Merge tag 'apparmor-pr-2018-04-10' of...

Merge tag 'apparmor-pr-2018-04-10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor

Pull apparmor updates from John Johansen:
 "Features:
  - add base infrastructure for socket mediation. ABI bump and
    additional checks to ensure only v8 compliant policy uses socket af
    mediation.
  - improve and cleanup dfa verification
  - improve profile attachment logic
     - improve overlapping expression handling
     - add the xattr matching to the attachment logic
  - improve signal mediation handling with stacked labels
  - improve handling of no_new_privs in a label stack

  Cleanups and changes:
  - use dfa to parse string split
  - bounded version of label_parse
  - proper line wrap nulldfa.in
  - split context out into task and cred naming to better match usage
  - simplify code in aafs

  Bug fixes:
  - fix display of .ns_name for containers
  - fix resource audit messages when auditing peer
  - fix logging of the existence test for signals
  - fix resource audit messages when auditing peer
  - fix display of .ns_name for containers
  - fix an error code in verify_table_headers()
  - fix memory leak on buffer on error exit path
  - fix error returns checks by making size a ssize_t"

* tag 'apparmor-pr-2018-04-10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor: (36 commits)
  apparmor: fix memory leak on buffer on error exit path
  apparmor: fix dangling symlinks to policy rawdata after replacement
  apparmor: Fix an error code in verify_table_headers()
  apparmor: fix error returns checks by making size a ssize_t
  apparmor: update MAINTAINERS file git and wiki locations
  apparmor: remove POLICY_MEDIATES_SAFE
  apparmor: add base infastructure for socket mediation
  apparmor: improve overlapping domain attachment resolution
  apparmor: convert attaching profiles via xattrs to use dfa matching
  apparmor: Add support for attaching profiles via xattr, presence and value
  apparmor: cleanup: simplify code to get ns symlink name
  apparmor: cleanup create_aafs() error path
  apparmor: dfa split verification of table headers
  apparmor: dfa add support for state differential encoding
  apparmor: dfa move character match into a macro
  apparmor: update domain transitions that are subsets of confinement at nnp
  apparmor: move context.h to cred.h
  apparmor: move task related defines and fns to task.X files
  apparmor: cleanup, drop unused fn __aa_task_is_confined()
  apparmor: cleanup fixup description of aa_replace_profiles
  ...

MAINTAINERS

@@ -934,8 +934,8 @@ F:	drivers/char/apm-emulation.c
 APPARMOR SECURITY MODULE
 M:	John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
 L:	apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com (subscribers-only, general discussion)
-W:	apparmor.wiki.kernel.org
-T:	git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/apparmor-dev.git
+W:	wiki.apparmor.net
+T:	git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor
 S:	Supported
 F:	security/apparmor/
 F:	Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/apparmor.rst

security/apparmor/.gitignore

 #
 # Generated include files
 #
+net_names.h
 capability_names.h
 rlim_names.h

security/apparmor/Makefile

@@ -3,13 +3,46 @@
 #
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
 
-apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
+apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o task.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
               path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
-              resource.o secid.o file.o policy_ns.o label.o mount.o
+              resource.o secid.o file.o policy_ns.o label.o mount.o net.o
 apparmor-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH) += crypto.o
 
-clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h
+clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h net_names.h
 
+# Build a lower case string table of address family names
+# Transform lines from
+#    #define AF_LOCAL		1	/* POSIX name for AF_UNIX	*/
+#    #define AF_INET		2	/* Internet IP Protocol 	*/
+# to
+#    [1] = "local",
+#    [2] = "inet",
+#
+# and build the securityfs entries for the mapping.
+# Transforms lines from
+#    #define AF_INET		2	/* Internet IP Protocol 	*/
+# to
+#    #define AA_SFS_AF_MASK "local inet"
+quiet_cmd_make-af = GEN     $@
+cmd_make-af = echo "static const char *address_family_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
+	sed $< >>$@ -r -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e "/AF_ROUTE/d" -e \
+	 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
+	echo "};" >> $@ ;\
+	printf '%s' '\#define AA_SFS_AF_MASK "' >> $@ ;\
+	sed -r -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e "/AF_ROUTE/d" -e \
+	 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/\L\1/p'\
+	 $< | tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
+
+# Build a lower case string table of sock type names
+# Transform lines from
+#    SOCK_STREAM	= 1,
+# to
+#    [1] = "stream",
+quiet_cmd_make-sock = GEN     $@
+cmd_make-sock = echo "static const char *sock_type_names[] = {" >> $@ ;\
+	sed $^ >>$@ -r -n \
+	-e 's/^\tSOCK_([A-Z0-9_]+)[\t]+=[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
+	echo "};" >> $@
 
 # Build a lower case string table of capability names
 # Transforms lines from
@@ -62,6 +95,7 @@ cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *const rlim_names[RLIM_NLIMITS] = {" \
 	    tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
 
 $(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h
+$(obj)/net.o : $(obj)/net_names.h
 $(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h
 $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/linux/capability.h \
 			    $(src)/Makefile
@@ -69,3 +103,8 @@ $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/linux/capability.h \
 $(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/asm-generic/resource.h \
 		      $(src)/Makefile
 	$(call cmd,make-rlim)
+$(obj)/net_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/socket.h \
+		     $(srctree)/include/linux/net.h \
+		     $(src)/Makefile
+	$(call cmd,make-af)
+	$(call cmd,make-sock)

security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c

@@ -30,10 +30,9 @@
 #include "include/apparmor.h"
 #include "include/apparmorfs.h"
 #include "include/audit.h"
-#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
 #include "include/crypto.h"
 #include "include/ipc.h"
-#include "include/policy_ns.h"
 #include "include/label.h"
 #include "include/policy.h"
 #include "include/policy_ns.h"
@@ -120,9 +119,7 @@ static int aafs_count;
 
 static int aafs_show_path(struct seq_file *seq, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
-	struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
-
-	seq_printf(seq, "%s:[%lu]", AAFS_NAME, inode->i_ino);
+	seq_printf(seq, "%s:[%lu]", AAFS_NAME, d_inode(dentry)->i_ino);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -313,6 +310,7 @@ static struct dentry *aafs_create_dir(const char *name, struct dentry *parent)
  * @name: name of dentry to create
  * @parent: parent directory for this dentry
  * @target: if symlink, symlink target string
+ * @private: private data
  * @iops: struct of inode_operations that should be used
  *
  * If @target parameter is %NULL, then the @iops parameter needs to be
@@ -321,17 +319,17 @@ static struct dentry *aafs_create_dir(const char *name, struct dentry *parent)
 static struct dentry *aafs_create_symlink(const char *name,
 					  struct dentry *parent,
 					  const char *target,
+					  void *private,
 					  const struct inode_operations *iops)
 {
 	struct dentry *dent;
 	char *link = NULL;
 
 	if (target) {
-		link = kstrdup(target, GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!link)
 			return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 	}
-	dent = aafs_create(name, S_IFLNK | 0444, parent, NULL, link, NULL,
+	dent = aafs_create(name, S_IFLNK | 0444, parent, private, link, NULL,
 			   iops);
 	if (IS_ERR(dent))
 		kfree(link);
@@ -622,7 +620,7 @@ static void profile_query_cb(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms,
 			tmp = aa_compute_fperms(dfa, state, &cond);
 		}
 	} else if (profile->policy.dfa) {
-		if (!PROFILE_MEDIATES_SAFE(profile, *match_str))
+		if (!PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, *match_str))
 			return;	/* no change to current perms */
 		dfa = profile->policy.dfa;
 		state = aa_dfa_match_len(dfa, profile->policy.start[0],
@@ -1189,9 +1187,7 @@ static int seq_ns_level_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
 static int seq_ns_name_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
 {
 	struct aa_label *label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
-
-	seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", aa_ns_name(labels_ns(label),
-					   labels_ns(label), true));
+	seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", labels_ns(label)->base.name);
 	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
 
 	return 0;
@@ -1484,26 +1480,97 @@ static int profile_depth(struct aa_profile *profile)
 	return depth;
 }
 
-static int gen_symlink_name(char *buffer, size_t bsize, int depth,
-			    const char *dirname, const char *fname)
+static char *gen_symlink_name(int depth, const char *dirname, const char *fname)
 {
+	char *buffer, *s;
 	int error;
+	int size = depth * 6 + strlen(dirname) + strlen(fname) + 11;
+
+	s = buffer = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!buffer)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 
 	for (; depth > 0; depth--) {
-		if (bsize < 7)
-			return -ENAMETOOLONG;
-		strcpy(buffer, "../../");
-		buffer += 6;
-		bsize -= 6;
+		strcpy(s, "../../");
+		s += 6;
+		size -= 6;
 	}
 
-	error = snprintf(buffer, bsize, "raw_data/%s/%s", dirname, fname);
-	if (error >= bsize || error < 0)
-		return -ENAMETOOLONG;
+	error = snprintf(s, size, "raw_data/%s/%s", dirname, fname);
+	if (error >= size || error < 0) {
+		kfree(buffer);
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG);
+	}
 
-	return 0;
+	return buffer;
+}
+
+static void rawdata_link_cb(void *arg)
+{
+	kfree(arg);
+}
+
+static const char *rawdata_get_link_base(struct dentry *dentry,
+					 struct inode *inode,
+					 struct delayed_call *done,
+					 const char *name)
+{
+	struct aa_proxy *proxy = inode->i_private;
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	char *target;
+	int depth;
+
+	if (!dentry)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD);
+
+	label = aa_get_label_rcu(&proxy->label);
+	profile = labels_profile(label);
+	depth = profile_depth(profile);
+	target = gen_symlink_name(depth, profile->rawdata->name, name);
+	aa_put_label(label);
+
+	if (IS_ERR(target))
+		return target;
+
+	set_delayed_call(done, rawdata_link_cb, target);
+
+	return target;
+}
+
+static const char *rawdata_get_link_sha1(struct dentry *dentry,
+					 struct inode *inode,
+					 struct delayed_call *done)
+{
+	return rawdata_get_link_base(dentry, inode, done, "sha1");
+}
+
+static const char *rawdata_get_link_abi(struct dentry *dentry,
+					struct inode *inode,
+					struct delayed_call *done)
+{
+	return rawdata_get_link_base(dentry, inode, done, "abi");
+}
+
+static const char *rawdata_get_link_data(struct dentry *dentry,
+					 struct inode *inode,
+					 struct delayed_call *done)
+{
+	return rawdata_get_link_base(dentry, inode, done, "raw_data");
 }
 
+static const struct inode_operations rawdata_link_sha1_iops = {
+	.get_link	= rawdata_get_link_sha1,
+};
+
+static const struct inode_operations rawdata_link_abi_iops = {
+	.get_link	= rawdata_get_link_abi,
+};
+static const struct inode_operations rawdata_link_data_iops = {
+	.get_link	= rawdata_get_link_data,
+};
+
+
 /*
  * Requires: @profile->ns->lock held
  */
@@ -1574,34 +1641,28 @@ int __aafs_profile_mkdir(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *parent)
 	}
 
 	if (profile->rawdata) {
-		char target[64];
-		int depth = profile_depth(profile);
-
-		error = gen_symlink_name(target, sizeof(target), depth,
-					 profile->rawdata->name, "sha1");
-		if (error < 0)
-			goto fail2;
-		dent = aafs_create_symlink("raw_sha1", dir, target, NULL);
+		dent = aafs_create_symlink("raw_sha1", dir, NULL,
+					   profile->label.proxy,
+					   &rawdata_link_sha1_iops);
 		if (IS_ERR(dent))
 			goto fail;
+		aa_get_proxy(profile->label.proxy);
 		profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_HASH] = dent;
 
-		error = gen_symlink_name(target, sizeof(target), depth,
-					 profile->rawdata->name, "abi");
-		if (error < 0)
-			goto fail2;
-		dent = aafs_create_symlink("raw_abi", dir, target, NULL);
+		dent = aafs_create_symlink("raw_abi", dir, NULL,
+					   profile->label.proxy,
+					   &rawdata_link_abi_iops);
 		if (IS_ERR(dent))
 			goto fail;
+		aa_get_proxy(profile->label.proxy);
 		profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_ABI] = dent;
 
-		error = gen_symlink_name(target, sizeof(target), depth,
-					 profile->rawdata->name, "raw_data");
-		if (error < 0)
-			goto fail2;
-		dent = aafs_create_symlink("raw_data", dir, target, NULL);
+		dent = aafs_create_symlink("raw_data", dir, NULL,
+					   profile->label.proxy,
+					   &rawdata_link_data_iops);
 		if (IS_ERR(dent))
 			goto fail;
+		aa_get_proxy(profile->label.proxy);
 		profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_DATA] = dent;
 	}
 
@@ -2152,6 +2213,10 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_signal[] = {
 	{ }
 };
 
+static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_attach[] = {
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("xattr", 1),
+	{ }
+};
 static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_domain[] = {
 	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("change_hat",	1),
 	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("change_hatv",	1),
@@ -2159,6 +2224,9 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_domain[] = {
 	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("change_profile",	1),
 	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("stack",		1),
 	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("fix_binfmt_elf_mmap",	1),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("post_nnp_subset",	1),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("computed_longest_left",	1),
+	AA_SFS_DIR("attach_conditions",		aa_sfs_entry_attach),
 	AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("version", "1.2"),
 	{ }
 };
@@ -2167,6 +2235,7 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_versions[] = {
 	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("v5",	1),
 	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("v6",	1),
 	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("v7",	1),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("v8",	1),
 	{ }
 };
 
@@ -2202,6 +2271,7 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_features[] = {
 	AA_SFS_DIR("policy",			aa_sfs_entry_policy),
 	AA_SFS_DIR("domain",			aa_sfs_entry_domain),
 	AA_SFS_DIR("file",			aa_sfs_entry_file),
+	AA_SFS_DIR("network_v8",		aa_sfs_entry_network),
 	AA_SFS_DIR("mount",			aa_sfs_entry_mount),
 	AA_SFS_DIR("namespaces",		aa_sfs_entry_ns),
 	AA_SFS_FILE_U64("capability",		VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK),
@@ -2394,29 +2464,18 @@ static const char *policy_get_link(struct dentry *dentry,
 	return NULL;
 }
 
-static int ns_get_name(char *buf, size_t size, struct aa_ns *ns,
-		       struct inode *inode)
-{
-	int res = snprintf(buf, size, "%s:[%lu]", AAFS_NAME, inode->i_ino);
-
-	if (res < 0 || res >= size)
-		res = -ENOENT;
-
-	return res;
-}
-
 static int policy_readlink(struct dentry *dentry, char __user *buffer,
 			   int buflen)
 {
-	struct aa_ns *ns;
 	char name[32];
 	int res;
 
-	ns = aa_get_current_ns();
-	res = ns_get_name(name, sizeof(name), ns, d_inode(dentry));
-	if (res >= 0)
+	res = snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%s:[%lu]", AAFS_NAME,
+		       d_inode(dentry)->i_ino);
+	if (res > 0 && res < sizeof(name))
 		res = readlink_copy(buffer, buflen, name);
-	aa_put_ns(ns);
+	else
+		res = -ENOENT;
 
 	return res;
 }
@@ -2460,34 +2519,26 @@ static int __init aa_create_aafs(void)
 
 	dent = securityfs_create_file(".load", 0666, aa_sfs_entry.dentry,
 				      NULL, &aa_fs_profile_load);
-	if (IS_ERR(dent)) {
-		error = PTR_ERR(dent);
-		goto error;
-	}
+	if (IS_ERR(dent))
+		goto dent_error;
 	ns_subload(root_ns) = dent;
 
 	dent = securityfs_create_file(".replace", 0666, aa_sfs_entry.dentry,
 				      NULL, &aa_fs_profile_replace);
-	if (IS_ERR(dent)) {
-		error = PTR_ERR(dent);
-		goto error;
-	}
+	if (IS_ERR(dent))
+		goto dent_error;
 	ns_subreplace(root_ns) = dent;
 
 	dent = securityfs_create_file(".remove", 0666, aa_sfs_entry.dentry,
 				      NULL, &aa_fs_profile_remove);
-	if (IS_ERR(dent)) {
-		error = PTR_ERR(dent);
-		goto error;
-	}
+	if (IS_ERR(dent))
+		goto dent_error;
 	ns_subremove(root_ns) = dent;
 
 	dent = securityfs_create_file("revision", 0444, aa_sfs_entry.dentry,
 				      NULL, &aa_fs_ns_revision_fops);
-	if (IS_ERR(dent)) {
-		error = PTR_ERR(dent);
-		goto error;
-	}
+	if (IS_ERR(dent))
+		goto dent_error;
 	ns_subrevision(root_ns) = dent;
 
 	/* policy tree referenced by magic policy symlink */
@@ -2501,10 +2552,8 @@ static int __init aa_create_aafs(void)
 	/* magic symlink similar to nsfs redirects based on task policy */
 	dent = securityfs_create_symlink("policy", aa_sfs_entry.dentry,
 					 NULL, &policy_link_iops);
-	if (IS_ERR(dent)) {
-		error = PTR_ERR(dent);
-		goto error;
-	}
+	if (IS_ERR(dent))
+		goto dent_error;
 
 	error = aa_mk_null_file(aa_sfs_entry.dentry);
 	if (error)
@@ -2516,6 +2565,8 @@ static int __init aa_create_aafs(void)
 	aa_info_message("AppArmor Filesystem Enabled");
 	return 0;
 
+dent_error:
+	error = PTR_ERR(dent);
 error:
 	aa_destroy_aafs();
 	AA_ERROR("Error creating AppArmor securityfs\n");

security/apparmor/capability.c

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
 
 #include "include/apparmor.h"
 #include "include/capability.h"
-#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
 #include "include/policy.h"
 #include "include/audit.h"
 

security/apparmor/domain.c

@@ -19,10 +19,11 @@
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
 #include <linux/personality.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
 
 #include "include/audit.h"
 #include "include/apparmorfs.h"
-#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
 #include "include/domain.h"
 #include "include/file.h"
 #include "include/ipc.h"
@@ -301,8 +302,71 @@ static int change_profile_perms(struct aa_profile *profile,
 	return label_match(profile, target, stack, start, true, request, perms);
 }
 
+/**
+ * aa_xattrs_match - check whether a file matches the xattrs defined in profile
+ * @bprm: binprm struct for the process to validate
+ * @profile: profile to match against (NOT NULL)
+ * @state: state to start match in
+ *
+ * Returns: number of extended attributes that matched, or < 0 on error
+ */
+static int aa_xattrs_match(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+			   struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int state)
+{
+	int i;
+	ssize_t size;
+	struct dentry *d;
+	char *value = NULL;
+	int value_size = 0, ret = profile->xattr_count;
+
+	if (!bprm || !profile->xattr_count)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* transition from exec match to xattr set */
+	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->xmatch, state);
+
+	d = bprm->file->f_path.dentry;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < profile->xattr_count; i++) {
+		size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(d, profile->xattrs[i], &value,
+					  value_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (size >= 0) {
+			u32 perm;
+
+			/* Check the xattr value, not just presence */
+			state = aa_dfa_match_len(profile->xmatch, state, value,
+						 size);
+			perm = dfa_user_allow(profile->xmatch, state);
+			if (!(perm & MAY_EXEC)) {
+				ret = -EINVAL;
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+		/* transition to next element */
+		state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->xmatch, state);
+		if (size < 0) {
+			/*
+			 * No xattr match, so verify if transition to
+			 * next element was valid. IFF so the xattr
+			 * was optional.
+			 */
+			if (!state) {
+				ret = -EINVAL;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			/* don't count missing optional xattr as matched */
+			ret--;
+		}
+	}
+
+out:
+	kfree(value);
+	return ret;
+}
+
 /**
  * __attach_match_ - find an attachment match
+ * @bprm - binprm structure of transitioning task
  * @name - to match against  (NOT NULL)
  * @head - profile list to walk  (NOT NULL)
  * @info - info message if there was an error (NOT NULL)
@@ -316,40 +380,80 @@ static int change_profile_perms(struct aa_profile *profile,
  *
  * Returns: profile or NULL if no match found
  */
-static struct aa_profile *__attach_match(const char *name,
+static struct aa_profile *__attach_match(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+					 const char *name,
 					 struct list_head *head,
 					 const char **info)
 {
-	int len = 0;
+	int candidate_len = 0, candidate_xattrs = 0;
 	bool conflict = false;
 	struct aa_profile *profile, *candidate = NULL;
 
+	AA_BUG(!name);
+	AA_BUG(!head);
+
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(profile, head, base.list) {
 		if (profile->label.flags & FLAG_NULL &&
 		    &profile->label == ns_unconfined(profile->ns))
 			continue;
 
+		/* Find the "best" matching profile. Profiles must
+		 * match the path and extended attributes (if any)
+		 * associated with the file. A more specific path
+		 * match will be preferred over a less specific one,
+		 * and a match with more matching extended attributes
+		 * will be preferred over one with fewer. If the best
+		 * match has both the same level of path specificity
+		 * and the same number of matching extended attributes
+		 * as another profile, signal a conflict and refuse to
+		 * match.
+		 */
 		if (profile->xmatch) {
-			if (profile->xmatch_len >= len) {
-				unsigned int state;
-				u32 perm;
-
-				state = aa_dfa_match(profile->xmatch,
-						     DFA_START, name);
-				perm = dfa_user_allow(profile->xmatch, state);
-				/* any accepting state means a valid match. */
-				if (perm & MAY_EXEC) {
-					if (profile->xmatch_len == len) {
+			unsigned int state, count;
+			u32 perm;
+
+			state = aa_dfa_leftmatch(profile->xmatch, DFA_START,
+						 name, &count);
+			perm = dfa_user_allow(profile->xmatch, state);
+			/* any accepting state means a valid match. */
+			if (perm & MAY_EXEC) {
+				int ret;
+
+				if (count < candidate_len)
+					continue;
+
+				ret = aa_xattrs_match(bprm, profile, state);
+				/* Fail matching if the xattrs don't match */
+				if (ret < 0)
+					continue;
+
+				/*
+				 * TODO: allow for more flexible best match
+				 *
+				 * The new match isn't more specific
+				 * than the current best match
+				 */
+				if (count == candidate_len &&
+				    ret <= candidate_xattrs) {
+					/* Match is equivalent, so conflict */
+					if (ret == candidate_xattrs)
 						conflict = true;
-						continue;
-					}
-					candidate = profile;
-					len = profile->xmatch_len;
-					conflict = false;
+					continue;
 				}
+
+				/* Either the same length with more matching
+				 * xattrs, or a longer match
+				 */
+				candidate = profile;
+				candidate_len = profile->xmatch_len;
+				candidate_xattrs = ret;
+				conflict = false;
 			}
 		} else if (!strcmp(profile->base.name, name))
-			/* exact non-re match, no more searching required */
+			/*
+			 * old exact non-re match, without conditionals such
+			 * as xattrs. no more searching required
+			 */
 			return profile;
 	}
 
@@ -363,6 +467,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *__attach_match(const char *name,
 
 /**
  * find_attach - do attachment search for unconfined processes
+ * @bprm - binprm structure of transitioning task
  * @ns: the current namespace  (NOT NULL)
  * @list: list to search  (NOT NULL)
  * @name: the executable name to match against  (NOT NULL)
@@ -370,13 +475,14 @@ static struct aa_profile *__attach_match(const char *name,
  *
  * Returns: label or NULL if no match found
  */
-static struct aa_label *find_attach(struct aa_ns *ns, struct list_head *list,
+static struct aa_label *find_attach(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+				    struct aa_ns *ns, struct list_head *list,
 				    const char *name, const char **info)
 {
 	struct aa_profile *profile;
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
-	profile = aa_get_profile(__attach_match(name, list, info));
+	profile = aa_get_profile(__attach_match(bprm, name, list, info));
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 
 	return profile ? &profile->label : NULL;
@@ -432,6 +538,7 @@ struct aa_label *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex,
 /**
  * x_to_label - get target label for a given xindex
  * @profile: current profile  (NOT NULL)
+ * @bprm: binprm structure of transitioning task
  * @name: name to lookup (NOT NULL)
  * @xindex: index into x transition table
  * @lookupname: returns: name used in lookup if one was specified (NOT NULL)
@@ -441,6 +548,7 @@ struct aa_label *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex,
  * Returns: refcounted label or NULL if not found available
  */
 static struct aa_label *x_to_label(struct aa_profile *profile,
+				   const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
 				   const char *name, u32 xindex,
 				   const char **lookupname,
 				   const char **info)
@@ -468,11 +576,11 @@ static struct aa_label *x_to_label(struct aa_profile *profile,
 	case AA_X_NAME:
 		if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD)
 			/* released by caller */
-			new = find_attach(ns, &profile->base.profiles,
+			new = find_attach(bprm, ns, &profile->base.profiles,
 					  name, info);
 		else
 			/* released by caller */
-			new = find_attach(ns, &ns->base.profiles,
+			new = find_attach(bprm, ns, &ns->base.profiles,
 					  name, info);
 		*lookupname = name;
 		break;
@@ -512,6 +620,8 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile,
 					   bool *secure_exec)
 {
 	struct aa_label *new = NULL;
+	struct aa_profile *component;
+	struct label_it i;
 	const char *info = NULL, *name = NULL, *target = NULL;
 	unsigned int state = profile->file.start;
 	struct aa_perms perms = {};
@@ -536,8 +646,8 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile,
 	}
 
 	if (profile_unconfined(profile)) {
-		new = find_attach(profile->ns, &profile->ns->base.profiles,
-				  name, &info);
+		new = find_attach(bprm, profile->ns,
+				  &profile->ns->base.profiles, name, &info);
 		if (new) {
 			AA_DEBUG("unconfined attached to new label");
 			return new;
@@ -550,7 +660,8 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile,
 	state = aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, state, name, cond, &perms);
 	if (perms.allow & MAY_EXEC) {
 		/* exec permission determine how to transition */
-		new = x_to_label(profile, name, perms.xindex, &target, &info);
+		new = x_to_label(profile, bprm, name, perms.xindex, &target,
+				 &info);
 		if (new && new->proxy == profile->label.proxy && info) {
 			/* hack ix fallback - improve how this is detected */
 			goto audit;
@@ -559,6 +670,21 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile,
 			info = "profile transition not found";
 			/* remove MAY_EXEC to audit as failure */
 			perms.allow &= ~MAY_EXEC;
+		} else {
+			/* verify that each component's xattr requirements are
+			 * met, and fail execution otherwise
+			 */
+			label_for_each(i, new, component) {
+				if (aa_xattrs_match(bprm, component, state) <
+				    0) {
+					error = -EACCES;
+					info = "required xattrs not present";
+					perms.allow &= ~MAY_EXEC;
+					aa_put_label(new);
+					new = NULL;
+					goto audit;
+				}
+			}
 		}
 	} else if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) {
 		/* no exec permission - learning mode */
@@ -592,22 +718,6 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile,
 	if (!new)
 		goto audit;
 
-	/* Policy has specified a domain transitions. if no_new_privs and
-	 * confined and not transitioning to the current domain fail.
-	 *
-	 * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined and to stritly stacked
-	 * subsets are allowed even when no_new_privs is set because this
-	 * aways results in a further reduction of permissions.
-	 */
-	if ((bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) &&
-	    !profile_unconfined(profile) &&
-	    !aa_label_is_subset(new, &profile->label)) {
-		error = -EPERM;
-		info = "no new privs";
-		nonewprivs = true;
-		perms.allow &= ~MAY_EXEC;
-		goto audit;
-	}
 
 	if (!(perms.xindex & AA_X_UNSAFE)) {
 		if (DEBUG_ON) {
@@ -684,21 +794,6 @@ static int profile_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *onexec,
 		perms.allow &= ~AA_MAY_ONEXEC;
 		goto audit;
 	}
-	/* Policy has specified a domain transitions. if no_new_privs and
-	 * confined and not transitioning to the current domain fail.
-	 *
-	 * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined and to stritly stacked
-	 * subsets are allowed even when no_new_privs is set because this
-	 * aways results in a further reduction of permissions.
-	 */
-	if ((bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) &&
-	    !profile_unconfined(profile) &&
-	    !aa_label_is_subset(onexec, &profile->label)) {
-		error = -EPERM;
-		info = "no new privs";
-		perms.allow &= ~AA_MAY_ONEXEC;
-		goto audit;
-	}
 
 	if (!(perms.xindex & AA_X_UNSAFE)) {
 		if (DEBUG_ON) {
@@ -794,10 +889,22 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	if (bprm->called_set_creds)
 		return 0;
 
-	ctx = cred_ctx(bprm->cred);
+	ctx = task_ctx(current);
+	AA_BUG(!cred_label(bprm->cred));
 	AA_BUG(!ctx);
 
-	label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->label);
+	label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(bprm->cred));
+
+	/*
+	 * Detect no new privs being set, and store the label it
+	 * occurred under. Ideally this would happen when nnp
+	 * is set but there isn't a good way to do that yet.
+	 *
+	 * Testing for unconfined must be done before the subset test
+	 */
+	if ((bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) && !unconfined(label) &&
+	    !ctx->nnp)
+		ctx->nnp = aa_get_label(label);
 
 	/* buffer freed below, name is pointer into buffer */
 	get_buffers(buffer);
@@ -819,7 +926,20 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		goto done;
 	}
 
-	/* TODO: Add ns level no_new_privs subset test */
+	/* Policy has specified a domain transitions. If no_new_privs and
+	 * confined ensure the transition is to confinement that is subset
+	 * of the confinement when the task entered no new privs.
+	 *
+	 * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined and to stacked
+	 * subsets are allowed even when no_new_privs is set because this
+	 * aways results in a further reduction of permissions.
+	 */
+	if ((bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) &&
+	    !unconfined(label) && !aa_label_is_subset(new, ctx->nnp)) {
+		error = -EPERM;
+		info = "no new privs";
+		goto audit;
+	}
 
 	if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
 		/* FIXME: currently don't mediate shared state */
@@ -853,14 +973,11 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		}
 		bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
 	}
-	aa_put_label(ctx->label);
-	/* transfer reference, released when ctx is freed */
-	ctx->label = new;
+	aa_put_label(cred_label(bprm->cred));
+	/* transfer reference, released when cred is freed */
+	cred_label(bprm->cred) = new;
 
 done:
-	/* clear out temporary/transitional state from the context */
-	aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(ctx);
-
 	aa_put_label(label);
 	put_buffers(buffer);
 
@@ -1049,30 +1166,28 @@ static struct aa_label *change_hat(struct aa_label *label, const char *hats[],
 int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred;
-	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx;
+	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
 	struct aa_label *label, *previous, *new = NULL, *target = NULL;
 	struct aa_profile *profile;
 	struct aa_perms perms = {};
 	const char *info = NULL;
 	int error = 0;
 
-	/*
-	 * Fail explicitly requested domain transitions if no_new_privs.
-	 * There is no exception for unconfined as change_hat is not
-	 * available.
-	 */
-	if (task_no_new_privs(current)) {
-		/* not an apparmor denial per se, so don't log it */
-		AA_DEBUG("no_new_privs - change_hat denied");
-		return -EPERM;
-	}
-
 	/* released below */
 	cred = get_current_cred();
-	ctx = cred_ctx(cred);
 	label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
 	previous = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
 
+	/*
+	 * Detect no new privs being set, and store the label it
+	 * occurred under. Ideally this would happen when nnp
+	 * is set but there isn't a good way to do that yet.
+	 *
+	 * Testing for unconfined must be done before the subset test
+	 */
+	if (task_no_new_privs(current) && !unconfined(label) && !ctx->nnp)
+		ctx->nnp = aa_get_label(label);
+
 	if (unconfined(label)) {
 		info = "unconfined can not change_hat";
 		error = -EPERM;
@@ -1093,6 +1208,18 @@ int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags)
 		if (error)
 			goto fail;
 
+		/*
+		 * no new privs prevents domain transitions that would
+		 * reduce restrictions.
+		 */
+		if (task_no_new_privs(current) && !unconfined(label) &&
+		    !aa_label_is_subset(new, ctx->nnp)) {
+			/* not an apparmor denial per se, so don't log it */
+			AA_DEBUG("no_new_privs - change_hat denied");
+			error = -EPERM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
 		if (flags & AA_CHANGE_TEST)
 			goto out;
 
@@ -1102,6 +1229,18 @@ int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags)
 			/* kill task in case of brute force attacks */
 			goto kill;
 	} else if (previous && !(flags & AA_CHANGE_TEST)) {
+		/*
+		 * no new privs prevents domain transitions that would
+		 * reduce restrictions.
+		 */
+		if (task_no_new_privs(current) && !unconfined(label) &&
+		    !aa_label_is_subset(previous, ctx->nnp)) {
+			/* not an apparmor denial per se, so don't log it */
+			AA_DEBUG("no_new_privs - change_hat denied");
+			error = -EPERM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
 		/* Return to saved label.  Kill task if restore fails
 		 * to avoid brute force attacks
 		 */
@@ -1144,21 +1283,6 @@ static int change_profile_perms_wrapper(const char *op, const char *name,
 	const char *info = NULL;
 	int error = 0;
 
-	/*
-	 * Fail explicitly requested domain transitions when no_new_privs
-	 * and not unconfined OR the transition results in a stack on
-	 * the current label.
-	 * Stacking domain transitions and transitions from unconfined are
-	 * allowed even when no_new_privs is set because this aways results
-	 * in a reduction of permissions.
-	 */
-	if (task_no_new_privs(current) && !stack &&
-	    !profile_unconfined(profile) &&
-	    !aa_label_is_subset(target, &profile->label)) {
-		info = "no new privs";
-		error = -EPERM;
-	}
-
 	if (!error)
 		error = change_profile_perms(profile, target, stack, request,
 					     profile->file.start, perms);
@@ -1192,10 +1316,23 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *fqname, int flags)
 	const char *info = NULL;
 	const char *auditname = fqname;		/* retain leading & if stack */
 	bool stack = flags & AA_CHANGE_STACK;
+	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
 	int error = 0;
 	char *op;
 	u32 request;
 
+	label = aa_get_current_label();
+
+	/*
+	 * Detect no new privs being set, and store the label it
+	 * occurred under. Ideally this would happen when nnp
+	 * is set but there isn't a good way to do that yet.
+	 *
+	 * Testing for unconfined must be done before the subset test
+	 */
+	if (task_no_new_privs(current) && !unconfined(label) && !ctx->nnp)
+		ctx->nnp = aa_get_label(label);
+
 	if (!fqname || !*fqname) {
 		AA_DEBUG("no profile name");
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -1283,14 +1420,28 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *fqname, int flags)
 	if (flags & AA_CHANGE_TEST)
 		goto out;
 
+	/* stacking is always a subset, so only check the nonstack case */
+	if (!stack) {
+		new = fn_label_build_in_ns(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL,
+					   aa_get_label(target),
+					   aa_get_label(&profile->label));
+		/*
+		 * no new privs prevents domain transitions that would
+		 * reduce restrictions.
+		 */
+		if (task_no_new_privs(current) && !unconfined(label) &&
+		    !aa_label_is_subset(new, ctx->nnp)) {
+			/* not an apparmor denial per se, so don't log it */
+			AA_DEBUG("no_new_privs - change_hat denied");
+			error = -EPERM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
 	if (!(flags & AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC)) {
 		/* only transition profiles in the current ns */
 		if (stack)
 			new = aa_label_merge(label, target, GFP_KERNEL);
-		else
-			new = fn_label_build_in_ns(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL,
-					aa_get_label(target),
-					aa_get_label(&profile->label));
 		if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(new)) {
 			info = "failed to build target label";
 			error = PTR_ERR(new);
@@ -1299,9 +1450,15 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *fqname, int flags)
 			goto audit;
 		}
 		error = aa_replace_current_label(new);
-	} else
+	} else {
+		if (new) {
+			aa_put_label(new);
+			new = NULL;
+		}
+
 		/* full transition will be built in exec path */
 		error = aa_set_current_onexec(target, stack);
+	}
 
 audit:
 	error = fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile,

security/apparmor/file.c

@@ -18,9 +18,10 @@
 
 #include "include/apparmor.h"
 #include "include/audit.h"
-#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
 #include "include/file.h"
 #include "include/match.h"
+#include "include/net.h"
 #include "include/path.h"
 #include "include/policy.h"
 #include "include/label.h"
@@ -560,6 +561,32 @@ static int __file_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
 	return error;
 }
 
+static int __file_sock_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
+			    struct aa_label *flabel, struct file *file,
+			    u32 request, u32 denied)
+{
+	struct socket *sock = (struct socket *) file->private_data;
+	int error;
+
+	AA_BUG(!sock);
+
+	/* revalidation due to label out of date. No revocation at this time */
+	if (!denied && aa_label_is_subset(flabel, label))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* TODO: improve to skip profiles cached in flabel */
+	error = aa_sock_file_perm(label, op, request, sock);
+	if (denied) {
+		/* TODO: improve to skip profiles checked above */
+		/* check every profile in file label to is cached */
+		last_error(error, aa_sock_file_perm(flabel, op, request, sock));
+	}
+	if (!error)
+		update_file_ctx(file_ctx(file), label, request);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
 /**
  * aa_file_perm - do permission revalidation check & audit for @file
  * @op: operation being checked
@@ -604,6 +631,9 @@ int aa_file_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, struct file *file,
 		error = __file_path_perm(op, label, flabel, file, request,
 					 denied);
 
+	else if (S_ISSOCK(file_inode(file)->i_mode))
+		error = __file_sock_perm(op, label, flabel, file, request,
+					 denied);
 done:
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 

security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h

@@ -24,12 +24,13 @@
 #define AA_CLASS_UNKNOWN	1
 #define AA_CLASS_FILE		2
 #define AA_CLASS_CAP		3
-#define AA_CLASS_NET		4
+#define AA_CLASS_DEPRECATED	4
 #define AA_CLASS_RLIMITS	5
 #define AA_CLASS_DOMAIN		6
 #define AA_CLASS_MOUNT		7
 #define AA_CLASS_PTRACE		9
 #define AA_CLASS_SIGNAL		10
+#define AA_CLASS_NET		14
 #define AA_CLASS_LABEL		16
 
 #define AA_CLASS_LAST		AA_CLASS_LABEL

security/apparmor/include/audit.h

@@ -126,7 +126,20 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
 					const char *target;
 					kuid_t ouid;
 				} fs;
-				int signal;
+				struct {
+					int rlim;
+					unsigned long max;
+				} rlim;
+				struct {
+					int signal;
+					int unmappedsig;
+				};
+				struct {
+					int type, protocol;
+					struct sock *peer_sk;
+					void *addr;
+					int addrlen;
+				} net;
 			};
 		};
 		struct {
@@ -134,10 +147,6 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
 			const char *ns;
 			long pos;
 		} iface;
-		struct {
-			int rlim;
-			unsigned long max;
-		} rlim;
 		struct {
 			const char *src_name;
 			const char *type;

security/apparmor/include/context.h → security/apparmor/include/cred.h

@@ -21,38 +21,9 @@
 
 #include "label.h"
 #include "policy_ns.h"
+#include "task.h"
 
-#define cred_ctx(X) ((X)->security)
-#define current_ctx() cred_ctx(current_cred())
-
-/**
- * struct aa_task_ctx - primary label for confined tasks
- * @label: the current label   (NOT NULL)
- * @exec: label to transition to on next exec  (MAYBE NULL)
- * @previous: label the task may return to     (MAYBE NULL)
- * @token: magic value the task must know for returning to @previous
- *
- * Contains the task's current label (which could change due to
- * change_hat).  Plus the hat_magic needed during change_hat.
- *
- * TODO: make so a task can be confined by a stack of contexts
- */
-struct aa_task_ctx {
-	struct aa_label *label;
-	struct aa_label *onexec;
-	struct aa_label *previous;
-	u64 token;
-};
-
-struct aa_task_ctx *aa_alloc_task_context(gfp_t flags);
-void aa_free_task_context(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx);
-void aa_dup_task_context(struct aa_task_ctx *new,
-			 const struct aa_task_ctx *old);
-int aa_replace_current_label(struct aa_label *label);
-int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_label *label, bool stack);
-int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_label *label, u64 token);
-int aa_restore_previous_label(u64 cookie);
-struct aa_label *aa_get_task_label(struct task_struct *task);
+#define cred_label(X) ((X)->security)
 
 
 /**
@@ -65,10 +36,10 @@ struct aa_label *aa_get_task_label(struct task_struct *task);
  */
 static inline struct aa_label *aa_cred_raw_label(const struct cred *cred)
 {
-	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = cred_ctx(cred);
+	struct aa_label *label = cred_label(cred);
 
-	AA_BUG(!ctx || !ctx->label);
-	return ctx->label;
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+	return label;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -95,17 +66,6 @@ static inline struct aa_label *__aa_task_raw_label(struct task_struct *task)
 	return aa_cred_raw_label(__task_cred(task));
 }
 
-/**
- * __aa_task_is_confined - determine if @task has any confinement
- * @task: task to check confinement of  (NOT NULL)
- *
- * If @task != current needs to be called in RCU safe critical section
- */
-static inline bool __aa_task_is_confined(struct task_struct *task)
-{
-	return !unconfined(__aa_task_raw_label(task));
-}
-
 /**
  * aa_current_raw_label - find the current tasks confining label
  *
@@ -213,17 +173,4 @@ static inline struct aa_ns *aa_get_current_ns(void)
 	return ns;
 }
 
-/**
- * aa_clear_task_ctx_trans - clear transition tracking info from the ctx
- * @ctx: task context to clear (NOT NULL)
- */
-static inline void aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx)
-{
-	aa_put_label(ctx->previous);
-	aa_put_label(ctx->onexec);
-	ctx->previous = NULL;
-	ctx->onexec = NULL;
-	ctx->token = 0;
-}
-
 #endif /* __AA_CONTEXT_H */

security/apparmor/include/label.h

@@ -327,9 +327,37 @@ void aa_label_audit(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp);
 void aa_label_seq_print(struct seq_file *f, struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp);
 void aa_label_printk(struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp);
 
+struct aa_label *aa_label_strn_parse(struct aa_label *base, const char *str,
+				     size_t n, gfp_t gfp, bool create,
+				     bool force_stack);
 struct aa_label *aa_label_parse(struct aa_label *base, const char *str,
 				gfp_t gfp, bool create, bool force_stack);
 
+static inline const char *aa_label_strn_split(const char *str, int n)
+{
+	const char *pos;
+	unsigned int state;
+
+	state = aa_dfa_matchn_until(stacksplitdfa, DFA_START, str, n, &pos);
+	if (!ACCEPT_TABLE(stacksplitdfa)[state])
+		return NULL;
+
+	return pos - 3;
+}
+
+static inline const char *aa_label_str_split(const char *str)
+{
+	const char *pos;
+	unsigned int state;
+
+	state = aa_dfa_match_until(stacksplitdfa, DFA_START, str, &pos);
+	if (!ACCEPT_TABLE(stacksplitdfa)[state])
+		return NULL;
+
+	return pos - 3;
+}
+
+
 
 struct aa_perms;
 int aa_label_match(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *label,

security/apparmor/include/match.h

@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
  */
 
 #define YYTH_MAGIC	0x1B5E783D
+#define YYTH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE	1
 
 struct table_set_header {
 	u32 th_magic;		/* YYTH_MAGIC */
@@ -101,6 +102,7 @@ struct aa_dfa {
 };
 
 extern struct aa_dfa *nulldfa;
+extern struct aa_dfa *stacksplitdfa;
 
 #define byte_to_byte(X) (X)
 
@@ -129,9 +131,32 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
 			  const char *str);
 unsigned int aa_dfa_next(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
 			 const char c);
+unsigned int aa_dfa_match_until(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
+				const char *str, const char **retpos);
+unsigned int aa_dfa_matchn_until(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
+				 const char *str, int n, const char **retpos);
 
 void aa_dfa_free_kref(struct kref *kref);
 
+#define WB_HISTORY_SIZE 8
+struct match_workbuf {
+	unsigned int count;
+	unsigned int pos;
+	unsigned int len;
+	unsigned int size;	/* power of 2, same as history size */
+	unsigned int history[WB_HISTORY_SIZE];
+};
+#define DEFINE_MATCH_WB(N)		\
+struct match_workbuf N = {		\
+	.count = 0,			\
+	.pos = 0,			\
+	.len = 0,			\
+	.size = WB_HISTORY_SIZE,			\
+}
+
+unsigned int aa_dfa_leftmatch(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
+			      const char *str, unsigned int *count);
+
 /**
  * aa_get_dfa - increment refcount on dfa @p
  * @dfa: dfa  (MAYBE NULL)
@@ -159,4 +184,7 @@ static inline void aa_put_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa)
 		kref_put(&dfa->count, aa_dfa_free_kref);
 }
 
+#define MATCH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE 0x80000000
+#define MARK_DIFF_ENCODE 0x40000000
+
 #endif /* __AA_MATCH_H */

security/apparmor/include/net.h

+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor network mediation definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_NET_H
+#define __AA_NET_H
+
+#include <net/sock.h>
+#include <linux/path.h>
+
+#include "apparmorfs.h"
+#include "label.h"
+#include "perms.h"
+#include "policy.h"
+
+#define AA_MAY_SEND		AA_MAY_WRITE
+#define AA_MAY_RECEIVE		AA_MAY_READ
+
+#define AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN		AA_MAY_DELETE
+
+#define AA_MAY_CONNECT		AA_MAY_OPEN
+#define AA_MAY_ACCEPT		0x00100000
+
+#define AA_MAY_BIND		0x00200000
+#define AA_MAY_LISTEN		0x00400000
+
+#define AA_MAY_SETOPT		0x01000000
+#define AA_MAY_GETOPT		0x02000000
+
+#define NET_PERMS_MASK (AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE | AA_MAY_CREATE |    \
+			AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN | AA_MAY_BIND | AA_MAY_LISTEN |	  \
+			AA_MAY_CONNECT | AA_MAY_ACCEPT | AA_MAY_SETATTR | \
+			AA_MAY_GETATTR | AA_MAY_SETOPT | AA_MAY_GETOPT)
+
+#define NET_FS_PERMS (AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE | AA_MAY_CREATE |	\
+		      AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN | AA_MAY_CONNECT | AA_MAY_RENAME |\
+		      AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_GETATTR | AA_MAY_CHMOD |	\
+		      AA_MAY_CHOWN | AA_MAY_CHGRP | AA_MAY_LOCK |	\
+		      AA_MAY_MPROT)
+
+#define NET_PEER_MASK (AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE | AA_MAY_CONNECT |	\
+		       AA_MAY_ACCEPT)
+struct aa_sk_ctx {
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	struct aa_label *peer;
+};
+
+#define SK_CTX(X) ((X)->sk_security)
+#define SOCK_ctx(X) SOCK_INODE(X)->i_security
+#define DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, F, T, P)				  \
+	struct lsm_network_audit NAME ## _net = { .sk = (SK),		  \
+						  .family = (F)};	  \
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(NAME,						  \
+			  ((SK) && (F) != AF_UNIX) ? LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET : \
+						     LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, \
+			  OP);						  \
+	NAME.u.net = &(NAME ## _net);					  \
+	aad(&NAME)->net.type = (T);					  \
+	aad(&NAME)->net.protocol = (P)
+
+#define DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(NAME, OP, SK)					\
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, (SK)->sk_family, (SK)->sk_type,	\
+			 (SK)->sk_protocol)
+
+
+#define af_select(FAMILY, FN, DEF_FN)		\
+({						\
+	int __e;				\
+	switch ((FAMILY)) {			\
+	default:				\
+		__e = DEF_FN;			\
+	}					\
+	__e;					\
+})
+
+extern struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[];
+
+void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va);
+int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa,
+		       u32 request, u16 family, int type);
+int aa_af_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family,
+	       int type, int protocol);
+static inline int aa_profile_af_sk_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
+					struct common_audit_data *sa,
+					u32 request,
+					struct sock *sk)
+{
+	return aa_profile_af_perm(profile, sa, request, sk->sk_family,
+				  sk->sk_type);
+}
+int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk);
+
+int aa_sock_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
+		      struct socket *sock);
+
+#endif /* __AA_NET_H */

security/apparmor/include/perms.h

@@ -138,9 +138,10 @@ extern struct aa_perms allperms;
 
 
 void aa_perm_mask_to_str(char *str, const char *chrs, u32 mask);
-void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char **names, u32 mask);
+void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char * const *names,
+			 u32 mask);
 void aa_audit_perm_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask, const char *chrs,
-			u32 chrsmask, const char **names, u32 namesmask);
+			u32 chrsmask, const char * const *names, u32 namesmask);
 void aa_apply_modes_to_perms(struct aa_profile *profile,
 			     struct aa_perms *perms);
 void aa_compute_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,

security/apparmor/include/policy.h

@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
 #include "file.h"
 #include "lib.h"
 #include "label.h"
+#include "net.h"
 #include "perms.h"
 #include "resource.h"
 
@@ -148,6 +149,10 @@ struct aa_profile {
 	struct aa_policydb policy;
 	struct aa_file_rules file;
 	struct aa_caps caps;
+
+	int xattr_count;
+	char **xattrs;
+
 	struct aa_rlimit rlimits;
 
 	struct aa_loaddata *rawdata;
@@ -209,15 +214,15 @@ static inline struct aa_profile *aa_get_newest_profile(struct aa_profile *p)
 	return labels_profile(aa_get_newest_label(&p->label));
 }
 
-#define PROFILE_MEDIATES(P, T)  ((P)->policy.start[(T)])
-/* safe version of POLICY_MEDIATES for full range input */
-static inline unsigned int PROFILE_MEDIATES_SAFE(struct aa_profile *profile,
-						 unsigned char class)
-{
-	if (profile->policy.dfa)
-		return aa_dfa_match_len(profile->policy.dfa,
-					profile->policy.start[0], &class, 1);
-	return 0;
+#define PROFILE_MEDIATES(P, T)  ((P)->policy.start[(unsigned char) (T)])
+static inline unsigned int PROFILE_MEDIATES_AF(struct aa_profile *profile,
+					       u16 AF) {
+	unsigned int state = PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_NET);
+	__be16 be_af = cpu_to_be16(AF);
+
+	if (!state)
+		return 0;
+	return aa_dfa_match_len(profile->policy.dfa, state, (char *) &be_af, 2);
 }
 
 /**

security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h

@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ struct aa_loaddata {
 	int abi;
 	unsigned char *hash;
 
-	char data[];
+	char *data;
 };
 
 int aa_unpack(struct aa_loaddata *udata, struct list_head *lh, const char **ns);

security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h

@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@
 
 #define SIGUNKNOWN 0
 #define MAXMAPPED_SIG 35
+#define MAXMAPPED_SIGNAME (MAXMAPPED_SIG + 1)
+#define SIGRT_BASE 128
+
 /* provide a mapping of arch signal to internal signal # for mediation
  * those that are always an alias SIGCLD for SIGCLHD and SIGPOLL for SIGIO
  * map to the same entry those that may/or may not get a separate entry
@@ -56,7 +59,7 @@ static const int sig_map[MAXMAPPED_SIG] = {
 };
 
 /* this table is ordered post sig_map[sig] mapping */
-static const char *const sig_names[MAXMAPPED_SIG + 1] = {
+static const char *const sig_names[MAXMAPPED_SIGNAME] = {
 	"unknown",
 	"hup",
 	"int",

security/apparmor/include/task.h

+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor task related definitions and mediation
+ *
+ * Copyright 2017 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_TASK_H
+#define __AA_TASK_H
+
+#define task_ctx(X) ((X)->security)
+
+/*
+ * struct aa_task_ctx - information for current task label change
+ * @nnp: snapshot of label at time of no_new_privs
+ * @onexec: profile to transition to on next exec  (MAY BE NULL)
+ * @previous: profile the task may return to     (MAY BE NULL)
+ * @token: magic value the task must know for returning to @previous_profile
+ */
+struct aa_task_ctx {
+	struct aa_label *nnp;
+	struct aa_label *onexec;
+	struct aa_label *previous;
+	u64 token;
+};
+
+int aa_replace_current_label(struct aa_label *label);
+int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_label *label, bool stack);
+int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_label *label, u64 token);
+int aa_restore_previous_label(u64 cookie);
+struct aa_label *aa_get_task_label(struct task_struct *task);
+
+/**
+ * aa_alloc_task_ctx - allocate a new task_ctx
+ * @flags: gfp flags for allocation
+ *
+ * Returns: allocated buffer or NULL on failure
+ */
+static inline struct aa_task_ctx *aa_alloc_task_ctx(gfp_t flags)
+{
+	return kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx), flags);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_free_task_ctx - free a task_ctx
+ * @ctx: task_ctx to free (MAYBE NULL)
+ */
+static inline void aa_free_task_ctx(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	if (ctx) {
+		aa_put_label(ctx->nnp);
+		aa_put_label(ctx->previous);
+		aa_put_label(ctx->onexec);
+
+		kzfree(ctx);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_dup_task_ctx - duplicate a task context, incrementing reference counts
+ * @new: a blank task context      (NOT NULL)
+ * @old: the task context to copy  (NOT NULL)
+ */
+static inline void aa_dup_task_ctx(struct aa_task_ctx *new,
+				   const struct aa_task_ctx *old)
+{
+	*new = *old;
+	aa_get_label(new->nnp);
+	aa_get_label(new->previous);
+	aa_get_label(new->onexec);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_clear_task_ctx_trans - clear transition tracking info from the ctx
+ * @ctx: task context to clear (NOT NULL)
+ */
+static inline void aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!ctx);
+
+	aa_put_label(ctx->previous);
+	aa_put_label(ctx->onexec);
+	ctx->previous = NULL;
+	ctx->onexec = NULL;
+	ctx->token = 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* __AA_TASK_H */

security/apparmor/ipc.c

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
 
 #include "include/audit.h"
 #include "include/capability.h"
-#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
 #include "include/policy.h"
 #include "include/ipc.h"
 #include "include/sig_names.h"
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static inline int map_signal_num(int sig)
 	if (sig > SIGRTMAX)
 		return SIGUNKNOWN;
 	else if (sig >= SIGRTMIN)
-		return sig - SIGRTMIN + 128;	/* rt sigs mapped to 128 */
+		return sig - SIGRTMIN + SIGRT_BASE;
 	else if (sig < MAXMAPPED_SIG)
 		return sig_map[sig];
 	return SIGUNKNOWN;
@@ -174,60 +174,48 @@ static void audit_signal_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
 			audit_signal_mask(ab, aad(sa)->denied);
 		}
 	}
-	if (aad(sa)->signal < MAXMAPPED_SIG)
+	if (aad(sa)->signal == SIGUNKNOWN)
+		audit_log_format(ab, "signal=unknown(%d)",
+				 aad(sa)->unmappedsig);
+	else if (aad(sa)->signal < MAXMAPPED_SIGNAME)
 		audit_log_format(ab, " signal=%s", sig_names[aad(sa)->signal]);
 	else
 		audit_log_format(ab, " signal=rtmin+%d",
-				 aad(sa)->signal - 128);
+				 aad(sa)->signal - SIGRT_BASE);
 	audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
 	aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
 			FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
 }
 
-/* TODO: update to handle compound name&name2, conditionals */
-static void profile_match_signal(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *label,
-				 int signal, struct aa_perms *perms)
-{
-	unsigned int state;
-
-	/* TODO: secondary cache check <profile, profile, perm> */
-	state = aa_dfa_next(profile->policy.dfa,
-			    profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_SIGNAL],
-			    signal);
-	state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa, state, label);
-	aa_compute_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state, perms);
-}
-
 static int profile_signal_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
-			       struct aa_profile *peer, u32 request,
+			       struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
 			       struct common_audit_data *sa)
 {
 	struct aa_perms perms;
+	unsigned int state;
 
 	if (profile_unconfined(profile) ||
 	    !PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_SIGNAL))
 		return 0;
 
-	aad(sa)->peer = &peer->label;
-	profile_match_signal(profile, peer->base.hname, aad(sa)->signal,
-			     &perms);
+	aad(sa)->peer = peer;
+	/* TODO: secondary cache check <profile, profile, perm> */
+	state = aa_dfa_next(profile->policy.dfa,
+			    profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_SIGNAL],
+			    aad(sa)->signal);
+	aa_label_match(profile, peer, state, false, request, &perms);
 	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
 	return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_signal_cb);
 }
 
-static int aa_signal_cross_perm(struct aa_profile *sender,
-				struct aa_profile *target,
-				struct common_audit_data *sa)
-{
-	return xcheck(profile_signal_perm(sender, target, MAY_WRITE, sa),
-		      profile_signal_perm(target, sender, MAY_READ, sa));
-}
-
 int aa_may_signal(struct aa_label *sender, struct aa_label *target, int sig)
 {
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
 	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_SIGNAL);
 
 	aad(&sa)->signal = map_signal_num(sig);
-	return xcheck_labels_profiles(sender, target, aa_signal_cross_perm,
-				      &sa);
+	aad(&sa)->unmappedsig = sig;
+	return xcheck_labels(sender, target, profile,
+			profile_signal_perm(profile, target, MAY_WRITE, &sa),
+			profile_signal_perm(profile, sender, MAY_READ, &sa));
 }

security/apparmor/label.c

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
 #include <linux/sort.h>
 
 #include "include/apparmor.h"
-#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
 #include "include/label.h"
 #include "include/policy.h"
 #include "include/secid.h"
@@ -1808,14 +1808,17 @@ void aa_label_printk(struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp)
 	aa_put_ns(ns);
 }
 
-static int label_count_str_entries(const char *str)
+static int label_count_strn_entries(const char *str, size_t n)
 {
+	const char *end = str + n;
 	const char *split;
 	int count = 1;
 
 	AA_BUG(!str);
 
-	for (split = strstr(str, "//&"); split; split = strstr(str, "//&")) {
+	for (split = aa_label_strn_split(str, end - str);
+	     split;
+	     split = aa_label_strn_split(str, end - str)) {
 		count++;
 		str = split + 3;
 	}
@@ -1843,9 +1846,10 @@ static struct aa_profile *fqlookupn_profile(struct aa_label *base,
 }
 
 /**
- * aa_label_parse - parse, validate and convert a text string to a label
+ * aa_label_strn_parse - parse, validate and convert a text string to a label
  * @base: base label to use for lookups (NOT NULL)
  * @str: null terminated text string (NOT NULL)
+ * @n: length of str to parse, will stop at \0 if encountered before n
  * @gfp: allocation type
  * @create: true if should create compound labels if they don't exist
  * @force_stack: true if should stack even if no leading &
@@ -1853,19 +1857,24 @@ static struct aa_profile *fqlookupn_profile(struct aa_label *base,
  * Returns: the matching refcounted label if present
  *     else ERRPTR
  */
-struct aa_label *aa_label_parse(struct aa_label *base, const char *str,
-				gfp_t gfp, bool create, bool force_stack)
+struct aa_label *aa_label_strn_parse(struct aa_label *base, const char *str,
+				     size_t n, gfp_t gfp, bool create,
+				     bool force_stack)
 {
 	DEFINE_VEC(profile, vec);
 	struct aa_label *label, *currbase = base;
 	int i, len, stack = 0, error;
-	char *split;
+	const char *end = str + n;
+	const char *split;
 
 	AA_BUG(!base);
 	AA_BUG(!str);
 
-	str = skip_spaces(str);
-	len = label_count_str_entries(str);
+	str = skipn_spaces(str, n);
+	if (str == NULL || (*str == '=' && base != &root_ns->unconfined->label))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+	len = label_count_strn_entries(str, end - str);
 	if (*str == '&' || force_stack) {
 		/* stack on top of base */
 		stack = base->size;
@@ -1873,8 +1882,6 @@ struct aa_label *aa_label_parse(struct aa_label *base, const char *str,
 		if (*str == '&')
 			str++;
 	}
-	if (*str == '=')
-		base = &root_ns->unconfined->label;
 
 	error = vec_setup(profile, vec, len, gfp);
 	if (error)
@@ -1883,7 +1890,8 @@ struct aa_label *aa_label_parse(struct aa_label *base, const char *str,
 	for (i = 0; i < stack; i++)
 		vec[i] = aa_get_profile(base->vec[i]);
 
-	for (split = strstr(str, "//&"), i = stack; split && i < len; i++) {
+	for (split = aa_label_strn_split(str, end - str), i = stack;
+	     split && i < len; i++) {
 		vec[i] = fqlookupn_profile(base, currbase, str, split - str);
 		if (!vec[i])
 			goto fail;
@@ -1894,11 +1902,11 @@ struct aa_label *aa_label_parse(struct aa_label *base, const char *str,
 		if (vec[i]->ns != labels_ns(currbase))
 			currbase = &vec[i]->label;
 		str = split + 3;
-		split = strstr(str, "//&");
+		split = aa_label_strn_split(str, end - str);
 	}
 	/* last element doesn't have a split */
 	if (i < len) {
-		vec[i] = fqlookupn_profile(base, currbase, str, strlen(str));
+		vec[i] = fqlookupn_profile(base, currbase, str, end - str);
 		if (!vec[i])
 			goto fail;
 	}
@@ -1930,6 +1938,12 @@ struct aa_label *aa_label_parse(struct aa_label *base, const char *str,
 	goto out;
 }
 
+struct aa_label *aa_label_parse(struct aa_label *base, const char *str,
+				gfp_t gfp, bool create, bool force_stack)
+{
+	return aa_label_strn_parse(base, str, strlen(str), gfp, create,
+				   force_stack);
+}
 
 /**
  * aa_labelset_destroy - remove all labels from the label set

security/apparmor/lib.c

@@ -211,7 +211,8 @@ void aa_perm_mask_to_str(char *str, const char *chrs, u32 mask)
 	*str = '\0';
 }
 
-void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char **names, u32 mask)
+void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char * const *names,
+			 u32 mask)
 {
 	const char *fmt = "%s";
 	unsigned int i, perm = 1;
@@ -229,7 +230,7 @@ void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char **names, u32 mask)
 }
 
 void aa_audit_perm_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask, const char *chrs,
-			u32 chrsmask, const char **names, u32 namesmask)
+			u32 chrsmask, const char * const *names, u32 namesmask)
 {
 	char str[33];
 

security/apparmor/lsm.c

@@ -29,9 +29,10 @@
 #include "include/apparmorfs.h"
 #include "include/audit.h"
 #include "include/capability.h"
-#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
 #include "include/file.h"
 #include "include/ipc.h"
+#include "include/net.h"
 #include "include/path.h"
 #include "include/label.h"
 #include "include/policy.h"
@@ -50,12 +51,12 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct aa_buffers, aa_buffers);
  */
 
 /*
- * free the associated aa_task_ctx and put its labels
+ * put the associated labels
  */
 static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
 {
-	aa_free_task_context(cred_ctx(cred));
-	cred_ctx(cred) = NULL;
+	aa_put_label(cred_label(cred));
+	cred_label(cred) = NULL;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -63,30 +64,17 @@ static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
  */
 static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
 {
-	/* freed by apparmor_cred_free */
-	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp);
-
-	if (!ctx)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	cred_ctx(cred) = ctx;
+	cred_label(cred) = NULL;
 	return 0;
 }
 
 /*
- * prepare new aa_task_ctx for modification by prepare_cred block
+ * prepare new cred label for modification by prepare_cred block
  */
 static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 				 gfp_t gfp)
 {
-	/* freed by apparmor_cred_free */
-	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp);
-
-	if (!ctx)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	aa_dup_task_context(ctx, cred_ctx(old));
-	cred_ctx(new) = ctx;
+	cred_label(new) = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(old));
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -95,10 +83,28 @@ static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
  */
 static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 {
-	const struct aa_task_ctx *old_ctx = cred_ctx(old);
-	struct aa_task_ctx *new_ctx = cred_ctx(new);
+	cred_label(new) = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(old));
+}
+
+static void apparmor_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+
+	aa_free_task_ctx(task_ctx(task));
+	task_ctx(task) = NULL;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
+			       unsigned long clone_flags)
+{
+	struct aa_task_ctx *new = aa_alloc_task_ctx(GFP_KERNEL);
+
+	if (!new)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	aa_dup_task_ctx(new, task_ctx(current));
+	task_ctx(task) = new;
 
-	aa_dup_task_context(new_ctx, old_ctx);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
@@ -576,11 +582,11 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
 	int error = -ENOENT;
 	/* released below */
 	const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
-	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = cred_ctx(cred);
+	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
 	struct aa_label *label = NULL;
 
 	if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
-		label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->label);
+		label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(cred));
 	else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0  && ctx->previous)
 		label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
 	else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && ctx->onexec)
@@ -677,11 +683,11 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value,
 static void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	struct aa_label *label = aa_current_raw_label();
-	struct aa_task_ctx *new_ctx = cred_ctx(bprm->cred);
+	struct aa_label *new_label = cred_label(bprm->cred);
 
 	/* bail out if unconfined or not changing profile */
-	if ((new_ctx->label->proxy == label->proxy) ||
-	    (unconfined(new_ctx->label)))
+	if ((new_label->proxy == label->proxy) ||
+	    (unconfined(new_label)))
 		return;
 
 	aa_inherit_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
@@ -689,7 +695,7 @@ static void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	current->pdeath_signal = 0;
 
 	/* reset soft limits and set hard limits for the new label */
-	__aa_transition_rlimits(label, new_ctx->label);
+	__aa_transition_rlimits(label, new_label);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -698,7 +704,9 @@ static void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
  */
 static void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
-	/* TODO: cleanup signals - ipc mediation */
+	/* clear out temporary/transitional state from the context */
+	aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(task_ctx(current));
+
 	return;
 }
 
@@ -742,6 +750,373 @@ static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct siginfo *info,
 	return error;
 }
 
+/**
+ * apparmor_sk_alloc_security - allocate and attach the sk_security field
+ */
+static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t flags)
+{
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx;
+
+	ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), flags);
+	if (!ctx)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	SK_CTX(sk) = ctx;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_sk_free_security - free the sk_security field
+ */
+static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+
+	SK_CTX(sk) = NULL;
+	aa_put_label(ctx->label);
+	aa_put_label(ctx->peer);
+	kfree(ctx);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_clone_security - clone the sk_security field
+ */
+static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk,
+				       struct sock *newsk)
+{
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *new = SK_CTX(newsk);
+
+	new->label = aa_get_label(ctx->label);
+	new->peer = aa_get_label(ctx->peer);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_create - check perms before creating a new socket
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	int error = 0;
+
+	AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+	label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+	if (!(kern || unconfined(label)))
+		error = af_select(family,
+				  create_perm(label, family, type, protocol),
+				  aa_af_perm(label, OP_CREATE, AA_MAY_CREATE,
+					     family, type, protocol));
+	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_post_create - setup the per-socket security struct
+ *
+ * Note:
+ * -   kernel sockets currently labeled unconfined but we may want to
+ *     move to a special kernel label
+ * -   socket may not have sk here if created with sock_create_lite or
+ *     sock_alloc. These should be accept cases which will be handled in
+ *     sock_graft.
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
+				       int type, int protocol, int kern)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label;
+
+	if (kern) {
+		struct aa_ns *ns = aa_get_current_ns();
+
+		label = aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(ns));
+		aa_put_ns(ns);
+	} else
+		label = aa_get_current_label();
+
+	if (sock->sk) {
+		struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sock->sk);
+
+		aa_put_label(ctx->label);
+		ctx->label = aa_get_label(label);
+	}
+	aa_put_label(label);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_bind - check perms before bind addr to socket
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
+				struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!sock);
+	AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
+	AA_BUG(!address);
+	AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+	return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
+			 bind_perm(sock, address, addrlen),
+			 aa_sk_perm(OP_BIND, AA_MAY_BIND, sock->sk));
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_connect - check perms before connecting @sock to @address
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
+				   struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!sock);
+	AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
+	AA_BUG(!address);
+	AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+	return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
+			 connect_perm(sock, address, addrlen),
+			 aa_sk_perm(OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT, sock->sk));
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_list - check perms before allowing listen
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!sock);
+	AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
+	AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+	return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
+			 listen_perm(sock, backlog),
+			 aa_sk_perm(OP_LISTEN, AA_MAY_LISTEN, sock->sk));
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_accept - check perms before accepting a new connection.
+ *
+ * Note: while @newsock is created and has some information, the accept
+ *       has not been done.
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!sock);
+	AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
+	AA_BUG(!newsock);
+	AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+	return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
+			 accept_perm(sock, newsock),
+			 aa_sk_perm(OP_ACCEPT, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, sock->sk));
+}
+
+static int aa_sock_msg_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
+			    struct msghdr *msg, int size)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!sock);
+	AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
+	AA_BUG(!msg);
+	AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+	return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
+			 msg_perm(op, request, sock, msg, size),
+			 aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk));
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_sendmsg - check perms before sending msg to another socket
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
+				   struct msghdr *msg, int size)
+{
+	return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, sock, msg, size);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_recvmsg - check perms before receiving a message
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock,
+				   struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags)
+{
+	return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_RECVMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE, sock, msg, size);
+}
+
+/* revaliation, get/set attr, shutdown */
+static int aa_sock_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!sock);
+	AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
+	AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+	return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
+			 sock_perm(op, request, sock),
+			 aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk));
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_getsockname - check perms before getting the local address
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
+{
+	return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETSOCKNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_getpeername - check perms before getting remote address
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
+{
+	return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETPEERNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock);
+}
+
+/* revaliation, get/set attr, opt */
+static int aa_sock_opt_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
+			    int level, int optname)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!sock);
+	AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
+	AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+	return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
+			 opt_perm(op, request, sock, level, optname),
+			 aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk));
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_getsockopt - check perms before getting socket options
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
+				      int optname)
+{
+	return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_GETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_GETOPT, sock,
+				level, optname);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_setsockopt - check perms before setting socket options
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
+				      int optname)
+{
+	return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_SETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_SETOPT, sock,
+				level, optname);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_shutdown - check perms before shutting down @sock conn
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
+{
+	return aa_sock_perm(OP_SHUTDOWN, AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN, sock);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_sock_recv_skb - check perms before associating skb to sk
+ *
+ * Note: can not sleep may be called with locks held
+ *
+ * dont want protocol specific in __skb_recv_datagram()
+ * to deny an incoming connection  socket_sock_rcv_skb()
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+
+	if (ctx->peer)
+		return ctx->peer;
+
+	return ERR_PTR(-ENOPROTOOPT);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream - get security context of peer
+ *
+ * Note: for tcp only valid if using ipsec or cipso on lan
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
+					     char __user *optval,
+					     int __user *optlen,
+					     unsigned int len)
+{
+	char *name;
+	int slen, error = 0;
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	struct aa_label *peer;
+
+	label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+	peer = sk_peer_label(sock->sk);
+	if (IS_ERR(peer)) {
+		error = PTR_ERR(peer);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	slen = aa_label_asxprint(&name, labels_ns(label), peer,
+				 FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
+				 FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED, GFP_KERNEL);
+	/* don't include terminating \0 in slen, it breaks some apps */
+	if (slen < 0) {
+		error = -ENOMEM;
+	} else {
+		if (slen > len) {
+			error = -ERANGE;
+		} else if (copy_to_user(optval, name, slen)) {
+			error = -EFAULT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (put_user(slen, optlen))
+			error = -EFAULT;
+out:
+		kfree(name);
+
+	}
+
+done:
+	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram - get security label of packet
+ * @sock: the peer socket
+ * @skb: packet data
+ * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
+ *
+ * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
+					    struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+
+{
+	/* TODO: requires secid support */
+	return -ENOPROTOOPT;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_sock_graft - Initialize newly created socket
+ * @sk: child sock
+ * @parent: parent socket
+ *
+ * Note: could set off of SOCK_CTX(parent) but need to track inode and we can
+ *       just set sk security information off of current creating process label
+ *       Labeling of sk for accept case - probably should be sock based
+ *       instead of task, because of the case where an implicitly labeled
+ *       socket is shared by different tasks.
+ */
+static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
+{
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+
+	if (!ctx->label)
+		ctx->label = aa_get_current_label();
+}
+
 static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -776,6 +1151,30 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
 
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, apparmor_socket_create),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, apparmor_socket_post_create),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, apparmor_socket_bind),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, apparmor_socket_connect),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, apparmor_socket_listen),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, apparmor_socket_accept),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, apparmor_socket_sendmsg),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, apparmor_socket_recvmsg),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, apparmor_socket_getsockname),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, apparmor_socket_getpeername),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, apparmor_socket_getsockopt),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, apparmor_socket_setsockopt),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, apparmor_socket_shutdown),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
+		      apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram,
+		      apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft),
+
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare),
@@ -785,6 +1184,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, apparmor_bprm_committing_creds),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, apparmor_bprm_committed_creds),
 
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, apparmor_task_free),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, apparmor_task_alloc),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, apparmor_task_kill),
 };
@@ -1032,12 +1433,12 @@ static int __init set_init_ctx(void)
 	struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred;
 	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx;
 
-	ctx = aa_alloc_task_context(GFP_KERNEL);
+	ctx = aa_alloc_task_ctx(GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!ctx)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	ctx->label = aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(root_ns));
-	cred_ctx(cred) = ctx;
+	cred_label(cred) = aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(root_ns));
+	task_ctx(current) = ctx;
 
 	return 0;
 }

security/apparmor/match.c

@@ -30,6 +30,11 @@ static char nulldfa_src[] = {
 };
 struct aa_dfa *nulldfa;
 
+static char stacksplitdfa_src[] = {
+	#include "stacksplitdfa.in"
+};
+struct aa_dfa *stacksplitdfa;
+
 int aa_setup_dfa_engine(void)
 {
 	int error;
@@ -37,19 +42,31 @@ int aa_setup_dfa_engine(void)
 	nulldfa = aa_dfa_unpack(nulldfa_src, sizeof(nulldfa_src),
 				TO_ACCEPT1_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32) |
 				TO_ACCEPT2_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32));
-	if (!IS_ERR(nulldfa))
-		return 0;
+	if (IS_ERR(nulldfa)) {
+		error = PTR_ERR(nulldfa);
+		nulldfa = NULL;
+		return error;
+	}
 
-	error = PTR_ERR(nulldfa);
-	nulldfa = NULL;
+	stacksplitdfa = aa_dfa_unpack(stacksplitdfa_src,
+				      sizeof(stacksplitdfa_src),
+				      TO_ACCEPT1_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32) |
+				      TO_ACCEPT2_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32));
+	if (IS_ERR(stacksplitdfa)) {
+		aa_put_dfa(nulldfa);
+		nulldfa = NULL;
+		error = PTR_ERR(stacksplitdfa);
+		stacksplitdfa = NULL;
+		return error;
+	}
 
-	return error;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 void aa_teardown_dfa_engine(void)
 {
+	aa_put_dfa(stacksplitdfa);
 	aa_put_dfa(nulldfa);
-	nulldfa = NULL;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -119,8 +136,8 @@ static struct table_header *unpack_table(char *blob, size_t bsize)
 }
 
 /**
- * verify_dfa - verify that transitions and states in the tables are in bounds.
- * @dfa: dfa to test  (NOT NULL)
+ * verify_table_headers - verify that the tables headers are as expected
+ * @tables - array of dfa tables to check (NOT NULL)
  * @flags: flags controlling what type of accept table are acceptable
  *
  * Assumes dfa has gone through the first pass verification done by unpacking
@@ -128,64 +145,98 @@ static struct table_header *unpack_table(char *blob, size_t bsize)
  *
  * Returns: %0 else error code on failure to verify
  */
-static int verify_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa, int flags)
+static int verify_table_headers(struct table_header **tables, int flags)
 {
-	size_t i, state_count, trans_count;
+	size_t state_count, trans_count;
 	int error = -EPROTO;
 
 	/* check that required tables exist */
-	if (!(dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_DEF] &&
-	      dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_BASE] &&
-	      dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_NXT] && dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_CHK]))
+	if (!(tables[YYTD_ID_DEF] && tables[YYTD_ID_BASE] &&
+	      tables[YYTD_ID_NXT] && tables[YYTD_ID_CHK]))
 		goto out;
 
 	/* accept.size == default.size == base.size */
-	state_count = dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_BASE]->td_lolen;
+	state_count = tables[YYTD_ID_BASE]->td_lolen;
 	if (ACCEPT1_FLAGS(flags)) {
-		if (!dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT])
+		if (!tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT])
 			goto out;
-		if (state_count != dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT]->td_lolen)
+		if (state_count != tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT]->td_lolen)
 			goto out;
 	}
 	if (ACCEPT2_FLAGS(flags)) {
-		if (!dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2])
+		if (!tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2])
 			goto out;
-		if (state_count != dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2]->td_lolen)
+		if (state_count != tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2]->td_lolen)
 			goto out;
 	}
-	if (state_count != dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_DEF]->td_lolen)
+	if (state_count != tables[YYTD_ID_DEF]->td_lolen)
 		goto out;
 
 	/* next.size == chk.size */
-	trans_count = dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_NXT]->td_lolen;
-	if (trans_count != dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_CHK]->td_lolen)
+	trans_count = tables[YYTD_ID_NXT]->td_lolen;
+	if (trans_count != tables[YYTD_ID_CHK]->td_lolen)
 		goto out;
 
 	/* if equivalence classes then its table size must be 256 */
-	if (dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC] &&
-	    dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC]->td_lolen != 256)
+	if (tables[YYTD_ID_EC] && tables[YYTD_ID_EC]->td_lolen != 256)
 		goto out;
 
-	if (flags & DFA_FLAG_VERIFY_STATES) {
-		for (i = 0; i < state_count; i++) {
-			if (DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= state_count)
-				goto out;
-			if (base_idx(BASE_TABLE(dfa)[i]) + 255 >= trans_count) {
-				printk(KERN_ERR "AppArmor DFA next/check upper "
-				       "bounds error\n");
-				goto out;
-			}
+	error = 0;
+out:
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * verify_dfa - verify that transitions and states in the tables are in bounds.
+ * @dfa: dfa to test  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Assumes dfa has gone through the first pass verification done by unpacking
+ * NOTE: this does not valid accept table values
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error code on failure to verify
+ */
+static int verify_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa)
+{
+	size_t i, state_count, trans_count;
+	int error = -EPROTO;
+
+	state_count = dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_BASE]->td_lolen;
+	trans_count = dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_NXT]->td_lolen;
+	for (i = 0; i < state_count; i++) {
+		if (!(BASE_TABLE(dfa)[i] & MATCH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE) &&
+		    (DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= state_count))
+			goto out;
+		if (base_idx(BASE_TABLE(dfa)[i]) + 255 >= trans_count) {
+			pr_err("AppArmor DFA next/check upper bounds error\n");
+			goto out;
 		}
+	}
 
-		for (i = 0; i < trans_count; i++) {
-			if (NEXT_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= state_count)
-				goto out;
-			if (CHECK_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= state_count)
+	for (i = 0; i < trans_count; i++) {
+		if (NEXT_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= state_count)
+			goto out;
+		if (CHECK_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= state_count)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Now that all the other tables are verified, verify diffencoding */
+	for (i = 0; i < state_count; i++) {
+		size_t j, k;
+
+		for (j = i;
+		     (BASE_TABLE(dfa)[j] & MATCH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE) &&
+		     !(BASE_TABLE(dfa)[j] & MARK_DIFF_ENCODE);
+		     j = k) {
+			k = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa)[j];
+			if (j == k)
 				goto out;
+			if (k < j)
+				break;		/* already verified */
+			BASE_TABLE(dfa)[j] |= MARK_DIFF_ENCODE;
 		}
 	}
-
 	error = 0;
+
 out:
 	return error;
 }
@@ -257,6 +308,9 @@ struct aa_dfa *aa_dfa_unpack(void *blob, size_t size, int flags)
 		goto fail;
 
 	dfa->flags = ntohs(*(__be16 *) (data + 12));
+	if (dfa->flags != 0 && dfa->flags != YYTH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE)
+		goto fail;
+
 	data += hsize;
 	size -= hsize;
 
@@ -299,11 +353,16 @@ struct aa_dfa *aa_dfa_unpack(void *blob, size_t size, int flags)
 		size -= table_size(table->td_lolen, table->td_flags);
 		table = NULL;
 	}
-
-	error = verify_dfa(dfa, flags);
+	error = verify_table_headers(dfa->tables, flags);
 	if (error)
 		goto fail;
 
+	if (flags & DFA_FLAG_VERIFY_STATES) {
+		error = verify_dfa(dfa);
+		if (error)
+			goto fail;
+	}
+
 	return dfa;
 
 fail:
@@ -312,6 +371,20 @@ struct aa_dfa *aa_dfa_unpack(void *blob, size_t size, int flags)
 	return ERR_PTR(error);
 }
 
+#define match_char(state, def, base, next, check, C)	\
+do {							\
+	u32 b = (base)[(state)];			\
+	unsigned int pos = base_idx(b) + (C);		\
+	if ((check)[pos] != (state)) {			\
+		(state) = (def)[(state)];		\
+		if (b & MATCH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE)		\
+			continue;			\
+		break;					\
+	}						\
+	(state) = (next)[pos];				\
+	break;						\
+} while (1)
+
 /**
  * aa_dfa_match_len - traverse @dfa to find state @str stops at
  * @dfa: the dfa to match @str against  (NOT NULL)
@@ -335,6 +408,118 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_match_len(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
 	u32 *base = BASE_TABLE(dfa);
 	u16 *next = NEXT_TABLE(dfa);
 	u16 *check = CHECK_TABLE(dfa);
+	unsigned int state = start;
+
+	if (state == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* current state is <state>, matching character *str */
+	if (dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC]) {
+		/* Equivalence class table defined */
+		u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa);
+		for (; len; len--)
+			match_char(state, def, base, next, check,
+				   equiv[(u8) *str++]);
+	} else {
+		/* default is direct to next state */
+		for (; len; len--)
+			match_char(state, def, base, next, check, (u8) *str++);
+	}
+
+	return state;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_dfa_match - traverse @dfa to find state @str stops at
+ * @dfa: the dfa to match @str against  (NOT NULL)
+ * @start: the state of the dfa to start matching in
+ * @str: the null terminated string of bytes to match against the dfa (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * aa_dfa_match will match @str against the dfa and return the state it
+ * finished matching in. The final state can be used to look up the accepting
+ * label, or as the start state of a continuing match.
+ *
+ * Returns: final state reached after input is consumed
+ */
+unsigned int aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
+			  const char *str)
+{
+	u16 *def = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa);
+	u32 *base = BASE_TABLE(dfa);
+	u16 *next = NEXT_TABLE(dfa);
+	u16 *check = CHECK_TABLE(dfa);
+	unsigned int state = start;
+
+	if (state == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* current state is <state>, matching character *str */
+	if (dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC]) {
+		/* Equivalence class table defined */
+		u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa);
+		/* default is direct to next state */
+		while (*str)
+			match_char(state, def, base, next, check,
+				   equiv[(u8) *str++]);
+	} else {
+		/* default is direct to next state */
+		while (*str)
+			match_char(state, def, base, next, check, (u8) *str++);
+	}
+
+	return state;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_dfa_next - step one character to the next state in the dfa
+ * @dfa: the dfa to tranverse (NOT NULL)
+ * @state: the state to start in
+ * @c: the input character to transition on
+ *
+ * aa_dfa_match will step through the dfa by one input character @c
+ *
+ * Returns: state reach after input @c
+ */
+unsigned int aa_dfa_next(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
+			  const char c)
+{
+	u16 *def = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa);
+	u32 *base = BASE_TABLE(dfa);
+	u16 *next = NEXT_TABLE(dfa);
+	u16 *check = CHECK_TABLE(dfa);
+
+	/* current state is <state>, matching character *str */
+	if (dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC]) {
+		/* Equivalence class table defined */
+		u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa);
+		match_char(state, def, base, next, check, equiv[(u8) c]);
+	} else
+		match_char(state, def, base, next, check, (u8) c);
+
+	return state;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_dfa_match_until - traverse @dfa until accept state or end of input
+ * @dfa: the dfa to match @str against  (NOT NULL)
+ * @start: the state of the dfa to start matching in
+ * @str: the null terminated string of bytes to match against the dfa (NOT NULL)
+ * @retpos: first character in str after match OR end of string
+ *
+ * aa_dfa_match will match @str against the dfa and return the state it
+ * finished matching in. The final state can be used to look up the accepting
+ * label, or as the start state of a continuing match.
+ *
+ * Returns: final state reached after input is consumed
+ */
+unsigned int aa_dfa_match_until(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
+				const char *str, const char **retpos)
+{
+	u16 *def = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa);
+	u32 *base = BASE_TABLE(dfa);
+	u16 *next = NEXT_TABLE(dfa);
+	u16 *check = CHECK_TABLE(dfa);
+	u32 *accept = ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa);
 	unsigned int state = start, pos;
 
 	if (state == 0)
@@ -345,48 +530,60 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_match_len(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
 		/* Equivalence class table defined */
 		u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa);
 		/* default is direct to next state */
-		for (; len; len--) {
+		while (*str) {
 			pos = base_idx(base[state]) + equiv[(u8) *str++];
 			if (check[pos] == state)
 				state = next[pos];
 			else
 				state = def[state];
+			if (accept[state])
+				break;
 		}
 	} else {
 		/* default is direct to next state */
-		for (; len; len--) {
+		while (*str) {
 			pos = base_idx(base[state]) + (u8) *str++;
 			if (check[pos] == state)
 				state = next[pos];
 			else
 				state = def[state];
+			if (accept[state])
+				break;
 		}
 	}
 
+	*retpos = str;
 	return state;
 }
 
 /**
- * aa_dfa_match - traverse @dfa to find state @str stops at
+ * aa_dfa_matchn_until - traverse @dfa until accept or @n bytes consumed
  * @dfa: the dfa to match @str against  (NOT NULL)
  * @start: the state of the dfa to start matching in
- * @str: the null terminated string of bytes to match against the dfa (NOT NULL)
+ * @str: the string of bytes to match against the dfa  (NOT NULL)
+ * @n: length of the string of bytes to match
+ * @retpos: first character in str after match OR str + n
  *
- * aa_dfa_match will match @str against the dfa and return the state it
+ * aa_dfa_match_len will match @str against the dfa and return the state it
  * finished matching in. The final state can be used to look up the accepting
  * label, or as the start state of a continuing match.
  *
+ * This function will happily match again the 0 byte and only finishes
+ * when @n input is consumed.
+ *
  * Returns: final state reached after input is consumed
  */
-unsigned int aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
-			  const char *str)
+unsigned int aa_dfa_matchn_until(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
+				 const char *str, int n, const char **retpos)
 {
 	u16 *def = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa);
 	u32 *base = BASE_TABLE(dfa);
 	u16 *next = NEXT_TABLE(dfa);
 	u16 *check = CHECK_TABLE(dfa);
+	u32 *accept = ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa);
 	unsigned int state = start, pos;
 
+	*retpos = NULL;
 	if (state == 0)
 		return 0;
 
@@ -395,65 +592,149 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
 		/* Equivalence class table defined */
 		u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa);
 		/* default is direct to next state */
-		while (*str) {
+		for (; n; n--) {
 			pos = base_idx(base[state]) + equiv[(u8) *str++];
 			if (check[pos] == state)
 				state = next[pos];
 			else
 				state = def[state];
+			if (accept[state])
+				break;
 		}
 	} else {
 		/* default is direct to next state */
-		while (*str) {
+		for (; n; n--) {
 			pos = base_idx(base[state]) + (u8) *str++;
 			if (check[pos] == state)
 				state = next[pos];
 			else
 				state = def[state];
+			if (accept[state])
+				break;
 		}
 	}
 
+	*retpos = str;
 	return state;
 }
 
-/**
- * aa_dfa_next - step one character to the next state in the dfa
- * @dfa: the dfa to tranverse (NOT NULL)
- * @state: the state to start in
- * @c: the input character to transition on
- *
- * aa_dfa_match will step through the dfa by one input character @c
- *
- * Returns: state reach after input @c
- */
-unsigned int aa_dfa_next(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
-			  const char c)
+#define inc_wb_pos(wb)						\
+do {								\
+	wb->pos = (wb->pos + 1) & (wb->size - 1);		\
+	wb->len = (wb->len + 1) & (wb->size - 1);		\
+} while (0)
+
+/* For DFAs that don't support extended tagging of states */
+static bool is_loop(struct match_workbuf *wb, unsigned int state,
+		    unsigned int *adjust)
+{
+	unsigned int pos = wb->pos;
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	if (wb->history[pos] < state)
+		return false;
+
+	for (i = 0; i <= wb->len; i++) {
+		if (wb->history[pos] == state) {
+			*adjust = i;
+			return true;
+		}
+		if (pos == 0)
+			pos = wb->size;
+		pos--;
+	}
+
+	*adjust = i;
+	return true;
+}
+
+static unsigned int leftmatch_fb(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
+				 const char *str, struct match_workbuf *wb,
+				 unsigned int *count)
 {
 	u16 *def = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa);
 	u32 *base = BASE_TABLE(dfa);
 	u16 *next = NEXT_TABLE(dfa);
 	u16 *check = CHECK_TABLE(dfa);
-	unsigned int pos;
+	unsigned int state = start, pos;
+
+	AA_BUG(!dfa);
+	AA_BUG(!str);
+	AA_BUG(!wb);
+	AA_BUG(!count);
+
+	*count = 0;
+	if (state == 0)
+		return 0;
 
 	/* current state is <state>, matching character *str */
 	if (dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC]) {
 		/* Equivalence class table defined */
 		u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa);
 		/* default is direct to next state */
+		while (*str) {
+			unsigned int adjust;
 
-		pos = base_idx(base[state]) + equiv[(u8) c];
-		if (check[pos] == state)
-			state = next[pos];
-		else
-			state = def[state];
+			wb->history[wb->pos] = state;
+			pos = base_idx(base[state]) + equiv[(u8) *str++];
+			if (check[pos] == state)
+				state = next[pos];
+			else
+				state = def[state];
+			if (is_loop(wb, state, &adjust)) {
+				state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, str);
+				*count -= adjust;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			inc_wb_pos(wb);
+			(*count)++;
+		}
 	} else {
 		/* default is direct to next state */
-		pos = base_idx(base[state]) + (u8) c;
-		if (check[pos] == state)
-			state = next[pos];
-		else
-			state = def[state];
+		while (*str) {
+			unsigned int adjust;
+
+			wb->history[wb->pos] = state;
+			pos = base_idx(base[state]) + (u8) *str++;
+			if (check[pos] == state)
+				state = next[pos];
+			else
+				state = def[state];
+			if (is_loop(wb, state, &adjust)) {
+				state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, str);
+				*count -= adjust;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			inc_wb_pos(wb);
+			(*count)++;
+		}
 	}
 
+out:
+	if (!state)
+		*count = 0;
 	return state;
 }
+
+/**
+ * aa_dfa_leftmatch - traverse @dfa to find state @str stops at
+ * @dfa: the dfa to match @str against  (NOT NULL)
+ * @start: the state of the dfa to start matching in
+ * @str: the null terminated string of bytes to match against the dfa (NOT NULL)
+ * @count: current count of longest left.
+ *
+ * aa_dfa_match will match @str against the dfa and return the state it
+ * finished matching in. The final state can be used to look up the accepting
+ * label, or as the start state of a continuing match.
+ *
+ * Returns: final state reached after input is consumed
+ */
+unsigned int aa_dfa_leftmatch(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
+			      const char *str, unsigned int *count)
+{
+	DEFINE_MATCH_WB(wb);
+
+	/* TODO: match for extended state dfas */
+
+	return leftmatch_fb(dfa, start, str, &wb, count);
+}

security/apparmor/mount.c

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
 
 #include "include/apparmor.h"
 #include "include/audit.h"
-#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
 #include "include/domain.h"
 #include "include/file.h"
 #include "include/match.h"

security/apparmor/net.c

+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor network mediation
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
+#include "include/label.h"
+#include "include/net.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+
+#include "net_names.h"
+
+
+struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[] = {
+	AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("af_mask",	AA_SFS_AF_MASK),
+	{ }
+};
+
+static const char * const net_mask_names[] = {
+	"unknown",
+	"send",
+	"receive",
+	"unknown",
+
+	"create",
+	"shutdown",
+	"connect",
+	"unknown",
+
+	"setattr",
+	"getattr",
+	"setcred",
+	"getcred",
+
+	"chmod",
+	"chown",
+	"chgrp",
+	"lock",
+
+	"mmap",
+	"mprot",
+	"unknown",
+	"unknown",
+
+	"accept",
+	"bind",
+	"listen",
+	"unknown",
+
+	"setopt",
+	"getopt",
+	"unknown",
+	"unknown",
+
+	"unknown",
+	"unknown",
+	"unknown",
+	"unknown",
+};
+
+
+/* audit callback for net specific fields */
+void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, " family=");
+	if (address_family_names[sa->u.net->family])
+		audit_log_string(ab, address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]);
+	else
+		audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", sa->u.net->family);
+	audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=");
+	if (sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type])
+		audit_log_string(ab, sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type]);
+	else
+		audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", aad(sa)->net.type);
+	audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", aad(sa)->net.protocol);
+
+	if (aad(sa)->request & NET_PERMS_MASK) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=");
+		aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, aad(sa)->request, NULL, 0,
+				   net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK);
+
+		if (aad(sa)->denied & NET_PERMS_MASK) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=");
+			aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, aad(sa)->denied, NULL, 0,
+					   net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK);
+		}
+	}
+	if (aad(sa)->peer) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
+		aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
+				FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	}
+}
+
+/* Generic af perm */
+int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa,
+		       u32 request, u16 family, int type)
+{
+	struct aa_perms perms = { };
+	unsigned int state;
+	__be16 buffer[2];
+
+	AA_BUG(family >= AF_MAX);
+	AA_BUG(type < 0 || type >= SOCK_MAX);
+
+	if (profile_unconfined(profile))
+		return 0;
+	state = PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_NET);
+	if (!state)
+		return 0;
+
+	buffer[0] = cpu_to_be16(family);
+	buffer[1] = cpu_to_be16((u16) type);
+	state = aa_dfa_match_len(profile->policy.dfa, state, (char *) &buffer,
+				 4);
+	aa_compute_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state, &perms);
+	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
+
+	return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_net_cb);
+}
+
+int aa_af_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family,
+	       int type, int protocol)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(sa, op, NULL, family, type, protocol);
+
+	return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+			aa_profile_af_perm(profile, &sa, request, family,
+					   type));
+}
+
+static int aa_label_sk_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
+			    struct sock *sk)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(sa, op, sk);
+
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+	AA_BUG(!sk);
+
+	if (unconfined(label))
+		return 0;
+
+	return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+			aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, &sa, request, sk));
+}
+
+int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	int error;
+
+	AA_BUG(!sk);
+	AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+	/* TODO: switch to begin_current_label ???? */
+	label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+	error = aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sk);
+	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+
+int aa_sock_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
+		      struct socket *sock)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+	AA_BUG(!sock);
+	AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
+
+	return aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sock->sk);
+}

security/apparmor/nulldfa.in

-0x1B, 0x5E, 0x78, 0x3D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x90, 0x00, 0x00, 0x6E, 0x6F, 0x74, 0x66, 0x6C, 0x65, 0x78, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x07, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00
+0x1B, 0x5E, 0x78, 0x3D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04,
+0x90, 0x00, 0x00, 0x6E, 0x6F, 0x74, 0x66, 0x6C, 0x65, 0x78, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x07, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00,
+0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00

security/apparmor/policy.c

@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@
 
 #include "include/apparmor.h"
 #include "include/capability.h"
-#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
 #include "include/file.h"
 #include "include/ipc.h"
 #include "include/match.h"
@@ -210,6 +210,7 @@ static void aa_free_data(void *ptr, void *arg)
 void aa_free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
 {
 	struct rhashtable *rht;
+	int i;
 
 	AA_DEBUG("%s(%p)\n", __func__, profile);
 
@@ -227,6 +228,9 @@ void aa_free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
 	aa_free_cap_rules(&profile->caps);
 	aa_free_rlimit_rules(&profile->rlimits);
 
+	for (i = 0; i < profile->xattr_count; i++)
+		kzfree(profile->xattrs[i]);
+	kzfree(profile->xattrs);
 	kzfree(profile->dirname);
 	aa_put_dfa(profile->xmatch);
 	aa_put_dfa(profile->policy.dfa);
@@ -845,8 +849,9 @@ static struct aa_profile *update_to_newest_parent(struct aa_profile *new)
  * @udata: serialized data stream  (NOT NULL)
  *
  * unpack and replace a profile on the profile list and uses of that profile
- * by any aa_task_ctx.  If the profile does not exist on the profile list
- * it is added.
+ * by any task creds via invalidating the old version of the profile, which
+ * tasks will notice to update their own cred.  If the profile does not exist
+ * on the profile list it is added.
  *
  * Returns: size of data consumed else error code on failure.
  */

security/apparmor/policy_ns.c

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
 #include <linux/string.h>
 
 #include "include/apparmor.h"
-#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
 #include "include/policy_ns.h"
 #include "include/label.h"
 #include "include/policy.h"

security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
 
 #include "include/apparmor.h"
 #include "include/audit.h"
-#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
 #include "include/crypto.h"
 #include "include/match.h"
 #include "include/path.h"
@@ -37,7 +37,8 @@
 
 #define v5	5	/* base version */
 #define v6	6	/* per entry policydb mediation check */
-#define v7	7	/* full network masking */
+#define v7	7
+#define v8	8	/* full network masking */
 
 /*
  * The AppArmor interface treats data as a type byte followed by the
@@ -164,8 +165,9 @@ static void do_loaddata_free(struct work_struct *work)
 	}
 
 	kzfree(d->hash);
-	kfree(d->name);
-	kvfree(d);
+	kzfree(d->name);
+	kvfree(d->data);
+	kzfree(d);
 }
 
 void aa_loaddata_kref(struct kref *kref)
@@ -180,10 +182,16 @@ void aa_loaddata_kref(struct kref *kref)
 
 struct aa_loaddata *aa_loaddata_alloc(size_t size)
 {
-	struct aa_loaddata *d = kvzalloc(sizeof(*d) + size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	struct aa_loaddata *d;
 
+	d = kzalloc(sizeof(*d), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (d == NULL)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	d->data = kvzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!d->data) {
+		kfree(d);
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	}
 	kref_init(&d->count);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&d->list);
 
@@ -196,6 +204,15 @@ static bool inbounds(struct aa_ext *e, size_t size)
 	return (size <= e->end - e->pos);
 }
 
+static void *kvmemdup(const void *src, size_t len)
+{
+	void *p = kvmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
+
+	if (p)
+		memcpy(p, src, len);
+	return p;
+}
+
 /**
  * aa_u16_chunck - test and do bounds checking for a u16 size based chunk
  * @e: serialized data read head (NOT NULL)
@@ -515,6 +532,35 @@ static bool unpack_trans_table(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static bool unpack_xattrs(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+	void *pos = e->pos;
+
+	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "xattrs")) {
+		int i, size;
+
+		size = unpack_array(e, NULL);
+		profile->xattr_count = size;
+		profile->xattrs = kcalloc(size, sizeof(char *), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!profile->xattrs)
+			goto fail;
+		for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
+			if (!unpack_strdup(e, &profile->xattrs[i], NULL))
+				goto fail;
+		}
+		if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
+			goto fail;
+		if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
+			goto fail;
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+
+fail:
+	e->pos = pos;
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static bool unpack_rlimits(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile)
 {
 	void *pos = e->pos;
@@ -549,15 +595,6 @@ static bool unpack_rlimits(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void *kvmemdup(const void *src, size_t len)
-{
-	void *p = kvmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
-
-	if (p)
-		memcpy(p, src, len);
-	return p;
-}
-
 static u32 strhash(const void *data, u32 len, u32 seed)
 {
 	const char * const *key = data;
@@ -712,6 +749,11 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name)
 			goto fail;
 	}
 
+	if (!unpack_xattrs(e, profile)) {
+		info = "failed to unpack profile xattrs";
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
 	if (!unpack_rlimits(e, profile)) {
 		info = "failed to unpack profile rlimits";
 		goto fail;

security/apparmor/procattr.c

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "include/apparmor.h"
-#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
 #include "include/policy.h"
 #include "include/policy_ns.h"
 #include "include/domain.h"

security/apparmor/resource.c

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
 #include <linux/security.h>
 
 #include "include/audit.h"
-#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
 #include "include/resource.h"
 #include "include/policy.h"
 

security/apparmor/stacksplitdfa.in

+/* 0x1 [^\000]*[^/\000]//& */ 0x1B, 0x5E, 0x78, 0x3D, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x18, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0xD8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x6E, 0x6F, 0x74,
+0x66, 0x6C, 0x65, 0x78, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x04,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x06, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x07, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x06, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x02, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x06,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x05, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x06, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02,
+0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00,
+0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x05, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00,
+0x04, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00,
+0x02, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x05, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x04,
+0x00, 0x05, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00

security/apparmor/context.c → security/apparmor/task.c

 /*
  * AppArmor security module
  *
- * This file contains AppArmor functions used to manipulate object security
- * contexts.
+ * This file contains AppArmor task related definitions and mediation
  *
- * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
- * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ * Copyright 2017 Canonical Ltd.
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
  * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
  * License.
  *
- *
- * AppArmor sets confinement on every task, via the the aa_task_ctx and
- * the aa_task_ctx.label, both of which are required and are not allowed
- * to be NULL.  The aa_task_ctx is not reference counted and is unique
- * to each cred (which is reference count).  The label pointed to by
- * the task_ctx is reference counted.
- *
  * TODO
  * If a task uses change_hat it currently does not return to the old
  * cred or task context but instead creates a new one.  Ideally the task
  * should return to the previous cred if it has not been modified.
- *
  */
 
-#include "include/context.h"
-#include "include/policy.h"
-
-/**
- * aa_alloc_task_context - allocate a new task_ctx
- * @flags: gfp flags for allocation
- *
- * Returns: allocated buffer or NULL on failure
- */
-struct aa_task_ctx *aa_alloc_task_context(gfp_t flags)
-{
-	return kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx), flags);
-}
-
-/**
- * aa_free_task_context - free a task_ctx
- * @ctx: task_ctx to free (MAYBE NULL)
- */
-void aa_free_task_context(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx)
-{
-	if (ctx) {
-		aa_put_label(ctx->label);
-		aa_put_label(ctx->previous);
-		aa_put_label(ctx->onexec);
-
-		kzfree(ctx);
-	}
-}
-
-/**
- * aa_dup_task_context - duplicate a task context, incrementing reference counts
- * @new: a blank task context      (NOT NULL)
- * @old: the task context to copy  (NOT NULL)
- */
-void aa_dup_task_context(struct aa_task_ctx *new, const struct aa_task_ctx *old)
-{
-	*new = *old;
-	aa_get_label(new->label);
-	aa_get_label(new->previous);
-	aa_get_label(new->onexec);
-}
+#include "include/cred.h"
+#include "include/task.h"
 
 /**
  * aa_get_task_label - Get another task's label
@@ -93,11 +44,13 @@ struct aa_label *aa_get_task_label(struct task_struct *task)
  */
 int aa_replace_current_label(struct aa_label *label)
 {
-	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = current_ctx();
+	struct aa_label *old = aa_current_raw_label();
+	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
 	struct cred *new;
+
 	AA_BUG(!label);
 
-	if (ctx->label == label)
+	if (old == label)
 		return 0;
 
 	if (current_cred() != current_real_cred())
@@ -107,27 +60,34 @@ int aa_replace_current_label(struct aa_label *label)
 	if (!new)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	ctx = cred_ctx(new);
-	if (unconfined(label) || (labels_ns(ctx->label) != labels_ns(label)))
-		/* if switching to unconfined or a different label namespace
+	if (ctx->nnp && label_is_stale(ctx->nnp)) {
+		struct aa_label *tmp = ctx->nnp;
+
+		ctx->nnp = aa_get_newest_label(tmp);
+		aa_put_label(tmp);
+	}
+	if (unconfined(label) || (labels_ns(old) != labels_ns(label)))
+		/*
+		 * if switching to unconfined or a different label namespace
 		 * clear out context state
 		 */
-		aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(ctx);
+		aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(task_ctx(current));
 
 	/*
-	 * be careful switching ctx->profile, when racing replacement it
-	 * is possible that ctx->profile->proxy->profile is the reference
-	 * keeping @profile valid, so make sure to get its reference before
-	 * dropping the reference on ctx->profile
+	 * be careful switching cred label, when racing replacement it
+	 * is possible that the cred labels's->proxy->label is the reference
+	 * keeping @label valid, so make sure to get its reference before
+	 * dropping the reference on the cred's label
 	 */
 	aa_get_label(label);
-	aa_put_label(ctx->label);
-	ctx->label = label;
+	aa_put_label(cred_label(new));
+	cred_label(new) = label;
 
 	commit_creds(new);
 	return 0;
 }
 
+
 /**
  * aa_set_current_onexec - set the tasks change_profile to happen onexec
  * @label: system label to set at exec  (MAYBE NULL to clear value)
@@ -136,18 +96,13 @@ int aa_replace_current_label(struct aa_label *label)
  */
 int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_label *label, bool stack)
 {
-	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx;
-	struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
-	if (!new)
-		return -ENOMEM;
+	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
 
-	ctx = cred_ctx(new);
 	aa_get_label(label);
-	aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(ctx);
+	aa_put_label(ctx->onexec);
 	ctx->onexec = label;
 	ctx->token = stack;
 
-	commit_creds(new);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -163,25 +118,27 @@ int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_label *label, bool stack)
  */
 int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_label *label, u64 token)
 {
-	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx;
-	struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
+	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
+	struct cred *new;
+
+	new = prepare_creds();
 	if (!new)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	AA_BUG(!label);
 
-	ctx = cred_ctx(new);
 	if (!ctx->previous) {
 		/* transfer refcount */
-		ctx->previous = ctx->label;
+		ctx->previous = cred_label(new);
 		ctx->token = token;
 	} else if (ctx->token == token) {
-		aa_put_label(ctx->label);
+		aa_put_label(cred_label(new));
 	} else {
 		/* previous_profile && ctx->token != token */
 		abort_creds(new);
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
-	ctx->label = aa_get_newest_label(label);
+
+	cred_label(new) = aa_get_newest_label(label);
 	/* clear exec on switching context */
 	aa_put_label(ctx->onexec);
 	ctx->onexec = NULL;
@@ -201,28 +158,26 @@ int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_label *label, u64 token)
  */
 int aa_restore_previous_label(u64 token)
 {
-	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx;
-	struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
-	if (!new)
-		return -ENOMEM;
+	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
+	struct cred *new;
 
-	ctx = cred_ctx(new);
-	if (ctx->token != token) {
-		abort_creds(new);
+	if (ctx->token != token)
 		return -EACCES;
-	}
 	/* ignore restores when there is no saved label */
-	if (!ctx->previous) {
-		abort_creds(new);
+	if (!ctx->previous)
 		return 0;
-	}
 
-	aa_put_label(ctx->label);
-	ctx->label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
-	AA_BUG(!ctx->label);
+	new = prepare_creds();
+	if (!new)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	aa_put_label(cred_label(new));
+	cred_label(new) = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
+	AA_BUG(!cred_label(new));
 	/* clear exec && prev information when restoring to previous context */
 	aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(ctx);
 
 	commit_creds(new);
+
 	return 0;
 }