USB: usbfs: don't leak kernel data in siginfo

When a signal is delivered, the information in the siginfo structure
is copied to userspace.  Good security practice dicatates that the
unused fields in this structure should be initialized to 0 so that
random kernel stack data isn't exposed to the user.  This patch adds
such an initialization to the two places where usbfs raises signals.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Dave Mielke <dave@mielke.cc>
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

drivers/usb/core/devio.c

@@ -501,6 +501,7 @@ static void async_completed(struct urb *urb)
 	as->status = urb->status;
 	signr = as->signr;
 	if (signr) {
+		memset(&sinfo, 0, sizeof(sinfo));
 		sinfo.si_signo = as->signr;
 		sinfo.si_errno = as->status;
 		sinfo.si_code = SI_ASYNCIO;
@@ -2382,6 +2383,7 @@ static void usbdev_remove(struct usb_device *udev)
 		wake_up_all(&ps->wait);
 		list_del_init(&ps->list);
 		if (ps->discsignr) {
+			memset(&sinfo, 0, sizeof(sinfo));
 			sinfo.si_signo = ps->discsignr;
 			sinfo.si_errno = EPIPE;
 			sinfo.si_code = SI_ASYNCIO;