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  1. 13 Jul, 2018 5 commits
  3. 09 Jul, 2018 1 commit
  5. 04 Jul, 2018 10 commits
  7. 02 Jul, 2018 2 commits
    • Thomas Gleixner's avatar
      cpu/hotplug: Boot HT siblings at least once · 0cc3cd21
      Thomas Gleixner authored 
      Due to the way Machine Check Exceptions work on X86 hyperthreads it's
required to boot up _all_ logical cores at least once in order to set the
CR4.MCE bit.

So instead of ignoring the sibling threads right away, let them boot up
once so they can configure themselves. After they came out of the initial
boot stage check whether its a "secondary" sibling and cancel the operation
which puts the CPU back into offline state.
Reported-by: default avatarDave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: default avatarTony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
      0cc3cd21
    • Thomas Gleixner's avatar
      Revert "x86/apic: Ignore secondary threads if nosmt=force" · 506a66f3
      Thomas Gleixner authored 
      Dave Hansen reported, that it's outright dangerous to keep SMT siblings
disabled completely so they are stuck in the BIOS and wait for SIPI.

The reason is that Machine Check Exceptions are broadcasted to siblings and
the soft disabled sibling has CR4.MCE = 0. If a MCE is delivered to a
logical core with CR4.MCE = 0, it asserts IERR#, which shuts down or
reboots the machine. The MCE chapter in the SDM contains the following
blurb:

    Because the logical processors within a physical package are tightly
    coupled with respect to shared hardware resources, both logical
    processors are notified of machine check errors that occur within a
    given physical processor. If machine-check exceptions are enabled when
    a fatal error is reported, all the logical processors within a physical
    package are dispatched to the machine-check exception handler. If
    machine-check exceptions are disabled, the logical processors enter the
    shutdown state and assert the IERR# signal. When enabling machine-check
    exceptions, the MCE flag in control register CR4 should be set for each
    logical processor.

Reverting the commit which ignores siblings at enumeration time solves only
half of the problem. The core cpuhotplug logic needs to be adjusted as
well.

This thoughtful engineered mechanism also turns the boot process on all
Intel HT enabled systems into a MCE lottery. MCE is enabled on the boot CPU
before the secondary CPUs are brought up. Depending on the number of
physical cores the window in which this situation can happen is smaller or
larger. On a HSW-EX it's about 750ms:

MCE is enabled on the boot CPU:

[    0.244017] mce: CPU supports 22 MCE banks

The corresponding sibling #72 boots:

[    1.008005] .... node  #0, CPUs:    #72

That means if an MCE hits on physical core 0 (logical CPUs 0 and 72)
between these two points the machine is going to shutdown. At least it's a
known safe state.

It's obvious that the early boot can be hit by an MCE as well and then runs
into the same situation because MCEs are not yet enabled on the boot CPU.
But after enabling them on the boot CPU, it does not make any sense to
prevent the kernel from recovering.

Adjust the nosmt kernel parameter documentation as well.

Reverts: 2207def7 ("x86/apic: Ignore secondary threads if nosmt=force")
Reported-by: default avatarDave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: default avatarTony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
      506a66f3
  9. 29 Jun, 2018 1 commit
  11. 27 Jun, 2018 1 commit
    • Vlastimil Babka's avatar
      x86/speculation/l1tf: Protect PAE swap entries against L1TF · 0d0f6249
      Vlastimil Babka authored 
      The PAE 3-level paging code currently doesn't mitigate L1TF by flipping the
offset bits, and uses the high PTE word, thus bits 32-36 for type, 37-63 for
offset. The lower word is zeroed, thus systems with less than 4GB memory are
safe. With 4GB to 128GB the swap type selects the memory locations vulnerable
to L1TF; with even more memory, also the swap offfset influences the address.
This might be a problem with 32bit PAE guests running on large 64bit hosts.

By continuing to keep the whole swap entry in either high or low 32bit word of
PTE we would limit the swap size too much. Thus this patch uses the whole PAE
PTE with the same layout as the 64bit version does. The macros just become a
bit tricky since they assume the arch-dependent swp_entry_t to be 32bit.
Signed-off-by: default avatarVlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: default avatarMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
      0d0f6249
  13. 22 Jun, 2018 1 commit
  15. 21 Jun, 2018 17 commits
  17. 20 Jun, 2018 2 commits
    • Andi Kleen's avatar
      x86/speculation/l1tf: Limit swap file size to MAX_PA/2 · 377eeaa8
      Andi Kleen authored 
      For the L1TF workaround its necessary to limit the swap file size to below
MAX_PA/2, so that the higher bits of the swap offset inverted never point
to valid memory.

Add a mechanism for the architecture to override the swap file size check
in swapfile.c and add a x86 specific max swapfile check function that
enforces that limit.

The check is only enabled if the CPU is vulnerable to L1TF.

In VMs with 42bit MAX_PA the typical limit is 2TB now, on a native system
with 46bit PA it is 32TB. The limit is only per individual swap file, so
it's always possible to exceed these limits with multiple swap files or
partitions.
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: default avatarJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: default avatarMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: default avatarDave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      377eeaa8
    • Andi Kleen's avatar
      x86/speculation/l1tf: Disallow non privileged high MMIO PROT_NONE mappings · 42e4089c
      Andi Kleen authored 
      For L1TF PROT_NONE mappings are protected by inverting the PFN in the page
table entry. This sets the high bits in the CPU's address space, thus
making sure to point to not point an unmapped entry to valid cached memory.

Some server system BIOSes put the MMIO mappings high up in the physical
address space. If such an high mapping was mapped to unprivileged users
they could attack low memory by setting such a mapping to PROT_NONE. This
could happen through a special device driver which is not access
protected. Normal /dev/mem is of course access protected.

To avoid this forbid PROT_NONE mappings or mprotect for high MMIO mappings.

Valid page mappings are allowed because the system is then unsafe anyways.

It's not expected that users commonly use PROT_NONE on MMIO. But to
minimize any impact this is only enforced if the mapping actually refers to
a high MMIO address (defined as the MAX_PA-1 bit being set), and also skip
the check for root.

For mmaps this is straight forward and can be handled in vm_insert_pfn and
in remap_pfn_range().

For mprotect it's a bit trickier. At the point where the actual PTEs are
accessed a lot of state has been changed and it would be difficult to undo
on an error. Since this is a uncommon case use a separate early page talk
walk pass for MMIO PROT_NONE mappings that checks for this condition
early. For non MMIO and non PROT_NONE there are no changes.
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: default avatarJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: default avatarDave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      42e4089c
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