Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel

Smack is the Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel.

Smack implements mandatory access control (MAC) using labels
attached to tasks and data containers, including files, SVIPC,
and other tasks. Smack is a kernel based scheme that requires
an absolute minimum of application support and a very small
amount of configuration data.

Smack uses extended attributes and
provides a set of general mount options, borrowing technics used
elsewhere. Smack uses netlabel for CIPSO labeling. Smack provides
a pseudo-filesystem smackfs that is used for manipulation of
system Smack attributes.

The patch, patches for ls and sshd, a README, a startup script,
and x86 binaries for ls and sshd are also available on

    http://www.schaufler-ca.com

Development has been done using Fedora Core 7 in a virtual machine
environment and on an old Sony laptop.

Smack provides mandatory access controls based on the label attached
to a task and the label attached to the object it is attempting to
access. Smack labels are deliberately short (1-23 characters) text
strings. Single character labels using special characters are reserved
for system use. The only operation applied to Smack labels is equality
comparison. No wildcards or expressions, regular or otherwise, are
used. Smack labels are composed of printable characters and may not
include "/".

A file always gets the Smack label of the task that created it.

Smack defines and uses these labels:

    "*" - pronounced "star"
    "_" - pronounced "floor"
    "^" - pronounced "hat"
    "?" - pronounced "huh"

The access rules enforced by Smack are, in order:

1. Any access requested by a task labeled "*" is denied.
2. A read or execute access requested by a task labeled "^"
   is permitted.
3. A read or execute access requested on an object labeled "_"
   is permitted.
4. Any access requested on an object labeled "*" is permitted.
5. Any access requested by a task on an object with the same
   label is permitted.
6. Any access requested that is explicitly defined in the loaded
   rule set is permitted.
7. Any other access is denied.

Rules may be explicitly defined by writing subject,object,access
triples to /smack/load.

Smack rule sets can be easily defined that describe Bell&LaPadula
sensitivity, Biba integrity, and a variety of interesting
configurations. Smack rule sets can be modified on the fly to
accommodate changes in the operating environment or even the time
of day.

Some practical use cases:

Hierarchical levels. The less common of the two usual uses
for MLS systems is to define hierarchical levels, often
unclassified, confidential, secret, and so on. To set up smack
to support this, these rules could be defined:

   C        Unclass rx
   S        C       rx
   S        Unclass rx
   TS       S       rx
   TS       C       rx
   TS       Unclass rx

A TS process can read S, C, and Unclass data, but cannot write it.
An S process can read C and Unclass. Note that specifying that
TS can read S and S can read C does not imply TS can read C, it
has to be explicitly stated.

Non-hierarchical categories. This is the more common of the
usual uses for an MLS system. Since the default rule is that a
subject cannot access an object with a different label no
access rules are required to implement compartmentalization.

A case that the Bell & LaPadula policy does not allow is demonstrated
with this Smack access rule:

A case that Bell&LaPadula does not allow that Smack does:

    ESPN    ABC   r
    ABC     ESPN  r

On my portable video device I have two applications, one that
shows ABC programming and the other ESPN programming. ESPN wants
to show me sport stories that show up as news, and ABC will
only provide minimal information about a sports story if ESPN
is covering it. Each side can look at the other's info, neither
can change the other. Neither can see what FOX is up to, which
is just as well all things considered.

Another case that I especially like:

    SatData Guard   w
    Guard   Publish w

A program running with the Guard label opens a UDP socket and
accepts messages sent by a program running with a SatData label.
The Guard program inspects the message to ensure it is wholesome
and if it is sends it to a program running with the Publish label.
This program then puts the information passed in an appropriate
place. Note that the Guard program cannot write to a Publish
file system object because file system semanitic require read as
well as write.

The four cases (categories, levels, mutual read, guardbox) here
are all quite real, and problems I've been asked to solve over
the years. The first two are easy to do with traditonal MLS systems
while the last two you can't without invoking privilege, at least
for a while.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Joshua Brindle <method@manicmethod.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

include/linux/capability.h

@@ -315,7 +315,24 @@ typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
 
 #define CAP_SETFCAP	     31
 
-#define CAP_LAST_CAP         CAP_SETFCAP
+/* Override MAC access.
+   The base kernel enforces no MAC policy.
+   An LSM may enforce a MAC policy, and if it does and it chooses
+   to implement capability based overrides of that policy, this is
+   the capability it should use to do so. */
+
+#define CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE     32
+
+/* Allow MAC configuration or state changes.
+   The base kernel requires no MAC configuration.
+   An LSM may enforce a MAC policy, and if it does and it chooses
+   to implement capability based checks on modifications to that
+   policy or the data required to maintain it, this is the
+   capability it should use to do so. */
+
+#define CAP_MAC_ADMIN        33
+
+#define CAP_LAST_CAP         CAP_MAC_ADMIN
 
 #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
 
@@ -341,6 +358,8 @@ typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
 			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FOWNER)		\
 			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FSETID))
 
+# define CAP_FS_MASK_B1     (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+
 #if _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2
 # error Fix up hand-coded capability macro initializers
 #else /* HAND-CODED capability initializers */
@@ -348,8 +367,9 @@ typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
 # define CAP_EMPTY_SET    {{ 0, 0 }}
 # define CAP_FULL_SET     {{ ~0, ~0 }}
 # define CAP_INIT_EFF_SET {{ ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP), ~0 }}
-# define CAP_FS_SET       {{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0, 0 }}
-# define CAP_NFSD_SET     {{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0|CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE), 0 }}
+# define CAP_FS_SET       {{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0, CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } }
+# define CAP_NFSD_SET     {{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0|CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE), \
+			     CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } }
 
 #endif /* _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2 */
 

security/Kconfig

@@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ config SECURITY_ROOTPLUG
 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
 
 source security/selinux/Kconfig
+source security/smack/Kconfig
 
 endmenu
 

security/Makefile

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS)			+= keys/
 subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)	+= selinux
+subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)		+= smack
 
 # if we don't select a security model, use the default capabilities
 ifneq ($(CONFIG_SECURITY),y)
@@ -14,5 +15,6 @@ endif
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY)			+= security.o dummy.o inode.o
 # Must precede capability.o in order to stack properly.
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)		+= selinux/built-in.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)		+= commoncap.o smack/built-in.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES)	+= commoncap.o capability.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_ROOTPLUG)		+= commoncap.o root_plug.o

security/smack/Kconfig

+config SECURITY_SMACK
+	bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Support"
+	depends on NETLABEL && SECURITY_NETWORK
+	default n
+	help
+	  This selects the Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel.
+	  Smack is useful for sensitivity, integrity, and a variety
+	  of other mandatory security schemes.
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+

security/smack/Makefile

+#
+# Makefile for the SMACK LSM
+#
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) := smack.o
+
+smack-y := smack_lsm.o smack_access.o smackfs.o

security/smack/smack.h

+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ *
+ *      This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *      it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *      the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ *
+ * Author:
+ *      Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SECURITY_SMACK_H
+#define _SECURITY_SMACK_H
+
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <net/netlabel.h>
+
+/*
+ * Why 23? CIPSO is constrained to 30, so a 32 byte buffer is
+ * bigger than can be used, and 24 is the next lower multiple
+ * of 8, and there are too many issues if there isn't space set
+ * aside for the terminating null byte.
+ */
+#define SMK_MAXLEN	23
+#define SMK_LABELLEN	(SMK_MAXLEN+1)
+
+/*
+ * How many kinds of access are there?
+ * Here's your answer.
+ */
+#define SMK_ACCESSDASH	'-'
+#define SMK_ACCESSLOW	"rwxa"
+#define SMK_ACCESSKINDS	(sizeof(SMK_ACCESSLOW) - 1)
+
+struct superblock_smack {
+	char		*smk_root;
+	char		*smk_floor;
+	char		*smk_hat;
+	char		*smk_default;
+	int		smk_initialized;
+	spinlock_t	smk_sblock;	/* for initialization */
+};
+
+struct socket_smack {
+	char		*smk_out;			/* outbound label */
+	char		*smk_in;			/* inbound label */
+	char		smk_packet[SMK_LABELLEN];	/* TCP peer label */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Inode smack data
+ */
+struct inode_smack {
+	char		*smk_inode;	/* label of the fso */
+	struct mutex	smk_lock;	/* initialization lock */
+	int		smk_flags;	/* smack inode flags */
+};
+
+#define	SMK_INODE_INSTANT	0x01	/* inode is instantiated */
+
+/*
+ * A label access rule.
+ */
+struct smack_rule {
+	char	*smk_subject;
+	char	*smk_object;
+	int	smk_access;
+};
+
+/*
+ * An entry in the table of permitted label accesses.
+ */
+struct smk_list_entry {
+	struct smk_list_entry	*smk_next;
+	struct smack_rule	smk_rule;
+};
+
+/*
+ * An entry in the table mapping smack values to
+ * CIPSO level/category-set values.
+ */
+struct smack_cipso {
+	int	smk_level;
+	char	smk_catset[SMK_LABELLEN];
+};
+
+/*
+ * This is the repository for labels seen so that it is
+ * not necessary to keep allocating tiny chuncks of memory
+ * and so that they can be shared.
+ *
+ * Labels are never modified in place. Anytime a label
+ * is imported (e.g. xattrset on a file) the list is checked
+ * for it and it is added if it doesn't exist. The address
+ * is passed out in either case. Entries are added, but
+ * never deleted.
+ *
+ * Since labels are hanging around anyway it doesn't
+ * hurt to maintain a secid for those awkward situations
+ * where kernel components that ought to use LSM independent
+ * interfaces don't. The secid should go away when all of
+ * these components have been repaired.
+ *
+ * If there is a cipso value associated with the label it
+ * gets stored here, too. This will most likely be rare as
+ * the cipso direct mapping in used internally.
+ */
+struct smack_known {
+	struct smack_known	*smk_next;
+	char			smk_known[SMK_LABELLEN];
+	u32			smk_secid;
+	struct smack_cipso	*smk_cipso;
+	spinlock_t		smk_cipsolock; /* for changing cipso map */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Mount options
+ */
+#define SMK_FSDEFAULT	"smackfsdef="
+#define SMK_FSFLOOR	"smackfsfloor="
+#define SMK_FSHAT	"smackfshat="
+#define SMK_FSROOT	"smackfsroot="
+
+/*
+ * xattr names
+ */
+#define XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX	"SMACK64"
+#define XATTR_SMACK_IPIN	"SMACK64IPIN"
+#define XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT	"SMACK64IPOUT"
+#define XATTR_NAME_SMACK	XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX
+#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN	XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPIN
+#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT	XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT
+
+/*
+ * smackfs macic number
+ */
+#define SMACK_MAGIC	0x43415d53 /* "SMAC" */
+
+/*
+ * A limit on the number of entries in the lists
+ * makes some of the list administration easier.
+ */
+#define SMACK_LIST_MAX	10000
+
+/*
+ * CIPSO defaults.
+ */
+#define SMACK_CIPSO_DOI_DEFAULT		3	/* Historical */
+#define SMACK_CIPSO_DIRECT_DEFAULT	250	/* Arbitrary */
+#define SMACK_CIPSO_MAXCATVAL		63	/* Bigger gets harder */
+#define SMACK_CIPSO_MAXLEVEL            255     /* CIPSO 2.2 standard */
+#define SMACK_CIPSO_MAXCATNUM           239     /* CIPSO 2.2 standard */
+
+/*
+ * Just to make the common cases easier to deal with
+ */
+#define MAY_ANY		(MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
+#define MAY_ANYREAD	(MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC)
+#define MAY_ANYWRITE	(MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND)
+#define MAY_READWRITE	(MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE)
+#define MAY_NOT		0
+
+/*
+ * These functions are in smack_lsm.c
+ */
+struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *);
+
+/*
+ * These functions are in smack_access.c
+ */
+int smk_access(char *, char *, int);
+int smk_curacc(char *, u32);
+int smack_to_cipso(const char *, struct smack_cipso *);
+void smack_from_cipso(u32, char *, char *);
+char *smack_from_secid(const u32);
+char *smk_import(const char *, int);
+struct smack_known *smk_import_entry(const char *, int);
+u32 smack_to_secid(const char *);
+
+/*
+ * Shared data.
+ */
+extern int smack_cipso_direct;
+extern int smack_net_nltype;
+extern char *smack_net_ambient;
+
+extern struct smack_known *smack_known;
+extern struct smack_known smack_known_floor;
+extern struct smack_known smack_known_hat;
+extern struct smack_known smack_known_huh;
+extern struct smack_known smack_known_invalid;
+extern struct smack_known smack_known_star;
+extern struct smack_known smack_known_unset;
+
+extern struct smk_list_entry *smack_list;
+
+/*
+ * Stricly for CIPSO level manipulation.
+ * Set the category bit number in a smack label sized buffer.
+ */
+static inline void smack_catset_bit(int cat, char *catsetp)
+{
+	if (cat > SMK_LABELLEN * 8)
+		return;
+
+	catsetp[(cat - 1) / 8] |= 0x80 >> ((cat - 1) % 8);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Present a pointer to the smack label in an inode blob.
+ */
+static inline char *smk_of_inode(const struct inode *isp)
+{
+	struct inode_smack *sip = isp->i_security;
+	return sip->smk_inode;
+}
+
+#endif  /* _SECURITY_SMACK_H */

security/smack/smack_access.c

+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ *
+ *      This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *      it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *      the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ *
+ * Author:
+ *      Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include "smack.h"
+
+struct smack_known smack_known_unset = {
+	.smk_next	= NULL,
+	.smk_known	= "UNSET",
+	.smk_secid	= 1,
+	.smk_cipso	= NULL,
+};
+
+struct smack_known smack_known_huh = {
+	.smk_next	= &smack_known_unset,
+	.smk_known	= "?",
+	.smk_secid	= 2,
+	.smk_cipso	= NULL,
+};
+
+struct smack_known smack_known_hat = {
+	.smk_next	= &smack_known_huh,
+	.smk_known	= "^",
+	.smk_secid	= 3,
+	.smk_cipso	= NULL,
+};
+
+struct smack_known smack_known_star = {
+	.smk_next	= &smack_known_hat,
+	.smk_known	= "*",
+	.smk_secid	= 4,
+	.smk_cipso	= NULL,
+};
+
+struct smack_known smack_known_floor = {
+	.smk_next	= &smack_known_star,
+	.smk_known	= "_",
+	.smk_secid	= 5,
+	.smk_cipso	= NULL,
+};
+
+struct smack_known smack_known_invalid = {
+	.smk_next	= &smack_known_floor,
+	.smk_known	= "",
+	.smk_secid	= 6,
+	.smk_cipso	= NULL,
+};
+
+struct smack_known *smack_known = &smack_known_invalid;
+
+/*
+ * The initial value needs to be bigger than any of the
+ * known values above.
+ */
+static u32 smack_next_secid = 10;
+
+/**
+ * smk_access - determine if a subject has a specific access to an object
+ * @subject_label: a pointer to the subject's Smack label
+ * @object_label: a pointer to the object's Smack label
+ * @request: the access requested, in "MAY" format
+ *
+ * This function looks up the subject/object pair in the
+ * access rule list and returns 0 if the access is permitted,
+ * non zero otherwise.
+ *
+ * Even though Smack labels are usually shared on smack_list
+ * labels that come in off the network can't be imported
+ * and added to the list for locking reasons.
+ *
+ * Therefore, it is necessary to check the contents of the labels,
+ * not just the pointer values. Of course, in most cases the labels
+ * will be on the list, so checking the pointers may be a worthwhile
+ * optimization.
+ */
+int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request)
+{
+	u32 may = MAY_NOT;
+	struct smk_list_entry *sp;
+	struct smack_rule *srp;
+
+	/*
+	 * Hardcoded comparisons.
+	 *
+	 * A star subject can't access any object.
+	 */
+	if (subject_label == smack_known_star.smk_known ||
+	    strcmp(subject_label, smack_known_star.smk_known) == 0)
+		return -EACCES;
+	/*
+	 * A star object can be accessed by any subject.
+	 */
+	if (object_label == smack_known_star.smk_known ||
+	    strcmp(object_label, smack_known_star.smk_known) == 0)
+		return 0;
+	/*
+	 * An object can be accessed in any way by a subject
+	 * with the same label.
+	 */
+	if (subject_label == object_label ||
+	    strcmp(subject_label, object_label) == 0)
+		return 0;
+	/*
+	 * A hat subject can read any object.
+	 * A floor object can be read by any subject.
+	 */
+	if ((request & MAY_ANYREAD) == request) {
+		if (object_label == smack_known_floor.smk_known ||
+		    strcmp(object_label, smack_known_floor.smk_known) == 0)
+			return 0;
+		if (subject_label == smack_known_hat.smk_known ||
+		    strcmp(subject_label, smack_known_hat.smk_known) == 0)
+			return 0;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Beyond here an explicit relationship is required.
+	 * If the requested access is contained in the available
+	 * access (e.g. read is included in readwrite) it's
+	 * good.
+	 */
+	for (sp = smack_list; sp != NULL; sp = sp->smk_next) {
+		srp = &sp->smk_rule;
+
+		if (srp->smk_subject == subject_label ||
+		    strcmp(srp->smk_subject, subject_label) == 0) {
+			if (srp->smk_object == object_label ||
+			    strcmp(srp->smk_object, object_label) == 0) {
+				may = srp->smk_access;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	/*
+	 * This is a bit map operation.
+	 */
+	if ((request & may) == request)
+		return 0;
+
+	return -EACCES;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_curacc - determine if current has a specific access to an object
+ * @object_label: a pointer to the object's Smack label
+ * @request: the access requested, in "MAY" format
+ *
+ * This function checks the current subject label/object label pair
+ * in the access rule list and returns 0 if the access is permitted,
+ * non zero otherwise. It allows that current my have the capability
+ * to override the rules.
+ */
+int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = smk_access(current->security, obj_label, mode);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+		return 0;
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_known_lock);
+
+/**
+ * smk_import_entry - import a label, return the list entry
+ * @string: a text string that might be a Smack label
+ * @len: the maximum size, or zero if it is NULL terminated.
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the entry in the label list that
+ * matches the passed string, adding it if necessary.
+ */
+struct smack_known *smk_import_entry(const char *string, int len)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	char smack[SMK_LABELLEN];
+	int found;
+	int i;
+
+	if (len <= 0 || len > SMK_MAXLEN)
+		len = SMK_MAXLEN;
+
+	for (i = 0, found = 0; i < SMK_LABELLEN; i++) {
+		if (found)
+			smack[i] = '\0';
+		else if (i >= len || string[i] > '~' || string[i] <= ' ' ||
+			 string[i] == '/') {
+			smack[i] = '\0';
+			found = 1;
+		} else
+			smack[i] = string[i];
+	}
+
+	if (smack[0] == '\0')
+		return NULL;
+
+	mutex_lock(&smack_known_lock);
+
+	for (skp = smack_known; skp != NULL; skp = skp->smk_next)
+		if (strncmp(skp->smk_known, smack, SMK_MAXLEN) == 0)
+			break;
+
+	if (skp == NULL) {
+		skp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_known), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (skp != NULL) {
+			skp->smk_next = smack_known;
+			strncpy(skp->smk_known, smack, SMK_MAXLEN);
+			skp->smk_secid = smack_next_secid++;
+			skp->smk_cipso = NULL;
+			spin_lock_init(&skp->smk_cipsolock);
+			/*
+			 * Make sure that the entry is actually
+			 * filled before putting it on the list.
+			 */
+			smp_mb();
+			smack_known = skp;
+		}
+	}
+
+	mutex_unlock(&smack_known_lock);
+
+	return skp;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_import - import a smack label
+ * @string: a text string that might be a Smack label
+ * @len: the maximum size, or zero if it is NULL terminated.
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the label in the label list that
+ * matches the passed string, adding it if necessary.
+ */
+char *smk_import(const char *string, int len)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+
+	skp = smk_import_entry(string, len);
+	if (skp == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	return skp->smk_known;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_from_secid - find the Smack label associated with a secid
+ * @secid: an integer that might be associated with a Smack label
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the appropraite Smack label if there is one,
+ * otherwise a pointer to the invalid Smack label.
+ */
+char *smack_from_secid(const u32 secid)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+
+	for (skp = smack_known; skp != NULL; skp = skp->smk_next)
+		if (skp->smk_secid == secid)
+			return skp->smk_known;
+
+	/*
+	 * If we got this far someone asked for the translation
+	 * of a secid that is not on the list.
+	 */
+	return smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_to_secid - find the secid associated with a Smack label
+ * @smack: the Smack label
+ *
+ * Returns the appropriate secid if there is one,
+ * otherwise 0
+ */
+u32 smack_to_secid(const char *smack)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+
+	for (skp = smack_known; skp != NULL; skp = skp->smk_next)
+		if (strncmp(skp->smk_known, smack, SMK_MAXLEN) == 0)
+			return skp->smk_secid;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_from_cipso - find the Smack label associated with a CIPSO option
+ * @level: Bell & LaPadula level from the network
+ * @cp: Bell & LaPadula categories from the network
+ * @result: where to put the Smack value
+ *
+ * This is a simple lookup in the label table.
+ *
+ * This is an odd duck as far as smack handling goes in that
+ * it sends back a copy of the smack label rather than a pointer
+ * to the master list. This is done because it is possible for
+ * a foreign host to send a smack label that is new to this
+ * machine and hence not on the list. That would not be an
+ * issue except that adding an entry to the master list can't
+ * be done at that point.
+ */
+void smack_from_cipso(u32 level, char *cp, char *result)
+{
+	struct smack_known *kp;
+	char *final = NULL;
+
+	for (kp = smack_known; final == NULL && kp != NULL; kp = kp->smk_next) {
+		if (kp->smk_cipso == NULL)
+			continue;
+
+		spin_lock_bh(&kp->smk_cipsolock);
+
+		if (kp->smk_cipso->smk_level == level &&
+		    memcmp(kp->smk_cipso->smk_catset, cp, SMK_LABELLEN) == 0)
+			final = kp->smk_known;
+
+		spin_unlock_bh(&kp->smk_cipsolock);
+	}
+	if (final == NULL)
+		final = smack_known_huh.smk_known;
+	strncpy(result, final, SMK_MAXLEN);
+	return;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_to_cipso - find the CIPSO option to go with a Smack label
+ * @smack: a pointer to the smack label in question
+ * @cp: where to put the result
+ *
+ * Returns zero if a value is available, non-zero otherwise.
+ */
+int smack_to_cipso(const char *smack, struct smack_cipso *cp)
+{
+	struct smack_known *kp;
+
+	for (kp = smack_known; kp != NULL; kp = kp->smk_next)
+		if (kp->smk_known == smack ||
+		    strcmp(kp->smk_known, smack) == 0)
+			break;
+
+	if (kp == NULL || kp->smk_cipso == NULL)
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	memcpy(cp, kp->smk_cipso, sizeof(struct smack_cipso));
+	return 0;
+}