Commit 69191754 authored by KP Singh's avatar KP Singh Committed by Alexei Starovoitov

bpf: Remove unnecessary CAP_MAC_ADMIN check

While well intentioned, checking CAP_MAC_ADMIN for attaching
BPF_MODIFY_RETURN tracing programs to "security_" functions is not
necessary as tracing BPF programs already require CAP_SYS_ADMIN.

Fixes: 6ba43b76 ("bpf: Attachment verification for BPF_MODIFY_RETURN")
Signed-off-by: default avatarKP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200305204955.31123-1-kpsingh@chromium.org
parent dad737c9
......@@ -9808,20 +9808,13 @@ static int check_attach_modify_return(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
unsigned long addr = (unsigned long) prog->aux->trampoline->func.addr;
if (within_error_injection_list(addr))
return 0;
/* This is expected to be cleaned up in the future with the KRSI effort
* introducing the LSM_HOOK macro for cleaning up lsm_hooks.h.
*/
if (!strncmp(SECURITY_PREFIX, prog->aux->attach_func_name,
sizeof(SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1)) {
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (within_error_injection_list(addr) ||
!strncmp(SECURITY_PREFIX, prog->aux->attach_func_name,
sizeof(SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1))
return 0;
}
verbose(env, "fmod_ret attach_btf_id %u (%s) is not modifiable\n",
prog->aux->attach_btf_id, prog->aux->attach_func_name);
......
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