Commit a601266e authored by Vladislav Yasevich's avatar Vladislav Yasevich Committed by Sridhar Samudrala

[SCTP]: Validate the parameter length in HB-ACK chunk.

If SCTP receives a badly formatted HB-ACK chunk, it is possible
that we may access invalid memory and potentially have a buffer
overflow.  We should really make sure that the chunk format is
what we expect, before attempting to touch the data.
Signed-off-by: default avatarVlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarSridhar Samudrala <sri@us.ibm.com>
parent dd2d1c6f
......@@ -1019,6 +1019,12 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_backbeat_8_3(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
commands);
hbinfo = (sctp_sender_hb_info_t *) chunk->skb->data;
/* Make sure that the length of the parameter is what we expect */
if (ntohs(hbinfo->param_hdr.length) !=
sizeof(sctp_sender_hb_info_t)) {
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
}
from_addr = hbinfo->daddr;
link = sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(asoc, &from_addr);
......
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