Commit e525de3a authored by Linus Torvalds's avatar Linus Torvalds

Merge branch 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar:
 "Misc fixes all across the map:

   - /proc/kcore vsyscall related fixes
   - LTO fix
   - build warning fix
   - CPU hotplug fix
   - Kconfig NR_CPUS cleanups
   - cpu_has() cleanups/robustification
   - .gitignore fix
   - memory-failure unmapping fix
   - UV platform fix"

* 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/mm, mm/hwpoison: Don't unconditionally unmap kernel 1:1 pages
  x86/error_inject: Make just_return_func() globally visible
  x86/platform/UV: Fix GAM Range Table entries less than 1GB
  x86/build: Add arch/x86/tools/insn_decoder_test to .gitignore
  x86/smpboot: Fix uncore_pci_remove() indexing bug when hot-removing a physical CPU
  x86/mm/kcore: Add vsyscall page to /proc/kcore conditionally
  vfs/proc/kcore, x86/mm/kcore: Fix SMAP fault when dumping vsyscall user page
  x86/Kconfig: Further simplify the NR_CPUS config
  x86/Kconfig: Simplify NR_CPUS config
  x86/MCE: Fix build warning introduced by "x86: do not use print_symbol()"
  x86/cpufeature: Update _static_cpu_has() to use all named variables
  x86/cpufeature: Reindent _static_cpu_has()
parents d4667ca1 fd0e786d
boot/compressed/vmlinux
tools/test_get_len
tools/insn_sanity
tools/insn_decoder_test
purgatory/kexec-purgatory.c
purgatory/purgatory.ro
......@@ -423,12 +423,6 @@ config X86_MPPARSE
For old smp systems that do not have proper acpi support. Newer systems
(esp with 64bit cpus) with acpi support, MADT and DSDT will override it
config X86_BIGSMP
bool "Support for big SMP systems with more than 8 CPUs"
depends on X86_32 && SMP
---help---
This option is needed for the systems that have more than 8 CPUs
config GOLDFISH
def_bool y
depends on X86_GOLDFISH
......@@ -460,6 +454,12 @@ config INTEL_RDT
Say N if unsure.
if X86_32
config X86_BIGSMP
bool "Support for big SMP systems with more than 8 CPUs"
depends on SMP
---help---
This option is needed for the systems that have more than 8 CPUs
config X86_EXTENDED_PLATFORM
bool "Support for extended (non-PC) x86 platforms"
default y
......@@ -949,25 +949,66 @@ config MAXSMP
Enable maximum number of CPUS and NUMA Nodes for this architecture.
If unsure, say N.
#
# The maximum number of CPUs supported:
#
# The main config value is NR_CPUS, which defaults to NR_CPUS_DEFAULT,
# and which can be configured interactively in the
# [NR_CPUS_RANGE_BEGIN ... NR_CPUS_RANGE_END] range.
#
# The ranges are different on 32-bit and 64-bit kernels, depending on
# hardware capabilities and scalability features of the kernel.
#
# ( If MAXSMP is enabled we just use the highest possible value and disable
# interactive configuration. )
#
config NR_CPUS_RANGE_BEGIN
int
default NR_CPUS_RANGE_END if MAXSMP
default 1 if !SMP
default 2
config NR_CPUS_RANGE_END
int
depends on X86_32
default 64 if SMP && X86_BIGSMP
default 8 if SMP && !X86_BIGSMP
default 1 if !SMP
config NR_CPUS_RANGE_END
int
depends on X86_64
default 8192 if SMP && ( MAXSMP || CPUMASK_OFFSTACK)
default 512 if SMP && (!MAXSMP && !CPUMASK_OFFSTACK)
default 1 if !SMP
config NR_CPUS_DEFAULT
int
depends on X86_32
default 32 if X86_BIGSMP
default 8 if SMP
default 1 if !SMP
config NR_CPUS_DEFAULT
int
depends on X86_64
default 8192 if MAXSMP
default 64 if SMP
default 1 if !SMP
config NR_CPUS
int "Maximum number of CPUs" if SMP && !MAXSMP
range 2 8 if SMP && X86_32 && !X86_BIGSMP
range 2 64 if SMP && X86_32 && X86_BIGSMP
range 2 512 if SMP && !MAXSMP && !CPUMASK_OFFSTACK && X86_64
range 2 8192 if SMP && !MAXSMP && CPUMASK_OFFSTACK && X86_64
default "1" if !SMP
default "8192" if MAXSMP
default "32" if SMP && X86_BIGSMP
default "8" if SMP && X86_32
default "64" if SMP
range NR_CPUS_RANGE_BEGIN NR_CPUS_RANGE_END
default NR_CPUS_DEFAULT
---help---
This allows you to specify the maximum number of CPUs which this
kernel will support. If CPUMASK_OFFSTACK is enabled, the maximum
supported value is 8192, otherwise the maximum value is 512. The
minimum value which makes sense is 2.
This is purely to save memory - each supported CPU adds
approximately eight kilobytes to the kernel image.
This is purely to save memory: each supported CPU adds about 8KB
to the kernel image.
config SCHED_SMT
bool "SMT (Hyperthreading) scheduler support"
......
......@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ static __always_inline __pure bool _static_cpu_has(u16 bit)
".section .altinstructions,\"a\"\n"
" .long 1b - .\n" /* src offset */
" .long 4f - .\n" /* repl offset */
" .word %P1\n" /* always replace */
" .word %P[always]\n" /* always replace */
" .byte 3b - 1b\n" /* src len */
" .byte 5f - 4f\n" /* repl len */
" .byte 3b - 2b\n" /* pad len */
......@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ static __always_inline __pure bool _static_cpu_has(u16 bit)
".section .altinstructions,\"a\"\n"
" .long 1b - .\n" /* src offset */
" .long 0\n" /* no replacement */
" .word %P0\n" /* feature bit */
" .word %P[feature]\n" /* feature bit */
" .byte 3b - 1b\n" /* src len */
" .byte 0\n" /* repl len */
" .byte 0\n" /* pad len */
......@@ -179,13 +179,14 @@ static __always_inline __pure bool _static_cpu_has(u16 bit)
" jnz %l[t_yes]\n"
" jmp %l[t_no]\n"
".previous\n"
: : "i" (bit), "i" (X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS),
: : [feature] "i" (bit),
[always] "i" (X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS),
[bitnum] "i" (1 << (bit & 7)),
[cap_byte] "m" (((const char *)boot_cpu_data.x86_capability)[bit >> 3])
: : t_yes, t_no);
t_yes:
t_yes:
return true;
t_no:
t_no:
return false;
}
......
......@@ -52,10 +52,6 @@ static inline void clear_page(void *page)
void copy_page(void *to, void *from);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE
#define arch_unmap_kpfn arch_unmap_kpfn
#endif
#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_VSYSCALL_EMULATION
......
......@@ -1176,16 +1176,25 @@ static void __init decode_gam_rng_tbl(unsigned long ptr)
uv_gre_table = gre;
for (; gre->type != UV_GAM_RANGE_TYPE_UNUSED; gre++) {
unsigned long size = ((unsigned long)(gre->limit - lgre)
<< UV_GAM_RANGE_SHFT);
int order = 0;
char suffix[] = " KMGTPE";
while (size > 9999 && order < sizeof(suffix)) {
size /= 1024;
order++;
}
if (!index) {
pr_info("UV: GAM Range Table...\n");
pr_info("UV: # %20s %14s %5s %4s %5s %3s %2s\n", "Range", "", "Size", "Type", "NASID", "SID", "PN");
}
pr_info("UV: %2d: 0x%014lx-0x%014lx %5luG %3d %04x %02x %02x\n",
pr_info("UV: %2d: 0x%014lx-0x%014lx %5lu%c %3d %04x %02x %02x\n",
index++,
(unsigned long)lgre << UV_GAM_RANGE_SHFT,
(unsigned long)gre->limit << UV_GAM_RANGE_SHFT,
((unsigned long)(gre->limit - lgre)) >>
(30 - UV_GAM_RANGE_SHFT), /* 64M -> 1G */
size, suffix[order],
gre->type, gre->nasid, gre->sockid, gre->pnode);
lgre = gre->limit;
......
......@@ -115,4 +115,19 @@ static inline void mce_unregister_injector_chain(struct notifier_block *nb) { }
extern struct mca_config mca_cfg;
#ifndef CONFIG_X86_64
/*
* On 32-bit systems it would be difficult to safely unmap a poison page
* from the kernel 1:1 map because there are no non-canonical addresses that
* we can use to refer to the address without risking a speculative access.
* However, this isn't much of an issue because:
* 1) Few unmappable pages are in the 1:1 map. Most are in HIGHMEM which
* are only mapped into the kernel as needed
* 2) Few people would run a 32-bit kernel on a machine that supports
* recoverable errors because they have too much memory to boot 32-bit.
*/
static inline void mce_unmap_kpfn(unsigned long pfn) {}
#define mce_unmap_kpfn mce_unmap_kpfn
#endif
#endif /* __X86_MCE_INTERNAL_H__ */
......@@ -105,6 +105,10 @@ static struct irq_work mce_irq_work;
static void (*quirk_no_way_out)(int bank, struct mce *m, struct pt_regs *regs);
#ifndef mce_unmap_kpfn
static void mce_unmap_kpfn(unsigned long pfn);
#endif
/*
* CPU/chipset specific EDAC code can register a notifier call here to print
* MCE errors in a human-readable form.
......@@ -234,7 +238,7 @@ static void __print_mce(struct mce *m)
m->cs, m->ip);
if (m->cs == __KERNEL_CS)
pr_cont("{%pS}", (void *)m->ip);
pr_cont("{%pS}", (void *)(unsigned long)m->ip);
pr_cont("\n");
}
......@@ -590,7 +594,8 @@ static int srao_decode_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long val,
if (mce_usable_address(mce) && (mce->severity == MCE_AO_SEVERITY)) {
pfn = mce->addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
memory_failure(pfn, 0);
if (!memory_failure(pfn, 0))
mce_unmap_kpfn(pfn);
}
return NOTIFY_OK;
......@@ -1057,12 +1062,13 @@ static int do_memory_failure(struct mce *m)
ret = memory_failure(m->addr >> PAGE_SHIFT, flags);
if (ret)
pr_err("Memory error not recovered");
else
mce_unmap_kpfn(m->addr >> PAGE_SHIFT);
return ret;
}
#if defined(arch_unmap_kpfn) && defined(CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE)
void arch_unmap_kpfn(unsigned long pfn)
#ifndef mce_unmap_kpfn
static void mce_unmap_kpfn(unsigned long pfn)
{
unsigned long decoy_addr;
......@@ -1073,7 +1079,7 @@ void arch_unmap_kpfn(unsigned long pfn)
* We would like to just call:
* set_memory_np((unsigned long)pfn_to_kaddr(pfn), 1);
* but doing that would radically increase the odds of a
* speculative access to the posion page because we'd have
* speculative access to the poison page because we'd have
* the virtual address of the kernel 1:1 mapping sitting
* around in registers.
* Instead we get tricky. We create a non-canonical address
......@@ -1098,7 +1104,6 @@ void arch_unmap_kpfn(unsigned long pfn)
if (set_memory_np(decoy_addr, 1))
pr_warn("Could not invalidate pfn=0x%lx from 1:1 map\n", pfn);
}
#endif
......
......@@ -1430,7 +1430,6 @@ static void remove_siblinginfo(int cpu)
cpumask_clear(cpu_llc_shared_mask(cpu));
cpumask_clear(topology_sibling_cpumask(cpu));
cpumask_clear(topology_core_cpumask(cpu));
c->phys_proc_id = 0;
c->cpu_core_id = 0;
cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, cpu_sibling_setup_mask);
recompute_smt_state();
......
......@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ asmlinkage void just_return_func(void);
asm(
".type just_return_func, @function\n"
".globl just_return_func\n"
"just_return_func:\n"
" ret\n"
".size just_return_func, .-just_return_func\n"
......
......@@ -1193,8 +1193,8 @@ void __init mem_init(void)
register_page_bootmem_info();
/* Register memory areas for /proc/kcore */
kclist_add(&kcore_vsyscall, (void *)VSYSCALL_ADDR,
PAGE_SIZE, KCORE_OTHER);
if (get_gate_vma(&init_mm))
kclist_add(&kcore_vsyscall, (void *)VSYSCALL_ADDR, PAGE_SIZE, KCORE_USER);
mem_init_print_info(NULL);
}
......
......@@ -510,6 +510,10 @@ read_kcore(struct file *file, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen, loff_t *fpos)
/* we have to zero-fill user buffer even if no read */
if (copy_to_user(buffer, buf, tsz))
return -EFAULT;
} else if (m->type == KCORE_USER) {
/* User page is handled prior to normal kernel page: */
if (copy_to_user(buffer, (char *)start, tsz))
return -EFAULT;
} else {
if (kern_addr_valid(start)) {
/*
......
......@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ enum kcore_type {
KCORE_VMALLOC,
KCORE_RAM,
KCORE_VMEMMAP,
KCORE_USER,
KCORE_OTHER,
};
......
......@@ -127,10 +127,4 @@ static __always_inline enum lru_list page_lru(struct page *page)
#define lru_to_page(head) (list_entry((head)->prev, struct page, lru))
#ifdef arch_unmap_kpfn
extern void arch_unmap_kpfn(unsigned long pfn);
#else
static __always_inline void arch_unmap_kpfn(unsigned long pfn) { }
#endif
#endif
......@@ -1139,8 +1139,6 @@ int memory_failure(unsigned long pfn, int flags)
return 0;
}
arch_unmap_kpfn(pfn);
orig_head = hpage = compound_head(p);
num_poisoned_pages_inc();
......
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