Commit 59df9f1f authored by Alexei Starovoitov's avatar Alexei Starovoitov

Merge branch 'restrict-bpf_probe_read'

Daniel Borkmann says:

====================
Small set of fixes in order to restrict BPF helpers for tracing which are
broken on archs with overlapping address ranges as per discussion in [0].
I've targetted this for -bpf tree so they can be routed as fixes. Thanks!

v1 -> v2:
  - switch to reusable %pks, %pus format specifiers (Yonghong)
    - fixate %s on kernel_ds probing for archs with overlapping addr space

      [0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAHk-=wjJKo0GVixYLmqPn-Q22WFu0xHaBSjKEo7e7Yw72y5SPQ@mail.gmail.com/T/
====================
Signed-off-by: default avatarAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
parents 6d74f64b b2a5212f
...@@ -112,6 +112,20 @@ used when printing stack backtraces. The specifier takes into ...@@ -112,6 +112,20 @@ used when printing stack backtraces. The specifier takes into
consideration the effect of compiler optimisations which may occur consideration the effect of compiler optimisations which may occur
when tail-calls are used and marked with the noreturn GCC attribute. when tail-calls are used and marked with the noreturn GCC attribute.
Probed Pointers from BPF / tracing
----------------------------------
::
%pks kernel string
%pus user string
The ``k`` and ``u`` specifiers are used for printing prior probed memory from
either kernel memory (k) or user memory (u). The subsequent ``s`` specifier
results in printing a string. For direct use in regular vsnprintf() the (k)
and (u) annotation is ignored, however, when used out of BPF's bpf_trace_printk(),
for example, it reads the memory it is pointing to without faulting.
Kernel Pointers Kernel Pointers
--------------- ---------------
......
...@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ config ARM ...@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ config ARM
select ARCH_HAS_KEEPINITRD select ARCH_HAS_KEEPINITRD
select ARCH_HAS_KCOV select ARCH_HAS_KCOV
select ARCH_HAS_MEMBARRIER_SYNC_CORE select ARCH_HAS_MEMBARRIER_SYNC_CORE
select ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE
select ARCH_HAS_PTE_SPECIAL if ARM_LPAE select ARCH_HAS_PTE_SPECIAL if ARM_LPAE
select ARCH_HAS_PHYS_TO_DMA select ARCH_HAS_PHYS_TO_DMA
select ARCH_HAS_SETUP_DMA_OPS select ARCH_HAS_SETUP_DMA_OPS
......
...@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ config ARM64 ...@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ config ARM64
select ARCH_HAS_KCOV select ARCH_HAS_KCOV
select ARCH_HAS_KEEPINITRD select ARCH_HAS_KEEPINITRD
select ARCH_HAS_MEMBARRIER_SYNC_CORE select ARCH_HAS_MEMBARRIER_SYNC_CORE
select ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE
select ARCH_HAS_PTE_DEVMAP select ARCH_HAS_PTE_DEVMAP
select ARCH_HAS_PTE_SPECIAL select ARCH_HAS_PTE_SPECIAL
select ARCH_HAS_SETUP_DMA_OPS select ARCH_HAS_SETUP_DMA_OPS
......
...@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ config X86 ...@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ config X86
select ARCH_HAS_KCOV if X86_64 select ARCH_HAS_KCOV if X86_64
select ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT select ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT
select ARCH_HAS_MEMBARRIER_SYNC_CORE select ARCH_HAS_MEMBARRIER_SYNC_CORE
select ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE
select ARCH_HAS_PMEM_API if X86_64 select ARCH_HAS_PMEM_API if X86_64
select ARCH_HAS_PTE_DEVMAP if X86_64 select ARCH_HAS_PTE_DEVMAP if X86_64
select ARCH_HAS_PTE_SPECIAL select ARCH_HAS_PTE_SPECIAL
......
...@@ -2279,6 +2279,9 @@ config ASN1 ...@@ -2279,6 +2279,9 @@ config ASN1
source "kernel/Kconfig.locks" source "kernel/Kconfig.locks"
config ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE
bool
config ARCH_HAS_SYNC_CORE_BEFORE_USERMODE config ARCH_HAS_SYNC_CORE_BEFORE_USERMODE
bool bool
......
...@@ -4340,7 +4340,9 @@ static void do_refine_retval_range(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, int ret_type, ...@@ -4340,7 +4340,9 @@ static void do_refine_retval_range(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, int ret_type,
if (ret_type != RET_INTEGER || if (ret_type != RET_INTEGER ||
(func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stack && (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stack &&
func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_str)) func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_str &&
func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel_str &&
func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_user_str))
return; return;
ret_reg->smax_value = meta->msize_max_value; ret_reg->smax_value = meta->msize_max_value;
......
...@@ -323,17 +323,15 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto *bpf_get_probe_write_proto(void) ...@@ -323,17 +323,15 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto *bpf_get_probe_write_proto(void)
/* /*
* Only limited trace_printk() conversion specifiers allowed: * Only limited trace_printk() conversion specifiers allowed:
* %d %i %u %x %ld %li %lu %lx %lld %lli %llu %llx %p %s * %d %i %u %x %ld %li %lu %lx %lld %lli %llu %llx %p %pks %pus %s
*/ */
BPF_CALL_5(bpf_trace_printk, char *, fmt, u32, fmt_size, u64, arg1, BPF_CALL_5(bpf_trace_printk, char *, fmt, u32, fmt_size, u64, arg1,
u64, arg2, u64, arg3) u64, arg2, u64, arg3)
{ {
int i, mod[3] = {}, fmt_cnt = 0;
char buf[64], fmt_ptype;
void *unsafe_ptr = NULL;
bool str_seen = false; bool str_seen = false;
int mod[3] = {};
int fmt_cnt = 0;
u64 unsafe_addr;
char buf[64];
int i;
/* /*
* bpf_check()->check_func_arg()->check_stack_boundary() * bpf_check()->check_func_arg()->check_stack_boundary()
...@@ -359,40 +357,71 @@ BPF_CALL_5(bpf_trace_printk, char *, fmt, u32, fmt_size, u64, arg1, ...@@ -359,40 +357,71 @@ BPF_CALL_5(bpf_trace_printk, char *, fmt, u32, fmt_size, u64, arg1,
if (fmt[i] == 'l') { if (fmt[i] == 'l') {
mod[fmt_cnt]++; mod[fmt_cnt]++;
i++; i++;
} else if (fmt[i] == 'p' || fmt[i] == 's') { } else if (fmt[i] == 'p') {
mod[fmt_cnt]++; mod[fmt_cnt]++;
if ((fmt[i + 1] == 'k' ||
fmt[i + 1] == 'u') &&
fmt[i + 2] == 's') {
fmt_ptype = fmt[i + 1];
i += 2;
goto fmt_str;
}
/* disallow any further format extensions */ /* disallow any further format extensions */
if (fmt[i + 1] != 0 && if (fmt[i + 1] != 0 &&
!isspace(fmt[i + 1]) && !isspace(fmt[i + 1]) &&
!ispunct(fmt[i + 1])) !ispunct(fmt[i + 1]))
return -EINVAL; return -EINVAL;
fmt_cnt++;
if (fmt[i] == 's') { goto fmt_next;
if (str_seen) } else if (fmt[i] == 's') {
/* allow only one '%s' per fmt string */ mod[fmt_cnt]++;
return -EINVAL; fmt_ptype = fmt[i];
str_seen = true; fmt_str:
if (str_seen)
switch (fmt_cnt) { /* allow only one '%s' per fmt string */
case 1: return -EINVAL;
unsafe_addr = arg1; str_seen = true;
arg1 = (long) buf;
break; if (fmt[i + 1] != 0 &&
case 2: !isspace(fmt[i + 1]) &&
unsafe_addr = arg2; !ispunct(fmt[i + 1]))
arg2 = (long) buf; return -EINVAL;
break;
case 3: switch (fmt_cnt) {
unsafe_addr = arg3; case 0:
arg3 = (long) buf; unsafe_ptr = (void *)(long)arg1;
break; arg1 = (long)buf;
} break;
buf[0] = 0; case 1:
strncpy_from_unsafe(buf, unsafe_ptr = (void *)(long)arg2;
(void *) (long) unsafe_addr, arg2 = (long)buf;
break;
case 2:
unsafe_ptr = (void *)(long)arg3;
arg3 = (long)buf;
break;
}
buf[0] = 0;
switch (fmt_ptype) {
case 's':
#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE
strncpy_from_unsafe(buf, unsafe_ptr,
sizeof(buf)); sizeof(buf));
break;
#endif
case 'k':
strncpy_from_unsafe_strict(buf, unsafe_ptr,
sizeof(buf));
break;
case 'u':
strncpy_from_unsafe_user(buf,
(__force void __user *)unsafe_ptr,
sizeof(buf));
break;
} }
continue; goto fmt_next;
} }
if (fmt[i] == 'l') { if (fmt[i] == 'l') {
...@@ -403,6 +432,7 @@ BPF_CALL_5(bpf_trace_printk, char *, fmt, u32, fmt_size, u64, arg1, ...@@ -403,6 +432,7 @@ BPF_CALL_5(bpf_trace_printk, char *, fmt, u32, fmt_size, u64, arg1,
if (fmt[i] != 'i' && fmt[i] != 'd' && if (fmt[i] != 'i' && fmt[i] != 'd' &&
fmt[i] != 'u' && fmt[i] != 'x') fmt[i] != 'u' && fmt[i] != 'x')
return -EINVAL; return -EINVAL;
fmt_next:
fmt_cnt++; fmt_cnt++;
} }
...@@ -825,14 +855,16 @@ bpf_tracing_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog) ...@@ -825,14 +855,16 @@ bpf_tracing_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog)
return &bpf_probe_read_user_proto; return &bpf_probe_read_user_proto;
case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel: case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel:
return &bpf_probe_read_kernel_proto; return &bpf_probe_read_kernel_proto;
case BPF_FUNC_probe_read:
return &bpf_probe_read_compat_proto;
case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_user_str: case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_user_str:
return &bpf_probe_read_user_str_proto; return &bpf_probe_read_user_str_proto;
case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel_str: case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel_str:
return &bpf_probe_read_kernel_str_proto; return &bpf_probe_read_kernel_str_proto;
#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE
case BPF_FUNC_probe_read:
return &bpf_probe_read_compat_proto;
case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_str: case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_str:
return &bpf_probe_read_compat_str_proto; return &bpf_probe_read_compat_str_proto;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS #ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS
case BPF_FUNC_get_current_cgroup_id: case BPF_FUNC_get_current_cgroup_id:
return &bpf_get_current_cgroup_id_proto; return &bpf_get_current_cgroup_id_proto;
......
...@@ -2168,6 +2168,10 @@ char *fwnode_string(char *buf, char *end, struct fwnode_handle *fwnode, ...@@ -2168,6 +2168,10 @@ char *fwnode_string(char *buf, char *end, struct fwnode_handle *fwnode,
* f full name * f full name
* P node name, including a possible unit address * P node name, including a possible unit address
* - 'x' For printing the address. Equivalent to "%lx". * - 'x' For printing the address. Equivalent to "%lx".
* - '[ku]s' For a BPF/tracing related format specifier, e.g. used out of
* bpf_trace_printk() where [ku] prefix specifies either kernel (k)
* or user (u) memory to probe, and:
* s a string, equivalent to "%s" on direct vsnprintf() use
* *
* ** When making changes please also update: * ** When making changes please also update:
* Documentation/core-api/printk-formats.rst * Documentation/core-api/printk-formats.rst
...@@ -2251,6 +2255,14 @@ char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr, ...@@ -2251,6 +2255,14 @@ char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr,
if (!IS_ERR(ptr)) if (!IS_ERR(ptr))
break; break;
return err_ptr(buf, end, ptr, spec); return err_ptr(buf, end, ptr, spec);
case 'u':
case 'k':
switch (fmt[1]) {
case 's':
return string(buf, end, ptr, spec);
default:
return error_string(buf, end, "(einval)", spec);
}
} }
/* default is to _not_ leak addresses, hash before printing */ /* default is to _not_ leak addresses, hash before printing */
......
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