1. 16 Sep, 2019 37 commits
  2. 15 Sep, 2019 2 commits
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Linux 5.3 · 4d856f72
      Linus Torvalds authored
      4d856f72
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Revert "ext4: make __ext4_get_inode_loc plug" · 72dbcf72
      Linus Torvalds authored
      This reverts commit b03755ad.
      
      This is sad, and done for all the wrong reasons.  Because that commit is
      good, and does exactly what it says: avoids a lot of small disk requests
      for the inode table read-ahead.
      
      However, it turns out that it causes an entirely unrelated problem: the
      getrandom() system call was introduced back in 2014 by commit
      c6e9d6f3 ("random: introduce getrandom(2) system call"), and people
      use it as a convenient source of good random numbers.
      
      But part of the current semantics for getrandom() is that it waits for
      the entropy pool to fill at least partially (unlike /dev/urandom).  And
      at least ArchLinux apparently has a systemd that uses getrandom() at
      boot time, and the improvements in IO patterns means that existing
      installations suddenly start hanging, waiting for entropy that will
      never happen.
      
      It seems to be an unlucky combination of not _quite_ enough entropy,
      together with a particular systemd version and configuration.  Lennart
      says that the systemd-random-seed process (which is what does this early
      access) is supposed to not block any other boot activity, but sadly that
      doesn't actually seem to be the case (possibly due bogus dependencies on
      cryptsetup for encrypted swapspace).
      
      The correct fix is to fix getrandom() to not block when it's not
      appropriate, but that fix is going to take a lot more discussion.  Do we
      just make it act like /dev/urandom by default, and add a new flag for
      "wait for entropy"? Do we add a boot-time option? Or do we just limit
      the amount of time it will wait for entropy?
      
      So in the meantime, we do the revert to give us time to discuss the
      eventual fix for the fundamental problem, at which point we can re-apply
      the ext4 inode table access optimization.
      Reported-by: default avatarAhmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
      Cc: Ted Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
      Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
      Cc: Alexander E. Patrakov <patrakov@gmail.com>
      Cc: Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@0pointer.de>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      72dbcf72
  3. 14 Sep, 2019 1 commit
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm · 1609d760
      Linus Torvalds authored
      Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
       "The main change here is a revert of reverts. We recently simplified
        some code that was thought unnecessary; however, since then KVM has
        grown quite a few cond_resched()s and for that reason the simplified
        code is prone to livelocks---one CPUs tries to empty a list of guest
        page tables while the others keep adding to them. This adds back the
        generation-based zapping of guest page tables, which was not
        unnecessary after all.
      
        On top of this, there is a fix for a kernel memory leak and a couple
        of s390 fixlets as well"
      
      * tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
        KVM: x86/mmu: Reintroduce fast invalidate/zap for flushing memslot
        KVM: x86: work around leak of uninitialized stack contents
        KVM: nVMX: handle page fault in vmread
        KVM: s390: Do not leak kernel stack data in the KVM_S390_INTERRUPT ioctl
        KVM: s390: kvm_s390_vm_start_migration: check dirty_bitmap before using it as target for memset()
      1609d760