Commit e2b32e67 authored by Kees Cook's avatar Kees Cook Committed by H. Peter Anvin

x86, kaslr: randomize module base load address

Randomize the load address of modules in the kernel to make kASLR
effective for modules.  Modules can only be loaded within a particular
range of virtual address space.  This patch adds 10 bits of entropy to
the load address by adding 1-1024 * PAGE_SIZE to the beginning range
where modules are loaded.

The single base offset was chosen because randomizing each module
load ends up wasting/fragmenting memory too much. Prior approaches to
minimizing fragmentation while doing randomization tend to result in
worse entropy than just doing a single base address offset.

Example kASLR boot without this change, with a single module loaded:
---[ Modules ]---
0xffffffffc0000000-0xffffffffc0001000           4K     ro     GLB x  pte
0xffffffffc0001000-0xffffffffc0002000           4K     ro     GLB NX pte
0xffffffffc0002000-0xffffffffc0004000           8K     RW     GLB NX pte
0xffffffffc0004000-0xffffffffc0200000        2032K                   pte
0xffffffffc0200000-0xffffffffff000000        1006M                   pmd
---[ End Modules ]---

Example kASLR boot after this change, same module loaded:
---[ Modules ]---
0xffffffffc0000000-0xffffffffc0200000           2M                   pmd
0xffffffffc0200000-0xffffffffc03bf000        1788K                   pte
0xffffffffc03bf000-0xffffffffc03c0000           4K     ro     GLB x  pte
0xffffffffc03c0000-0xffffffffc03c1000           4K     ro     GLB NX pte
0xffffffffc03c1000-0xffffffffc03c3000           8K     RW     GLB NX pte
0xffffffffc03c3000-0xffffffffc0400000         244K                   pte
0xffffffffc0400000-0xffffffffff000000        1004M                   pmd
---[ End Modules ]---
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140226005916.GA27083@www.outflux.netSigned-off-by: default avatarKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarH. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
parent cfbf8d48
......@@ -2053,8 +2053,8 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
IOAPICs that may be present in the system.
nokaslr [X86]
Disable kernel base offset ASLR (Address Space
Layout Randomization) if built into the kernel.
Disable kernel and module base offset ASLR (Address
Space Layout Randomization) if built into the kernel.
noautogroup Disable scheduler automatic task group creation.
......
......@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/gfp.h>
#include <linux/jump_label.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <asm/page.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
......@@ -43,13 +44,49 @@ do { \
} while (0)
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE
static unsigned long module_load_offset;
static int randomize_modules = 1;
static int __init parse_nokaslr(char *p)
{
randomize_modules = 0;
return 0;
}
early_param("nokaslr", parse_nokaslr);
static unsigned long int get_module_load_offset(void)
{
if (randomize_modules) {
mutex_lock(&module_mutex);
/*
* Calculate the module_load_offset the first time this
* code is called. Once calculated it stays the same until
* reboot.
*/
if (module_load_offset == 0)
module_load_offset =
(get_random_int() % 1024 + 1) * PAGE_SIZE;
mutex_unlock(&module_mutex);
}
return module_load_offset;
}
#else
static unsigned long int get_module_load_offset(void)
{
return 0;
}
#endif
void *module_alloc(unsigned long size)
{
if (PAGE_ALIGN(size) > MODULES_LEN)
return NULL;
return __vmalloc_node_range(size, 1, MODULES_VADDR, MODULES_END,
GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_HIGHMEM, PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC,
NUMA_NO_NODE, __builtin_return_address(0));
return __vmalloc_node_range(size, 1,
MODULES_VADDR + get_module_load_offset(),
MODULES_END, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_HIGHMEM,
PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC, NUMA_NO_NODE,
__builtin_return_address(0));
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
......
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