In CMT and NPAR the PF is unknown when the GFS block processes the
packet. Therefore cannot use searcher as it has a per PF database,
and thus ARFS must be disabled.

Fixes: d51e4af5 ("qed: aRFS infrastructure support")
Signed-off-by: Manish Chopra <manishc@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Igor Russkikh <irusskikh@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Kalderon <michal.kalderon@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Bogdanov <dbogdanov@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Merge tag 'wireless-drivers-2020-09-09' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvalo/wireless-drivers

Kalle Valo says:

====================
wireless-drivers fixes for v5.9

First set of fixes for v5.9, small but important.

brcmfmac

* fix a throughput regression on bcm4329

mt76

* fix a regression with stations reconnecting on mt7616

* properly free tx skbs, it was working by accident before

mwifiex

* fix a regression with 256 bit encryption keys

wlcore

* revert AES CMAC support as it caused a regression
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Jason A. Donenfeld says:

====================
wireguard fixes for 5.9-rc5

Yesterday, Eric reported a race condition found by syzbot. This series
contains two commits, one that fixes the direct issue, and another that
addresses the more general issue, as a defense in depth.

1) The basic problem syzbot unearthed was that one particular mutation
   of handshake->entry was not protected by the handshake mutex like the
   other cases, so this patch basically just reorders a line to make
   sure the mutex is actually taken at the right point. Most of the work
   here went into making sure the race was fully understood and making a
   reproducer (which syzbot was unable to do itself, due to the rarity
   of the race).

2) Eric's initial suggestion for fixing this was taking a spinlock
   around the hash table replace function where the null ptr deref was
   happening. This doesn't address the main problem in the most precise
   possible way like (1) does, but it is a good suggestion for
   defense-in-depth, in case related issues come up in the future, and
   basically costs nothing from a performance perspective. I thought it
   aided in implementing a good general rule: all mutators of that hash
   table take the table lock. So that's part of this series as a
   companion.

Both of these contain Fixes: tags and are good candidates for stable.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Eric's suggested fix for the previous commit's mentioned race condition
was to simply take the table->lock in wg_index_hashtable_replace(). The
table->lock of the hash table is supposed to protect the bucket heads,
not the entires, but actually, since all the mutator functions are
already taking it, it makes sense to take it too for the test to
hlist_unhashed, as a defense in depth measure, so that it no longer
races with deletions, regardless of what other locks are protecting
individual entries. This is sensible from a performance perspective
because, as Eric pointed out, the case of being unhashed is already the
unlikely case, so this won't add common contention. And comparing
instructions, this basically doesn't make much of a difference other
than pushing and popping %r13, used by the new `bool ret`. More
generally, I like the idea of locking consistency across table mutator
functions, and this might let me rest slightly easier at night.
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/wireguard/20200908145911.4090480-1-edumazet@google.com/
Fixes: e7096c13 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel")
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Eric reported that syzkaller found a race of this variety:

CPU 1                                       CPU 2
-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------
wg_index_hashtable_replace(old, ...)       |
  if (hlist_unhashed(&old->index_hash))    |
                                           | wg_index_hashtable_remove(old)
                                           |   hlist_del_init_rcu(&old->index_hash)
				           |     old->index_hash.pprev = NULL
  hlist_replace_rcu(&old->index_hash, ...) |
    *old->index_hash.pprev                 |

Syzbot wasn't actually able to reproduce this more than once or create a
reproducer, because the race window between checking "hlist_unhashed" and
calling "hlist_replace_rcu" is just so small. Adding an mdelay(5) or
similar there helps make this demonstrable using this simple script:

    #!/bin/bash
    set -ex
    trap 'kill $pid1; kill $pid2; ip link del wg0; ip link del wg1' EXIT
    ip link add wg0 type wireguard
    ip link add wg1 type wireguard
    wg set wg0 private-key <(wg genkey) listen-port 9999
    wg set wg1 private-key <(wg genkey) peer $(wg show wg0 public-key) endpoint 127.0.0.1:9999 persistent-keepalive 1
    wg set wg0 peer $(wg show wg1 public-key)
    ip link set wg0 up
    yes link set wg1 up | ip -force -batch - &
    pid1=$!
    yes link set wg1 down | ip -force -batch - &
    pid2=$!
    wait

The fundumental underlying problem is that we permit calls to wg_index_
hashtable_remove(handshake.entry) without requiring the caller to take
the handshake mutex that is intended to protect members of handshake
during mutations. This is consistently the case with calls to wg_index_
hashtable_insert(handshake.entry) and wg_index_hashtable_replace(
handshake.entry), but it's missing from a pertinent callsite of wg_
index_hashtable_remove(handshake.entry). So, this patch makes sure that
mutex is taken.

The original code was a little bit funky though, in the form of:

    remove(handshake.entry)
    lock(), memzero(handshake.some_members), unlock()
    remove(handshake.entry)

The original intention of that double removal pattern outside the lock
appears to be some attempt to prevent insertions that might happen while
locks are dropped during expensive crypto operations, but actually, all
callers of wg_index_hashtable_insert(handshake.entry) take the write
lock and then explicitly check handshake.state, as they should, which
the aforementioned memzero clears, which means an insertion should
already be impossible. And regardless, the original intention was
necessarily racy, since it wasn't guaranteed that something else would
run after the unlock() instead of after the remove(). So, from a
soundness perspective, it seems positive to remove what looks like a
hack at best.

The crash from both syzbot and from the script above is as follows:

  general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
  KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
  CPU: 0 PID: 7395 Comm: kworker/0:3 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc4-syzkaller #0
  Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
  Workqueue: wg-kex-wg1 wg_packet_handshake_receive_worker
  RIP: 0010:hlist_replace_rcu include/linux/rculist.h:505 [inline]
  RIP: 0010:wg_index_hashtable_replace+0x176/0x330 drivers/net/wireguard/peerlookup.c:174
  Code: 00 fc ff df 48 89 f9 48 c1 e9 03 80 3c 01 00 0f 85 44 01 00 00 48 b9 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8b 45 10 48 89 c6 48 c1 ee 03 <80> 3c 0e 00 0f 85 06 01 00 00 48 85 d2 4c 89 28 74 47 e8 a3 4f b5
  RSP: 0018:ffffc90006a97bf8 EFLAGS: 00010246
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888050ffc4f8 RCX: dffffc0000000000
  RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88808e04e010
  RBP: ffff88808e04e000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff8880543d0000
  R10: ffffed100a87a000 R11: 000000000000016e R12: ffff8880543d0000
  R13: ffff88808e04e008 R14: ffff888050ffc508 R15: ffff888050ffc500
  FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880ae600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 00000000f5505db0 CR3: 0000000097cf7000 CR4: 00000000001526f0
  DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
  DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
  Call Trace:
  wg_noise_handshake_begin_session+0x752/0xc9a drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c:820
  wg_receive_handshake_packet drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c:183 [inline]
  wg_packet_handshake_receive_worker+0x33b/0x730 drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c:220
  process_one_work+0x94c/0x1670 kernel/workqueue.c:2269
  worker_thread+0x64c/0x1120 kernel/workqueue.c:2415
  kthread+0x3b5/0x4a0 kernel/kthread.c:292
  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:294
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/wireguard/20200908145911.4090480-1-edumazet@google.com/
Fixes: e7096c13 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel")
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

clean follow coccicheck warning:
net//hsr/hsr_netlink.c:94:8-42: WARNING avoid newline at end of message
in NL_SET_ERR_MSG_MOD
net//hsr/hsr_netlink.c:87:30-57: WARNING avoid newline at end of message
in NL_SET_ERR_MSG_MOD
net//hsr/hsr_netlink.c:79:29-53: WARNING avoid newline at end of message
in NL_SET_ERR_MSG_MOD
Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Eric Dumazet says:

====================
net: skb_put_padto() fixes

sysbot reported a bug in qrtr leading to use-after-free.

First patch fixes the issue.

Second patch addes __must_check attribute to avoid similar
issues in the future.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

skb_put_padto() and __skb_put_padto() callers
must check return values or risk use-after-free.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

If skb_put_padto() returns an error, skb has been freed.
Better not touch it anymore, as reported by syzbot [1]

Note to qrtr maintainers : this suggests qrtr_sendmsg()
should adjust sock_alloc_send_skb() second parameter
to account for the potential added alignment to avoid
reallocation.

[1]

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __skb_insert include/linux/skbuff.h:1907 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __skb_queue_before include/linux/skbuff.h:2016 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __skb_queue_tail include/linux/skbuff.h:2049 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in skb_queue_tail+0x6b/0x120 net/core/skbuff.c:3146
Write of size 8 at addr ffff88804d8ab3c0 by task syz-executor.4/4316

CPU: 1 PID: 4316 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc4-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x1d6/0x29e lib/dump_stack.c:118
 print_address_description+0x66/0x620 mm/kasan/report.c:383
 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:513 [inline]
 kasan_report+0x132/0x1d0 mm/kasan/report.c:530
 __skb_insert include/linux/skbuff.h:1907 [inline]
 __skb_queue_before include/linux/skbuff.h:2016 [inline]
 __skb_queue_tail include/linux/skbuff.h:2049 [inline]
 skb_queue_tail+0x6b/0x120 net/core/skbuff.c:3146
 qrtr_tun_send+0x1a/0x40 net/qrtr/tun.c:23
 qrtr_node_enqueue+0x44f/0xc00 net/qrtr/qrtr.c:364
 qrtr_bcast_enqueue+0xbe/0x140 net/qrtr/qrtr.c:861
 qrtr_sendmsg+0x680/0x9c0 net/qrtr/qrtr.c:960
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:651 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:671 [inline]
 sock_write_iter+0x317/0x470 net/socket.c:998
 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1882 [inline]
 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:503 [inline]
 vfs_write+0xa96/0xd10 fs/read_write.c:578
 ksys_write+0x11b/0x220 fs/read_write.c:631
 do_syscall_64+0x31/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x45d5b9
Code: 5d b4 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 2b b4 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007f84b5b81c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000038b40 RCX: 000000000045d5b9
RDX: 0000000000000055 RSI: 0000000020001240 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f84b5b81ca0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000000f
R13: 00007ffcbbf86daf R14: 00007f84b5b829c0 R15: 000000000118cf4c

Allocated by task 4316:
 kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:48 [inline]
 kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:56 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc+0x100/0x130 mm/kasan/common.c:461
 slab_post_alloc_hook+0x3e/0x290 mm/slab.h:518
 slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3312 [inline]
 kmem_cache_alloc+0x1c1/0x2d0 mm/slab.c:3482
 skb_clone+0x1b2/0x370 net/core/skbuff.c:1449
 qrtr_bcast_enqueue+0x6d/0x140 net/qrtr/qrtr.c:857
 qrtr_sendmsg+0x680/0x9c0 net/qrtr/qrtr.c:960
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:651 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:671 [inline]
 sock_write_iter+0x317/0x470 net/socket.c:998
 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1882 [inline]
 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:503 [inline]
 vfs_write+0xa96/0xd10 fs/read_write.c:578
 ksys_write+0x11b/0x220 fs/read_write.c:631
 do_syscall_64+0x31/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Freed by task 4316:
 kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:48 [inline]
 kasan_set_track+0x3d/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:56
 kasan_set_free_info+0x17/0x30 mm/kasan/generic.c:355
 __kasan_slab_free+0xdd/0x110 mm/kasan/common.c:422
 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3418 [inline]
 kmem_cache_free+0x82/0xf0 mm/slab.c:3693
 __skb_pad+0x3f5/0x5a0 net/core/skbuff.c:1823
 __skb_put_padto include/linux/skbuff.h:3233 [inline]
 skb_put_padto include/linux/skbuff.h:3252 [inline]
 qrtr_node_enqueue+0x62f/0xc00 net/qrtr/qrtr.c:360
 qrtr_bcast_enqueue+0xbe/0x140 net/qrtr/qrtr.c:861
 qrtr_sendmsg+0x680/0x9c0 net/qrtr/qrtr.c:960
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:651 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:671 [inline]
 sock_write_iter+0x317/0x470 net/socket.c:998
 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1882 [inline]
 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:503 [inline]
 vfs_write+0xa96/0xd10 fs/read_write.c:578
 ksys_write+0x11b/0x220 fs/read_write.c:631
 do_syscall_64+0x31/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88804d8ab3c0
 which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 224
The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
 224-byte region [ffff88804d8ab3c0, ffff88804d8ab4a0)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:00000000ea8cccfb refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff88804d8abb40 pfn:0x4d8ab
flags: 0xfffe0000000200(slab)
raw: 00fffe0000000200 ffffea0002237ec8 ffffea00029b3388 ffff88821bb66800
raw: ffff88804d8abb40 ffff88804d8ab000 000000010000000b 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Fixes: ce57785b ("net: qrtr: fix len of skb_put_padto in qrtr_node_enqueue")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Carl Huang <cjhuang@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org>
Cc: Manivannan Sadhasivam <manivannan.sadhasivam@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Manivannan Sadhasivam <manivannan.sadhasivam@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Currently, in tcp_v4_reqsk_send_ack() and tcp_v4_send_reset(), we
echo the TOS value of the received packets in the response.
However, we do not want to echo the lower 2 ECN bits in accordance
with RFC 3168 6.1.5 robustness principles.

Fixes: 1da177e4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Merge tag 'ieee802154-for-davem-2020-09-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sschmidt/wpan

Stefan Schmidt says:

====================
pull-request: ieee802154 for net 2020-09-08

An update from ieee802154 for your *net* tree.

A potential memory leak fix for ca8210 from Liu Jian,
a check on the return for a register read in adf7242
and finally a user after free fix in the softmac tx
function from Eric found by syzkaller.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

John's email has bounced and Thomas confirms he no longer
works on ibmvnic.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

If CONFIG_IPV6=m, the IPV6 functions won't be found by the linker:

ld: net/core/fib_rules.o: in function `fib_rules_lookup':
fib_rules.c:(.text+0x606): undefined reference to `fib6_rule_match'
ld: fib_rules.c:(.text+0x611): undefined reference to `fib6_rule_match'
ld: fib_rules.c:(.text+0x68c): undefined reference to `fib6_rule_action'
ld: fib_rules.c:(.text+0x693): undefined reference to `fib6_rule_action'
ld: fib_rules.c:(.text+0x6aa): undefined reference to `fib6_rule_suppress'
ld: fib_rules.c:(.text+0x6bc): undefined reference to `fib6_rule_suppress'
make: *** [Makefile:1166: vmlinux] Error 1
Reported-by: Sven Joachim <svenjoac@gmx.de>
Fixes: b9aaec8f ("fib: use indirect call wrappers in the most common fib_rules_ops")
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> # build-tested
Signed-off-by: Brian Vazquez <brianvv@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Pablo Neira Ayuso says:

===================
Netfilter fixes for net

The following patchset contains Netfilter fixes for net:

1) Allow conntrack entries with l3num == NFPROTO_IPV4 or == NFPROTO_IPV6
   only via ctnetlink, from Will McVicker.

2) Batch notifications to userspace to improve netlink socket receive
   utilization.

3) Restore mark based dump filtering via ctnetlink, from Martin Willi.

4) nf_conncount_init() fails with -EPROTO with CONFIG_IPV6, from
   Eelco Chaudron.

5) Containers fail to match on meta skuid and skgid, use socket user_ns
   to retrieve meta skuid and skgid.
===================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

syzbot reported twice a lockdep issue in fib6_del() [1]
which I think is caused by net->ipv6.fib6_null_entry
having a NULL fib6_table pointer.

fib6_del() already checks for fib6_null_entry special
case, we only need to return earlier.

Bug seems to occur very rarely, I have thus chosen
a 'bug origin' that makes backports not too complex.

[1]
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
5.9.0-rc4-syzkaller #0 Not tainted
-----------------------------
net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1996 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage!

other info that might help us debug this:

rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
4 locks held by syz-executor.5/8095:
 #0: ffffffff8a7ea708 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ppp_release+0x178/0x240 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:401
 #1: ffff88804c422dd8 (&net->ipv6.fib6_gc_lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_trylock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:414 [inline]
 #1: ffff88804c422dd8 (&net->ipv6.fib6_gc_lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: fib6_run_gc+0x21b/0x2d0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2312
 #2: ffffffff89bd6a40 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __fib6_clean_all+0x0/0x290 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2613
 #3: ffff8880a82e6430 (&tb->tb6_lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:359 [inline]
 #3: ffff8880a82e6430 (&tb->tb6_lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: __fib6_clean_all+0x107/0x290 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2245

stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 8095 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc4-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x198/0x1fd lib/dump_stack.c:118
 fib6_del+0x12b4/0x1630 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1996
 fib6_clean_node+0x39b/0x570 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2180
 fib6_walk_continue+0x4aa/0x8e0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2102
 fib6_walk+0x182/0x370 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2150
 fib6_clean_tree+0xdb/0x120 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2230
 __fib6_clean_all+0x120/0x290 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2246
 fib6_clean_all net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2257 [inline]
 fib6_run_gc+0x113/0x2d0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2320
 ndisc_netdev_event+0x217/0x350 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:1805
 notifier_call_chain+0xb5/0x200 kernel/notifier.c:83
 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0xb5/0x130 net/core/dev.c:2033
 call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2045 [inline]
 call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2059 [inline]
 dev_close_many+0x30b/0x650 net/core/dev.c:1634
 rollback_registered_many+0x3a8/0x1210 net/core/dev.c:9261
 rollback_registered net/core/dev.c:9329 [inline]
 unregister_netdevice_queue+0x2dd/0x570 net/core/dev.c:10410
 unregister_netdevice include/linux/netdevice.h:2774 [inline]
 ppp_release+0x216/0x240 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:403
 __fput+0x285/0x920 fs/file_table.c:281
 task_work_run+0xdd/0x190 kernel/task_work.c:141
 tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:188 [inline]
 exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:163 [inline]
 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1e1/0x200 kernel/entry/common.c:190
 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x7e/0x2e0 kernel/entry/common.c:265
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Fixes: 421842ed ("net/ipv6: Add fib6_null_entry")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Since commit 845e0ebb ("net: change addr_list_lock back to static
key"), cascaded DSA setups (DSA switch port as DSA master for another
DSA switch port) are emitting this lockdep warning:

============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
5.8.0-rc1-00133-g923e4b5032dd-dirty #208 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
dhcpcd/323 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff000066dd4268 (&dsa_master_addr_list_lock_key/1){+...}-{2:2}, at: dev_mc_sync+0x44/0x90

but task is already holding lock:
ffff00006608c268 (&dsa_master_addr_list_lock_key/1){+...}-{2:2}, at: dev_mc_sync+0x44/0x90

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(&dsa_master_addr_list_lock_key/1);
  lock(&dsa_master_addr_list_lock_key/1);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

 May be due to missing lock nesting notation

3 locks held by dhcpcd/323:
 #0: ffffdbd1381dda18 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rtnl_lock+0x24/0x30
 #1: ffff00006614b268 (_xmit_ETHER){+...}-{2:2}, at: dev_set_rx_mode+0x28/0x48
 #2: ffff00006608c268 (&dsa_master_addr_list_lock_key/1){+...}-{2:2}, at: dev_mc_sync+0x44/0x90

stack backtrace:
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1e0
 show_stack+0x20/0x30
 dump_stack+0xec/0x158
 __lock_acquire+0xca0/0x2398
 lock_acquire+0xe8/0x440
 _raw_spin_lock_nested+0x64/0x90
 dev_mc_sync+0x44/0x90
 dsa_slave_set_rx_mode+0x34/0x50
 __dev_set_rx_mode+0x60/0xa0
 dev_mc_sync+0x84/0x90
 dsa_slave_set_rx_mode+0x34/0x50
 __dev_set_rx_mode+0x60/0xa0
 dev_set_rx_mode+0x30/0x48
 __dev_open+0x10c/0x180
 __dev_change_flags+0x170/0x1c8
 dev_change_flags+0x2c/0x70
 devinet_ioctl+0x774/0x878
 inet_ioctl+0x348/0x3b0
 sock_do_ioctl+0x50/0x310
 sock_ioctl+0x1f8/0x580
 ksys_ioctl+0xb0/0xf0
 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x28/0x38
 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x7c/0x180
 do_el0_svc+0x2c/0x98
 el0_sync_handler+0x9c/0x1b8
 el0_sync+0x158/0x180

Since DSA never made use of the netdev API for describing links between
upper devices and lower devices, the dev->lower_level value of a DSA
switch interface would be 1, which would warn when it is a DSA master.

We can use netdev_upper_dev_link() to describe the relationship between
a DSA slave and a DSA master. To be precise, a DSA "slave" (switch port)
is an "upper" to a DSA "master" (host port). The relationship is "many
uppers to one lower", like in the case of VLAN. So, for that reason, we
use the same function as VLAN uses.

There might be a chance that somebody will try to take hold of this
interface and use it immediately after register_netdev() and before
netdev_upper_dev_link(). To avoid that, we do the registration and
linkage while holding the RTNL, and we use the RTNL-locked cousin of
register_netdev(), which is register_netdevice().

Since this warning was not there when lockdep was using dynamic keys for
addr_list_lock, we are blaming the lockdep patch itself. The network
stack _has_ been using static lockdep keys before, and it _is_ likely
that stacked DSA setups have been triggering these lockdep warnings
since forever, however I can't test very old kernels on this particular
stacked DSA setup, to ensure I'm not in fact introducing regressions.

Fixes: 845e0ebb ("net: change addr_list_lock back to static key")
Suggested-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <olteanv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

syzbot reported a bug in ieee802154_tx() [1]

A similar issue in ieee802154_xmit_worker() is also fixed in this patch.

[1]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ieee802154_tx+0x3d2/0x480 net/mac802154/tx.c:88
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880251a8c70 by task syz-executor.3/928

CPU: 0 PID: 928 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc3-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x198/0x1fd lib/dump_stack.c:118
 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xae/0x497 mm/kasan/report.c:383
 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:513 [inline]
 kasan_report.cold+0x1f/0x37 mm/kasan/report.c:530
 ieee802154_tx+0x3d2/0x480 net/mac802154/tx.c:88
 ieee802154_subif_start_xmit+0xbe/0xe4 net/mac802154/tx.c:130
 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4634 [inline]
 netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4648 [inline]
 dev_direct_xmit+0x4e9/0x6e0 net/core/dev.c:4203
 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2989 [inline]
 packet_sendmsg+0x2413/0x5290 net/packet/af_packet.c:3014
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:651 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:671
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2353
 ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2407
 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2440
 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x45d5b9
Code: 5d b4 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 2b b4 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007fc98e749c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000002ccc0 RCX: 000000000045d5b9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020007780 RDI: 000000000000000b
RBP: 000000000118d020 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000118cfec
R13: 00007fff690c720f R14: 00007fc98e74a9c0 R15: 000000000118cfec

Allocated by task 928:
 kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:48
 kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:56 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xbf/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:461
 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:518 [inline]
 slab_alloc_node mm/slab.c:3254 [inline]
 kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x136/0x3e0 mm/slab.c:3574
 __alloc_skb+0x71/0x550 net/core/skbuff.c:198
 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1094 [inline]
 alloc_skb_with_frags+0x92/0x570 net/core/skbuff.c:5771
 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x72a/0x880 net/core/sock.c:2348
 packet_alloc_skb net/packet/af_packet.c:2837 [inline]
 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2932 [inline]
 packet_sendmsg+0x19fb/0x5290 net/packet/af_packet.c:3014
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:651 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:671
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2353
 ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2407
 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2440
 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Freed by task 928:
 kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:48
 kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:56
 kasan_set_free_info+0x1b/0x30 mm/kasan/generic.c:355
 __kasan_slab_free+0xd8/0x120 mm/kasan/common.c:422
 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3418 [inline]
 kmem_cache_free.part.0+0x74/0x1e0 mm/slab.c:3693
 kfree_skbmem+0xef/0x1b0 net/core/skbuff.c:622
 __kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:679 [inline]
 consume_skb net/core/skbuff.c:838 [inline]
 consume_skb+0xcf/0x160 net/core/skbuff.c:832
 __dev_kfree_skb_any+0x9c/0xc0 net/core/dev.c:3107
 fakelb_hw_xmit+0x20e/0x2a0 drivers/net/ieee802154/fakelb.c:81
 drv_xmit_async net/mac802154/driver-ops.h:16 [inline]
 ieee802154_tx+0x282/0x480 net/mac802154/tx.c:81
 ieee802154_subif_start_xmit+0xbe/0xe4 net/mac802154/tx.c:130
 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4634 [inline]
 netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4648 [inline]
 dev_direct_xmit+0x4e9/0x6e0 net/core/dev.c:4203
 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2989 [inline]
 packet_sendmsg+0x2413/0x5290 net/packet/af_packet.c:3014
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:651 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:671
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2353
 ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2407
 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2440
 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880251a8c00
 which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 224
The buggy address is located 112 bytes inside of
 224-byte region [ffff8880251a8c00, ffff8880251a8ce0)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:0000000062b6a4f1 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x251a8
flags: 0xfffe0000000200(slab)
raw: 00fffe0000000200 ffffea0000435c88 ffffea00028b6c08 ffff8880a9055d00
raw: 0000000000000000 ffff8880251a80c0 000000010000000c 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff8880251a8b00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ffff8880251a8b80: fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff8880251a8c00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                                                             ^
 ffff8880251a8c80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
 ffff8880251a8d00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb

Fixes: 409c3b0c ("mac802154: tx: move stats tx increment")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Alexander Aring <alex.aring@gmail.com>
Cc: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@datenfreihafen.org>
Cc: linux-wpan@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200908104025.4009085-1-edumazet@google.comSigned-off-by: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@datenfreihafen.org>

... instead of using init_user_ns.

Fixes: 96518518 ("netfilter: add nftables")
Tested-by: Phil Sutter <phil@nwl.cc>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>

The openvswitch module fails initialization when used in a kernel
without IPv6 enabled. nf_conncount_init() fails because the ct code
unconditionally tries to initialize the netns IPv6 related bit,
regardless of the build option. The change below ignores the IPv6
part if not enabled.

Note that the corresponding _put() function already has this IPv6
configuration check.

Fixes: 11efd5cb ("openvswitch: Support conntrack zone limit")
Signed-off-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>

conntrack mark based dump filtering may falsely skip entries if a mask
is given: If the mask-based check does not filter out the entry, the
else-if check is always true and compares the mark without considering
the mask. The if/else-if logic seems wrong.

Given that the mask during filter setup is implicitly set to 0xffffffff
if not specified explicitly, the mark filtering flags seem to just
complicate things. Restore the previously used approach by always
matching against a zero mask is no filter mark is given.

Fixes: cb8aa9a3 ("netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump")
Signed-off-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>

On x86_64, each notification results in one skbuff allocation which
consumes at least 768 bytes due to the skbuff overhead.

This patch coalesces several notifications into one single skbuff, so
each notification consumes at least ~211 bytes, that ~3.5 times less
memory consumption. As a result, this is reducing the chances to exhaust
the netlink socket receive buffer.

Rule of thumb is that each notification batch only contains netlink
messages whose report flag is the same, nfnetlink_send() requires this
to do appropriate delivery to userspace, either via unicast (echo
mode) or multicast (monitor mode).

The skbuff control buffer is used to annotate the report flag for later
handling at the new coalescing routine.

The batch skbuff notification size is NLMSG_GOODSIZE, using a larger
skbuff would allow for more socket receiver buffer savings (to amortize
the cost of the skbuff even more), however, going over that size might
break userspace applications, so let's be conservative and stick to
NLMSG_GOODSIZE.
Reported-by: Phil Sutter <phil@nwl.cc>
Acked-by: Phil Sutter <phil@nwl.cc>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>

The indexes to the nf_nat_l[34]protos arrays come from userspace. So
check the tuple's family, e.g. l3num, when creating the conntrack in
order to prevent an OOB memory access during setup.  Here is an example
kernel panic on 4.14.180 when userspace passes in an index greater than
NFPROTO_NUMPROTO.

Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:...
Process poc (pid: 5614, stack limit = 0x00000000a3933121)
CPU: 4 PID: 5614 Comm: poc Tainted: G S      W  O    4.14.180-g051355490483
Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. SM8150 V2 PM8150 Google Inc. MSM
task: 000000002a3dfffe task.stack: 00000000a3933121
pc : __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24
lr : __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24
...
Call trace:
__cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24
name_to_dev_t+0x0/0x468
nfnetlink_parse_nat_setup+0x234/0x258
ctnetlink_parse_nat_setup+0x4c/0x228
ctnetlink_new_conntrack+0x590/0xc40
nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x31c/0x4d4
netlink_rcv_skb+0x100/0x184
nfnetlink_rcv+0xf4/0x180
netlink_unicast+0x360/0x770
netlink_sendmsg+0x5a0/0x6a4
___sys_sendmsg+0x314/0x46c
SyS_sendmsg+0xb4/0x108
el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38

This crash is not happening since 5.4+, however, ctnetlink still
allows for creating entries with unsupported layer 3 protocol number.

Fixes: c1d10adb ("[NETFILTER]: Add ctnetlink port for nf_conntrack")
Signed-off-by: Will McVicker <willmcvicker@google.com>
[pablo@netfilter.org: rebased original patch on top of nf.git]
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>

mlx5_suspend()/resume() keep the network interface, so during hibernation
netvsc_unregister_vf() and netvsc_register_vf() are not called, and hence
netvsc_resume() should call netvsc_vf_changed() to switch the data path
back to the VF after hibernation. Note: after we close and re-open the
vmbus channel of the netvsc NIC in netvsc_suspend() and netvsc_resume(),
the data path is implicitly switched to the netvsc NIC. Similarly,
netvsc_suspend() should not call netvsc_unregister_vf(), otherwise the VF
can no longer be used after hibernation.

For mlx4, since the VF network interafce is explicitly destroyed and
re-created during hibernation (see mlx4_suspend()/resume()), hv_netvsc
already explicitly switches the data path from and to the VF automatically
via netvsc_register_vf() and netvsc_unregister_vf(), so mlx4 doesn't need
this fix. Note: mlx4 can still work with the fix because in
netvsc_suspend()/resume() ndev_ctx->vf_netdev is NULL for mlx4.

Fixes: 0efeea5f ("hv_netvsc: Add the support of hibernation")
Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

This reverts commit 8d7e5dee.

To protect netns id, the nsid_lock is used when netns id is being
allocated and removed by peernet2id_alloc() and unhash_nsid().
The nsid_lock can be used in BH context but only spin_lock() is used
in this code.
Using spin_lock() instead of spin_lock_bh() can result in a deadlock in
the following scenario reported by the lockdep.
In order to avoid a deadlock, the spin_lock_bh() should be used instead
of spin_lock() to acquire nsid_lock.

Test commands:
    ip netns del nst
    ip netns add nst
    ip link add veth1 type veth peer name veth2
    ip link set veth1 netns nst
    ip netns exec nst ip link add name br1 type bridge vlan_filtering 1
    ip netns exec nst ip link set dev br1 up
    ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 master br1
    ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 up
    ip netns exec nst ip link add macvlan0 link br1 up type macvlan

Splat looks like:
[   33.615860][  T607] WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected
[   33.617194][  T607] 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 Not tainted
[ ... ]
[   33.670615][  T607] Chain exists of:
[   33.670615][  T607]   &mc->mca_lock --> &bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key --> &net->nsid_lock
[   33.670615][  T607]
[   33.673118][  T607]  Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:
[   33.673118][  T607]
[   33.674599][  T607]        CPU0                    CPU1
[   33.675557][  T607]        ----                    ----
[   33.676516][  T607]   lock(&net->nsid_lock);
[   33.677306][  T607]                                local_irq_disable();
[   33.678517][  T607]                                lock(&mc->mca_lock);
[   33.679725][  T607]                                lock(&bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key);
[   33.681166][  T607]   <Interrupt>
[   33.681791][  T607]     lock(&mc->mca_lock);
[   33.682579][  T607]
[   33.682579][  T607]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[ ... ]
[   33.922046][  T607] stack backtrace:
[   33.922999][  T607] CPU: 3 PID: 607 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.9.0-rc1+ #665
[   33.924099][  T607] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[   33.925714][  T607] Call Trace:
[   33.926238][  T607]  dump_stack+0x78/0xab
[   33.926905][  T607]  check_irq_usage+0x70b/0x720
[   33.927708][  T607]  ? iterate_chain_key+0x60/0x60
[   33.928507][  T607]  ? check_path+0x22/0x40
[   33.929201][  T607]  ? check_noncircular+0xcf/0x180
[   33.930024][  T607]  ? __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20
[   33.930860][  T607]  __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20
[   33.931667][  T607]  lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0
[   33.932366][  T607]  ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170
[   33.933147][  T607]  ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x54c/0x6b0 [bridge]
[   33.934140][  T607]  ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x5de/0x6b0 [bridge]
[   33.935113][  T607]  ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x30
[   33.935974][  T607]  _raw_spin_lock+0x30/0x70
[   33.936728][  T607]  ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170
[   33.937523][  T607]  peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170
[   33.938313][  T607]  rtnl_fill_ifinfo+0xb5e/0x1400
[   33.939091][  T607]  rtmsg_ifinfo_build_skb+0x8a/0xf0
[   33.939953][  T607]  rtmsg_ifinfo_event.part.39+0x17/0x50
[   33.940863][  T607]  rtmsg_ifinfo+0x1f/0x30
[   33.941571][  T607]  __dev_notify_flags+0xa5/0xf0
[   33.942376][  T607]  ? __irq_work_queue_local+0x49/0x50
[   33.943249][  T607]  ? irq_work_queue+0x1d/0x30
[   33.943993][  T607]  ? __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0
[   33.944878][  T607]  __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0
[   33.945758][  T607]  dev_set_promiscuity+0x1e/0x50
[   33.946582][  T607]  br_port_set_promisc+0x1f/0x40 [bridge]
[   33.947487][  T607]  br_manage_promisc+0x8b/0xe0 [bridge]
[   33.948388][  T607]  __dev_set_promiscuity+0x123/0x1a0
[   33.949244][  T607]  __dev_set_rx_mode+0x68/0x90
[   33.950021][  T607]  dev_uc_add+0x50/0x60
[   33.950720][  T607]  macvlan_open+0x18e/0x1f0 [macvlan]
[   33.951601][  T607]  __dev_open+0xd6/0x170
[   33.952269][  T607]  __dev_change_flags+0x181/0x1d0
[   33.953056][  T607]  rtnl_configure_link+0x2f/0xa0
[   33.953884][  T607]  __rtnl_newlink+0x6b9/0x8e0
[   33.954665][  T607]  ? __lock_acquire+0x95d/0x1f20
[   33.955450][  T607]  ? lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0
[   33.956193][  T607]  ? is_bpf_text_address+0x5/0xe0
[   33.956999][  T607]  rtnl_newlink+0x47/0x70
Acked-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com>
Fixes: 8d7e5dee ("netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"")
Reported-by: syzbot+3f960c64a104eaa2c813@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

Indentation and logic clearly show that this code is missing
parenthesis.

Fixes: 9f134573 ("ibmvnic fix NULL tx_pools and rx_tools issue at do_reset")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

Fix kernel-doc warning in <linux/netdevice.h>:

../include/linux/netdevice.h:2158: warning: Function parameter or member 'xdp_state' not described in 'net_device'

Fixes: 7f0a8382 ("bpf, xdp: Maintain info on attached XDP BPF programs in net_device")
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

Fix kernel-doc warning in <linux/netdevice.h>:

../include/linux/netdevice.h:2158: warning: Function parameter or member 'proto_down_reason' not described in 'net_device'

Fixes: 829eb208 ("rtnetlink: add support for protodown reason")
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Roopa Prabhu <roopa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

Michael Chan says:

====================
bnxt_en: Two bug fixes.

The first patch fixes AER recovery by reducing the time from several
minutes to a more reasonable 20 - 30 seconds.  The second patch fixes
a possible NULL pointer crash during firmware reset.
====================
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

bnxt_fw_reset_task() which runs from a workqueue can race with
bnxt_remove_one().  For example, if firmware reset and VF FLR are
happening at about the same time.

bnxt_remove_one() already cancels the workqueue and waits for it
to finish, but we need to do this earlier before the devlink
reporters are destroyed.  This will guarantee that
the devlink reporters will always be valid when bnxt_fw_reset_task()
is still running.

Fixes: b148bb23 ("bnxt_en: Fix possible crash in bnxt_fw_reset_task().")
Reviewed-by: Edwin Peer <edwin.peer@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasundhara Volam <vasundhara-v.volam@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

When the driver goes through PCIe AER reset in error state, all
firmware messages will timeout because the PCIe bus is no longer
accessible.  This can lead to AER reset taking many minutes to
complete as each firmware command takes time to timeout.

Define a new macro BNXT_NO_FW_ACCESS() to skip these firmware messages
when either firmware is in fatal error state or when
pci_channel_offline() is true.  It now takes a more reasonable 20 to
30 seconds to complete AER recovery.

Fixes: b4fff207 ("bnxt_en: Do not send firmware messages if firmware is in error state.")
Signed-off-by: Vasundhara Volam <vasundhara-v.volam@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

This patch causes a regression betwen Kernel 5.7 and 5.8 at wlcore:
with it applied, WiFi stops working, and the Kernel starts printing
this message every second:

   wlcore: PHY firmware version: Rev 8.2.0.0.242
   wlcore: firmware booted (Rev 8.9.0.0.79)
   wlcore: ERROR command execute failure 14
   ------------[ cut here ]------------
   WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 133 at drivers/net/wireless/ti/wlcore/main.c:795 wl12xx_queue_recovery_work.part.0+0x6c/0x74 [wlcore]
   Modules linked in: wl18xx wlcore mac80211 libarc4 cfg80211 rfkill snd_soc_hdmi_codec crct10dif_ce wlcore_sdio adv7511 cec kirin9xx_drm(C) kirin9xx_dw_drm_dsi(C) drm_kms_helper drm ip_tables x_tables ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6
   CPU: 0 PID: 133 Comm: kworker/0:1 Tainted: G        WC        5.8.0+ #186
   Hardware name: HiKey970 (DT)
   Workqueue: events_freezable ieee80211_restart_work [mac80211]
   pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO BTYPE=--)
   pc : wl12xx_queue_recovery_work.part.0+0x6c/0x74 [wlcore]
   lr : wl12xx_queue_recovery_work+0x24/0x30 [wlcore]
   sp : ffff8000126c3a60
   x29: ffff8000126c3a60 x28: 00000000000025de
   x27: 0000000000000010 x26: 0000000000000005
   x25: ffff0001a5d49e80 x24: ffff8000092cf580
   x23: ffff0001b7c12623 x22: ffff0001b6fcf2e8
   x21: ffff0001b7e46200 x20: 00000000fffffffb
   x19: ffff0001a78e6400 x18: 0000000000000030
   x17: 0000000000000001 x16: 0000000000000001
   x15: ffff0001b7e46670 x14: ffffffffffffffff
   x13: ffff8000926c37d7 x12: ffff8000126c37e0
   x11: ffff800011e01000 x10: ffff8000120526d0
   x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 3431206572756c69
   x7 : 6166206574756365 x6 : 0000000000000c2c
   x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : ffff0001bf1361e8
   x3 : ffff0001bf1790b0 x2 : 0000000000000000
   x1 : ffff0001a5d49e80 x0 : 0000000000000001
   Call trace:
    wl12xx_queue_recovery_work.part.0+0x6c/0x74 [wlcore]
    wl12xx_queue_recovery_work+0x24/0x30 [wlcore]
    wl1271_cmd_set_sta_key+0x258/0x25c [wlcore]
    wl1271_set_key+0x7c/0x2dc [wlcore]
    wlcore_set_key+0xe4/0x360 [wlcore]
    wl18xx_set_key+0x48/0x1d0 [wl18xx]
    wlcore_op_set_key+0xa4/0x180 [wlcore]
    ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel+0xb0/0x2d0 [mac80211]
    ieee80211_reenable_keys+0x70/0x110 [mac80211]
    ieee80211_reconfig+0xa00/0xca0 [mac80211]
    ieee80211_restart_work+0xc4/0xfc [mac80211]
    process_one_work+0x1cc/0x350
    worker_thread+0x13c/0x470
    kthread+0x154/0x160
    ret_from_fork+0x10/0x30
   ---[ end trace b1f722abf9af5919 ]---
   wlcore: WARNING could not set keys
   wlcore: ERROR Could not add or replace key
   wlan0: failed to set key (4, ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff) to hardware (-5)
   wlcore: Hardware recovery in progress. FW ver: Rev 8.9.0.0.79
   wlcore: pc: 0x0, hint_sts: 0x00000040 count: 39
   wlcore: down
   wlcore: down
   ieee80211 phy0: Hardware restart was requested
   mmc_host mmc0: Bus speed (slot 0) = 400000Hz (slot req 400000Hz, actual 400000HZ div = 0)
   mmc_host mmc0: Bus speed (slot 0) = 25000000Hz (slot req 25000000Hz, actual 25000000HZ div = 0)
   wlcore: PHY firmware version: Rev 8.2.0.0.242
   wlcore: firmware booted (Rev 8.9.0.0.79)
   wlcore: ERROR command execute failure 14
   ------------[ cut here ]------------

Tested on Hikey 970.

This reverts commit 2b7aadd3.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/f0a2cb7ea606f1a284d4c23cbf983da2954ce9b6.1598420968.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.org

When removing a port from a VLAN we are just erasing the
member config for the VLAN, which is wrong: other ports
can be using it.

Just mask off the port and only zero out the rest of the
member config once ports using of the VLAN are removed
from it.
Reported-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Fixes: d8652956 ("net: dsa: realtek-smi: Add Realtek SMI driver")
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

PAE bit of NCFGR register, when set, pauses transmission
if a non-zero 802.3 classic pause frame is received.

Fixes: 7897b071 ("net: macb: convert to phylink")
Signed-off-by: Parshuram Thombare <pthombar@cadence.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

Pass the correct offset to clear the stale filter hit
bytes counter. Otherwise, the counter starts incrementing
from the stale information, instead of 0.

Fixes: 12b276fb ("cxgb4: add support to create hash filters")
Signed-off-by: Ganji Aravind <ganji.aravind@chelsio.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

Luo bin says:

====================
hinic: BugFixes

The bugs fixed in this patchset have been present since the following
commits:
patch #1: Fixes: 00e57a6d ("net-next/hinic: Add Tx operation")
patch #2: Fixes: 5e126e7c ("hinic: add firmware update support")
====================
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

Firmware erases the entire flash region which may take several
seconds before flashing, so we bump up the timeout to ensure this
cmd won't return failure.

Fixes: 5e126e7c ("hinic: add firmware update support")
Signed-off-by: Luo bin <luobin9@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

We free memory regardless of the return value of SET_FUNC_STATE
cmd in hinic_close function to avoid memory leak and this cmd may
timeout when fw is busy with handling other cmds, so we bump up the
timeout of this cmd to ensure it won't return failure.

Fixes: 00e57a6d ("net-next/hinic: Add Tx operation")
Signed-off-by: Luo bin <luobin9@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

The following deadlock scenario is triggered by syzbot:

Thread A:				Thread B:
tcf_idr_check_alloc()
...
populate_metalist()
  rtnl_unlock()
					rtnl_lock()
					...
  request_module()			tcf_idr_check_alloc()
  rtnl_lock()

At this point, thread A is waiting for thread B to release RTNL
lock, while thread B is waiting for thread A to commit the IDR
change with tcf_idr_insert() later.

Break this deadlock situation by preloading ife modules earlier,
before tcf_idr_check_alloc(), this is fine because we only need
to load modules we need potentially.

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+80e32b5d1f9923f8ace6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 0190c1d4 ("net: sched: atomically check-allocate action")
Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@mellanox.com>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

eni_init_one() misses to call pci_disable_device() in an error path.
Jump to err_disable to fix it.

Fixes: ede58ef2 ("atm: remove deprecated use of pci api")
Signed-off-by: Jing Xiangfeng <jingxiangfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

PVC devices are virtual devices in this driver stacked on top of the
actual HDLC device. They are the devices normal users would use.
PVC devices have two types: normal PVC devices and Ethernet-emulating
PVC devices.

When transmitting data with PVC devices, the ndo_start_xmit function
will prepend a header of 4 or 10 bytes. Currently this driver requests
this headroom to be reserved for normal PVC devices by setting their
hard_header_len to 10. However, this does not work when these devices
are used with AF_PACKET/RAW sockets. Also, this driver does not request
this headroom for Ethernet-emulating PVC devices (but deals with this
problem by reallocating the skb when needed, which is not optimal).

This patch replaces hard_header_len with needed_headroom, and set
needed_headroom for Ethernet-emulating PVC devices, too. This makes
the driver to request headroom for all PVC devices in all cases.

Cc: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
Cc: Martin Schiller <ms@dev.tdt.de>
Signed-off-by: Xie He <xie.he.0141@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>