The vmcs12 fields offsets are constant and known at compile time.  Store
the associated offset for each shadowed field to avoid the costly lookup
in vmcs_field_to_offset() when copying between vmcs12 and the shadow
VMCS.  Avoiding the costly lookup reduces the latency of copying by
~100 cycles in each direction.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

VMMs frequently read the guest's CS and SS AR bytes to detect 64-bit
mode and CPL respectively, but effectively never write said fields once
the VM is initialized.  Intercepting VMWRITEs for the two fields saves
~55 cycles in copy_shadow_to_vmcs12().

Because some Intel CPUs, e.g. Haswell, drop the reserved bits of the
guest access rights fields on VMWRITE, exposing the fields to L1 for
VMREAD but not VMWRITE leads to inconsistent behavior between L1 and L2.
On hardware that drops the bits, L1 will see the stripped down value due
to reading the value from hardware, while L2 will see the full original
value as stored by KVM.  To avoid such an inconsistency, emulate the
behavior on all CPUS, but only for intercepted VMWRITEs so as to avoid
introducing pointless latency into copy_shadow_to_vmcs12(), e.g. if the
emulation were added to vmcs12_write_any().

Since the AR_BYTES emulation is done only for intercepted VMWRITE, if a
future patch (re)exposed AR_BYTES for both VMWRITE and VMREAD, then KVM
would end up with incosistent behavior on pre-Haswell hardware, e.g. KVM
would drop the reserved bits on intercepted VMWRITE, but direct VMWRITE
to the shadow VMCS would not drop the bits.  Add a WARN in the shadow
field initialization to detect any attempt to expose an AR_BYTES field
without updating vmcs12_write_any().

Note, emulation of the AR_BYTES reserved bit behavior is based on a
patch[1] from Jim Mattson that applied the emulation to all writes to
vmcs12 so that live migration across different generations of hardware
would not introduce divergent behavior.  But given that live migration
of nested state has already been enabled, that ship has sailed (not to
mention that no sane VMM will be affected by this behavior).

[1] https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10483321/

Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Allowing L1 to VMWRITE read-only fields is only beneficial in a double
nesting scenario, e.g. no sane VMM will VMWRITE VM_EXIT_REASON in normal
non-nested operation.  Intercepting RO fields means KVM doesn't need to
sync them from the shadow VMCS to vmcs12 when running L2.  The obvious
downside is that L1 will VM-Exit more often when running L3, but it's
likely safe to assume most folks would happily sacrifice a bit of L3
performance, which may not even be noticeable in the grande scheme, to
improve L2 performance across the board.

Not intercepting fields tagged read-only also allows for additional
optimizations, e.g. marking GUEST_{CS,SS}_AR_BYTES as SHADOW_FIELD_RO
since those fields are rarely written by a VMMs, but read frequently.

When utilizing a shadow VMCS with asymmetric R/W and R/O bitmaps, fields
that cause VM-Exit on VMWRITE but not VMREAD need to be propagated to
the shadow VMCS during VMWRITE emulation, otherwise a subsequence VMREAD
from L1 will consume a stale value.

Note, KVM currently utilizes asymmetric bitmaps when "VMWRITE any field"
is not exposed to L1, but only so that it can reject the VMWRITE, i.e.
propagating the VMWRITE to the shadow VMCS is a new requirement, not a
bug fix.

Eliminating the copying of RO fields reduces the latency of nested
VM-Entry (copy_shadow_to_vmcs12()) by ~100 cycles (plus 40-50 cycles
if/when the AR_BYTES fields are exposed RO).
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Per commit 1b6269db ("KVM: VMX: Handle NMIs before enabling
interrupts and preemption"), NMIs are handled directly in vmx_vcpu_run()
to "make sure we handle NMI on the current cpu, and that we don't
service maskable interrupts before non-maskable ones".  The other
exceptions handled by complete_atomic_exit(), e.g. async #PF and #MC,
have similar requirements, and are located there to avoid extra VMREADs
since VMX bins hardware exceptions and NMIs into a single exit reason.

Clean up the code and eliminate the vaguely named complete_atomic_exit()
by moving the interrupts-disabled exception and NMI handling into the
existing handle_external_intrs() callback, and rename the callback to
a more appropriate name.  Rename VMexit handlers throughout so that the
atomic and non-atomic counterparts have similar names.

In addition to improving code readability, this also ensures the NMI
handler is run with the host's debug registers loaded in the unlikely
event that the user is debugging NMIs.  Accuracy of the last_guest_tsc
field is also improved when handling NMIs (and #MCs) as the handler
will run after updating said field.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
[Naming cleanups. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

VMX can conditionally call kvm_{before,after}_interrupt() since KVM
always uses "ack interrupt on exit" and therefore explicitly handles
interrupts as opposed to blindly enabling irqs.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Although the kernel may use multiple IDTs, KVM should only ever see the
"real" IDT, e.g. the early init IDT is long gone by the time KVM runs
and the debug stack IDT is only used for small windows of time in very
specific flows.

Before commit a547c6db ("KVM: VMX: Enable acknowledge interupt on
vmexit"), the kernel's IDT base was consumed by KVM only when setting
constant VMCS state, i.e. to set VMCS.HOST_IDTR_BASE.  Because constant
host state is done once per vCPU, there was ostensibly no need to cache
the kernel's IDT base.

When support for "ack interrupt on exit" was introduced, KVM added a
second consumer of the IDT base as handling already-acked interrupts
requires directly calling the interrupt handler, i.e. KVM uses the IDT
base to find the address of the handler.  Because interrupts are a fast
path, KVM cached the IDT base to avoid having to VMREAD HOST_IDTR_BASE.
Presumably, the IDT base was cached on a per-vCPU basis simply because
the existing code grabbed the IDT base on a per-vCPU (VMCS) basis.

Note, all post-boot IDTs use the same handlers for external interrupts,
i.e. the "ack interrupt on exit" use of the IDT base would be unaffected
even if the cached IDT somehow did not match the current IDT.  And as
for the original use case of setting VMCS.HOST_IDTR_BASE, if any of the
above analysis is wrong then KVM has had a bug since the beginning of
time since KVM has effectively been caching the IDT at vCPU creation
since commit a8b732ca01c ("[PATCH] kvm: userspace interface").
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Generic x86 code invokes the kvm_x86_ops external interrupt handler on
all VM-Exits regardless of the actual exit type.  Use the already-cached
EXIT_REASON to determine if the VM-Exit was due to an interrupt, thus
avoiding an extra VMREAD (to query VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO) for all other
types of VM-Exit.

In addition to avoiding the extra VMREAD, checking the EXIT_REASON
instead of VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO makes it more obvious that
vmx_handle_external_intr() is called for all VM-Exits, e.g. someone
unfamiliar with the flow might wonder under what condition(s)
VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO does not contain a valid interrupt, which is
simply not possible since KVM always runs with "ack interrupt on exit".

WARN once if VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO doesn't contain a valid interrupt on
an EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT VM-Exit, as such a condition would indicate a
hardware bug.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

The reason for skipping handling of NMI and #MC in handle_exception is
the same, namely they are handled earlier by vmx_complete_atomic_exit.
Calling the machine check handler (which just returns 1) is misleading,
don't do it.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

A previous fix to prevent KVM from consuming stale VMCS state after a
failed VM-Entry inadvertantly blocked KVM's handling of machine checks
that occur during VM-Entry.

Per Intel's SDM, a #MC during VM-Entry is handled in one of three ways,
depending on when the #MC is recognoized.  As it pertains to this bug
fix, the third case explicitly states EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY
is handled like any other VM-Exit during VM-Entry, i.e. sets bit 31 to
indicate the VM-Entry failed.

If a machine-check event occurs during a VM entry, one of the following occurs:
 - The machine-check event is handled as if it occurred before the VM entry:
        ...
 - The machine-check event is handled after VM entry completes:
        ...
 - A VM-entry failure occurs as described in Section 26.7. The basic
   exit reason is 41, for "VM-entry failure due to machine-check event".

Explicitly handle EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY as a one-off case in
vmx_vcpu_run() instead of binning it into vmx_complete_atomic_exit().
Doing so allows vmx_vcpu_run() to handle VMX_EXIT_REASONS_FAILED_VMENTRY
in a sane fashion and also simplifies vmx_complete_atomic_exit() since
VMCS.VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO is guaranteed to be fresh.

Fixes: b060ca3b ("kvm: vmx: Handle VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME failure properly")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Make it available to AMD hosts as well, just in case someone is trying
to use an Intel processor's CPUID setup.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

In function apic_mmio_write(), the offset has been checked in:

   * apic_mmio_in_range()
   * offset & 0xf

These two ensures offset is in range [0x010, 0xff0].
Signed-off-by: Wei Yang <richardw.yang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

apic_clear_vector() is the counterpart of kvm_lapic_set_vector(),
while they have different naming convention.

Rename it and move together to arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h. Also fix one typo
in comment by hand.
Signed-off-by: Wei Yang <richardw.yang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

On delivering irq to apic, we iterate on vcpu and do the check like
this:

    kvm_apic_present(vcpu)
    kvm_lapic_enabled(vpu)
        kvm_apic_present(vcpu) && kvm_apic_sw_enabled(vcpu->arch.apic)

Since we have already checked kvm_apic_present(), it is reasonable to
replace kvm_lapic_enabled() with kvm_apic_sw_enabled().
Signed-off-by: Wei Yang <richardw.yang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Add an MSRs which allows the guest to disable
host polling (specifically the cpuidle-haltpoll,
when performing polling in the guest, disables
host side polling).
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

There is an imperfection in get_vmx_mem_address(): access length is ignored
when checking the limit. To fix this, pass access length as a function argument.
The access length is usually obvious since it is used by callers after
get_vmx_mem_address() call, but for vmread/vmwrite it depends on the
state of 64-bit mode.
Signed-off-by: Eugene Korenevsky <ekorenevsky@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Intel SDM vol. 3, 5.3:
The processor causes a
general-protection exception (or, if the segment is SS, a stack-fault
exception) any time an attempt is made to access the following addresses
in a segment:
- A byte at an offset greater than the effective limit
- A word at an offset greater than the (effective-limit – 1)
- A doubleword at an offset greater than the (effective-limit – 3)
- A quadword at an offset greater than the (effective-limit – 7)

Therefore, the generic limit checking error condition must be

exn = (off > limit + 1 - access_len) = (off + access_len - 1 > limit)

but not

exn = (off + access_len > limit)

as for now.

Also avoid integer overflow of `off` at 32-bit KVM by casting it to u64.

Note: access length is currently sizeof(u64) which is incorrect. This
will be fixed in the subsequent patch.
Signed-off-by: Eugene Korenevsky <ekorenevsky@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Add support to expose Intel V2 Extended Topology Enumeration Leaf for
some new systems with multiple software-visible die within each package.

Because unimplemented and unexposed leaves should be explicitly reported
as zero, there is no need to limit cpuid.0.eax to the maximum value of
feature configuration but limit it to the highest leaf implemented in
the current code. A single clamping seems sufficient and cheaper.
Co-developed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Make all code consistent with kvm_deliver_exception_payload() by using
appropriate symbolic constant instead of hard-coded number.
Reviewed-by: Nikita Leshenko <nikita.leshchenko@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Even when asynchronous page fault is disabled, KVM does not want to pause
the host if a guest triggers a page fault; instead it will put it into
an artificial HLT state that allows running other host processes while
allowing interrupt delivery into the guest.

However, the way this feature is triggered is a bit confusing.
First, it is not used for page faults while a nested guest is
running: but this is not an issue since the artificial halt
is completely invisible to the guest, either L1 or L2.  Second,
it is used even if kvm_halt_in_guest() returns true; in this case,
the guest probably should not pay the additional latency cost of the
artificial halt, and thus we should handle the page fault in a
completely synchronous way.

By introducing a new function kvm_can_deliver_async_pf, this patch
commonizes the code that chooses whether to deliver an async page fault
(kvm_arch_async_page_not_present) and the code that chooses whether a
page fault should be handled synchronously (kvm_can_do_async_pf).
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

It doesn't seem as if there is any particular need for kvm_lock to be a
spinlock, so convert the lock to a mutex so that sleepable functions (in
particular cond_resched()) can be called while holding it.
Signed-off-by: Junaid Shahid <junaids@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

__vmcs_writel uses volatile asm, so there is no need to insert another
one between the first and the second call to __vmcs_writel in order
to prevent unwanted code moves for 32bit targets.
Signed-off-by: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

One of the more common cases of allocation size calculations is finding
the size of a structure that has a zero-sized array at the end, along
with memory for some number of elements for that array. For example:

struct foo {
   int stuff;
   struct boo entry[];
};

instance = kzalloc(sizeof(struct foo) + count * sizeof(struct boo), GFP_KERNEL);

Instead of leaving these open-coded and prone to type mistakes, we can
now use the new struct_size() helper:

instance = kzalloc(struct_size(instance, entry, count), GFP_KERNEL);

This code was detected with the help of Coccinelle.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

While upstream gcc doesn't detect conflicts on cc (yet), it really
should, and hence "cc" should not be specified for asm()-s also having
"=@cc<cond>" outputs. (It is quite pointless anyway to specify a "cc"
clobber in x86 inline assembly, since the compiler assumes it to be
always clobbered, and has no means [yet] to suppress this behavior.)
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Fixes: bbc0b823 ("KVM: nVMX: Capture VM-Fail via CC_{SET,OUT} in nested early checks")
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

This is the same as vm_vcpu_add_default, but it also takes a
kvm_vcpu_init struct pointer.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

This allows aarch64 tests to run on more targets, such as the Arm
simulator that doesn't like KVM_ARM_TARGET_GENERIC_V8. And it also
allows aarch64 tests to provide vcpu features in struct kvm_vcpu_init.
Additionally it drops the unused memslot parameters.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

This removes the processor-dependent arguments from vm_vcpu_add.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Make sure we complete the I/O after determining we have a ucall,
which is I/O. Also allow the *uc parameter to optionally be NULL.
It's quite possible that a test case will only care about the
return value, like for example when looping on a check for
UCALL_DONE.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

MSR IA32_MISC_ENABLE bit 18, according to SDM:

| When this bit is set to 0, the MONITOR feature flag is not set (CPUID.01H:ECX[bit 3] = 0).
| This indicates that MONITOR/MWAIT are not supported.
|
| Software attempts to execute MONITOR/MWAIT will cause #UD when this bit is 0.
|
| When this bit is set to 1 (default), MONITOR/MWAIT are supported (CPUID.01H:ECX[bit 3] = 1).

The CPUID.01H:ECX[bit 3] ought to mirror the value of the MSR bit,
CPUID.01H:ECX[bit 3] is a better guard than kvm_mwait_in_guest().
kvm_mwait_in_guest() affects the behavior of MONITOR/MWAIT, not its
guest visibility.

This patch implements toggling of the CPUID bit based on guest writes
to the MSR.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
[Fixes for backwards compatibility - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Allow guest reads CORE cstate when exposing host CPU power management capabilities
to the guest. PKG cstate is restricted to avoid a guest to get the whole package
information in multi-tenant scenario.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Commit b31c114b (KVM: X86: Provide a capability to disable PAUSE intercepts)
forgot to add the KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_PAUSE into api doc. This patch adds
it.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

1. Using X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES to enumerate the existence of
MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES to avoid using rdmsrl_safe().

2. Since kvm_get_arch_capabilities() is only used in this file, making
it static.
Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Add a wrapper to invoke kvm_arch_check_processor_compat() so that the
boilerplate ugliness of checking virtualization support on all CPUs is
hidden from the arch specific code.  x86's implementation in particular
is quite heinous, as it unnecessarily propagates the out-param pattern
into kvm_x86_ops.

While the x86 specific issue could be resolved solely by changing
kvm_x86_ops, make the change for all architectures as returning a value
directly is prettier and technically more robust, e.g. s390 doesn't set
the out param, which could lead to subtle breakage in the (highly
unlikely) scenario where the out-param was not pre-initialized by the
caller.

Opportunistically annotate svm_check_processor_compat() with __init.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

AVIC doorbell is used to notify a running vCPU that interrupts
has been injected into the vCPU AVIC backing page. Current logic
checks only if a VCPU is running before sending a doorbell.
However, the doorbell is not necessary if the destination
CPU is itself.

Add logic to check currently running CPU before sending doorbell.
Signed-off-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Advance lapic timer tries to hidden the hypervisor overhead between the
host emulated timer fires and the guest awares the timer is fired. However,
it just hidden the time between apic_timer_fn/handle_preemption_timer ->
wait_lapic_expire, instead of the real position of vmentry which is
mentioned in the orignial commit d0659d94 ("KVM: x86: add option to
advance tscdeadline hrtimer expiration"). There is 700+ cpu cycles between
the end of wait_lapic_expire and before world switch on my haswell desktop.

This patch tries to narrow the last gap(wait_lapic_expire -> world switch),
it takes the real overhead time between apic_timer_fn/handle_preemption_timer
and before world switch into consideration when adaptively tuning timer
advancement. The patch can reduce 40% latency (~1600+ cycles to ~1000+ cycles
on a haswell desktop) for kvm-unit-tests/tscdeadline_latency when testing
busy waits.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

wait_lapic_expire() call was moved above guest_enter_irqoff() because of
its tracepoint, which violated the RCU extended quiescent state invoked
by guest_enter_irqoff()[1][2]. This patch simply moves the tracepoint
below guest_exit_irqoff() in vcpu_enter_guest(). Snapshot the delta before
VM-Enter, but trace it after VM-Exit. This can help us to move
wait_lapic_expire() just before vmentry in the later patch.

[1] Commit 8b89fe1f ("kvm: x86: move tracepoints outside extended quiescent state")
[2] https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/7821111/

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
[Track whether wait_lapic_expire was called, and do not invoke the tracepoint
 if not. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Extract adaptive tune timer advancement logic to a single function.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
[Rename new function. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Commit 8c5fbf1a ("KVM/nSVM: Use the new mapping API for mapping guest
memory") broke nested SVM completely: kvm_vcpu_map()'s second parameter is
GFN so vmcb_gpa needs to be converted with gpa_to_gfn(), not the other way
around.

Fixes: 8c5fbf1a ("KVM/nSVM: Use the new mapping API for mapping guest memory")
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Intel MKTME repurposes several high bits of physical address as 'keyID'
for memory encryption thus effectively reduces platform's maximum
physical address bits. Exactly how many bits are reduced is configured
by BIOS. To honor such HW behavior, the repurposed bits are reduced from
cpuinfo_x86->x86_phys_bits when MKTME is detected in CPU detection.
Similarly, AMD SME/SEV also reduces physical address bits for memory
encryption, and cpuinfo->x86_phys_bits is reduced too when SME/SEV is
detected, so for both MKTME and SME/SEV, boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits
doesn't hold physical address bits reported by CPUID anymore.

Currently KVM treats bits from boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits to 51 as
reserved bits, but it's not true anymore for MKTME, since MKTME treats
those reduced bits as 'keyID', but not reserved bits. Therefore
boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits cannot be used to calculate reserved bits
anymore, although we can still use it for AMD SME/SEV since SME/SEV
treats the reduced bits differently -- they are treated as reserved
bits, the same as other reserved bits in page table entity [1].

Fix by introducing a new 'shadow_phys_bits' variable in KVM x86 MMU code
to store the effective physical bits w/o reserved bits -- for MKTME,
it equals to physical address reported by CPUID, and for SME/SEV, it is
boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits.

Note that for the physical address bits reported to guest should remain
unchanged -- KVM should report physical address reported by CPUID to
guest, but not boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits. Because for Intel MKTME,
there's no harm if guest sets up 'keyID' bits in guest page table (since
MKTME only works at physical address level), and KVM doesn't even expose
MKTME to guest. Arguably, for AMD SME/SEV, guest is aware of SEV thus it
should adjust boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits when it detects SEV, therefore
KVM should still reports physcial address reported by CPUID to guest.
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

As a prerequisite to fix several SPTE reserved bits related calculation
errors caused by MKTME, which requires kvm_set_mmio_spte_mask() to use
local static variable defined in mmu.c.

Also move call site of kvm_set_mmio_spte_mask() from kvm_arch_init() to
kvm_mmu_module_init() so that kvm_set_mmio_spte_mask() can be static.
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Merge tag 'kvm-s390-master-5.2-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvms390/linux into kvm-master

KVM: s390: Fixes

- fix compilation for !CONFIG_PCI
- fix the output of KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPU_ID