- 02 Aug, 2010 40 commits
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Tetsuo Handa authored
Signed-off-by:
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by:
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Tetsuo Handa authored
Commit d74725b9 "TOMOYO: Use callback for updating entries." broke tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok() by counting deleted entries. It needs to count non-deleted entries. Signed-off-by:
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Eric Paris authored
execmod "could" show up on non regular files and non chr files. The current implementation would actually make these checks against non-existant bits since the code assumes the execmod permission is same for all file types. To make this line up for chr files we had to define execute_no_trans and entrypoint permissions. These permissions are unreachable and only existed to to make FILE__EXECMOD and CHR_FILE__EXECMOD the same. This patch drops those needless perms as well. Signed-off-by:
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by:
Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Paris authored
kernel can dynamically remap perms. Drop the open lookup table and put open in the common file perms. Signed-off-by:
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Eric Paris authored
Currently there are a number of applications (nautilus being the main one) which calls access() on files in order to determine how they should be displayed. It is normal and expected that nautilus will want to see if files are executable or if they are really read/write-able. access() should return the real permission. SELinux policy checks are done in access() and can result in lots of AVC denials as policy denies RWX on files which DAC allows. Currently SELinux must dontaudit actual attempts to read/write/execute a file in order to silence these messages (and not flood the logs.) But dontaudit rules like that can hide real attacks. This patch addes a new common file permission audit_access. This permission is special in that it is meaningless and should never show up in an allow rule. Instead the only place this permission has meaning is in a dontaudit rule like so: dontaudit nautilus_t sbin_t:file audit_access With such a rule if nautilus just checks access() we will still get denied and thus userspace will still get the correct answer but we will not log the denial. If nautilus attempted to actually perform one of the forbidden actions (rather than just querying access(2) about it) we would still log a denial. This type of dontaudit rule should be used sparingly, as it could be a method for an attacker to probe the system permissions without detection. Signed-off-by:
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Eric Paris authored
SELinux needs to pass the MAY_ACCESS flag so it can handle auditting correctly. Presently the masking of MAY_* flags is done in the VFS. In order to allow LSMs to decide what flags they care about and what flags they don't just pass them all and the each LSM mask off what they don't need. This patch should contain no functional changes to either the VFS or any LSM. Signed-off-by:
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Eric Paris authored
Currently MAY_ACCESS means that filesystems must check the permissions right then and not rely on cached results or the results of future operations on the object. This can be because of a call to sys_access() or because of a call to chdir() which needs to check search without relying on any future operations inside that dir. I plan to use MAY_ACCESS for other purposes in the security system, so I split the MAY_ACCESS and the MAY_CHDIR cases. Signed-off-by:
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Eric Paris authored
Move the reading of ocontext type data out of policydb_read() in a separate function ocontext_read() Signed-off-by:
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Eric Paris authored
move genfs read functionality out of policydb_read() and into a new function called genfs_read() Signed-off-by:
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Dan Carpenter authored
hashtab_create() only returns NULL on allocation failures to -ENOMEM is appropriate here. Signed-off-by:
Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com> Acked-by:
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Dan Carpenter authored
The original code always returned -1 (-EPERM) on error. The new code returns either -ENOMEM, or -EINVAL or it propagates the error codes from lower level functions next_entry() or hashtab_insert(). next_entry() returns -EINVAL. hashtab_insert() returns -EINVAL, -EEXIST, or -ENOMEM. Signed-off-by:
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Dan Carpenter authored
It's better to propagate the error code from avtab_init() instead of returning -1 (-EPERM). It turns out that avtab_init() never fails so this patch doesn't change how the code runs but it's still a clean up. Signed-off-by:
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Dan Carpenter authored
Originally cond_read_node() returned -1 (-EPERM) on errors which was incorrect. Now it either propagates the error codes from lower level functions next_entry() or cond_read_av_list() or it returns -ENOMEM or -EINVAL. next_entry() returns -EINVAL. cond_read_av_list() returns -EINVAL or -ENOMEM. Signed-off-by:
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Dan Carpenter authored
After this patch cond_read_av_list() no longer returns -1 for any errors. It just propagates error code back from lower levels. Those can either be -EINVAL or -ENOMEM. I also modified cond_insertf() since cond_read_av_list() passes that as a function pointer to avtab_read_item(). It isn't used anywhere else. Signed-off-by:
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Dan Carpenter authored
These are passed back when the security module gets loaded. The original code always returned -1 (-EPERM) on error but after this patch it can return -EINVAL, or -ENOMEM or propagate the error code from cond_read_node(). cond_read_node() still returns -1 all the time, but I fix that in a later patch. Signed-off-by:
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Dan Carpenter authored
The avtab_read_item() function tends to return -1 as a default error code which is wrong (-1 means -EPERM). I modified it to return appropriate error codes which is -EINVAL or the error code from next_entry() or insertf(). next_entry() returns -EINVAL. insertf() is a function pointer to either avtab_insert() or cond_insertf(). avtab_insert() returns -EINVAL, -ENOMEM, and -EEXIST. cond_insertf() currently returns -1, but I will fix it in a later patch. There is code in avtab_read() which translates the -1 returns from avtab_read_item() to -EINVAL. The translation is no longer needed, so I removed it. Signed-off-by:
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Chihau Chau authored
This fix a little code style issue deleting a space between a function name and a open parenthesis. Signed-off-by:
Chihau Chau <chihau@gmail.com> Acked-by:
Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Tvrtko Ursulin authored
lookup_one_len increments dentry reference count which is not decremented when the create operation fails. This can cause a kernel BUG at fs/dcache.c:676 at unmount time. Also error code returned when new_inode() fails was replaced with more appropriate -ENOMEM. Signed-off-by:
Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@sophos.com> Acked-by:
Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
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Arnd Bergmann authored
The default for llseek will change to no_llseek, so selinuxfs needs to add explicit .llseek assignments. Since we're dealing with regular files from a VFS perspective, use generic_file_llseek. Signed-off-by:
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Signed-off-by:
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Arnd Bergmann authored
The default for llseek will change to no_llseek, so securityfs users need to add explicit .llseek assignments. Since we're dealing with regular files from a VFS perspective, use generic_file_llseek. Signed-off-by:
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Tetsuo Handa authored
TOMOYO does not deal offset pointer. Thus seek operation makes no sense. Changing default seek operation from default_llseek() to no_llseek() might break some applications. Thus, explicitly set noop_llseek(). Signed-off-by:
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Mimi Zohar authored
Make the security extended attributes names global. Updated to move the remaining Smack xattrs. Signed-off-by:
Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by:
Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Justin P. Mattock authored
In commit bb952bb9 there was the accidental deletion of a statement from call_sbin_request_key() to render the process keyring ID to a text string so that it can be passed to /sbin/request-key. With gcc 4.6.0 this causes the following warning: CC security/keys/request_key.o security/keys/request_key.c: In function 'call_sbin_request_key': security/keys/request_key.c:102:15: warning: variable 'prkey' set but not used This patch reinstates that statement. Without this statement, /sbin/request-key will get some random rubbish from the stack as that parameter. Signed-off-by:
Justin P. Mattock <justinmattock@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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David Howells authored
keyctl_describe_key() turns the key reference it gets into a usable key pointer and assigns that to a variable called 'key', which it then ignores in favour of recomputing the key pointer each time it needs it. Make it use the precomputed pointer instead. Without this patch, gcc 4.6 reports that the variable key is set but not used: building with gcc 4.6 I'm getting a warning message: CC security/keys/keyctl.o security/keys/keyctl.c: In function 'keyctl_describe_key': security/keys/keyctl.c:472:14: warning: variable 'key' set but not used Reported-by:
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Tetsuo Handa authored
Commit 1dae08c "TOMOYO: Add interactive enforcing mode." forgot to register poll() hook. As a result, /usr/sbin/tomoyo-queryd was doing busy loop. Signed-off-by:
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Tetsuo Handa authored
Use shorter name in order to make it easier to fit 80 columns limit. Signed-off-by:
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Tetsuo Handa authored
Split tomoyo_write_profile() into several functions. Signed-off-by:
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Tetsuo Handa authored
When userspace program reads policy from /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface, TOMOYO uses line buffered mode. A line has at least one word. Commit 006dacc "TOMOYO: Support longer pathname." changed a word's max length from 4000 bytes to max kmalloc()able bytes. By that commit, a line's max length changed from 8192 bytes to more than max kmalloc()able bytes. Max number of words in a line remains finite. This patch changes the way of buffering so that all words in a line are firstly directly copied to userspace buffer as much as possible and are secondly queued for next read request. Words queued are guaranteed to be valid until /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface is close()d. Signed-off-by:
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Tetsuo Handa authored
tomoyo_print_..._acl() are similar. Merge them. Signed-off-by:
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Tetsuo Handa authored
Policy editor needs to know allow_execute entries in order to build domain transition tree. Reading all entries is slow. Thus, allow reading only allow_execute entries. Signed-off-by:
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Tetsuo Handa authored
Change list_for_each_cookie to (1) start from current position rather than next position (2) remove temporary cursor (3) check that srcu_read_lock() is held Signed-off-by:
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Tetsuo Handa authored
Use common code for "initialize_domain"/"no_initialize_domain"/"keep_domain"/ "no_keep_domain" keywords. Signed-off-by:
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Tetsuo Handa authored
Some programs behave differently depending on argv[0] passed to execve(). TOMOYO has "alias" keyword in order to allow administrators to define different domains if requested pathname passed to execve() is a symlink. But "alias" keyword is incomplete because this keyword assumes that requested pathname and argv[0] are identical. Thus, remove "alias" keyword (by this patch) and add syntax for checking argv[0] (by future patches). Signed-off-by:
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Tetsuo Handa authored
Use common code for "path_group" and "number_group". Signed-off-by:
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Tetsuo Handa authored
Now lists are accessible via array index. Aggregate reader functions using index. Signed-off-by:
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Tetsuo Handa authored
Assign list id and make the lists as array of "struct list_head". Signed-off-by:
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Tetsuo Handa authored
"struct tomoyo_path_group" and "struct tomoyo_number_group" are identical. Rename tomoyo_path_group/tomoyo_number_group to tomoyo_group and tomoyo_path_group_member to tomoyo_path_group and tomoyo_number_group_member to tomoyo_unmber_group. Signed-off-by:
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Paul Moore authored
There were a number of places using the following code pattern: struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security; ... which were simplified to the following: struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); Signed-off-by:
Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by:
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Paul Moore authored
At present, the socket related access controls use a mix of inode and socket labels; while there should be no practical difference (they _should_ always be the same), it makes the code more confusing. This patch attempts to convert all of the socket related access control points (with the exception of some of the inode/fd based controls) to use the socket's own label. In the process, I also converted the socket_has_perm() function to take a 'sock' argument instead of a 'socket' since that was adding a bit more overhead in some cases. Signed-off-by:
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Paul Moore authored
The sk_alloc_security() and sk_free_security() functions were only being called by the selinux_sk_alloc_security() and selinux_sk_free_security() functions so we just move the guts of the alloc/free routines to the callers and eliminate a layer of indirection. Signed-off-by:
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