc2 but never really used.

 - A number of small changes that remove dead code, clean up some
   awkward bits, and generally improve the quality of the code. See the
   individual commit descriptions for more information.

* tag 'selinux-pr-20230626' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
  selinux: avoid bool as identifier name
  selinux: fix Makefile for versions of make < v4.3
  selinux: make labeled NFS work when mounted before policy load
  selinux: cleanup exit_sel_fs() declaration
  selinux: deprecated fs ocon
  selinux: make header files self-including
  selinux: keep context struct members in sync
  selinux: Implement mptcp_add_subflow hook
  security, lsm: Introduce security_mptcp_add_subflow()
  selinux: small cleanups in selinux_audit_rule_init()
  selinux: declare read-only data arrays const
  selinux: retain const qualifier on string literal in avtab_hash_eval()
  selinux: drop return at end of void function avc_insert()
  selinux: avc: drop unused function avc_disable()
  selinux: adjust typos in comments
  selinux: do not leave dangling pointer behind
  selinux: more Makefile tweaks

include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h

@@ -343,6 +343,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, sctp_sk_clone, struct sctp_association *asoc,
 	 struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, sctp_assoc_established, struct sctp_association *asoc,
 	 struct sk_buff *skb)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, mptcp_add_subflow, struct sock *sk, struct sock *ssk)
 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND

include/linux/security.h

@@ -1465,6 +1465,7 @@ void security_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk,
 			    struct sock *newsk);
 int security_sctp_assoc_established(struct sctp_association *asoc,
 				    struct sk_buff *skb);
+int security_mptcp_add_subflow(struct sock *sk, struct sock *ssk);
 
 #else	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
 static inline int security_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
@@ -1692,6 +1693,11 @@ static inline int security_sctp_assoc_established(struct sctp_association *asoc,
 {
 	return 0;
 }
+
+static inline int security_mptcp_add_subflow(struct sock *sk, struct sock *ssk)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
 #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND

net/mptcp/subflow.c

@@ -1668,6 +1668,10 @@ int mptcp_subflow_create_socket(struct sock *sk, unsigned short family,
 
 	lock_sock_nested(sf->sk, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
 
+	err = security_mptcp_add_subflow(sk, sf->sk);
+	if (err)
+		goto release_ssk;
+
 	/* the newly created socket has to be in the same cgroup as its parent */
 	mptcp_attach_cgroup(sk, sf->sk);
 
@@ -1680,6 +1684,8 @@ int mptcp_subflow_create_socket(struct sock *sk, unsigned short family,
 	get_net_track(net, &sf->sk->ns_tracker, GFP_KERNEL);
 	sock_inuse_add(net, 1);
 	err = tcp_set_ulp(sf->sk, "mptcp");
+
+release_ssk:
 	release_sock(sf->sk);
 
 	if (err) {

security/security.c

@@ -4667,6 +4667,23 @@ int security_sctp_assoc_established(struct sctp_association *asoc,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_assoc_established);
 
+/**
+ * security_mptcp_add_subflow() - Inherit the LSM label from the MPTCP socket
+ * @sk: the owning MPTCP socket
+ * @ssk: the new subflow
+ *
+ * Update the labeling for the given MPTCP subflow, to match the one of the
+ * owning MPTCP socket. This hook has to be called after the socket creation and
+ * initialization via the security_socket_create() and
+ * security_socket_post_create() LSM hooks.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 on success or a negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int security_mptcp_add_subflow(struct sock *sk, struct sock *ssk)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(mptcp_add_subflow, 0, sk, ssk);
+}
+
 #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND

security/selinux/Makefile

@@ -3,32 +3,38 @@
 # Makefile for building the SELinux module as part of the kernel tree.
 #
 
+# NOTE: There are a number of improvements that can be made to this Makefile
+# once the kernel requires make v4.3 or greater; the most important feature
+# lacking in older versions of make is support for grouped targets.  These
+# improvements are noted inline in the Makefile below ...
+
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) := selinux.o
 
+ccflags-y := -I$(srctree)/security/selinux -I$(srctree)/security/selinux/include
+
 selinux-y := avc.o hooks.o selinuxfs.o netlink.o nlmsgtab.o netif.o \
 	     netnode.o netport.o status.o \
 	     ss/ebitmap.o ss/hashtab.o ss/symtab.o ss/sidtab.o ss/avtab.o \
 	     ss/policydb.o ss/services.o ss/conditional.o ss/mls.o ss/context.o
 
 selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM) += xfrm.o
-
 selinux-$(CONFIG_NETLABEL) += netlabel.o
-
 selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND) += ibpkey.o
-
 selinux-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
 
-ccflags-y := -I$(srctree)/security/selinux -I$(srctree)/security/selinux/include
+genhdrs := flask.h av_permissions.h
 
+# see the note above, replace the dependency rule with the one below:
+#  $(addprefix $(obj)/,$(selinux-y)): $(addprefix $(obj)/,$(genhdrs))
 $(addprefix $(obj)/,$(selinux-y)): $(obj)/flask.h
 
-quiet_cmd_flask = GEN     $(obj)/flask.h $(obj)/av_permissions.h
-      cmd_flask = $< $(obj)/flask.h $(obj)/av_permissions.h
+quiet_cmd_genhdrs = GEN     $(addprefix $(obj)/,$(genhdrs))
+      cmd_genhdrs = $< $(addprefix $(obj)/,$(genhdrs))
 
-targets += flask.h av_permissions.h
-# once make >= 4.3 is required, we can use grouped targets in the rule below,
-# which basically involves adding both headers and a '&' before the colon, see
-# the example below:
-#   $(obj)/flask.h $(obj)/av_permissions.h &: scripts/selinux/...
+# see the note above, replace the $targets and 'flask.h' rule with the lines
+# below:
+#  targets += $(genhdrs)
+#  $(addprefix $(obj)/,$(genhdrs)) &: scripts/selinux/...
+targets += flask.h
 $(obj)/flask.h: scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders FORCE
-	$(call if_changed,flask)
+	$(call if_changed,genhdrs)

security/selinux/avc.c

@@ -642,7 +642,6 @@ static void avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
 	hlist_add_head_rcu(&node->list, head);
 found:
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag);
-	return;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1203,22 +1202,3 @@ u32 avc_policy_seqno(void)
 {
 	return selinux_avc.avc_cache.latest_notif;
 }
-
-void avc_disable(void)
-{
-	/*
-	 * If you are looking at this because you have realized that we are
-	 * not destroying the avc_node_cachep it might be easy to fix, but
-	 * I don't know the memory barrier semantics well enough to know.  It's
-	 * possible that some other task dereferenced security_ops when
-	 * it still pointed to selinux operations.  If that is the case it's
-	 * possible that it is about to use the avc and is about to need the
-	 * avc_node_cachep.  I know I could wrap the security.c security_ops call
-	 * in an rcu_lock, but seriously, it's not worth it.  Instead I just flush
-	 * the cache and get that memory back.
-	 */
-	if (avc_node_cachep) {
-		avc_flush();
-		/* kmem_cache_destroy(avc_node_cachep); */
-	}
-}

security/selinux/hooks.c

@@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ enum {
 };
 
 #define A(s, has_arg) {#s, sizeof(#s) - 1, Opt_##s, has_arg}
-static struct {
+static const struct {
 	const char *name;
 	int len;
 	int opt;
@@ -605,6 +605,13 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 	u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
 	int rc = 0;
 
+	/*
+	 * Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
+	 * place the results is not allowed
+	 */
+	if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
 
 	if (!selinux_initialized()) {
@@ -612,6 +619,10 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 			/* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
 			   after the initial policy is loaded and the security
 			   server is ready to handle calls. */
+			if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) {
+				sbsec->flags |= SE_SBNATIVE;
+				*set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
+			}
 			goto out;
 		}
 		rc = -EINVAL;
@@ -619,12 +630,6 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 			"before the security server is initialized\n");
 		goto out;
 	}
-	if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) {
-		/* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
-		 * place the results is not allowed */
-		rc = -EINVAL;
-		goto out;
-	}
 
 	/*
 	 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice.  Once
@@ -757,7 +762,17 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 	 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
 	 * the superblock context if not already set.
 	 */
-	if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) {
+	if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBNATIVE) {
+		/*
+		 * This means we are initializing a superblock that has been
+		 * mounted before the SELinux was initialized and the
+		 * filesystem requested native labeling. We had already
+		 * returned SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS in *set_kern_flags
+		 * in the original mount attempt, so now we just need to set
+		 * the SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE behavior.
+		 */
+		sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
+	} else if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) {
 		sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
 		*set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
 	}
@@ -868,13 +883,6 @@ static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
 	int set_context =	(oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
 	int set_rootcontext =	(oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
 
-	/*
-	 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
-	 * mount options.  thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
-	 */
-	if (!selinux_initialized())
-		return 0;
-
 	/*
 	 * Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
 	 * place the results is not allowed.
@@ -882,18 +890,31 @@ static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
 	if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
+
+	/*
+	 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
+	 * mount options.  thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
+	 */
+	if (!selinux_initialized()) {
+		if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) {
+			newsbsec->flags |= SE_SBNATIVE;
+			*set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
+		}
+		goto out;
+	}
+
 	/* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
 	BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
 
 	/* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
 	if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
+		mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
 		if ((kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context)
 			*set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
 		return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
 	}
 
-	mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
-
 	newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
 
 	newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
@@ -937,7 +958,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
 }
 
 /*
- * NOTE: the caller is resposible for freeing the memory even if on error.
+ * NOTE: the caller is responsible for freeing the memory even if on error.
  */
 static int selinux_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts)
 {
@@ -1394,8 +1415,11 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
 	spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
 
 	switch (sbsec->behavior) {
+	/*
+	 * In case of SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE we need to re-fetch the labels
+	 * via xattr when called from delayed_superblock_init().
+	 */
 	case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
-		break;
 	case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
 		if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
 			sid = sbsec->def_sid;
@@ -5379,6 +5403,21 @@ static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk
 	selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(sk, newsk);
 }
 
+static int selinux_mptcp_add_subflow(struct sock *sk, struct sock *ssk)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *ssksec = ssk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
+	ssksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
+	ssksec->sid = sksec->sid;
+
+	/* replace the existing subflow label deleting the existing one
+	 * and re-recreating a new label using the updated context
+	 */
+	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssksec);
+	return selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(ssk, ssk->sk_family);
+}
+
 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 				     struct request_sock *req)
 {
@@ -7074,6 +7113,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_sk_clone, selinux_sctp_sk_clone),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_bind_connect, selinux_sctp_bind_connect),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_established, selinux_sctp_assoc_established),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mptcp_add_subflow, selinux_mptcp_add_subflow),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established),

security/selinux/ima.c

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  *
  * Author: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian (nramas@linux.microsoft.com)
  *
- * Measure critical data structures maintainted by SELinux
+ * Measure critical data structures maintained by SELinux
  * using IMA subsystem.
  */
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>

security/selinux/include/audit.h

@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *rule);
  *	selinux_audit_rule_match - determine if a context ID matches a rule.
  *	@sid: the context ID to check
  *	@field: the field this rule refers to
- *	@op: the operater the rule uses
+ *	@op: the operator the rule uses
  *	@rule: pointer to the audit rule to check against
  *
  *	Returns 1 if the context id matches the rule, 0 if it does not, and

security/selinux/include/avc.h

@@ -168,9 +168,6 @@ int avc_get_hash_stats(char *page);
 unsigned int avc_get_cache_threshold(void);
 void avc_set_cache_threshold(unsigned int cache_threshold);
 
-/* Attempt to free avc node cache */
-void avc_disable(void);
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
 DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct avc_cache_stats, avc_cache_stats);
 #endif

security/selinux/include/ibpkey.h

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #define _SELINUX_IB_PKEY_H
 
 #include <linux/types.h>
+#include "flask.h"
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
 void sel_ib_pkey_flush(void);

security/selinux/include/ima.h

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  *
  * Author: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian (nramas@linux.microsoft.com)
  *
- * Measure critical data structures maintainted by SELinux
+ * Measure critical data structures maintained by SELinux
  * using IMA subsystem.
  */
 

security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h

 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+#include <linux/stddef.h>
+
 static const char *const initial_sid_to_string[] = {
 	NULL,
 	"kernel",

security/selinux/include/security.h

@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@
 #define SE_SBPROC		0x0200
 #define SE_SBGENFS		0x0400
 #define SE_SBGENFS_XATTR	0x0800
+#define SE_SBNATIVE		0x1000
 
 #define CONTEXT_STR	"context"
 #define FSCONTEXT_STR	"fscontext"
@@ -384,7 +385,6 @@ struct selinux_kernel_status {
 extern void selinux_status_update_setenforce(int enforcing);
 extern void selinux_status_update_policyload(int seqno);
 extern void selinux_complete_init(void);
-extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
 extern struct path selinux_null;
 extern void selnl_notify_setenforce(int val);
 extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno);

security/selinux/netlabel.c

@@ -154,8 +154,12 @@ void selinux_netlbl_err(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, int error, int gateway)
  */
 void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(struct sk_security_struct *sksec)
 {
-	if (sksec->nlbl_secattr != NULL)
+	if (!sksec->nlbl_secattr)
+		return;
+
 	netlbl_secattr_free(sksec->nlbl_secattr);
+	sksec->nlbl_secattr = NULL;
+	sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_UNSET;
 }
 
 /**

security/selinux/selinuxfs.c

@@ -951,7 +951,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 		 * either whitespace or multibyte characters, they shall be
 		 * encoded based on the percentage-encoding rule.
 		 * If not encoded, the sscanf logic picks up only left-half
-		 * of the supplied name; splitted by a whitespace unexpectedly.
+		 * of the supplied name; split by a whitespace unexpectedly.
 		 */
 		char   *r, *w;
 		int     c1, c2;
@@ -1649,7 +1649,7 @@ static int sel_make_ss_files(struct dentry *dir)
 	struct super_block *sb = dir->d_sb;
 	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = sb->s_fs_info;
 	int i;
-	static struct tree_descr files[] = {
+	static const struct tree_descr files[] = {
 		{ "sidtab_hash_stats", &sel_sidtab_hash_stats_ops, S_IRUGO },
 	};
 

security/selinux/ss/avtab.c

@@ -354,7 +354,7 @@ int avtab_alloc_dup(struct avtab *new, const struct avtab *orig)
 	return avtab_alloc_common(new, orig->nslot);
 }
 
-void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, char *tag)
+void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, const char *tag)
 {
 	int i, chain_len, slots_used, max_chain_len;
 	unsigned long long chain2_len_sum;

security/selinux/ss/avtab.h

@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ int avtab_alloc(struct avtab *, u32);
 int avtab_alloc_dup(struct avtab *new, const struct avtab *orig);
 struct avtab_datum *avtab_search(struct avtab *h, const struct avtab_key *k);
 void avtab_destroy(struct avtab *h);
-void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, char *tag);
+void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, const char *tag);
 
 struct policydb;
 int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,

security/selinux/ss/conditional.c

@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ static int cond_evaluate_expr(struct policydb *p, struct cond_expr *expr)
 			if (sp == (COND_EXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
 				return -1;
 			sp++;
-			s[sp] = p->bool_val_to_struct[node->bool - 1]->state;
+			s[sp] = p->bool_val_to_struct[node->boolean - 1]->state;
 			break;
 		case COND_NOT:
 			if (sp < 0)
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ static int expr_node_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct cond_expr_node *expr)
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	if (expr->bool > p->p_bools.nprim) {
+	if (expr->boolean > p->p_bools.nprim) {
 		pr_err("SELinux: conditional expressions uses unknown bool.\n");
 		return 0;
 	}
@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ static int cond_read_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node, void *fp)
 			return rc;
 
 		expr->expr_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
-		expr->bool = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+		expr->boolean = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
 
 		if (!expr_node_isvalid(p, expr))
 			return -EINVAL;
@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ static int cond_write_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node,
 
 	for (i = 0; i < node->expr.len; i++) {
 		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(node->expr.nodes[i].expr_type);
-		buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(node->expr.nodes[i].bool);
+		buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(node->expr.nodes[i].boolean);
 		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;

security/selinux/ss/conditional.h

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ struct cond_expr_node {
 #define COND_NEQ	7 /* bool != bool */
 #define COND_LAST	COND_NEQ
 	u32 expr_type;
-	u32 bool;
+	u32 boolean;
 };
 
 struct cond_expr {

security/selinux/ss/context.h

@@ -167,6 +167,8 @@ static inline int context_cpy(struct context *dst, const struct context *src)
 	rc = mls_context_cpy(dst, src);
 	if (rc) {
 		kfree(dst->str);
+		dst->str = NULL;
+		dst->len = 0;
 		return rc;
 	}
 	return 0;

security/selinux/ss/policydb.c

@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
 #include "services.h"
 
 #ifdef DEBUG_HASHES
-static const char *symtab_name[SYM_NUM] = {
+static const char *const symtab_name[SYM_NUM] = {
 	"common prefixes",
 	"classes",
 	"roles",
@@ -2257,6 +2257,10 @@ static int ocontext_read(struct policydb *p, const struct policydb_compat_info *
 				if (rc)
 					goto out;
 
+				if (i == OCON_FS)
+					pr_warn("SELinux:  void and deprecated fs ocon %s\n",
+						c->u.name);
+
 				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
 				if (rc)
 					goto out;

security/selinux/ss/policydb.h

@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ struct genfs {
 
 /* object context array indices */
 #define OCON_ISID	0 /* initial SIDs */
-#define OCON_FS		1 /* unlabeled file systems */
+#define OCON_FS		1 /* unlabeled file systems (deprecated) */
 #define OCON_PORT	2 /* TCP and UDP port numbers */
 #define OCON_NETIF	3 /* network interfaces */
 #define OCON_NODE	4 /* nodes */

security/selinux/ss/services.c

@@ -583,7 +583,7 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct policydb *policydb,
 
 /*
  * flag which drivers have permissions
- * only looking for ioctl based extended permssions
+ * only looking for ioctl based extended permissions
  */
 void services_compute_xperms_drivers(
 		struct extended_perms *xperms,
@@ -3541,38 +3541,38 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
 	tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!tmprule)
 		return -ENOMEM;
-
 	context_init(&tmprule->au_ctxt);
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
 	policydb = &policy->policydb;
-
 	tmprule->au_seqno = policy->latest_granting;
-
 	switch (field) {
 	case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
 	case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
-		rc = -EINVAL;
 		userdatum = symtab_search(&policydb->p_users, rulestr);
-		if (!userdatum)
-			goto out;
+		if (!userdatum) {
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			goto err;
+		}
 		tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value;
 		break;
 	case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
 	case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
-		rc = -EINVAL;
 		roledatum = symtab_search(&policydb->p_roles, rulestr);
-		if (!roledatum)
-			goto out;
+		if (!roledatum) {
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			goto err;
+		}
 		tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value;
 		break;
 	case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
 	case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
-		rc = -EINVAL;
 		typedatum = symtab_search(&policydb->p_types, rulestr);
-		if (!typedatum)
-			goto out;
+		if (!typedatum) {
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			goto err;
+		}
 		tmprule->au_ctxt.type = typedatum->value;
 		break;
 	case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
@@ -3582,20 +3582,18 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
 		rc = mls_from_string(policydb, rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt,
 				     GFP_ATOMIC);
 		if (rc)
-			goto out;
+			goto err;
 		break;
 	}
-	rc = 0;
-out:
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 
-	if (rc) {
-		selinux_audit_rule_free(tmprule);
-		tmprule = NULL;
-	}
-
 	*rule = tmprule;
+	return 0;
 
+err:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	selinux_audit_rule_free(tmprule);
+	*rule = NULL;
 	return rc;
 }