- 03 Feb, 2009 3 commits
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Rajiv Andrade authored
This patch adds internal kernel support for: - reading/extending a pcr value - looking up the tpm_chip for a given chip number Signed-off-by:
Rajiv Andrade <srajiv@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Rajiv Andrade authored
According to Dave Hansen's comments on the tpm_show_*, some of these functions present a pattern when allocating data[] memory space and also when setting its content. A new function was created so that this pattern could be consolidated. Also, replaced the data[] command vectors and its indexes by meaningful structures as pointed out by Matt Helsley too. Signed-off-by:
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Serge E. Hallyn authored
If there is an error creating a file through securityfs_create_file, NULL is not returned, rather the error is propagated. Signed-off-by:
Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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- 01 Feb, 2009 1 commit
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James Morris authored
Remove SELinux hooks which do nothing except defer to the capabilites hooks (or in one case, replicates the function). Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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- 29 Jan, 2009 18 commits
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James Morris authored
Remove secondary ops call to shm_shmat, which is a noop in capabilities. Acked-by:
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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James Morris authored
Remove secondary ops call to unix_stream_connect, which is a noop in capabilities. Acked-by:
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James Morris authored
Remove secondary ops call to task_kill, which is a noop in capabilities. Acked-by:
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James Morris authored
Remove secondary ops call to task_setrlimit, which is a noop in capabilities. Acked-by:
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James Morris authored
Remove unused cred_commit hook from SELinux. This currently calls into the capabilities hook, which is a noop. Acked-by:
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James Morris authored
Remove secondary ops call to task_create, which is a noop in capabilities. Acked-by:
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James Morris authored
Remove secondary ops call to file_mprotect, which is a noop in capabilities. Acked-by:
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James Morris authored
Remove secondary ops call to inode_setattr, which is a noop in capabilities. Acked-by:
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James Morris authored
Remove secondary ops call to inode_permission, which is a noop in capabilities. Acked-by:
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James Morris authored
Remove secondary ops call to inode_follow_link, which is a noop in capabilities. Acked-by:
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James Morris authored
Remove secondary ops call to inode_mknod, which is a noop in capabilities. Acked-by:
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James Morris authored
Remove secondary ops call to inode_unlink, which is a noop in capabilities. Acked-by:
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James Morris authored
Remove secondary ops call to inode_link, which is a noop in capabilities. Acked-by:
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James Morris authored
Remove secondary ops call to sb_umount, which is a noop in capabilities. Acked-by:
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James Morris authored
Remove secondary ops call to sb_mount, which is a noop in capabilities. Acked-by:
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James Morris authored
Remove secondary ops call to bprm_committed_creds, which is a noop in capabilities. Acked-by:
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James Morris authored
Remove secondary ops call to bprm_committing_creds, which is a noop in capabilities. Acked-by:
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James Morris authored
Remove unused bprm_check_security hook from SELinux. This currently calls into the capabilities hook, which is a noop. Acked-by:
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- 18 Jan, 2009 3 commits
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David P. Quigley authored
Context mounts and genfs labeled file systems behave differently with respect to setting file system labels. This patch brings genfs labeled file systems in line with context mounts in that setxattr calls to them should return EOPNOTSUPP and fscreate calls will be ignored. Signed-off-by:
David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by:
James Morris <jmorris@macbook.localdomain>
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David P. Quigley authored
There is no easy way to tell if a file system supports SELinux security labeling. Because of this a new flag is being added to the super block security structure to indicate that the particular super block supports labeling. This flag is set for file systems using the xattr, task, and transition labeling methods unless that behavior is overridden by context mounts. Signed-off-by:
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David P. Quigley authored
The super block security structure currently has three fields for what are essentially flags. The flags field is used for mount options while two other char fields are used for initialization and proc flags. These latter two fields are essentially bit fields since the only used values are 0 and 1. These fields have been collapsed into the flags field and new bit masks have been added for them. The code is also fixed to work with these new flags. Signed-off-by:
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- 07 Jan, 2009 1 commit
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James Morris authored
Add url to the security subsystem wiki. Signed-off-by:
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- 06 Jan, 2009 2 commits
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David Howells authored
Fix a regression in cap_capable() due to: commit 3b11a1de Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Date: Fri Nov 14 10:39:26 2008 +1100 CRED: Differentiate objective and effective subjective credentials on a task The problem is that the above patch allows a process to have two sets of credentials, and for the most part uses the subjective credentials when accessing current's creds. There is, however, one exception: cap_capable(), and thus capable(), uses the real/objective credentials of the target task, whether or not it is the current task. Ordinarily this doesn't matter, since usually the two cred pointers in current point to the same set of creds. However, sys_faccessat() makes use of this facility to override the credentials of the calling process to make its test, without affecting the creds as seen from other processes. One of the things sys_faccessat() does is to make an adjustment to the effective capabilities mask, which cap_capable(), as it stands, then ignores. The affected capability check is in generic_permission(): if (!(mask & MAY_EXEC) || execute_ok(inode)) if (capable(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE)) return 0; This change passes the set of credentials to be tested down into the commoncap and SELinux code. The security functions called by capable() and has_capability() select the appropriate set of credentials from the process being checked. This can be tested by compiling the following program from the XFS testsuite: /* * t_access_root.c - trivial test program to show permission bug. * * Written by Michael Kerrisk - copyright ownership not pursued. * Sourced from: http://linux.derkeiler.com/Mailing-Lists/Kernel/2003-10/6030.html */ #include <limits.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #define UID 500 #define GID 100 #define PERM 0 #define TESTPATH "/tmp/t_access" static void errExit(char *msg) { perror(msg); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } /* errExit */ static void accessTest(char *file, int mask, char *mstr) { printf("access(%s, %s) returns %d\n", file, mstr, access(file, mask)); } /* accessTest */ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int fd, perm, uid, gid; char *testpath; char cmd[PATH_MAX + 20]; testpath = (argc > 1) ? argv[1] : TESTPATH; perm = (argc > 2) ? strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 8) : PERM; uid = (argc > 3) ? atoi(argv[3]) : UID; gid = (argc > 4) ? atoi(argv[4]) : GID; unlink(testpath); fd = open(testpath, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0); if (fd == -1) errExit("open"); if (fchown(fd, uid, gid) == -1) errExit("fchown"); if (fchmod(fd, perm) == -1) errExit("fchmod"); close(fd); snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "ls -l %s", testpath); system(cmd); if (seteuid(uid) == -1) errExit("seteuid"); accessTest(testpath, 0, "0"); accessTest(testpath, R_OK, "R_OK"); accessTest(testpath, W_OK, "W_OK"); accessTest(testpath, X_OK, "X_OK"); accessTest(testpath, R_OK | W_OK, "R_OK | W_OK"); accessTest(testpath, R_OK | X_OK, "R_OK | X_OK"); accessTest(testpath, W_OK | X_OK, "W_OK | X_OK"); accessTest(testpath, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK, "R_OK | W_OK | X_OK"); exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); } /* main */ This can be run against an Ext3 filesystem as well as against an XFS filesystem. If successful, it will show: [root@andromeda src]# ./t_access_root /tmp/xxx 0 4043 4043 ---------- 1 dhowells dhowells 0 2008-12-31 03:00 /tmp/xxx access(/tmp/xxx, 0) returns 0 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK) returns 0 access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK) returns 0 access(/tmp/xxx, X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK) returns 0 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK | X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) returns -1 If unsuccessful, it will show: [root@andromeda src]# ./t_access_root /tmp/xxx 0 4043 4043 ---------- 1 dhowells dhowells 0 2008-12-31 02:56 /tmp/xxx access(/tmp/xxx, 0) returns 0 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK | X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) returns -1 I've also tested the fix with the SELinux and syscalls LTP testsuites. Signed-off-by:
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by:
J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu> Acked-by:
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James Morris authored
This reverts commit 14eaddc9. David has a better version to come.
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- 05 Jan, 2009 2 commits
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Eric Paris authored
I started playing with pahole today and decided to put it against the selinux structures. Found we could save a little bit of space on x86_64 (and no harm on i686) just reorganizing some structs. Object size changes: av_inherit: 24 -> 16 selinux_class_perm: 48 -> 40 context: 80 -> 72 Admittedly there aren't many of av_inherit or selinux_class_perm's in the kernel (33 and 1 respectively) But the change to the size of struct context reverberate out a bit. I can get some hard number if they are needed, but I don't see why they would be. We do change which cacheline context->len and context->str would be on, but I don't see that as a problem since we are clearly going to have to load both if the context is to be of any value. I've run with the patch and don't seem to be having any problems. An example of what's going on using struct av_inherit would be: form: to: struct av_inherit { struct av_inherit { u16 tclass; const char **common_pts; const char **common_pts; u32 common_base; u32 common_base; u16 tclass; }; (notice all I did was move u16 tclass to the end of the struct instead of the beginning) Memory layout before the change: struct av_inherit { u16 tclass; /* 2 */ /* 6 bytes hole */ const char** common_pts; /* 8 */ u32 common_base; /* 4 */ /* 4 byes padding */ /* size: 24, cachelines: 1 */ /* sum members: 14, holes: 1, sum holes: 6 */ /* padding: 4 */ }; Memory layout after the change: struct av_inherit { const char ** common_pts; /* 8 */ u32 common_base; /* 4 */ u16 tclass; /* 2 */ /* 2 bytes padding */ /* size: 16, cachelines: 1 */ /* sum members: 14, holes: 0, sum holes: 0 */ /* padding: 2 */ }; Signed-off-by: -
David Howells authored
Fix a regression in cap_capable() due to: commit 5ff7711e635b32f0a1e558227d030c7e45b4a465 Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Date: Wed Dec 31 02:52:28 2008 +0000 CRED: Differentiate objective and effective subjective credentials on a task The problem is that the above patch allows a process to have two sets of credentials, and for the most part uses the subjective credentials when accessing current's creds. There is, however, one exception: cap_capable(), and thus capable(), uses the real/objective credentials of the target task, whether or not it is the current task. Ordinarily this doesn't matter, since usually the two cred pointers in current point to the same set of creds. However, sys_faccessat() makes use of this facility to override the credentials of the calling process to make its test, without affecting the creds as seen from other processes. One of the things sys_faccessat() does is to make an adjustment to the effective capabilities mask, which cap_capable(), as it stands, then ignores. The affected capability check is in generic_permission(): if (!(mask & MAY_EXEC) || execute_ok(inode)) if (capable(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE)) return 0; This change splits capable() from has_capability() down into the commoncap and SELinux code. The capable() security op now only deals with the current process, and uses the current process's subjective creds. A new security op - task_capable() - is introduced that can check any task's objective creds. strictly the capable() security op is superfluous with the presence of the task_capable() op, however it should be faster to call the capable() op since two fewer arguments need be passed down through the various layers. This can be tested by compiling the following program from the XFS testsuite: /* * t_access_root.c - trivial test program to show permission bug. * * Written by Michael Kerrisk - copyright ownership not pursued. * Sourced from: http://linux.derkeiler.com/Mailing-Lists/Kernel/2003-10/6030.html */ #include <limits.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #define UID 500 #define GID 100 #define PERM 0 #define TESTPATH "/tmp/t_access" static void errExit(char *msg) { perror(msg); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } /* errExit */ static void accessTest(char *file, int mask, char *mstr) { printf("access(%s, %s) returns %d\n", file, mstr, access(file, mask)); } /* accessTest */ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int fd, perm, uid, gid; char *testpath; char cmd[PATH_MAX + 20]; testpath = (argc > 1) ? argv[1] : TESTPATH; perm = (argc > 2) ? strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 8) : PERM; uid = (argc > 3) ? atoi(argv[3]) : UID; gid = (argc > 4) ? atoi(argv[4]) : GID; unlink(testpath); fd = open(testpath, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0); if (fd == -1) errExit("open"); if (fchown(fd, uid, gid) == -1) errExit("fchown"); if (fchmod(fd, perm) == -1) errExit("fchmod"); close(fd); snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "ls -l %s", testpath); system(cmd); if (seteuid(uid) == -1) errExit("seteuid"); accessTest(testpath, 0, "0"); accessTest(testpath, R_OK, "R_OK"); accessTest(testpath, W_OK, "W_OK"); accessTest(testpath, X_OK, "X_OK"); accessTest(testpath, R_OK | W_OK, "R_OK | W_OK"); accessTest(testpath, R_OK | X_OK, "R_OK | X_OK"); accessTest(testpath, W_OK | X_OK, "W_OK | X_OK"); accessTest(testpath, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK, "R_OK | W_OK | X_OK"); exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); } /* main */ This can be run against an Ext3 filesystem as well as against an XFS filesystem. If successful, it will show: [root@andromeda src]# ./t_access_root /tmp/xxx 0 4043 4043 ---------- 1 dhowells dhowells 0 2008-12-31 03:00 /tmp/xxx access(/tmp/xxx, 0) returns 0 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK) returns 0 access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK) returns 0 access(/tmp/xxx, X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK) returns 0 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK | X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) returns -1 If unsuccessful, it will show: [root@andromeda src]# ./t_access_root /tmp/xxx 0 4043 4043 ---------- 1 dhowells dhowells 0 2008-12-31 02:56 /tmp/xxx access(/tmp/xxx, 0) returns 0 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK | X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) returns -1 I've also tested the fix with the SELinux and syscalls LTP testsuites. Signed-off-by:
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- 04 Jan, 2009 1 commit
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- 31 Dec, 2008 9 commits
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James Morris authored
Fix the following sparse warning: CC security/keys/key.o security/keys/keyctl.c:1297:10: warning: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces) security/keys/keyctl.c:1297:10: expected char [noderef] <asn:1>*buffer security/keys/keyctl.c:1297:10: got char *<noident> which appears to be caused by lack of __user annotation to the cast of a syscall argument. Signed-off-by: -
Casey Schaufler authored
Add support for unlabeled network hosts and networks. Relies heavily on Paul Moore's netlabel support. Creates a new entry in /smack called netlabel. Writes to /smack/netlabel take the form: A.B.C.D LABEL or A.B.C.D/N LABEL where A.B.C.D is a network address, N is an integer between 0-32, and LABEL is the Smack label to be used. If /N is omitted /32 is assumed. N designates the netmask for the address. Entries are matched by the most specific address/mask pair. 0.0.0.0/0 will match everything, while 192.168.1.117/32 will match exactly one host. A new system label "@", pronounced "web", is defined. Processes can not be assigned the web label. An address assigned the web label can be written to by any process, and packets coming from a web address can be written to any socket. Use of the web label is a violation of any strict MAC policy, but the web label has been requested many times. The nltype entry has been removed from /smack. It did not work right and the netlabel interface can be used to specify that all hosts be treated as unlabeled. CIPSO labels on incoming packets will be honored, even from designated single label hosts. Single label hosts can only be written to by processes with labels that can write to the label of the host. Packets sent to single label hosts will always be unlabeled. Once added a single label designation cannot be removed, however the label may be changed. The behavior of the ambient label remains unchanged. Signed-off-by:Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by:
Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
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Paul Moore authored
This patch is the first step towards removing the old "compat_net" code from the kernel. Secmark, the "compat_net" replacement was first introduced in 2.6.18 (September 2006) and the major Linux distributions with SELinux support have transitioned to Secmark so it is time to start deprecating the "compat_net" mechanism. Testing a patched version of 2.6.28-rc6 with the initial release of Fedora Core 5 did not show any problems when running in enforcing mode. This patch adds an entry to the feature-removal-schedule.txt file and removes the SECURITY_SELINUX_ENABLE_SECMARK_DEFAULT configuration option, forcing Secmark on by default although it can still be disabled at runtime. The patch also makes the Secmark permission checks "dynamic" in the sense that they are only executed when Secmark is configured; this should help prevent problems with older distributions that have not yet migrated to Secmark. Signed-off-by:
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Paul Moore authored
Update the NetLabel kernel API to expose the new features added in kernel releases 2.6.25 and 2.6.28: the static/fallback label functionality and network address based selectors. Signed-off-by: -
git://oss.sgi.com/xfs/xfsLinus Torvalds authored
* 'for-linus' of git://oss.sgi.com/xfs/xfs: (184 commits) [XFS] Fix race in xfs_write() between direct and buffered I/O with DMAPI [XFS] handle unaligned data in xfs_bmbt_disk_get_all [XFS] avoid memory allocations in xfs_fs_vcmn_err [XFS] Fix speculative allocation beyond eof [XFS] Remove XFS_BUF_SHUT() and friends [XFS] Use the incore inode size in xfs_file_readdir() [XFS] set b_error from bio error in xfs_buf_bio_end_io [XFS] use inode_change_ok for setattr permission checking [XFS] add a FMODE flag to make XFS invisible I/O less hacky [XFS] resync headers with libxfs [XFS] simplify projid check in xfs_rename [XFS] replace b_fspriv with b_mount [XFS] Remove unused tracing code [XFS] Remove unnecessary assertion [XFS] Remove unused variable in ktrace_free() [XFS] Check return value of xfs_buf_get_noaddr() [XFS] Fix hang after disallowed rename across directory quota domains [XFS] Fix compile with CONFIG_COMPAT enabled move inode tracing out of xfs_vnode. move vn_iowait / vn_iowake into xfs_aops.c ...
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git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/trondmy/nfs-2.6Linus Torvalds authored
* git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/trondmy/nfs-2.6: (70 commits) fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c: make nfs4_map_errors() static rpc: add service field to new upcall rpc: add target field to new upcall nfsd: support callbacks with gss flavors rpc: allow gss callbacks to client rpc: pass target name down to rpc level on callbacks nfsd: pass client principal name in rsc downcall rpc: implement new upcall rpc: store pointer to pipe inode in gss upcall message rpc: use count of pipe openers to wait for first open rpc: track number of users of the gss upcall pipe rpc: call release_pipe only on last close rpc: add an rpc_pipe_open method rpc: minor gss_alloc_msg cleanup rpc: factor out warning code from gss_pipe_destroy_msg rpc: remove unnecessary assignment NFS: remove unused status from encode routines NFS: increment number of operations in each encode routine NFS: fix comment placement in nfs4xdr.c NFS: fix tabs in nfs4xdr.c ...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/roland/infinibandLinus Torvalds authored
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/roland/infiniband: IB/mlx4: Fix reading SL field out of cqe->sl_vid RDMA/addr: Fix build breakage when IPv6 is disabled
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/scsi-misc-2.6Linus Torvalds authored
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/scsi-misc-2.6: (104 commits) [SCSI] fcoe: fix configuration problems [SCSI] cxgb3i: fix select/depend problem [SCSI] fcoe: fix incorrect use of struct module [SCSI] cxgb3i: remove use of skb->sp [SCSI] cxgb3i: Add cxgb3i iSCSI driver. [SCSI] zfcp: Remove unnecessary warning message [SCSI] zfcp: Add support for unchained FSF requests [SCSI] zfcp: Remove busid macro [SCSI] zfcp: remove DID_DID flag [SCSI] zfcp: Simplify mask lookups for incoming RSCNs [SCSI] zfcp: Remove initial device data from zfcp_data [SCSI] zfcp: fix compile warning [SCSI] zfcp: Remove adapter list [SCSI] zfcp: Simplify SBAL allocation to fix sparse warnings [SCSI] zfcp: register with SCSI layer on ccw registration [SCSI] zfcp: Fix message line break [SCSI] qla2xxx: changes in multiq code [SCSI] eata: fix the data buffer accessors conversion regression [SCSI] ibmvfc: Improve async event handling [SCSI] lpfc : correct printk types on PPC compiles ...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mchehab/linux-2.6Linus Torvalds authored
* 'for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mchehab/linux-2.6: (583 commits) V4L/DVB (10130): use USB API functions rather than constants V4L/DVB (10129): dvb: remove deprecated use of RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED in frontends V4L/DVB (10128): modify V4L documentation to be a valid XHTML V4L/DVB (10127): stv06xx: Avoid having y unitialized V4L/DVB (10125): em28xx: Don't do AC97 vendor detection for i2s audio devices V4L/DVB (10124): em28xx: expand output formats available V4L/DVB (10123): em28xx: fix reversed definitions of I2S audio modes V4L/DVB (10122): em28xx: don't load em28xx-alsa for em2870 based devices V4L/DVB (10121): em28xx: remove worthless Pinnacle PCTV HD Mini 80e device profile V4L/DVB (10120): em28xx: remove redundant Pinnacle Dazzle DVC 100 profile V4L/DVB (10119): em28xx: fix corrupted XCLK value V4L/DVB (10118): zoran: fix warning for a variable not used V4L/DVB (10116): af9013: Fix gcc false warnings V4L/DVB (10111a): usbvideo.h: remove an useless blank line V4L/DVB (10111): quickcam_messenger.c: fix a warning V4L/DVB (10110): v4l2-ioctl: Fix warnings when using .unlocked_ioctl = __video_ioctl2 V4L/DVB (10109): anysee: Fix usage of an unitialized function V4L/DVB (10104): uvcvideo: Add support for video output devices V4L/DVB (10102): uvcvideo: Ignore interrupt endpoint for built-in iSight webcams. V4L/DVB (10101): uvcvideo: Fix bulk URB processing when the header is erroneous ...
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