Right now vfs_get_tree() calls security_sb_kern_mount() (i.e.
mount MAC) unless it gets MS_KERNMOUNT or MS_SUBMOUNT in flags.
Doing it that way is both clumsy and imprecise.

Consider the callers' tree of vfs_get_tree():
vfs_get_tree()
        <- do_new_mount()
	<- vfs_kern_mount()
		<- simple_pin_fs()
		<- vfs_submount()
		<- kern_mount_data()
		<- init_mount_tree()
		<- btrfs_mount()
			<- vfs_get_tree()
		<- nfs_do_root_mount()
			<- nfs4_try_mount()
				<- nfs_fs_mount()
					<- vfs_get_tree()
			<- nfs4_referral_mount()

do_new_mount() always does need MAC (we are guaranteed that neither
MS_KERNMOUNT nor MS_SUBMOUNT will be passed there).

simple_pin_fs(), vfs_submount() and kern_mount_data() pass explicit
flags inhibiting that check.  So does nfs4_referral_mount() (the
flags there are ulimately coming from vfs_submount()).

init_mount_tree() is called too early for anything LSM-related; it
doesn't matter whether we attempt those checks, they'll do nothing.

Finally, in case of btrfs_mount() and nfs_fs_mount(), doing MAC
is pointless - either the caller will do it, or the flags are
such that we wouldn't have done it either.

In other words, the one and only case when we want that check
done is when we are called from do_new_mount(), and there we
want it unconditionally.

So let's simply move it there.  The superblock is still locked,
so nobody is going to get access to it (via ustat(2), etc.)
until we get a chance to apply the checks - we are free to
move them to any point up to where we drop ->s_umount (in
do_new_mount_fc()).
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>