• Dan Rosenberg's avatar
    sound: Prevent buffer overflow in OSS load_mixer_volumes · d81a12bc
    Dan Rosenberg authored
    The load_mixer_volumes() function, which can be triggered by
    unprivileged users via the SOUND_MIXER_SETLEVELS ioctl, is vulnerable to
    a buffer overflow.  Because the provided "name" argument isn't
    guaranteed to be NULL terminated at the expected 32 bytes, it's possible
    to overflow past the end of the last element in the mixer_vols array.
    Further exploitation can result in an arbitrary kernel write (via
    subsequent calls to load_mixer_volumes()) leading to privilege
    escalation, or arbitrary kernel reads via get_mixer_levels().  In
    addition, the strcmp() may leak bytes beyond the mixer_vols array.
    Signed-off-by: default avatarDan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
    Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
    Signed-off-by: default avatarTakashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
    d81a12bc
soundcard.c 17.4 KB