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  1. 05 Feb, 2010 2 commits
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  9. 20 Jan, 2010 4 commits
    • Jerome Glisse's avatar
      drm/radeon: r6xx/r7xx possible security issue, system ram access · c8c15ff1
      Jerome Glisse authored 
      This patch workaround a possible security issue which can allow
user to abuse drm on r6xx/r7xx hw to access any system ram memory.
This patch doesn't break userspace, it detect "valid" old use of
CB_COLOR[0-7]_FRAG & CB_COLOR[0-7]_TILE registers and overwritte
the address these registers are pointing to with the one of the
last color buffer. This workaround will work for old mesa &
xf86-video-ati and any old user which did use similar register
programming pattern as those (we expect that there is no others
user of those ioctl except possibly a malicious one). This patch
add a warning if it detects such usage, warning encourage people
to update their mesa & xf86-video-ati. New userspace will submit
proper relocation.

Fix for xf86-video-ati / mesa (this kernel patch is enough to
prevent abuse, fix for userspace are to set proper cs stream and
avoid kernel warning) :
http://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/driver/xf86-video-ati/commit/?id=95d63e408cc88b6934bec84a0b1ef94dfe8bee7b
http://cgit.freedesktop.org/mesa/mesa/commit/?id=46dc6fd3ed5ef96cda53641a97bc68c3bc104a9f

Abusing this register to perform system ram memory is not easy,
here is outline on how it could be achieve. First attacker must
have access to the drm device and be able to submit command stream
throught cs ioctl. Then attacker must build a proper command stream
for r6xx/r7xx hw which will abuse the FRAG or TILE buffer to
overwrite the GPU GART which is in VRAM. To achieve so attacker
as to setup CB_COLOR[0-7]_FRAG or CB_COLOR[0-7]_TILE to point
to the GPU GART, then it has to find a way to write predictable
value into those buffer (with little cleverness i believe this
can be done but this is an hard task). Once attacker have such
program it can overwritte GPU GART to program GPU gart to point
anywhere in system memory. It then can reusse same method as he
used to reprogram GART to overwritte the system ram through the
GART mapping. In the process the attacker has to be carefull to
not overwritte any sensitive area of the GART table, like ring
or IB gart entry as it will more then likely lead to GPU lockup.
Bottom line is that i think it's very hard to use this flaw
to get system ram access but in theory one can achieve so.

Side note: I am not aware of anyone ever using the GPU as an
attack vector, nevertheless we take great care in the opensource
driver to try to detect and forbid malicious use of GPU. I don't
think the closed source driver are as cautious as we are.
Signed-off-by: default avatarJerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDave Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>
      c8c15ff1
    • Jerome Glisse's avatar
      drm/radeon/kms: r600/r700 don't test ib if ib initialization fails · db96380e
      Jerome Glisse authored 
      If ib initialization failed don't try to test ib as it will result
in an oops (accessing NULL ib buffer ptr).
Signed-off-by: default avatarJerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDave Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>
      db96380e
    • Jerome Glisse's avatar
      drm/radeon/kms: Forbid creation of framebuffer with no valid GEM object · 7e71c9e2
      Jerome Glisse authored 
      This will avoid oops if at later point the fb is use. Trying to create
a framebuffer with no valid GEM object is bogus and should be forbidden
as this patch does.
Signed-off-by: default avatarJerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDave Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>
      7e71c9e2
    • Jerome Glisse's avatar
      drm/radeon/kms: r600 handle irq vector ring overflow · 7924e5eb
      Jerome Glisse authored 
      In some rare case i faced an irq overflow quickly followed by
a GPU lockup (hard hang) this patch try to deal with irq vector
ring overflow, so far haven't been able to reproduce it with
the patch.
Signed-off-by: default avatarJerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarAlex Deucher <alexdeucher@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDave Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>
      7924e5eb
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