- 29 Apr, 2008 40 commits
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Denis V. Lunev authored
Use proc_create_data() to make sure that ->proc_fops and ->data be setup before gluing PDE to main tree. Signed-off-by:
Denis V. Lunev <den@openvz.org> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Nadia Derbey <Nadia.Derbey@bull.net> Cc: Pierre Peiffer <peifferp@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Denis V. Lunev authored
Use proc_create()/proc_create_data() to make sure that ->proc_fops and ->data be setup before gluing PDE to main tree. Signed-off-by:
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Denis V. Lunev authored
Use proc_create()/proc_create_data() to make sure that ->proc_fops and ->data be setup before gluing PDE to main tree. /proc entry owner is also added. Signed-off-by:
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Denis V. Lunev authored
Use proc_create()/proc_create_data() to make sure that ->proc_fops and ->data be setup before gluing PDE to main tree. Signed-off-by:
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Denis V. Lunev authored
Use proc_create()/proc_create_data() to make sure that ->proc_fops and ->data be setup before gluing PDE to main tree. Signed-off-by:
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by:
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Denis V. Lunev authored
Use proc_create() to make sure that ->proc_fops be setup before gluing PDE to main tree. Signed-off-by:
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Denis V. Lunev authored
Use proc_create() to make sure that ->proc_fops be setup before gluing PDE to main tree. Signed-off-by:
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Denis V. Lunev authored
This set of patches fixes an proc ->open'less usage due to ->proc_fops flip in the most part of the kernel code. The original OOPS is described in the commit 2d3a4e36: Typical PDE creation code looks like: pde = create_proc_entry("foo", 0, NULL); if (pde) pde->proc_fops = &foo_proc_fops; Notice that PDE is first created, only then ->proc_fops is set up to final value. This is a problem because right after creation a) PDE is fully visible in /proc , and b) ->proc_fops are proc_file_operations which do not have ->open callback. So, it's possible to ->read without ->open (see one class of oopses below). The fix is new API called proc_create() which makes sure ->proc_fops are set up before gluing PDE to main tree. Typical new code looks like: pde = proc_create("foo", 0, NULL, &foo_proc_fops); if (!pde) return -ENOMEM; Fix most networking users for a start. In the long run, create_proc_entry() for regular files will go. In addition to this, proc_create_data is introduced to fix reading from proc without PDE->data. The race is basically the same as above. create_proc_entries is replaced in the entire kernel code as new method is also simply better. This patch: The problem is the same as for de->proc_fops. Right now PDE becomes visible without data set. So, the entry could be looked up without data. This, in most cases, will simply OOPS. proc_create_data call is created to address this issue. proc_create now becomes a wrapper around it. Signed-off-by:
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Alexey Dobriyan authored
Note: THIS_MODULE and header addition aren't technically needed because this code is not modular, but let's keep it anyway because people can copy this code into modular code. Signed-off-by:Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
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Alexey Dobriyan authored
Now that last dozen or so users of ->get_info were removed, ditch it too. Everyone sane shouldd have switched to seq_file interface long ago. P.S.: Co-existing 3 interfaces (->get_info/->read_proc/->proc_fops) for proc is long-standing crap, BTW, thus a) put ->read_proc/->write_proc/read_proc_entry() users on death row, b) new such users should be rejected, c) everyone is encouraged to convert his favourite ->read_proc user or I'll do it, lazy bastards. Signed-off-by:Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@sw.ru> Signed-off-by:
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Alexey Dobriyan authored
Note 1: 0644 should be used, but root bypasses permissions, so writing to /proc/scsi/device_info still works. Note 2: looks like scsi_dev_info_list is unprotected Note 3: probably make proc whine about "unwriteable but with ->write hook" entries. Probably. Signed-off-by:
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Alexey Dobriyan authored
/******************************************/ /* Remove useless comment, while I am it. */ /******************************************/ Signed-off-by:
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Alexey Dobriyan authored
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Alexey Dobriyan authored
Probably interface misuse, because of the way iterating over hashbin is done. However! Printing of socket number ("IrNET socket %d - ", i++") made conversion to proper ->start/->next difficult enough to do blindly without hardware. Said that, please apply. Remove useless comment while I am it. Signed-off-by: -
Alexey Dobriyan authored
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Alexey Dobriyan authored
Signed-off-by:
Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Yani Ioannou <yani.ioannou@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by:
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Alexey Dobriyan authored
Entry creation was commented for a long time and right now it stands on the way of ->get_info removal, so unless nobody objects... Signed-off-by:
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Alexey Dobriyan authored
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Alexey Dobriyan authored
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Alexey Dobriyan authored
Remove proc_root export. Creation and removal works well if parent PDE is supplied as NULL -- it worked always that way. So, one useless export removed and consistency added, some drivers created PDEs with &proc_root as parent but removed them as NULL and so on. Signed-off-by:
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Alexey Dobriyan authored
Use creation by full path: "driver/foo". Signed-off-by:
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Alexey Dobriyan authored
Use creation by full path instead: "fs/foo". Signed-off-by:
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Alexey Dobriyan authored
Remove proc_bus export and variable itself. Using pathnames works fine and is slightly more understandable and greppable. Signed-off-by:
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Alexey Dobriyan authored
proc-misc code is noticeably full of "if (de)" checks when PDE passed is always valid. Remove them. Addition of such check in proc_lookup_de() is for failed lookup case. Signed-off-by:
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Alexey Dobriyan authored
If valid "parent" is passed to proc_create/remove_proc_entry(), then name of PDE should consist of only one path component, otherwise creation or or removal will fail. However, if NULL is passed as parent then create/remove accept full path as a argument. This is arbitrary restriction -- all infrastructure is in place. So, patch allows the following to succeed: create_proc_entry("foo/bar", 0, pde_baz); remove_proc_entry("baz/foo/bar", &proc_root); Also makes the following to behave identically: create_proc_entry("foo/bar", 0, NULL); create_proc_entry("foo/bar", 0, &proc_root); Discrepancy noticed by Den Lunev (IIRC). Signed-off-by: -
Alexey Dobriyan authored
proc_subdir_lock protects only modifying and walking through PDE lists, so after we've found PDE to remove and actually removed it from lists, there is no need to hold proc_subdir_lock for the rest of operation. Signed-off-by:
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Roland McGrath authored
This cleans up the permission checks done for /proc/PID/mem i/o calls. It puts all the logic in a new function, check_mem_permission(). The old code repeated the (!MAY_PTRACE(task) || !ptrace_may_attach(task)) magical expression multiple times. The new function does all that work in one place, with clear comments. The old code called security_ptrace() twice on successful checks, once in MAY_PTRACE() and once in __ptrace_may_attach(). Now it's only called once, and only if all other checks have succeeded. Signed-off-by:
Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Signed-off-by:
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Alexey Dobriyan authored
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Matt Helsley authored
The kernel implements readlink of /proc/pid/exe by getting the file from the first executable VMA. Then the path to the file is reconstructed and reported as the result. Because of the VMA walk the code is slightly different on nommu systems. This patch avoids separate /proc/pid/exe code on nommu systems. Instead of walking the VMAs to find the first executable file-backed VMA we store a reference to the exec'd file in the mm_struct. That reference would prevent the filesystem holding the executable file from being unmounted even after unmapping the VMAs. So we track the number of VM_EXECUTABLE VMAs and drop the new reference when the last one is unmapped. This avoids pinning the mounted filesystem. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: improve comments] [yamamoto@valinux.co.jp: fix dup_mmap] Signed-off-by:
Matt Helsley <matthltc@us.ibm.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc:"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Signed-off-by:
YAMAMOTO Takashi <yamamoto@valinux.co.jp> Signed-off-by:
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Alexey Dobriyan authored
This usually saves one recompile to insert similar printk like below. :) Sample nastygram: remove_proc_entry: removing non-empty directory '/proc/foo', leaking at least 'bar' ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: at fs/proc/generic.c:776 remove_proc_entry+0x18a/0x200() Modules linked in: foo(-) container fan battery dock sbs ac sbshc backlight ipv6 loop af_packet amd_rng sr_mod i2c_amd8111 i2c_amd756 cdrom i2c_core button thermal processor Pid: 3034, comm: rmmod Tainted: G M 2.6.25-rc1 #5 Call Trace: [<ffffffff80231974>] warn_on_slowpath+0x64/0x90 [<ffffffff80232a6e>] printk+0x4e/0x60 [<ffffffff802d6c8a>] remove_proc_entry+0x18a/0x200 [<ffffffff8045cd88>] mutex_lock_nested+0x1c8/0x2d0 [<ffffffff8025f0f0>] __try_stop_module+0x0/0x40 [<ffffffff8025effd>] sys_delete_module+0x14d/0x200 [<ffffffff8045df3d>] lockdep_sys_exit_thunk+0x35/0x67 [<ffffffff8031c307>] __up_read+0x27/0xa0 [<ffffffff8045decc>] trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x35/0x3a [<ffffffff8020b6ab>] system_call_after_swapgs+0x7b/0x80 ---[ end trace 10ef850597e89c54 ]--- Signed-off-by:
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David Howells authored
Make key_serial() an inline function rather than a macro if CONFIG_KEYS=y. This prevents double evaluation of the key pointer and also provides better type checking. Signed-off-by:
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Robert P. J. Day authored
Since these two source files invoke kmalloc(), they should explicitly include <linux/slab.h>. Signed-off-by:
Robert P. J. Day <rpjday@crashcourse.ca> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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David Howells authored
Make the keyring quotas controllable through /proc/sys files: (*) /proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxkeys /proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxbytes Maximum number of keys that root may have and the maximum total number of bytes of data that root may have stored in those keys. (*) /proc/sys/kernel/keys/maxkeys /proc/sys/kernel/keys/maxbytes Maximum number of keys that each non-root user may have and the maximum total number of bytes of data that each of those users may have stored in their keys. Also increase the quotas as a number of people have been complaining that it's not big enough. I'm not sure that it's big enough now either, but on the other hand, it can now be set in /etc/sysctl.conf. Signed-off-by: -
David Howells authored
Don't generate the per-UID user and user session keyrings unless they're explicitly accessed. This solves a problem during a login process whereby set*uid() is called before the SELinux PAM module, resulting in the per-UID keyrings having the wrong security labels. This also cures the problem of multiple per-UID keyrings sometimes appearing due to PAM modules (including pam_keyinit) setuiding and causing user_structs to come into and go out of existence whilst the session keyring pins the user keyring. This is achieved by first searching for extant per-UID keyrings before inventing new ones. The serial bound argument is also dropped from find_keyring_by_name() as it's not currently made use of (setting it to 0 disables the feature). Signed-off-by:
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Arun Raghavan authored
The key_create_or_update() function provided by the keyring code has a default set of permissions that are always applied to the key when created. This might not be desirable to all clients. Here's a patch that adds a "perm" parameter to the function to address this, which can be set to KEY_PERM_UNDEF to revert to the current behaviour. Signed-off-by:
Arun Raghavan <arunsr@cse.iitk.ac.in> Signed-off-by:
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Alexey Dobriyan authored
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David Howells authored
Add a keyctl() function to get the security label of a key. The following is added to Documentation/keys.txt: (*) Get the LSM security context attached to a key. long keyctl(KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY, key_serial_t key, char *buffer, size_t buflen) This function returns a string that represents the LSM security context attached to a key in the buffer provided. Unless there's an error, it always returns the amount of data it could produce, even if that's too big for the buffer, but it won't copy more than requested to userspace. If the buffer pointer is NULL then no copy will take place. A NUL character is included at the end of the string if the buffer is sufficiently big. This is included in the returned count. If no LSM is in force then an empty string will be returned. A process must have view permission on the key for this function to be successful. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: declare keyctl_get_security()] Signed-off-by:Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu> Signed-off-by:
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David Howells authored
Allow the callout data to be passed as a blob rather than a string for internal kernel services that call any request_key_*() interface other than request_key(). request_key() itself still takes a NUL-terminated string. The functions that change are: request_key_with_auxdata() request_key_async() request_key_async_with_auxdata() Signed-off-by:
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Kevin Coffman authored
Check the starting keyring as part of the search to (a) see if that is what we're searching for, and (b) to check it is still valid for searching. The scenario: User in process A does things that cause things to be created in its process session keyring. The user then does an su to another user and starts a new process, B. The two processes now share the same process session keyring. Process B does an NFS access which results in an upcall to gssd. When gssd attempts to instantiate the context key (to be linked into the process session keyring), it is denied access even though it has an authorization key. The order of calls is: keyctl_instantiate_key() lookup_user_key() (the default: case) search_process_keyrings(current) search_process_keyrings(rka->context) (recursive call) keyring_search_aux() keyring_search_aux() verifies the keys and keyrings underneath the top-level keyring it is given, but that top-level keyring is neither fully validated nor checked to see if it is the thing being searched for. This patch changes keyring_search_aux() to: 1) do more validation on the top keyring it is given and 2) check whether that top-level keyring is the thing being searched for Signed-off-by:Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu> Signed-off-by:
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David Howells authored
Increase the size of a payload that can be used to instantiate a key in add_key() and keyctl_instantiate_key(). This permits huge CIFS SPNEGO blobs to be passed around. The limit is raised to 1MB. If kmalloc() can't allocate a buffer of sufficient size, vmalloc() will be tried instead. Signed-off-by:
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