- 16 Nov, 2019 28 commits
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Paolo Bonzini authored
commit b8e8c830 upstream. With some Intel processors, putting the same virtual address in the TLB as both a 4 KiB and 2 MiB page can confuse the instruction fetch unit and cause the processor to issue a machine check resulting in a CPU lockup. Unfortunately when EPT page tables use huge pages, it is possible for a malicious guest to cause this situation. Add a knob to mark huge pages as non-executable. When the nx_huge_pages parameter is enabled (and we are using EPT), all huge pages are marked as NX. If the guest attempts to execute in one of those pages, the page is broken down into 4K pages, which are then marked executable. This is not an issue for shadow paging (except nested EPT), because then the host is in control of TLB flushes and the problematic situation cannot happen. With nested EPT, again the nested guest can cause problems shadow and direct EPT is treated in the same way. [ tglx: Fixup default to auto and massage wording a bit ] Originally-by:
Junaid Shahid <junaids@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> [bwh: Backported to 4.9: - Use kvm_mmu_invalidate_zap_all_pages() instead of kvm_mmu_zap_all_fast() - Don't provide mode for nx_largepages_splitted as all stats are read-only - Adjust filename, context] Signed-off-by:
Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Tyler Hicks authored
commit 731dc9df upstream. A kernel module may need to check the value of the "mitigations=" kernel command line parameter as part of its setup when the module needs to perform software mitigations for a CPU flaw. Uninline and export the helper functions surrounding the cpu_mitigations enum to allow for their usage from a module. Lastly, privatize the enum and cpu_mitigations variable since the value of cpu_mitigations can be checked with the exported helper functions. Signed-off-by:
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
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Vineela Tummalapalli authored
commit db4d30fb upstream. Some processors may incur a machine check error possibly resulting in an unrecoverable CPU lockup when an instruction fetch encounters a TLB multi-hit in the instruction TLB. This can occur when the page size is changed along with either the physical address or cache type. The relevant erratum can be found here: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=205195 There are other processors affected for which the erratum does not fully disclose the impact. This issue affects both bare-metal x86 page tables and EPT. It can be mitigated by either eliminating the use of large pages or by using careful TLB invalidations when changing the page size in the page tables. Just like Spectre, Meltdown, L1TF and MDS, a new bit has been allocated in MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (PSCHANGE_MC_NO) and will be set on CPUs which are mitigated against this issue. Signed-off-by:
Vineela Tummalapalli <vineela.tummalapalli@intel.com> Co-developed-by:
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Paolo Bonzini authored
commit 9167ab79 upstream. VMX already does so if the host has SMEP, in order to support the combination of CR0.WP=1 and CR4.SMEP=1. However, it is perfectly safe to always do so, and in fact VMX already ends up running with EFER.NXE=1 on old processors that lack the "load EFER" controls, because it may help avoiding a slow MSR write. Removing all the conditionals simplifies the code. SVM does not have similar code, but it should since recent AMD processors do support SMEP. So this patch also makes the code for the two vendors more similar while fixing NPT=0, CR0.WP=1 and CR4.SMEP=1 on AMD processors. Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
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Paolo Bonzini authored
commit 335e192a upstream. These are useful in debugging shadow paging. Signed-off-by:
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Ben Hutchings authored
Extracted from commit d3e328f2 "kvm: x86: mmu: Verify that restored PTE has needed perms in fast page fault". Signed-off-by:
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Paolo Bonzini authored
commit e9f2a760 upstream. Note that in such a case it is quite likely that KVM will BUG_ON in __pte_list_remove when the VM is closed. However, there is no immediate risk of memory corruption in the host so a WARN_ON is enough and it lets you gather traces for debugging. Signed-off-by:
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Paolo Bonzini authored
commit d679b326 upstream. After the previous patch, the low bits of the gfn are masked in both FNAME(fetch) and __direct_map, so we do not need to clear them in transparent_hugepage_adjust. Signed-off-by:
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Paolo Bonzini authored
commit 3fcf2d1b upstream. These two functions are basically doing the same thing through kvm_mmu_get_page, link_shadow_page and mmu_set_spte; yet, for historical reasons, their code looks very different. This patch tries to take the best of each and make them very similar, so that it is easy to understand changes that apply to both of them. Signed-off-by:
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Junaid Shahid authored
commit 43fdcda9 upstream. Release the page at the call-site where it was originally acquired. This makes the exit code cleaner for most call sites, since they do not need to duplicate code between success and the failure label. Signed-off-by:
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Junaid Shahid authored
commit 0d9ce162 upstream. It doesn't seem as if there is any particular need for kvm_lock to be a spinlock, so convert the lock to a mutex so that sleepable functions (in particular cond_resched()) can be called while holding it. Signed-off-by:
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Paolo Bonzini authored
commit 9b8ebbdb upstream. The x86 MMU if full of code that returns 0 and 1 for retry/emulate. Use the existing RET_MMIO_PF_RETRY/RET_MMIO_PF_EMULATE enum, renaming it to drop the MMIO part. Signed-off-by:
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Paolo Bonzini authored
commit e08d26f0 upstream. Calling handle_mmio_page_fault() has been unnecessary since commit e9ee956e ("KVM: x86: MMU: Move handle_mmio_page_fault() call to kvm_mmu_page_fault()", 2016-02-22). handle_mmio_page_fault() can now be made static. Signed-off-by:
David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> [bwh: Backported to 4.9: adjust context] Signed-off-by:
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Josh Poimboeuf authored
commit 012206a8 upstream. For new IBRS_ALL CPUs, the Enhanced IBRS check at the beginning of cpu_bugs_smt_update() causes the function to return early, unintentionally skipping the MDS and TAA logic. This is not a problem for MDS, because there appears to be no overlap between IBRS_ALL and MDS-affected CPUs. So the MDS mitigation would be disabled and nothing would need to be done in this function anyway. But for TAA, the TAA_MSG_SMT string will never get printed on Cascade Lake and newer. The check is superfluous anyway: when 'spectre_v2_enabled' is SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED, 'spectre_v2_user' is always SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE, and so the 'spectre_v2_user' switch statement handles it appropriately by doing nothing. So just remove the check. Fixes: 1b42f017 ("x86/speculation/taa: Add mitigation for TSX Async Abort") Signed-off-by:
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
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Michal Hocko authored
commit db616173 upstream. There is a general consensus that TSX usage is not largely spread while the history shows there is a non trivial space for side channel attacks possible. Therefore the tsx is disabled by default even on platforms that might have a safe implementation of TSX according to the current knowledge. This is a fair trade off to make. There are, however, workloads that really do benefit from using TSX and updating to a newer kernel with TSX disabled might introduce a noticeable regressions. This would be especially a problem for Linux distributions which will provide TAA mitigations. Introduce config options X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_OFF, X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_ON and X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_AUTO to control the TSX feature. The config setting can be overridden by the tsx cmdline options. [ bp: Text cleanups from Josh. ] Suggested-by:
Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
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Pawan Gupta authored
commit a7a248c5 upstream. Add the documenation for TSX Async Abort. Include the description of the issue, how to check the mitigation state, control the mitigation, guidance for system administrators. [ bp: Add proper SPDX tags, touch ups by Josh and me. ] Co-developed-by:
Antonio Gomez Iglesias <antonio.gomez.iglesias@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by:
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Reviewed-by:
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Pawan Gupta authored
commit 7531a359 upstream. Platforms which are not affected by X86_BUG_TAA may want the TSX feature enabled. Add "auto" option to the TSX cmdline parameter. When tsx=auto disable TSX when X86_BUG_TAA is present, otherwise enable TSX. More details on X86_BUG_TAA can be found here: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.html [ bp: Extend the arg buffer to accommodate "auto\0". ] Signed-off-by:
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Pawan Gupta authored
commit e1d38b63 upstream. Export the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR bit MDS_NO=0 to guests on TSX Async Abort(TAA) affected hosts that have TSX enabled and updated microcode. This is required so that the guests don't complain, "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode" when the host has the updated microcode to clear CPU buffers. Microcode update also adds support for MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL which is enumerated by the ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL bit in IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR. Guests can't do this check themselves when the ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL bit is not exported to the guests. In this case export MDS_NO=0 to the guests. When guests have CPUID.MD_CLEAR=1, they deploy MDS mitigation which also mitigates TAA. Signed-off-by:
Neelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com> Reviewed-by:
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Pawan Gupta authored
commit 6608b45a upstream. Add the sysfs reporting file for TSX Async Abort. It exposes the vulnerability and the mitigation state similar to the existing files for the other hardware vulnerabilities. Sysfs file path is: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort Signed-off-by:
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Pawan Gupta authored
commit 1b42f017 upstream. TSX Async Abort (TAA) is a side channel vulnerability to the internal buffers in some Intel processors similar to Microachitectural Data Sampling (MDS). In this case, certain loads may speculatively pass invalid data to dependent operations when an asynchronous abort condition is pending in a TSX transaction. This includes loads with no fault or assist condition. Such loads may speculatively expose stale data from the uarch data structures as in MDS. Scope of exposure is within the same-thread and cross-thread. This issue affects all current processors that support TSX, but do not have ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO (bit 8) set in MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES. On CPUs which have their IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR bit MDS_NO=0, CPUID.MD_CLEAR=1 and the MDS mitigation is clearing the CPU buffers using VERW or L1D_FLUSH, there is no additional mitigation needed for TAA. On affected CPUs with MDS_NO=1 this issue can be mitigated by disabling the Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) feature. A new MSR IA32_TSX_CTRL in future and current processors after a microcode update can be used to control the TSX feature. There are two bits in that MSR: * TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE disables the TSX sub-feature Restricted Transactional Memory (RTM). * TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR clears the RTM enumeration in CPUID. The other TSX sub-feature, Hardware Lock Elision (HLE), is unconditionally disabled with updated microcode but still enumerated as present by CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4}. The second mitigation approach is similar to MDS which is clearing the affected CPU buffers on return to user space and when entering a guest. Relevant microcode update is required for the mitigation to work. More details on this approach can be found here: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html The TSX feature can be controlled by the "tsx" command line parameter. If it is force-enabled then "Clear CPU buffers" (MDS mitigation) is deployed. The effective mitigation state can be read from sysfs. [ bp: - massage + comments cleanup - s/TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLE/TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED/g - Josh. - remove partial TAA mitigation in update_mds_branch_idle() - Josh. - s/tsx_async_abort_cmdline/tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline/g ] Signed-off-by:
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Pawan Gupta authored
commit 95c5824f upstream. Add a kernel cmdline parameter "tsx" to control the Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) feature. On CPUs that support TSX control, use "tsx=on|off" to enable or disable TSX. Not specifying this option is equivalent to "tsx=off". This is because on certain processors TSX may be used as a part of a speculative side channel attack. Carve out the TSX controlling functionality into a separate compilation unit because TSX is a CPU feature while the TSX async abort control machinery will go to cpu/bugs.c. [ bp: - Massage, shorten and clear the arg buffer. - Clarifications of the tsx= possible options - Josh. - Expand on TSX_CTRL availability - Pawan. ] Signed-off-by:
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Pawan Gupta authored
commit 286836a7 upstream. Add a helper function to read the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR. Signed-off-by:
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Pawan Gupta authored
commit c2955f27 upstream. Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) may be used on certain processors as part of a speculative side channel attack. A microcode update for existing processors that are vulnerable to this attack will add a new MSR - IA32_TSX_CTRL to allow the system administrator the option to disable TSX as one of the possible mitigations. The CPUs which get this new MSR after a microcode upgrade are the ones which do not set MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.MDS_NO (bit 5) because those CPUs have CPUID.MD_CLEAR, i.e., the VERW implementation which clears all CPU buffers takes care of the TAA case as well. [ Note that future processors that are not vulnerable will also support the IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR. ] Add defines for the new IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR and its bits. TSX has two sub-features: 1. Restricted Transactional Memory (RTM) is an explicitly-used feature where new instructions begin and end TSX transactions. 2. Hardware Lock Elision (HLE) is implicitly used when certain kinds of "old" style locks are used by software. Bit 7 of the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES indicates the presence of the IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR. There are two control bits in IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR: Bit 0: When set, it disables the Restricted Transactional Memory (RTM) sub-feature of TSX (will force all transactions to abort on the XBEGIN instruction). Bit 1: When set, it disables the enumeration of the RTM and HLE feature (i.e. it will make CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4} and CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit11} read as 0). The other TSX sub-feature, Hardware Lock Elision (HLE), is unconditionally disabled by the new microcode but still enumerated as present by CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4}, unless disabled by IA32_TSX_CTRL_MSR[1] - TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR. Signed-off-by:
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Paolo Bonzini authored
commit 0c54914d upstream. Similar to AMD bits, set the Intel bits from the vendor-independent feature and bug flags, because KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID does not care about the vendor and they should be set on AMD processors as well. Suggested-by:
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Reviewed-by:
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Jack Pham authored
commit 31fe084f upstream. In the SG case this is already handled since a non-zero request->num_mapped_sgs is a clear indicator that dma_map_sg() had been called. While it would be nice to do the same for the singly mapped case by simply checking for non-zero request->dma, it's conceivable that 0 is a valid dma_addr_t handle. Hence add a flag 'dma_mapped' to struct usb_request and use this to determine the need to call dma_unmap_single(). Otherwise, if a request is not DMA mapped then the result of calling usb_request_unmap_request() would safely be a no-op. Signed-off-by:
Jack Pham <jackp@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by:
Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jonas Gorski authored
commit 8a38dacf upstream. The Ethernet Switch core mask was set to 0, causing the switch core to be not reset on BCM6368 on boot. Provide the proper mask so the switch core gets reset to a known good state. Fixes: 799faa62 ("MIPS: BCM63XX: add core reset helper") Signed-off-by:
Jonas Gorski <jonas.gorski@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com> Cc: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org> Cc: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
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Kefeng Wang authored
commit 56897b21 upstream. task A: task B: hci_uart_set_proto flush_to_ldisc - p->open(hu) -> h5_open //alloc h5 - receive_buf - set_bit HCI_UART_PROTO_READY - tty_port_default_receive_buf - hci_uart_register_dev - tty_ldisc_receive_buf - hci_uart_tty_receive - test_bit HCI_UART_PROTO_READY - h5_recv - clear_bit HCI_UART_PROTO_READY while() { - p->open(hu) -> h5_close //free h5 - h5_rx_3wire_hdr - h5_reset() //use-after-free } It could use ioctl to set hci uart proto, but there is a use-after-free issue when hci_uart_register_dev() fail in hci_uart_set_proto(), see stack above, fix this by setting HCI_UART_PROTO_READY bit only when hci_uart_register_dev() return success. Reported-by: syzbot+899a33dc0fa0dbaf06a6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by:
Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by:
Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by:
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Junaid Shahid authored
[ Upstream commit d35b34a9 ] kvm should not attempt to read guest PDPTEs when CR0.PG = 0 and CR4.PAE = 1. Signed-off-by:
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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- 12 Nov, 2019 12 commits
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
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Ben Hutchings authored
commit ea0b163b upstream. When a jump_whitelist bitmap is reused, it needs to be cleared. Currently this is done with memset() and the size calculation assumes bitmaps are made of 32-bit words, not longs. So on 64-bit architectures, only the first half of the bitmap is cleared. If some whitelist bits are carried over between successive batches submitted on the same context, this will presumably allow embedding the rogue instructions that we're trying to reject. Use bitmap_zero() instead, which gets the calculation right. Fixes: f8c08d8f ("drm/i915/cmdparser: Add support for backward jumps") Signed-off-by:
Jon Bloomfield <jon.bloomfield@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Imre Deak authored
commit 7e34f4e4 upstream. In some circumstances the RC6 context can get corrupted. We can detect this and take the required action, that is disable RC6 and runtime PM. The HW recovers from the corrupted state after a system suspend/resume cycle, so detect the recovery and re-enable RC6 and runtime PM. v2: rebase (Mika) v3: - Move intel_suspend_gt_powersave() to the end of the GEM suspend sequence. - Add commit message. v4: - Rebased on intel_uncore_forcewake_put(i915->uncore, ...) API change. v5: - Rebased on latest upstream gt_pm refactoring. Signed-off-by:
Imre Deak <imre.deak@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Mika Kuoppala <mika.kuoppala@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Uma Shankar authored
commit 1d85a299 upstream. In BXT/APL, device 2 MMIO reads from MIPI controller requires its PLL to be turned ON. When MIPI PLL is turned off (MIPI Display is not active or connected), and someone (host or GT engine) tries to read MIPI registers, it causes hard hang. This is a hardware restriction or limitation. Driver by itself doesn't read MIPI registers when MIPI display is off. But any userspace application can submit unprivileged batch buffer for execution. In that batch buffer there can be mmio reads. And these reads are allowed even for unprivileged applications. If these register reads are for MIPI DSI controller and MIPI display is not active during that time, then the MMIO read operation causes system hard hang and only way to recover is hard reboot. A genuine process/application won't submit batch buffer like this and doesn't cause any issue. But on a compromised system, a malign userspace process/app can generate such batch buffer and can trigger system hard hang (denial of service attack). The fix is to lower the internal MMIO timeout value to an optimum value of 950us as recommended by hardware team. If the timeout is beyond 1ms (which will hit for any value we choose if MMIO READ on a DSI specific register is performed without PLL ON), it causes the system hang. But if the timeout value is lower than it will be below the threshold (even if timeout happens) and system will not get into a hung state. This will avoid a system hang without losing any programming or GT interrupts, taking the worst case of lowest CDCLK frequency and early DC5 abort into account. Signed-off-by:
Uma Shankar <uma.shankar@intel.com> Reviewed-by:
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Jon Bloomfield authored
commit 926abff2 upstream. Some of the gen instruction macros (e.g. MI_DISPLAY_FLIP) have the length directly encoded in them. Since these are used directly in the tables, the Length becomes part of the comparison used for matching during parsing. Thus, if the cmd being parsed has a different length to that in the table, it is not matched and the cmd is accepted via the default variable length path. Fix by masking out everything except the Opcode in the cmd tables Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com> Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
Chris Wilson <chris.p.wilson@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jon Bloomfield authored
commit f8c08d8f upstream. To keep things manageable, the pre-gen9 cmdparser does not attempt to track any form of nested BB_START's. This did not prevent usermode from using nested starts, or even chained batches because the cmdparser is not strictly enforced pre gen9. Instead, the existence of a nested BB_START would cause the batch to be emitted in insecure mode, and any privileged capabilities would not be available. For Gen9, the cmdparser becomes mandatory (for BCS at least), and so not providing any form of nested BB_START support becomes overly restrictive. Any such batch will simply not run. We make heavy use of backward jumps in igt, and it is much easier to add support for this restricted subset of nested jumps, than to rewrite the whole of our test suite to avoid them. Add the required logic to support limited backward jumps, to instructions that have already been validated by the parser. Note that it's not sufficient to simply approve any BB_START that jumps backwards in the buffer because this would allow an attacker to embed a rogue instruction sequence within the operand words of a harmless instruction (say LRI) and jump to that. We introduce a bit array to track every instr offset successfully validated, and test the target of BB_START against this. If the target offset hits, it is re-written to the same offset in the shadow buffer and the BB_START cmd is allowed. Note: This patch deliberately ignores checkpatch issues in the cmdtables, in order to match the style of the surrounding code. We'll correct the entire file in one go in a later patch. v2: set dispatch secure late (Mika) v3: rebase (Mika) v4: Clear whitelist on each parse Minor review updates (Chris) v5: Correct backward jump batching v6: fix compilation error due to struct eb shuffle (Mika) Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com> Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jon Bloomfield authored
commit 0546a29c upstream. In the next patch we will be adding a second valid termination condition which will require a small amount of refactoring to share logic with the BB_END case. Refactor all error conditions to jump to a dedicated exit path, with 'break' reserved only for a successful parse. Signed-off-by:
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Jon Bloomfield authored
commit 0f2f3975 upstream. For gen9 we enable cmdparsing on the BCS ring, specifically to catch inadvertent accesses to sensitive registers Unlike gen7/hsw, we use the parser only to block certain registers. We can rely on h/w to block restricted commands, so the command tables only provide enough info to allow the parser to delineate each command, and identify commands that access registers. Note: This patch deliberately ignores checkpatch issues in favour of matching the style of the surrounding code. We'll correct the entire file in one go in a later patch. v3: rebase (Mika) v4: Add RING_TIMESTAMP registers to whitelist (Jon) Signed-off-by:
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Jon Bloomfield authored
commit 435e8fc0 upstream. In "drm/i915: Add support for mandatory cmdparsing" we introduced the concept of mandatory parsing. This allows the cmdparser to be invoked even when user passes batch_len=0 to the execbuf ioctl's. However, the cmdparser needs to know the extents of the buffer being scanned. Refactor the code to ensure the cmdparser uses the actual object size, instead of the incoming length, if user passes 0. Signed-off-by:
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Jon Bloomfield authored
commit 4f7af194 upstream. For Gen7, the original cmdparser motive was to permit limited use of register read/write instructions in unprivileged BB's. This worked by copying the user supplied bb to a kmd owned bb, and running it in secure mode, from the ggtt, only if the scanner finds no unsafe commands or registers. For Gen8+ we can't use this same technique because running bb's from the ggtt also disables access to ppgtt space. But we also do not actually require 'secure' execution since we are only trying to reduce the available command/register set. Instead we will copy the user buffer to a kmd owned read-only bb in ppgtt, and run in the usual non-secure mode. Note that ro pages are only supported by ppgtt (not ggtt), but luckily that's exactly what we need. Add the required paths to map the shadow buffer to ppgtt ro for Gen8+ v2: IS_GEN7/IS_GEN (Mika) v3: rebase v4: rebase v5: rebase Signed-off-by:
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Jon Bloomfield authored
commit 311a50e7 upstream. The existing cmdparser for gen7 can be bypassed by specifying batch_len=0 in the execbuf call. This is safe because bypassing simply reduces the cmd-set available. In a later patch we will introduce cmdparsing for gen9, as a security measure, which must be strictly enforced since without it we are vulnerable to DoS attacks. Introduce the concept of 'required' cmd parsing that cannot be bypassed by submitting zero-length bb's. v2: rebase (Mika) v2: rebase (Mika) v3: fix conflict on engine flags (Mika) Signed-off-by:
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Jon Bloomfield authored
commit 66d8aba1 upstream. The previous patch has killed support for secure batches on gen6+, and hence the cmdparsers master tables are now dead code. Remove them. Signed-off-by:
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