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  1. 29 Jul, 2014 1 commit
  3. 28 Jul, 2014 2 commits
  5. 26 Jul, 2014 2 commits
  7. 25 Jul, 2014 4 commits
  9. 24 Jul, 2014 3 commits
    • Eric Paris's avatar
      CAPABILITIES: remove undefined caps from all processes · 7d8b6c63
      Eric Paris authored 
      This is effectively a revert of 7b9a7ec5
plus fixing it a different way...

We found, when trying to run an application from an application which
had dropped privs that the kernel does security checks on undefined
capability bits.  This was ESPECIALLY difficult to debug as those
undefined bits are hidden from /proc/$PID/status.

Consider a root application which drops all capabilities from ALL 4
capability sets.  We assume, since the application is going to set
eff/perm/inh from an array that it will clear not only the defined caps
less than CAP_LAST_CAP, but also the higher 28ish bits which are
undefined future capabilities.

The BSET gets cleared differently.  Instead it is cleared one bit at a
time.  The problem here is that in security/commoncap.c::cap_task_prctl()
we actually check the validity of a capability being read.  So any task
which attempts to 'read all things set in bset' followed by 'unset all
things set in bset' will not even attempt to unset the undefined bits
higher than CAP_LAST_CAP.

So the 'parent' will look something like:
CapInh:	0000000000000000
CapPrm:	0000000000000000
CapEff:	0000000000000000
CapBnd:	ffffffc000000000

All of this 'should' be fine.  Given that these are undefined bits that
aren't supposed to have anything to do with permissions.  But they do...

So lets now consider a task which cleared the eff/perm/inh completely
and cleared all of the valid caps in the bset (but not the invalid caps
it couldn't read out of the kernel).  We know that this is exactly what
the libcap-ng library does and what the go capabilities library does.
They both leave you in that above situation if you try to clear all of
you capapabilities from all 4 sets.  If that root task calls execve()
the child task will pick up all caps not blocked by the bset.  The bset
however does not block bits higher than CAP_LAST_CAP.  So now the child
task has bits in eff which are not in the parent.  These are
'meaningless' undefined bits, but still bits which the parent doesn't
have.

The problem is now in cred_cap_issubset() (or any operation which does a
subset test) as the child, while a subset for valid cap bits, is not a
subset for invalid cap bits!  So now we set durring commit creds that
the child is not dumpable.  Given it is 'more priv' than its parent.  It
also means the parent cannot ptrace the child and other stupidity.

The solution here:
1) stop hiding capability bits in status
	This makes debugging easier!

2) stop giving any task undefined capability bits.  it's simple, it you
don't put those invalid bits in CAP_FULL_SET you won't get them in init
and you won't get them in any other task either.
	This fixes the cap_issubset() tests and resulting fallout (which
	made the init task in a docker container untraceable among other
	things)

3) mask out undefined bits when sys_capset() is called as it might use
~0, ~0 to denote 'all capabilities' for backward/forward compatibility.
	This lets 'capsh --caps="all=eip" -- -c /bin/bash' run.

4) mask out undefined bit when we read a file capability off of disk as
again likely all bits are set in the xattr for forward/backward
compatibility.
	This lets 'setcap all+pe /bin/bash; /bin/bash' run
Signed-off-by: default avatarEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Cc: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: default avatarJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
      7d8b6c63
    • James Morris's avatar
      Merge tag 'keys-next-20140722' of... · 4ca332e1
      James Morris authored 
      Merge tag 'keys-next-20140722' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs into next
      4ca332e1
    • Tetsuo Handa's avatar
      commoncap: don't alloc the credential unless needed in cap_task_prctl · 6d6f3328
      Tetsuo Handa authored 
      In function cap_task_prctl(), we would allocate a credential
unconditionally and then check if we support the requested function.
If not we would release this credential with abort_creds() by using
RCU method. But on some archs such as powerpc, the sys_prctl is heavily
used to get/set the floating point exception mode. So the unnecessary
allocating/releasing of credential not only introduce runtime overhead
but also do cause OOM due to the RCU implementation.

This patch removes abort_creds() from cap_task_prctl() by calling
prepare_creds() only when we need to modify it.
Reported-by: default avatarKevin Hao <haokexin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reviewed-by: default avatarPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: default avatarSerge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
      6d6f3328
  11. 22 Jul, 2014 16 commits
  13. 19 Jul, 2014 2 commits
  15. 18 Jul, 2014 10 commits
    • Kees Cook's avatar
      seccomp: implement SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC · c2e1f2e3
      Kees Cook authored 
      Applying restrictive seccomp filter programs to large or diverse
codebases often requires handling threads which may be started early in
the process lifetime (e.g., by code that is linked in). While it is
possible to apply permissive programs prior to process start up, it is
difficult to further restrict the kernel ABI to those threads after that
point.

This change adds a new seccomp syscall flag to SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER for
synchronizing thread group seccomp filters at filter installation time.

When calling seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC,
filter) an attempt will be made to synchronize all threads in current's
threadgroup to its new seccomp filter program. This is possible iff all
threads are using a filter that is an ancestor to the filter current is
attempting to synchronize to. NULL filters (where the task is running as
SECCOMP_MODE_NONE) are also treated as ancestors allowing threads to be
transitioned into SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER. If prctrl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS,
...) has been set on the calling thread, no_new_privs will be set for
all synchronized threads too. On success, 0 is returned. On failure,
the pid of one of the failing threads will be returned and no filters
will have been applied.

The race conditions against another thread are:
- requesting TSYNC (already handled by sighand lock)
- performing a clone (already handled by sighand lock)
- changing its filter (already handled by sighand lock)
- calling exec (handled by cred_guard_mutex)
The clone case is assisted by the fact that new threads will have their
seccomp state duplicated from their parent before appearing on the tasklist.

Holding cred_guard_mutex means that seccomp filters cannot be assigned
while in the middle of another thread's exec (potentially bypassing
no_new_privs or similar). The call to de_thread() may kill threads waiting
for the mutex.

Changes across threads to the filter pointer includes a barrier.

Based on patches by Will Drewry.
Suggested-by: default avatarJulien Tinnes <jln@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: default avatarOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      c2e1f2e3
    • Kees Cook's avatar
      seccomp: allow mode setting across threads · 3ba2530c
      Kees Cook authored 
      This changes the mode setting helper to allow threads to change the
seccomp mode from another thread. We must maintain barriers to keep
TIF_SECCOMP synchronized with the rest of the seccomp state.
Signed-off-by: default avatarKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: default avatarOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      3ba2530c
    • Kees Cook's avatar
      seccomp: introduce writer locking · dbd95212
      Kees Cook authored 
      Normally, task_struct.seccomp.filter is only ever read or modified by
the task that owns it (current). This property aids in fast access
during system call filtering as read access is lockless.

Updating the pointer from another task, however, opens up race
conditions. To allow cross-thread filter pointer updates, writes to the
seccomp fields are now protected by the sighand spinlock (which is shared
by all threads in the thread group). Read access remains lockless because
pointer updates themselves are atomic.  However, writes (or cloning)
often entail additional checking (like maximum instruction counts)
which require locking to perform safely.

In the case of cloning threads, the child is invisible to the system
until it enters the task list. To make sure a child can't be cloned from
a thread and left in a prior state, seccomp duplication is additionally
moved under the sighand lock. Then parent and child are certain have
the same seccomp state when they exit the lock.

Based on patches by Will Drewry and David Drysdale.
Signed-off-by: default avatarKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: default avatarOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      dbd95212
    • Kees Cook's avatar
      seccomp: split filter prep from check and apply · c8bee430
      Kees Cook authored 
      In preparation for adding seccomp locking, move filter creation away
from where it is checked and applied. This will allow for locking where
no memory allocation is happening. The validation, filter attachment,
and seccomp mode setting can all happen under the future locks.

For extreme defensiveness, I've added a BUG_ON check for the calculated
size of the buffer allocation in case BPF_MAXINSN ever changes, which
shouldn't ever happen. The compiler should actually optimize out this
check since the test above it makes it impossible.
Signed-off-by: default avatarKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: default avatarOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      c8bee430
    • Kees Cook's avatar
      sched: move no_new_privs into new atomic flags · 1d4457f9
      Kees Cook authored 
      Since seccomp transitions between threads requires updates to the
no_new_privs flag to be atomic, the flag must be part of an atomic flag
set. This moves the nnp flag into a separate task field, and introduces
accessors.
Signed-off-by: default avatarKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: default avatarOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      1d4457f9
    • Kees Cook's avatar
      MIPS: add seccomp syscall · 8855d608
      Kees Cook authored 
      Wires up the new seccomp syscall.
Signed-off-by: default avatarKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: default avatarOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
      8855d608
    • Kees Cook's avatar
      ARM: add seccomp syscall · 83966971
      Kees Cook authored 
      Wires up the new seccomp syscall.
Signed-off-by: default avatarKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: default avatarOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
      83966971
    • Kees Cook's avatar
      seccomp: add "seccomp" syscall · 48dc92b9
      Kees Cook authored 
      This adds the new "seccomp" syscall with both an "operation" and "flags"
parameter for future expansion. The third argument is a pointer value,
used with the SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER operation. Currently, flags must
be 0. This is functionally equivalent to prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, ...).

In addition to the TSYNC flag later in this patch series, there is a
non-zero chance that this syscall could be used for configuring a fixed
argument area for seccomp-tracer-aware processes to pass syscall arguments
in the future. Hence, the use of "seccomp" not simply "seccomp_add_filter"
for this syscall. Additionally, this syscall uses operation, flags,
and user pointer for arguments because strictly passing arguments via
a user pointer would mean seccomp itself would be unable to trivially
filter the seccomp syscall itself.
Signed-off-by: default avatarKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: default avatarOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      48dc92b9
    • Kees Cook's avatar
      seccomp: split mode setting routines · 3b23dd12
      Kees Cook authored 
      Separates the two mode setting paths to make things more readable with
fewer #ifdefs within function bodies.
Signed-off-by: default avatarKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: default avatarOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      3b23dd12
    • Kees Cook's avatar
      seccomp: extract check/assign mode helpers · 1f41b450
      Kees Cook authored 
      To support splitting mode 1 from mode 2, extract the mode checking and
assignment logic into common functions.
Signed-off-by: default avatarKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: default avatarOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      1f41b450
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