- 18 Jun, 2019 14 commits
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Sean Christopherson authored
VMX can conditionally call kvm_{before,after}_interrupt() since KVM always uses "ack interrupt on exit" and therefore explicitly handles interrupts as opposed to blindly enabling irqs. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Sean Christopherson authored
Although the kernel may use multiple IDTs, KVM should only ever see the "real" IDT, e.g. the early init IDT is long gone by the time KVM runs and the debug stack IDT is only used for small windows of time in very specific flows. Before commit a547c6db ("KVM: VMX: Enable acknowledge interupt on vmexit"), the kernel's IDT base was consumed by KVM only when setting constant VMCS state, i.e. to set VMCS.HOST_IDTR_BASE. Because constant host state is done once per vCPU, there was ostensibly no need to cache the kernel's IDT base. When support for "ack interrupt on exit" was introduced, KVM added a second consumer of the IDT base as handling already-acked interrupts requires directly calling the interrupt handler, i.e. KVM uses the IDT base to find the address of the handler. Because interrupts are a fast path, KVM cached the IDT base to avoid having to VMREAD HOST_IDTR_BASE. Presumably, the IDT base was cached on a per-vCPU basis simply because the existing code grabbed the IDT base on a per-vCPU (VMCS) basis. Note, all post-boot IDTs use the same handlers for external interrupts, i.e. the "ack interrupt on exit" use of the IDT base would be unaffected even if the cached IDT somehow did not match the current IDT. And as for the original use case of setting VMCS.HOST_IDTR_BASE, if any of the above analysis is wrong then KVM has had a bug since the beginning of time since KVM has effectively been caching the IDT at vCPU creation since commit a8b732ca01c ("[PATCH] kvm: userspace interface"). Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Sean Christopherson authored
Generic x86 code invokes the kvm_x86_ops external interrupt handler on all VM-Exits regardless of the actual exit type. Use the already-cached EXIT_REASON to determine if the VM-Exit was due to an interrupt, thus avoiding an extra VMREAD (to query VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO) for all other types of VM-Exit. In addition to avoiding the extra VMREAD, checking the EXIT_REASON instead of VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO makes it more obvious that vmx_handle_external_intr() is called for all VM-Exits, e.g. someone unfamiliar with the flow might wonder under what condition(s) VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO does not contain a valid interrupt, which is simply not possible since KVM always runs with "ack interrupt on exit". WARN once if VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO doesn't contain a valid interrupt on an EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT VM-Exit, as such a condition would indicate a hardware bug. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Paolo Bonzini authored
The reason for skipping handling of NMI and #MC in handle_exception is the same, namely they are handled earlier by vmx_complete_atomic_exit. Calling the machine check handler (which just returns 1) is misleading, don't do it. Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Sean Christopherson authored
A previous fix to prevent KVM from consuming stale VMCS state after a failed VM-Entry inadvertantly blocked KVM's handling of machine checks that occur during VM-Entry. Per Intel's SDM, a #MC during VM-Entry is handled in one of three ways, depending on when the #MC is recognoized. As it pertains to this bug fix, the third case explicitly states EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY is handled like any other VM-Exit during VM-Entry, i.e. sets bit 31 to indicate the VM-Entry failed. If a machine-check event occurs during a VM entry, one of the following occurs: - The machine-check event is handled as if it occurred before the VM entry: ... - The machine-check event is handled after VM entry completes: ... - A VM-entry failure occurs as described in Section 26.7. The basic exit reason is 41, for "VM-entry failure due to machine-check event". Explicitly handle EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY as a one-off case in vmx_vcpu_run() instead of binning it into vmx_complete_atomic_exit(). Doing so allows vmx_vcpu_run() to handle VMX_EXIT_REASONS_FAILED_VMENTRY in a sane fashion and also simplifies vmx_complete_atomic_exit() since VMCS.VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO is guaranteed to be fresh. Fixes: b060ca3b ("kvm: vmx: Handle VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME failure properly") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Paolo Bonzini authored
Make it available to AMD hosts as well, just in case someone is trying to use an Intel processor's CPUID setup. Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Wei Yang authored
In function apic_mmio_write(), the offset has been checked in: * apic_mmio_in_range() * offset & 0xf These two ensures offset is in range [0x010, 0xff0]. Signed-off-by: Wei Yang <richardw.yang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Wei Yang authored
apic_clear_vector() is the counterpart of kvm_lapic_set_vector(), while they have different naming convention. Rename it and move together to arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h. Also fix one typo in comment by hand. Signed-off-by: Wei Yang <richardw.yang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Wei Yang authored
On delivering irq to apic, we iterate on vcpu and do the check like this: kvm_apic_present(vcpu) kvm_lapic_enabled(vpu) kvm_apic_present(vcpu) && kvm_apic_sw_enabled(vcpu->arch.apic) Since we have already checked kvm_apic_present(), it is reasonable to replace kvm_lapic_enabled() with kvm_apic_sw_enabled(). Signed-off-by: Wei Yang <richardw.yang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Marcelo Tosatti authored
Add an MSRs which allows the guest to disable host polling (specifically the cpuidle-haltpoll, when performing polling in the guest, disables host side polling). Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Eugene Korenevsky authored
There is an imperfection in get_vmx_mem_address(): access length is ignored when checking the limit. To fix this, pass access length as a function argument. The access length is usually obvious since it is used by callers after get_vmx_mem_address() call, but for vmread/vmwrite it depends on the state of 64-bit mode. Signed-off-by: Eugene Korenevsky <ekorenevsky@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Eugene Korenevsky authored
Intel SDM vol. 3, 5.3: The processor causes a general-protection exception (or, if the segment is SS, a stack-fault exception) any time an attempt is made to access the following addresses in a segment: - A byte at an offset greater than the effective limit - A word at an offset greater than the (effective-limit – 1) - A doubleword at an offset greater than the (effective-limit – 3) - A quadword at an offset greater than the (effective-limit – 7) Therefore, the generic limit checking error condition must be exn = (off > limit + 1 - access_len) = (off + access_len - 1 > limit) but not exn = (off + access_len > limit) as for now. Also avoid integer overflow of `off` at 32-bit KVM by casting it to u64. Note: access length is currently sizeof(u64) which is incorrect. This will be fixed in the subsequent patch. Signed-off-by: Eugene Korenevsky <ekorenevsky@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Like Xu authored
Add support to expose Intel V2 Extended Topology Enumeration Leaf for some new systems with multiple software-visible die within each package. Because unimplemented and unexposed leaves should be explicitly reported as zero, there is no need to limit cpuid.0.eax to the maximum value of feature configuration but limit it to the highest leaf implemented in the current code. A single clamping seems sufficient and cheaper. Co-developed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Like Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Liran Alon authored
Make all code consistent with kvm_deliver_exception_payload() by using appropriate symbolic constant instead of hard-coded number. Reviewed-by: Nikita Leshenko <nikita.leshchenko@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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- 13 Jun, 2019 1 commit
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Paolo Bonzini authored
Even when asynchronous page fault is disabled, KVM does not want to pause the host if a guest triggers a page fault; instead it will put it into an artificial HLT state that allows running other host processes while allowing interrupt delivery into the guest. However, the way this feature is triggered is a bit confusing. First, it is not used for page faults while a nested guest is running: but this is not an issue since the artificial halt is completely invisible to the guest, either L1 or L2. Second, it is used even if kvm_halt_in_guest() returns true; in this case, the guest probably should not pay the additional latency cost of the artificial halt, and thus we should handle the page fault in a completely synchronous way. By introducing a new function kvm_can_deliver_async_pf, this patch commonizes the code that chooses whether to deliver an async page fault (kvm_arch_async_page_not_present) and the code that chooses whether a page fault should be handled synchronously (kvm_can_do_async_pf). Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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- 05 Jun, 2019 7 commits
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Junaid Shahid authored
It doesn't seem as if there is any particular need for kvm_lock to be a spinlock, so convert the lock to a mutex so that sleepable functions (in particular cond_resched()) can be called while holding it. Signed-off-by: Junaid Shahid <junaids@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Uros Bizjak authored
__vmcs_writel uses volatile asm, so there is no need to insert another one between the first and the second call to __vmcs_writel in order to prevent unwanted code moves for 32bit targets. Signed-off-by: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Gustavo A. R. Silva authored
One of the more common cases of allocation size calculations is finding the size of a structure that has a zero-sized array at the end, along with memory for some number of elements for that array. For example: struct foo { int stuff; struct boo entry[]; }; instance = kzalloc(sizeof(struct foo) + count * sizeof(struct boo), GFP_KERNEL); Instead of leaving these open-coded and prone to type mistakes, we can now use the new struct_size() helper: instance = kzalloc(struct_size(instance, entry, count), GFP_KERNEL); This code was detected with the help of Coccinelle. Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Jan Beulich authored
While upstream gcc doesn't detect conflicts on cc (yet), it really should, and hence "cc" should not be specified for asm()-s also having "=@cc<cond>" outputs. (It is quite pointless anyway to specify a "cc" clobber in x86 inline assembly, since the compiler assumes it to be always clobbered, and has no means [yet] to suppress this behavior.) Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Fixes: bbc0b823 ("KVM: nVMX: Capture VM-Fail via CC_{SET,OUT} in nested early checks") Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Andrew Jones authored
This is the same as vm_vcpu_add_default, but it also takes a kvm_vcpu_init struct pointer. Signed-off-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Andrew Jones authored
This allows aarch64 tests to run on more targets, such as the Arm simulator that doesn't like KVM_ARM_TARGET_GENERIC_V8. And it also allows aarch64 tests to provide vcpu features in struct kvm_vcpu_init. Additionally it drops the unused memslot parameters. Signed-off-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Paolo Bonzini authored
This removes the processor-dependent arguments from vm_vcpu_add. Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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- 04 Jun, 2019 13 commits
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Andrew Jones authored
Make sure we complete the I/O after determining we have a ucall, which is I/O. Also allow the *uc parameter to optionally be NULL. It's quite possible that a test case will only care about the return value, like for example when looping on a check for UCALL_DONE. Signed-off-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Wanpeng Li authored
MSR IA32_MISC_ENABLE bit 18, according to SDM: | When this bit is set to 0, the MONITOR feature flag is not set (CPUID.01H:ECX[bit 3] = 0). | This indicates that MONITOR/MWAIT are not supported. | | Software attempts to execute MONITOR/MWAIT will cause #UD when this bit is 0. | | When this bit is set to 1 (default), MONITOR/MWAIT are supported (CPUID.01H:ECX[bit 3] = 1). The CPUID.01H:ECX[bit 3] ought to mirror the value of the MSR bit, CPUID.01H:ECX[bit 3] is a better guard than kvm_mwait_in_guest(). kvm_mwait_in_guest() affects the behavior of MONITOR/MWAIT, not its guest visibility. This patch implements toggling of the CPUID bit based on guest writes to the MSR. Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com> [Fixes for backwards compatibility - Paolo] Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Wanpeng Li authored
Allow guest reads CORE cstate when exposing host CPU power management capabilities to the guest. PKG cstate is restricted to avoid a guest to get the whole package information in multi-tenant scenario. Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Wanpeng Li authored
Commit b31c114b (KVM: X86: Provide a capability to disable PAUSE intercepts) forgot to add the KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_PAUSE into api doc. This patch adds it. Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Xiaoyao Li authored
1. Using X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES to enumerate the existence of MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES to avoid using rdmsrl_safe(). 2. Since kvm_get_arch_capabilities() is only used in this file, making it static. Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Sean Christopherson authored
Add a wrapper to invoke kvm_arch_check_processor_compat() so that the boilerplate ugliness of checking virtualization support on all CPUs is hidden from the arch specific code. x86's implementation in particular is quite heinous, as it unnecessarily propagates the out-param pattern into kvm_x86_ops. While the x86 specific issue could be resolved solely by changing kvm_x86_ops, make the change for all architectures as returning a value directly is prettier and technically more robust, e.g. s390 doesn't set the out param, which could lead to subtle breakage in the (highly unlikely) scenario where the out-param was not pre-initialized by the caller. Opportunistically annotate svm_check_processor_compat() with __init. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Suthikulpanit, Suravee authored
AVIC doorbell is used to notify a running vCPU that interrupts has been injected into the vCPU AVIC backing page. Current logic checks only if a VCPU is running before sending a doorbell. However, the doorbell is not necessary if the destination CPU is itself. Add logic to check currently running CPU before sending doorbell. Signed-off-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Wanpeng Li authored
Advance lapic timer tries to hidden the hypervisor overhead between the host emulated timer fires and the guest awares the timer is fired. However, it just hidden the time between apic_timer_fn/handle_preemption_timer -> wait_lapic_expire, instead of the real position of vmentry which is mentioned in the orignial commit d0659d94 ("KVM: x86: add option to advance tscdeadline hrtimer expiration"). There is 700+ cpu cycles between the end of wait_lapic_expire and before world switch on my haswell desktop. This patch tries to narrow the last gap(wait_lapic_expire -> world switch), it takes the real overhead time between apic_timer_fn/handle_preemption_timer and before world switch into consideration when adaptively tuning timer advancement. The patch can reduce 40% latency (~1600+ cycles to ~1000+ cycles on a haswell desktop) for kvm-unit-tests/tscdeadline_latency when testing busy waits. Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Wanpeng Li authored
wait_lapic_expire() call was moved above guest_enter_irqoff() because of its tracepoint, which violated the RCU extended quiescent state invoked by guest_enter_irqoff()[1][2]. This patch simply moves the tracepoint below guest_exit_irqoff() in vcpu_enter_guest(). Snapshot the delta before VM-Enter, but trace it after VM-Exit. This can help us to move wait_lapic_expire() just before vmentry in the later patch. [1] Commit 8b89fe1f ("kvm: x86: move tracepoints outside extended quiescent state") [2] https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/7821111/ Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com> [Track whether wait_lapic_expire was called, and do not invoke the tracepoint if not. - Paolo] Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Wanpeng Li authored
Extract adaptive tune timer advancement logic to a single function. Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com> [Rename new function. - Paolo] Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Vitaly Kuznetsov authored
Commit 8c5fbf1a ("KVM/nSVM: Use the new mapping API for mapping guest memory") broke nested SVM completely: kvm_vcpu_map()'s second parameter is GFN so vmcb_gpa needs to be converted with gpa_to_gfn(), not the other way around. Fixes: 8c5fbf1a ("KVM/nSVM: Use the new mapping API for mapping guest memory") Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Kai Huang authored
Intel MKTME repurposes several high bits of physical address as 'keyID' for memory encryption thus effectively reduces platform's maximum physical address bits. Exactly how many bits are reduced is configured by BIOS. To honor such HW behavior, the repurposed bits are reduced from cpuinfo_x86->x86_phys_bits when MKTME is detected in CPU detection. Similarly, AMD SME/SEV also reduces physical address bits for memory encryption, and cpuinfo->x86_phys_bits is reduced too when SME/SEV is detected, so for both MKTME and SME/SEV, boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits doesn't hold physical address bits reported by CPUID anymore. Currently KVM treats bits from boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits to 51 as reserved bits, but it's not true anymore for MKTME, since MKTME treats those reduced bits as 'keyID', but not reserved bits. Therefore boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits cannot be used to calculate reserved bits anymore, although we can still use it for AMD SME/SEV since SME/SEV treats the reduced bits differently -- they are treated as reserved bits, the same as other reserved bits in page table entity [1]. Fix by introducing a new 'shadow_phys_bits' variable in KVM x86 MMU code to store the effective physical bits w/o reserved bits -- for MKTME, it equals to physical address reported by CPUID, and for SME/SEV, it is boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits. Note that for the physical address bits reported to guest should remain unchanged -- KVM should report physical address reported by CPUID to guest, but not boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits. Because for Intel MKTME, there's no harm if guest sets up 'keyID' bits in guest page table (since MKTME only works at physical address level), and KVM doesn't even expose MKTME to guest. Arguably, for AMD SME/SEV, guest is aware of SEV thus it should adjust boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits when it detects SEV, therefore KVM should still reports physcial address reported by CPUID to guest. Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Kai Huang authored
As a prerequisite to fix several SPTE reserved bits related calculation errors caused by MKTME, which requires kvm_set_mmio_spte_mask() to use local static variable defined in mmu.c. Also move call site of kvm_set_mmio_spte_mask() from kvm_arch_init() to kvm_mmu_module_init() so that kvm_set_mmio_spte_mask() can be static. Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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- 31 May, 2019 2 commits
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Paolo Bonzini authored
Merge tag 'kvm-s390-master-5.2-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvms390/linux into kvm-master KVM: s390: Fixes - fix compilation for !CONFIG_PCI - fix the output of KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPU_ID
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Paolo Bonzini authored
Merge tag 'kvm-ppc-fixes-5.2-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/paulus/powerpc into kvm-master PPC KVM fixes for 5.2 - Several bug fixes for the new XIVE-native code. - Replace kvm->lock by other mutexes in several places where we hold a vcpu mutex, to avoid lock order inversions. - Fix a lockdep warning on guest entry for radix-mode guests. - Fix a bug causing user-visible corruption of SPRG3 on the host.
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- 30 May, 2019 3 commits
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Suraj Jitindar Singh authored
The sprgs are a set of 4 general purpose sprs provided for software use. SPRG3 is special in that it can also be read from userspace. Thus it is used on linux to store the cpu and numa id of the process to speed up syscall access to this information. This register is overwritten with the guest value on kvm guest entry, and so needs to be restored on exit again. Thus restore the value on the guest exit path in kvmhv_p9_guest_entry(). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.20+ Fixes: 95a6432c ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Streamlined guest entry/exit path on P9 for radix guests") Signed-off-by: Suraj Jitindar Singh <sjitindarsingh@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
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Paul Mackerras authored
Commit 3309bec8 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix lockdep warning when entering the guest") moved calls to trace_hardirqs_{on,off} in the entry path used for HPT guests. Similar code exists in the new streamlined entry path used for radix guests on POWER9. This makes the same change there, so as to avoid lockdep warnings such as this: [ 228.686461] DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(current->hardirqs_enabled) [ 228.686480] WARNING: CPU: 116 PID: 3803 at ../kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4219 check_flags.part.23+0x21c/0x270 [ 228.686544] Modules linked in: vhost_net vhost xt_CHECKSUM iptable_mangle xt_MASQUERADE iptable_nat nf_nat +xt_conntrack nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 tun bridge stp llc ebtable_filter +ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_filter fuse kvm_hv kvm at24 ipmi_powernv regmap_i2c ipmi_devintf +uio_pdrv_genirq ofpart ipmi_msghandler uio powernv_flash mtd ibmpowernv opal_prd ip_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 btrfs +zstd_decompress zstd_compress raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx libcrc32c xor +raid6_pq raid1 raid0 ses sd_mod enclosure scsi_transport_sas ast i2c_opal i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper syscopyarea +sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm drm i40e e1000e cxl aacraid tg3 drm_panel_orientation_quirks i2c_core [ 228.686859] CPU: 116 PID: 3803 Comm: qemu-system-ppc Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.2.0-rc1-xive+ #42 [ 228.686911] NIP: c0000000001b394c LR: c0000000001b3948 CTR: c000000000bfad20 [ 228.686963] REGS: c000200cdb50f570 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (5.2.0-rc1-xive+) [ 228.687001] MSR: 9000000002823033 <SF,HV,VEC,VSX,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 48222222 XER: 20040000 [ 228.687060] CFAR: c000000000116db0 IRQMASK: 1 [ 228.687060] GPR00: c0000000001b3948 c000200cdb50f800 c0000000015e7600 000000000000002e [ 228.687060] GPR04: 0000000000000001 c0000000001c71a0 000000006e655f73 72727563284e4f5f [ 228.687060] GPR08: 0000200e60680000 0000000000000000 c000200cdb486180 0000000000000000 [ 228.687060] GPR12: 0000000000002000 c000200fff61a680 0000000000000000 00007fffb75c0000 [ 228.687060] GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 c0000000017d6900 c000000001124900 [ 228.687060] GPR20: 0000000000000074 c008000006916f68 0000000000000074 0000000000000074 [ 228.687060] GPR24: ffffffffffffffff ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000003 c000200d4b600000 [ 228.687060] GPR28: c000000001627e58 c000000001489908 c000000001627e58 c000000002304de0 [ 228.687377] NIP [c0000000001b394c] check_flags.part.23+0x21c/0x270 [ 228.687415] LR [c0000000001b3948] check_flags.part.23+0x218/0x270 [ 228.687466] Call Trace: [ 228.687488] [c000200cdb50f800] [c0000000001b3948] check_flags.part.23+0x218/0x270 (unreliable) [ 228.687542] [c000200cdb50f870] [c0000000001b6548] lock_is_held_type+0x188/0x1c0 [ 228.687595] [c000200cdb50f8d0] [c0000000001d939c] rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xdc/0x100 [ 228.687646] [c000200cdb50f900] [c0000000001dd704] rcu_note_context_switch+0x304/0x340 [ 228.687701] [c000200cdb50f940] [c0080000068fcc58] kvmhv_run_single_vcpu+0xdb0/0x1120 [kvm_hv] [ 228.687756] [c000200cdb50fa20] [c0080000068fd5b0] kvmppc_vcpu_run_hv+0x5e8/0xe40 [kvm_hv] [ 228.687816] [c000200cdb50faf0] [c0080000071797dc] kvmppc_vcpu_run+0x34/0x48 [kvm] [ 228.687863] [c000200cdb50fb10] [c0080000071755dc] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x244/0x420 [kvm] [ 228.687916] [c000200cdb50fba0] [c008000007165ccc] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x424/0x838 [kvm] [ 228.687957] [c000200cdb50fd10] [c000000000433a24] do_vfs_ioctl+0xd4/0xcd0 [ 228.687995] [c000200cdb50fdb0] [c000000000434724] ksys_ioctl+0x104/0x120 [ 228.688033] [c000200cdb50fe00] [c000000000434768] sys_ioctl+0x28/0x80 [ 228.688072] [c000200cdb50fe20] [c00000000000b888] system_call+0x5c/0x70 [ 228.688109] Instruction dump: [ 228.688142] 4bf6342d 60000000 0fe00000 e8010080 7c0803a6 4bfffe60 3c82ff87 3c62ff87 [ 228.688196] 388472d0 3863d738 4bf63405 60000000 <0fe00000> 4bffff4c 3c82ff87 3c62ff87 [ 228.688251] irq event stamp: 205 [ 228.688287] hardirqs last enabled at (205): [<c0080000068fc1b4>] kvmhv_run_single_vcpu+0x30c/0x1120 [kvm_hv] [ 228.688344] hardirqs last disabled at (204): [<c0080000068fbff0>] kvmhv_run_single_vcpu+0x148/0x1120 [kvm_hv] [ 228.688412] softirqs last enabled at (180): [<c000000000c0b2ac>] __do_softirq+0x4ac/0x5d4 [ 228.688464] softirqs last disabled at (169): [<c000000000122aa8>] irq_exit+0x1f8/0x210 [ 228.688513] ---[ end trace eb16f6260022a812 ]--- [ 228.688548] possible reason: unannotated irqs-off. [ 228.688571] irq event stamp: 205 [ 228.688607] hardirqs last enabled at (205): [<c0080000068fc1b4>] kvmhv_run_single_vcpu+0x30c/0x1120 [kvm_hv] [ 228.688664] hardirqs last disabled at (204): [<c0080000068fbff0>] kvmhv_run_single_vcpu+0x148/0x1120 [kvm_hv] [ 228.688719] softirqs last enabled at (180): [<c000000000c0b2ac>] __do_softirq+0x4ac/0x5d4 [ 228.688758] softirqs last disabled at (169): [<c000000000122aa8>] irq_exit+0x1f8/0x210 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.20+ Fixes: 95a6432c ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Streamlined guest entry/exit path on P9 for radix guests") Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org> Reviewed-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org> Tested-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
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Cédric Le Goater authored
Under XIVE, the ESB pages of an interrupt are used for interrupt management (EOI) and triggering. They are made available to guests through a mapping of the XIVE KVM device. When a device is passed-through, the passthru_irq helpers, kvmppc_xive_set_mapped() and kvmppc_xive_clr_mapped(), clear the ESB pages of the guest IRQ number being mapped and let the VM fault handler repopulate with the correct page. The ESB pages are mapped at offset 4 (KVM_XIVE_ESB_PAGE_OFFSET) in the KVM device mapping. Unfortunately, this offset was not taken into account when clearing the pages. This lead to issues with the passthrough devices for which the interrupts were not functional under some guest configuration (tg3 and single CPU) or in any configuration (e1000e adapter). Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> Tested-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> Signed-off-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
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