Add support to be able to either encrypt or decrypt data in place during
the early stages of booting the kernel. This does not change the memory
encryption attribute - it is used for ensuring that data present in either
an encrypted or decrypted memory area is in the proper state (for example
the initrd will have been loaded by the boot loader and will not be
encrypted, but the memory that it resides in is marked as encrypted).
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f9968e9432cd6c4b57ef245729be04ff18852225.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Add early_memremap() support to be able to specify encrypted and
decrypted mappings with and without write-protection. The use of
write-protection is necessary when encrypting data "in place". The
write-protect attribute is considered cacheable for loads, but not
stores. This implies that the hardware will never give the core a
dirty line with this memtype.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/479b5832c30fae3efa7932e48f81794e86397229.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

The CR3 register entry can contain the SME encryption mask that indicates
the PGD is encrypted.  The encryption mask should not be used when
creating a virtual address from the CR3 register, so remove the SME
encryption mask in the read_cr3_pa() function.

During early boot SME will need to use a native version of read_cr3_pa(),
so create native_read_cr3_pa().
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/767b085c384a46f67f451f8589903a462c7ff68a.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Changes to the existing page table macros will allow the SME support to
be enabled in a simple fashion with minimal changes to files that use these
macros.  Since the memory encryption mask will now be part of the regular
pagetable macros, we introduce two new macros (_PAGE_TABLE_NOENC and
_KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC) to allow for early pagetable creation/initialization
without the encryption mask before SME becomes active.  Two new pgprot()
macros are defined to allow setting or clearing the page encryption mask.

The FIXMAP_PAGE_NOCACHE define is introduced for use with MMIO.  SME does
not support encryption for MMIO areas so this define removes the encryption
mask from the page attribute.

Two new macros are introduced (__sme_pa() / __sme_pa_nodebug()) to allow
creating a physical address with the encryption mask.  These are used when
working with the cr3 register so that the PGD can be encrypted. The current
__va() macro is updated so that the virtual address is generated based off
of the physical address without the encryption mask thus allowing the same
virtual address to be generated regardless of whether encryption is enabled
for that physical location or not.

Also, an early initialization function is added for SME.  If SME is active,
this function:

 - Updates the early_pmd_flags so that early page faults create mappings
   with the encryption mask.

 - Updates the __supported_pte_mask to include the encryption mask.

 - Updates the protection_map entries to include the encryption mask so
   that user-space allocations will automatically have the encryption mask
   applied.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b36e952c4c39767ae7f0a41cf5345adf27438480.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Create a pgd_pfn() macro similar to the p[4um]d_pfn() macros and then
use the p[g4um]d_pfn() macros in the p[g4um]d_page() macros instead of
duplicating the code.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e61eb533a6d0aac941db2723d8aa63ef6b882dee.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Add support to the early boot code to use Secure Memory Encryption (SME).
Since the kernel has been loaded into memory in a decrypted state, encrypt
the kernel in place and update the early pagetables with the memory
encryption mask so that new pagetable entries will use memory encryption.

The routines to set the encryption mask and perform the encryption are
stub routines for now with functionality to be added in a later patch.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e52ad781f085224bf835b3caff9aa3aee6febccb.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Currently there is a check if the address being mapped is in the ISA
range (is_ISA_range()), and if it is, then phys_to_virt() is used to
perform the mapping. When SME is active, the default is to add pagetable
mappings with the encryption bit set unless specifically overridden. The
resulting pagetable mapping from phys_to_virt() will result in a mapping
that has the encryption bit set. With SME, the use of ioremap() is
intended to generate pagetable mappings that do not have the encryption
bit set through the use of the PAGE_KERNEL_IO protection value.

Rather than special case the SME scenario, remove the ISA range check and
usage of phys_to_virt() and have ISA range mappings continue through the
remaining ioremap() path.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/88ada7b09c6568c61cd696351eb59fb15a82ce1a.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Add support for Secure Memory Encryption (SME). This initial support
provides a Kconfig entry to build the SME support into the kernel and
defines the memory encryption mask that will be used in subsequent
patches to mark pages as encrypted.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a6c34d16caaed3bc3e2d6f0987554275bd291554.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

When System Memory Encryption (SME) is enabled, the physical address
space is reduced. Adjust the x86_phys_bits value to reflect this
reduction.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/593c037a3cad85ba92f3d061ffa7462e9ce3531d.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Update the CPU features to include identifying and reporting on the
Secure Memory Encryption (SME) feature.  SME is identified by CPUID
0x8000001f, but requires BIOS support to enable it (set bit 23 of
MSR_K8_SYSCFG).  Only show the SME feature as available if reported by
CPUID, enabled by BIOS and not configured as CONFIG_X86_32=y.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/85c17ff450721abccddc95e611ae8df3f4d9718b.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

The ioremap() function is intended for mapping MMIO. For RAM, the
memremap() function should be used. Convert calls from ioremap() to
memremap() when re-mapping RAM.

This will be used later by SME to control how the encryption mask is
applied to memory mappings, with certain memory locations being mapped
decrypted vs encrypted.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b13fccb9abbd547a7eef7b1fdfc223431b211c88.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

For processors that support PAT, set the write-protect cache mode
(_PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WP) entry to the actual write-protect value (x05).
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/ade53b63d4dbffbfc3cb08fb62024647059c8688.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Create a Documentation entry to describe the AMD Secure Memory
Encryption (SME) feature and add documentation for the mem_encrypt=
kernel parameter.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/ca0a0c13b055fd804cfc92cbaca8acd68057eed0.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

The SME patches we are about to apply add some E820 logic, so merge in
pending E820 code changes first, to have a single code base.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Now process_e820_entry() is not limited to e820 entry processing, rename
it to process_mem_region(). And adjust the code comment accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: fanc.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com
Cc: izumi.taku@jp.fujitsu.com
Cc: matt@codeblueprint.co.uk
Cc: thgarnie@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1499603862-11516-4-git-send-email-bhe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

This makes process_e820_entry() be able to process any kind of memory
region.
Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: fanc.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com
Cc: izumi.taku@jp.fujitsu.com
Cc: matt@codeblueprint.co.uk
Cc: thgarnie@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1499603862-11516-3-git-send-email-bhe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

The original function process_e820_entry() only takes care of each
e820 entry passed.

And move the E820_TYPE_RAM checking logic into process_e820_entries().

And remove the redundent local variable 'addr' definition in
find_random_phys_addr().
Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: fanc.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com
Cc: izumi.taku@jp.fujitsu.com
Cc: matt@codeblueprint.co.uk
Cc: thgarnie@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1499603862-11516-2-git-send-email-bhe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Pull sparc fixes from David Miller:

 - Fix DMA regression in 4.13 merge window, only certain chips can do
   64-bit DMA. From Dave Dushar.

 - Correct cpu cross-call algorithm to correctly detect stalled or stuck
   remote cpus, from Jane Chu.

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/sparc:
  sparc64: Measure receiver forward progress to avoid send mondo timeout
  SPARC64: Fix sun4v DMA panic

Pull irq fix from Thomas Gleixner:
 "Fix the fallout from reworking the locking and resource management in
  request/free_irq()"

* 'irq-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  genirq: Keep chip buslock across irq_request/release_resources()

Pull SMP fix from Thomas Gleixner:
 "Replace the bogus BUG_ON in the cpu hotplug code"

* 'smp-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  smp/hotplug: Replace BUG_ON and react useful

Merge tag 'regmap-fix-w1-merge-window' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/regmap

Pull regmap fix from Mark Brown:
 "Fix build due to w1 header refactoring

  The regmap support for w1 was added shortly before a reorganization of
  the w1 headers. While this was noticed before the merge window and
  efforts made to get it resolved in what was sent that managed to fall
  through the cracks, this cleans up and updates things so we look for
  the header in the new location.

  It didn't cause build failures as the driver that's going to be the
  first user got held up with other review issues"

* tag 'regmap-fix-w1-merge-window' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/regmap:
  regmap: regmap-w1: Fix build troubles

Pull SCSI fixes from James Bottomley:
 "This is actually just a small set of mainly bug fixes for the original
  merge window code plus a few trivial updates and qedi boot from SAN
  support feature patch"

* tag 'scsi-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/scsi:
  scsi: libfc: pass an error pointer to fc_disc_error()
  scsi: hisi_sas: make several const arrays static
  scsi: qla2xxx: Off by one in qlt_ctio_to_cmd()
  scsi: sg: fix SG_DXFER_FROM_DEV transfers
  scsi: virtio_scsi: always read VPD pages for multiqueue too
  scsi: qedf: fix spelling mistake: "offlading" -> "offloading"
  scsi: qedi: fix another spelling mistake: "alloction" -> "allocation"
  scsi: isci: fix typo in function names
  scsi: cxlflash: return -EFAULT if copy_from_user() fails
  scsi: qedi: Add support for Boot from SAN over iSCSI offload

Several variables had their types changed from unsigned long to u32,
but the printk()-style format to print them wasn't updated, leading to:

    arch/blackfin/kernel/flat.c: In function 'bfin_get_addr_from_rp':
    arch/blackfin/kernel/flat.c:35:3: warning: format '%lx' expects argument of type 'long unsigned int', but argument 2 has type 'u32' [-Wformat]
    arch/blackfin/kernel/flat.c: In function 'bfin_put_addr_at_rp':
    arch/blackfin/kernel/flat.c:80:3: warning: format '%lx' expects argument of type 'long unsigned int', but argument 2 has type 'u32' [-Wformat]

Fixes: 468138d7 ("binfmt_flat: flat_{get,put}_addr_from_rp() should be able to fail")
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Fixes: cc5d0db3 ("regmap: Add 1-Wire bus support")
Commit de0d6dbd ("w1: Add subsystem kernel public interface")
Fix place off w1.h header file

Cosmetic: Fix company name (local to international)
Signed-off-by: Alex A. Mihaylov <minimumlaw@rambler.ru>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>

    In file included from include/linux/flat.h:13:0,
                     from fs/binfmt_flat.c:36:
    arch/h8300/include/asm/flat.h: In function 'flat_get_addr_from_rp':
    arch/h8300/include/asm/flat.h:28:3: error: expected ')' before 'val'
       val &= 0x00ffffff;
       ^
    arch/h8300/include/asm/flat.h:31:1: error: expected expression before '}' token
     }
     ^
    In file included from include/linux/flat.h:13:0,
                     from fs/binfmt_flat.c:36:
    arch/h8300/include/asm/flat.h:26:6: warning: unused variable 'val' [-Wunused-variable]
      u32 val = get_unaligned((__force u32 *)rp);
          ^
    In file included from include/linux/flat.h:13:0,
                     from fs/binfmt_flat.c:36:
    arch/h8300/include/asm/flat.h:31:1: warning: no return statement in function returning non-void [-Wreturn-type]
     }
     ^
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Fixes: 468138d7 ("binfmt_flat: flat_{get,put}_addr_from_rp() should be able to fail")
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Several variables had their types changed from unsigned long to u32, but
the arch-specific implementations of flat_set_persistent() weren't
updated, leading to compiler warnings on blackfin and m68k:

    fs/binfmt_flat.c: In function ‘load_flat_file’:
    fs/binfmt_flat.c:799: warning: passing argument 2 of ‘flat_set_persistent’ from incompatible pointer type

Fixes: 468138d7 ("binfmt_flat: flat_{get,put}_addr_from_rp() should be able to fail")
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Several variables had their types changed from unsigned long to u32, but
the printk()-style format to print them wasn't updated, leading to:

    fs/binfmt_flat.c: In function ‘load_flat_file’:
    fs/binfmt_flat.c:577: warning: format ‘%ld’ expects type ‘long int’, but argument 3 has type ‘u32’

Fixes: 468138d7 ("binfmt_flat: flat_{get,put}_addr_from_rp() should be able to fail")
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Pull documentation format standardization from Jonathan Corbet:
 "This series converts a number of top-level documents to the RST format
  without incorporating them into the Sphinx tree. The hope is to bring
  some uniformity to kernel documentation and, perhaps more importantly,
  have our existing docs serve as an example of the desired formatting
  for those that will be added later.

  Mauro has gone through and fixed up a lot of top-level documentation
  files to make them conform to the RST format, but without moving or
  renaming them in any way. This will help when we incorporate the ones
  we want to keep into the Sphinx doctree, but the real purpose is to
  bring a bit of uniformity to our documentation and let the top-level
  docs serve as examples for those writing new ones"

* tag 'standardize-docs' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (84 commits)
  docs: kprobes.txt: Fix whitespacing
  tee.txt: standardize document format
  cgroup-v2.txt: standardize document format
  dell_rbu.txt: standardize document format
  zorro.txt: standardize document format
  xz.txt: standardize document format
  xillybus.txt: standardize document format
  vfio.txt: standardize document format
  vfio-mediated-device.txt: standardize document format
  unaligned-memory-access.txt: standardize document format
  this_cpu_ops.txt: standardize document format
  svga.txt: standardize document format
  static-keys.txt: standardize document format
  smsc_ece1099.txt: standardize document format
  SM501.txt: standardize document format
  siphash.txt: standardize document format
  sgi-ioc4.txt: standardize document format
  SAK.txt: standardize document format
  rpmsg.txt: standardize document format
  robust-futexes.txt: standardize document format
  ...

Pull random updates from Ted Ts'o:
 "Add wait_for_random_bytes() and get_random_*_wait() functions so that
  callers can more safely get random bytes if they can block until the
  CRNG is initialized.

  Also print a warning if get_random_*() is called before the CRNG is
  initialized. By default, only one single-line warning will be printed
  per boot. If CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM is defined, then a
  warning will be printed for each function which tries to get random
  bytes before the CRNG is initialized. This can get spammy for certain
  architecture types, so it is not enabled by default"

* tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random:
  random: reorder READ_ONCE() in get_random_uXX
  random: suppress spammy warnings about unseeded randomness
  random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness
  net/route: use get_random_int for random counter
  net/neighbor: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit hash random
  rhashtable: use get_random_u32 for hash_rnd
  ceph: ensure RNG is seeded before using
  iscsi: ensure RNG is seeded before use
  cifs: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit lock random
  random: add get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long,once}_wait family
  random: add wait_for_random_bytes() API

Pull ->s_options removal from Al Viro:
 "Preparations for fsmount/fsopen stuff (coming next cycle). Everything
  gets moved to explicit ->show_options(), killing ->s_options off +
  some cosmetic bits around fs/namespace.c and friends. Basically, the
  stuff needed to work with fsmount series with minimum of conflicts
  with other work.

  It's not strictly required for this merge window, but it would reduce
  the PITA during the coming cycle, so it would be nice to have those
  bits and pieces out of the way"

* 'work.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  isofs: Fix isofs_show_options()
  VFS: Kill off s_options and helpers
  orangefs: Implement show_options
  9p: Implement show_options
  isofs: Implement show_options
  afs: Implement show_options
  affs: Implement show_options
  befs: Implement show_options
  spufs: Implement show_options
  bpf: Implement show_options
  ramfs: Implement show_options
  pstore: Implement show_options
  omfs: Implement show_options
  hugetlbfs: Implement show_options
  VFS: Don't use save/replace_mount_options if not using generic_show_options
  VFS: Provide empty name qstr
  VFS: Make get_filesystem() return the affected filesystem
  VFS: Clean up whitespace in fs/namespace.c and fs/super.c
  Provide a function to create a NUL-terminated string from unterminated data

Pull more __copy_.._user elimination from Al Viro.

* 'work.__copy_to_user' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  drm_dp_aux_dev: switch to read_iter/write_iter

Pull uacess-unaligned removal from Al Viro:
 "That stuff had just one user, and an exotic one, at that - binfmt_flat
  on arm and m68k"

* 'work.uaccess-unaligned' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  kill {__,}{get,put}_user_unaligned()
  binfmt_flat: flat_{get,put}_addr_from_rp() should be able to fail

Pull network field-by-field copy-in updates from Al Viro:
 "This part of the misc compat queue was held back for review from
  networking folks and since davem has jus ACKed those..."

* 'misc.compat' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  get_compat_bpf_fprog(): don't copyin field-by-field
  get_compat_msghdr(): get rid of field-by-field copyin
  copy_msghdr_from_user(): get rid of field-by-field copyin

Pull MIPS updates from Ralf Baechle:
 "Boston platform support:
   - Document DT bindings
   - Add CLK driver for board clocks

  CM:
   - Avoid per-core locking with CM3 & higher
   - WARN on attempt to lock invalid VP, not BUG

  CPS:
   - Select CONFIG_SYS_SUPPORTS_SCHED_SMT for MIPSr6
   - Prevent multi-core with dcache aliasing
   - Handle cores not powering down more gracefully
   - Handle spurious VP starts more gracefully

  DSP:
   - Add lwx & lhx missaligned access support

  eBPF:
   - Add MIPS support along with many supporting change to add the
     required infrastructure

  Generic arch code:
   - Misc sysmips MIPS_ATOMIC_SET fixes
   - Drop duplicate HAVE_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINTS
   - Negate error syscall return in trace
   - Correct forced syscall errors
   - Traced negative syscalls should return -ENOSYS
   - Allow samples/bpf/tracex5 to access syscall arguments for sane
     traces
   - Cleanup from old Kconfig options in defconfigs
   - Fix PREF instruction usage by memcpy for MIPS R6
   - Fix various special cases in the FPU eulation
   - Fix some special cases in MIPS16e2 support
   - Fix MIPS I ISA /proc/cpuinfo reporting
   - Sort MIPS Kconfig alphabetically
   - Fix minimum alignment requirement of IRQ stack as required by
     ABI / GCC
   - Fix special cases in the module loader
   - Perform post-DMA cache flushes on systems with MAARs
   - Probe the I6500 CPU
   - Cleanup cmpxchg and add support for 1 and 2 byte operations
   - Use queued read/write locks (qrwlock)
   - Use queued spinlocks (qspinlock)
   - Add CPU shared FTLB feature detection
   - Handle tlbex-tlbp race condition
   - Allow storing pgd in C0_CONTEXT for MIPSr6
   - Use current_cpu_type() in m4kc_tlbp_war()
   - Support Boston in the generic kernel

  Generic platform:
   - yamon-dt: Pull YAMON DT shim code out of SEAD-3 board
   - yamon-dt: Support > 256MB of RAM
   - yamon-dt: Use serial* rather than uart* aliases
   - Abstract FDT fixup application
   - Set RTC_ALWAYS_BCD to 0
   - Add a MAINTAINERS entry

  core kernel:
   - qspinlock.c: include linux/prefetch.h

  Loongson 3:
   - Add support

  Perf:
   - Add I6500 support

  SEAD-3:
   - Remove GIC timer from DT
   - Set interrupt-parent per-device, not at root node
   - Fix GIC interrupt specifiers

  SMP:
   - Skip IPI setup if we only have a single CPU

  VDSO:
   - Make comment match reality
   - Improvements to time code in VDSO"

* 'upstream' of git://git.linux-mips.org/pub/scm/ralf/upstream-linus: (86 commits)
  locking/qspinlock: Include linux/prefetch.h
  MIPS: Fix MIPS I ISA /proc/cpuinfo reporting
  MIPS: Fix minimum alignment requirement of IRQ stack
  MIPS: generic: Support MIPS Boston development boards
  MIPS: DTS: img: Don't attempt to build-in all .dtb files
  clk: boston: Add a driver for MIPS Boston board clocks
  dt-bindings: Document img,boston-clock binding
  MIPS: Traced negative syscalls should return -ENOSYS
  MIPS: Correct forced syscall errors
  MIPS: Negate error syscall return in trace
  MIPS: Drop duplicate HAVE_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINTS select
  MIPS16e2: Provide feature overrides for non-MIPS16 systems
  MIPS: MIPS16e2: Report ASE presence in /proc/cpuinfo
  MIPS: MIPS16e2: Subdecode extended LWSP/SWSP instructions
  MIPS: MIPS16e2: Identify ASE presence
  MIPS: VDSO: Fix a mismatch between comment and preprocessor constant
  MIPS: VDSO: Add implementation of gettimeofday() fallback
  MIPS: VDSO: Add implementation of clock_gettime() fallback
  MIPS: VDSO: Fix conversions in do_monotonic()/do_monotonic_coarse()
  MIPS: Use current_cpu_type() in m4kc_tlbp_war()
  ...

Pull UML updates from Richard Weinberger:
 "Mostly fixes for UML:

   - First round of fixes for PTRACE_GETRESET/SETREGSET

   - A printf vs printk cleanup

   - Minor improvements"

* 'for-linus-4.13-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rw/uml:
  um: Correctly check for PTRACE_GETRESET/SETREGSET
  um: v2: Use generic NOTES macro
  um: Add kerneldoc for userspace_tramp() and start_userspace()
  um: Add kerneldoc for segv_handler
  um: stub-data.h: remove superfluous include
  um: userspace - be more verbose in ptrace set regs error
  um: add dummy ioremap and iounmap functions
  um: Allow building and running on older hosts
  um: Avoid longjmp/setjmp symbol clashes with libpthread.a
  um: console: Ignore console= option
  um: Use os_warn to print out pre-boot warning/error messages
  um: Add os_warn() for pre-boot warning/error messages
  um: Use os_info for the messages on normal path
  um: Add os_info() for pre-boot information messages
  um: Use printk instead of printf in make_uml_dir

Pull UBIFS updates from Richard Weinberger:

 - Updates and fixes for the file encryption mode

 - Minor improvements

 - Random fixes

* tag 'upstream-4.13-rc1' of git://git.infradead.org/linux-ubifs:
  ubifs: Set double hash cookie also for RENAME_EXCHANGE
  ubifs: Massage assert in ubifs_xattr_set() wrt. init_xattrs
  ubifs: Don't leak kernel memory to the MTD
  ubifs: Change gfp flags in page allocation for bulk read
  ubifs: Fix oops when remounting with no_bulk_read.
  ubifs: Fail commit if TNC is obviously inconsistent
  ubifs: allow userspace to map mounts to volumes
  ubifs: Wire-up statx() support
  ubifs: Remove dead code from ubifs_get_link()
  ubifs: Massage debug prints wrt. fscrypt
  ubifs: Add assert to dent_key_init()
  ubifs: Fix unlink code wrt. double hash lookups
  ubifs: Fix data node size for truncating uncompressed nodes
  ubifs: Don't encrypt special files on creation
  ubifs: Fix memory leak in RENAME_WHITEOUT error path in do_rename
  ubifs: Fix inode data budget in ubifs_mknod
  ubifs: Correctly evict xattr inodes
  ubifs: Unexport ubifs_inode_slab
  ubifs: don't bother checking for encryption key in ->mmap()
  ubifs: require key for truncate(2) of encrypted file

Pull more KVM updates from Radim Krčmář:
 "Second batch of KVM updates for v4.13

  Common:
   - add uevents for VM creation/destruction
   - annotate and properly access RCU-protected objects

  s390:
   - rename IOCTL added in the first v4.13 merge

  x86:
   - emulate VMLOAD VMSAVE feature in SVM
   - support paravirtual asynchronous page fault while nested
   - add Hyper-V userspace interfaces for better migration
   - improve master clock corner cases
   - extend internal error reporting after EPT misconfig
   - correct single-stepping of emulated instructions in SVM
   - handle MCE during VM entry
   - fix nVMX VM entry checks and nVMX VMCS shadowing"

* tag 'kvm-4.13-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (28 commits)
  kvm: x86: hyperv: make VP_INDEX managed by userspace
  KVM: async_pf: Let guest support delivery of async_pf from guest mode
  KVM: async_pf: Force a nested vmexit if the injected #PF is async_pf
  KVM: async_pf: Add L1 guest async_pf #PF vmexit handler
  KVM: x86: Simplify kvm_x86_ops->queue_exception parameter list
  kvm: x86: hyperv: add KVM_CAP_HYPERV_SYNIC2
  KVM: x86: make backwards_tsc_observed a per-VM variable
  KVM: trigger uevents when creating or destroying a VM
  KVM: SVM: Enable Virtual VMLOAD VMSAVE feature
  KVM: SVM: Add Virtual VMLOAD VMSAVE feature definition
  KVM: SVM: Rename lbr_ctl field in the vmcb control area
  KVM: SVM: Prepare for new bit definition in lbr_ctl
  KVM: SVM: handle singlestep exception when skipping emulated instructions
  KVM: x86: take slots_lock in kvm_free_pit
  KVM: s390: Fix KVM_S390_GET_CMMA_BITS ioctl definition
  kvm: vmx: Properly handle machine check during VM-entry
  KVM: x86: update master clock before computing kvmclock_offset
  kvm: nVMX: Shadow "high" parts of shadowed 64-bit VMCS fields
  kvm: nVMX: Fix nested_vmx_check_msr_bitmap_controls
  kvm: nVMX: Validate the I/O bitmaps on nested VM-entry
  ...

Avoid the READ_ONCE in commit 4a072c71 ("random: silence compiler
warnings and fix race") if we can leave the function after
arch_get_random_XXX().

Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>

Unfortunately, on some models of some architectures getting a fully
seeded CRNG is extremely difficult, and so this can result in dmesg
getting spammed for a surprisingly long time.  This is really bad from
a security perspective, and so architecture maintainers really need to
do what they can to get the CRNG seeded sooner after the system is
booted.  However, users can't do anything actionble to address this,
and spamming the kernel messages log will only just annoy people.

For developers who want to work on improving this situation,
CONFIG_WARN_UNSEEDED_RANDOM has been renamed to
CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM.  By default the kernel will always
print the first use of unseeded randomness.  This way, hopefully the
security obsessed will be happy that there is _some_ indication when
the kernel boots there may be a potential issue with that architecture
or subarchitecture.  To see all uses of unseeded randomness,
developers can enable CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>