Commit 77243971 authored by Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk's avatar Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk Committed by Thomas Gleixner

x86/bugs/intel: Set proper CPU features and setup RDS

Intel CPUs expose methods to:

 - Detect whether RDS capability is available via CPUID.7.0.EDX[31],

 - The SPEC_CTRL MSR(0x48), bit 2 set to enable RDS.

 - MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, Bit(4) no need to enable RRS.

With that in mind if spec_store_bypass_disable=[auto,on] is selected set at
boot-time the SPEC_CTRL MSR to enable RDS if the platform requires it.

Note that this does not fix the KVM case where the SPEC_CTRL is exposed to
guests which can muck with it, see patch titled :
 KVM/SVM/VMX/x86/spectre_v2: Support the combination of guest and host IBRS.

And for the firmware (IBRS to be set), see patch titled:
 x86/spectre_v2: Read SPEC_CTRL MSR during boot and re-use reserved bits

[ tglx: Distangled it from the intel implementation and kept the call order ]
Signed-off-by: default avatarKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: default avatarBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
parent 24f7fc83
......@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
#define MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL 0x00000048 /* Speculation Control */
#define SPEC_CTRL_IBRS (1 << 0) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
#define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP (1 << 1) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
#define SPEC_CTRL_RDS (1 << 2) /* Reduced Data Speculation */
#define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD 0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */
#define PRED_CMD_IBPB (1 << 0) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
......@@ -68,6 +69,11 @@
#define MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES 0x0000010a
#define ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO (1 << 0) /* Not susceptible to Meltdown */
#define ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL (1 << 1) /* Enhanced IBRS support */
#define ARCH_CAP_RDS_NO (1 << 4) /*
* Not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass
* attack, so no Reduced Data Speculation control
* required.
*/
#define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL 0x00000119
#define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL3 0x0000011e
......
......@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
void x86_spec_ctrl_set(u64 val)
{
if (val & ~SPEC_CTRL_IBRS)
if (val & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_RDS))
WARN_ONCE(1, "SPEC_CTRL MSR value 0x%16llx is unknown.\n", val);
else
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base | val);
......@@ -444,8 +444,28 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void)
break;
}
if (mode != SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE)
/*
* We have three CPU feature flags that are in play here:
* - X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS - CPU is susceptible.
* - X86_FEATURE_RDS - CPU is able to turn off speculative store bypass
* - X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE - engage the mitigation
*/
if (mode != SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE);
/*
* Intel uses the SPEC CTRL MSR Bit(2) for this, while AMD uses
* a completely different MSR and bit dependent on family.
*/
switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor) {
case X86_VENDOR_INTEL:
x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_RDS;
x86_spec_ctrl_set(SPEC_CTRL_RDS);
break;
case X86_VENDOR_AMD:
break;
}
}
return mode;
}
......@@ -459,6 +479,12 @@ static void ssb_select_mitigation()
#undef pr_fmt
void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void)
{
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
x86_spec_ctrl_set(x86_spec_ctrl_base & (SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_RDS));
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
......
......@@ -951,7 +951,11 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
u64 ia32_cap = 0;
if (!x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_spec_store_bypass))
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES))
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap);
if (!x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_spec_store_bypass) &&
!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RDS_NO))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_speculation))
......@@ -963,9 +967,6 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_meltdown))
return;
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES))
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap);
/* Rogue Data Cache Load? No! */
if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO)
return;
......@@ -1383,6 +1384,7 @@ void identify_secondary_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
#endif
mtrr_ap_init();
validate_apic_and_package_id(c);
x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap();
}
static __init int setup_noclflush(char *arg)
......
......@@ -50,4 +50,6 @@ extern void cpu_detect_cache_sizes(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
unsigned int aperfmperf_get_khz(int cpu);
extern void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void);
#endif /* ARCH_X86_CPU_H */
......@@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_STIBP);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RDS);
}
/*
......
Markdown is supported
0%
or
You are about to add 0 people to the discussion. Proceed with caution.
Finish editing this message first!
Please register or to comment