Commit 0ad30b8f authored by Serge E. Hallyn's avatar Serge E. Hallyn Committed by Linus Torvalds

add some long-missing capabilities to fs_mask

When POSIX capabilities were introduced during the 2.1 Linux
cycle, the fs mask, which represents the capabilities which having
fsuid==0 is supposed to grant, did not include CAP_MKNOD and
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE.  However, before capabilities the privilege
to call these did in fact depend upon fsuid==0.

This patch introduces those capabilities into the fsmask,
restoring the old behavior.

See the thread starting at http://lkml.org/lkml/2009/3/11/157 for
reference.

Note that if this fix is deemed valid, then earlier kernel versions (2.4
and 2.2) ought to be fixed too.

Changelog:
	[Mar 23] Actually delete old CAP_FS_SET definition...
	[Mar 20] Updated against J. Bruce Fields's patch
Reported-by: default avatarIgor Zhbanov <izh1979@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarSerge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
parent d3ab02a7
...@@ -377,7 +377,21 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data { ...@@ -377,7 +377,21 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
#define CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) \ #define CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) \
for (__capi = 0; __capi < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S; ++__capi) for (__capi = 0; __capi < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S; ++__capi)
/*
* CAP_FS_MASK and CAP_NFSD_MASKS:
*
* The fs mask is all the privileges that fsuid==0 historically meant.
* At one time in the past, that included CAP_MKNOD and CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE.
*
* It has never meant setting security.* and trusted.* xattrs.
*
* We could also define fsmask as follows:
* 1. CAP_FS_MASK is the privilege to bypass all fs-related DAC permissions
* 2. The security.* and trusted.* xattrs are fs-related MAC permissions
*/
# define CAP_FS_MASK_B0 (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_CHOWN) \ # define CAP_FS_MASK_B0 (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_CHOWN) \
| CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MKNOD) \
| CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) \ | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) \
| CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) \ | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) \
| CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FOWNER) \ | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FOWNER) \
...@@ -392,11 +406,12 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data { ...@@ -392,11 +406,12 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
# define CAP_EMPTY_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ 0, 0 }}) # define CAP_EMPTY_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ 0, 0 }})
# define CAP_FULL_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, ~0 }}) # define CAP_FULL_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, ~0 }})
# define CAP_INIT_EFF_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP), ~0 }}) # define CAP_INIT_EFF_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP), ~0 }})
# define CAP_FS_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0, CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } }) # define CAP_FS_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
| CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE), \
CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
# define CAP_NFSD_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \ # define CAP_NFSD_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
| CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) \ | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE), \
| CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MKNOD), \ CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
#endif /* _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2 */ #endif /* _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2 */
......
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