- 22 Oct, 2013 9 commits
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Jason Gunthorpe authored
The version of the TPM should not depend on the bus it is connected through. 1.1, 1.2 and soon 2.0 TPMS will be all be able to use the same bus interfaces. Make tpm_show_caps try the 1.2 capability first. If that fails then fall back to the 1.1 capability. This effectively auto-detects what interface the TPM supports at run-time. Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> Reviewed-by: Joel Schopp <jschopp@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
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Jason Gunthorpe authored
For some reason this driver thinks that chip->data_buffer needs to be set before it can call tpm_pm_*. This is not true. data_buffer is used only by /dev/tpmX, which is why it is managed exclusively by the fops functions. Cc: Mathias Leblanc <mathias.leblanc@st.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> Reviewed-by: Joel Schopp <jschopp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Jason Gunthorpe authored
TPM drivers should not call dev_set_drvdata (or aliases), only the core code is allowed to call dev_set_drvdata, and it does it during tpm_register_hardware. These extra sets are harmless, but are an anti-pattern that many drivers have copied. Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> Reviewed-by: Joel Schopp <jschopp@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de> Acked-by: Ashley Lai <adlai@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
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Jason Gunthorpe authored
misc_open sets the file->private_date to the misc_dev when calling open. We can use container_of to go from the misc_dev back to the tpm_chip. Future clean ups will move tpm_open into a new file and this change means we do not have to export the tpm_chip list. Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> Reviewed-by: Joel Schopp <jschopp@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de> Acked-by: Ashley Lai <adlai@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
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Jason Gunthorpe authored
Just put the memory directly in the chip structure, rather than in a 2nd dedicated kmalloc. Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> Reviewed-by: Joel Schopp <jschopp@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de> Acked-by: Ashley Lai <adlai@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Jason Gunthorpe authored
Commit e0dd03ca ("tpm: return chip from tpm_register_hardware") changed the code path here so that ateml_get_base_addr no longer directly altered the tpm_vendor_specific structure, and instead placed the base address on the stack. The commit missed updating the request_region call, which would have resulted in request_region being called with 0 as the base address. I don't know if request_region(0, ..) will fail, if so the driver has been broken since 2006 and we should remove it from the tree as it has no users. Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> Reviewed-by: Joel Schopp <jschopp@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
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Jason Gunthorpe authored
This suppresses compile warnings on 32 bit builds. Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> Reviewed-by: Joel Schopp <jschopp@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de> Acked-by: Ashley Lai <adlai@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Peter Huewe authored
Since I'm actively maintaining the tpm subsystem for a few months now, it's time to step up and be an official maintainer for the tpm subsystem, atleast until I hear something different from my company. The maintaining is done solely in my private time, out of private interest. Speaking only on behalf of myself, trying to be as vendor neutral as possible. Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
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- 26 Sep, 2013 2 commits
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Paul Moore authored
The SELinux/NetLabel glue code has a locking bug that affects systems with NetLabel enabled, see the kernel error message below. This patch corrects this problem by converting the bottom half socket lock to a more conventional, and correct for this call-path, lock_sock() call. =============================== [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ] 3.11.0-rc3+ #19 Not tainted ------------------------------- net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c:1928 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0 2 locks held by ping/731: #0: (slock-AF_INET/1){+.-...}, at: [...] selinux_netlbl_socket_connect #1: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<...>] netlbl_conn_setattr stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 731 Comm: ping Not tainted 3.11.0-rc3+ #19 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 0000000000000001 ffff88006f659d28 ffffffff81726b6a ffff88003732c500 ffff88006f659d58 ffffffff810e4457 ffff88006b845a00 0000000000000000 000000000000000c ffff880075aa2f50 ffff88006f659d90 ffffffff8169bec7 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81726b6a>] dump_stack+0x54/0x74 [<ffffffff810e4457>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xe7/0x120 [<ffffffff8169bec7>] cipso_v4_sock_setattr+0x187/0x1a0 [<ffffffff8170f317>] netlbl_conn_setattr+0x187/0x190 [<ffffffff8170f195>] ? netlbl_conn_setattr+0x5/0x190 [<ffffffff8131ac9e>] selinux_netlbl_socket_connect+0xae/0xc0 [<ffffffff81303025>] selinux_socket_connect+0x135/0x170 [<ffffffff8119d127>] ? might_fault+0x57/0xb0 [<ffffffff812fb146>] security_socket_connect+0x16/0x20 [<ffffffff815d3ad3>] SYSC_connect+0x73/0x130 [<ffffffff81739a85>] ? sysret_check+0x22/0x5d [<ffffffff810e5e2d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xfd/0x1c0 [<ffffffff81373d4e>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f [<ffffffff815d52be>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10 [<ffffffff81739a59>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
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Duan Jiong authored
Signed-off-by: Duan Jiong <duanj.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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- 25 Sep, 2013 21 commits
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Antonio Alecrim Jr authored
Signed-off-by: Antonio Alecrim Jr <antonio.alecrim@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Konstantin Khlebnikov authored
This patch fixes lack of license, otherwise x509_key_parser.ko taints kernel. Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Konstantin Khlebnikov authored
This patch fixes lack of license, otherwise mpi.ko taints kernel. Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Mimi Zohar authored
In order to create the integrity keyrings (eg. _evm, _ima), root's uid and session keyrings need to be initialized early. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Mimi Zohar authored
Only public keys, with certificates signed by an existing 'trusted' key on the system trusted keyring, should be added to a trusted keyring. This patch adds support for verifying a certificate's signature. This is derived from David Howells pkcs7_request_asymmetric_key() patch. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Mimi Zohar authored
Give the root user the ability to read the system keyring and put read permission on the trusted keys added during boot. The latter is actually more theoretical than real for the moment as asymmetric keys do not currently provide a read operation. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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David Howells authored
The keyring expansion patches introduces a new search method by which key_search() attempts to walk directly to the key that has exactly the same description as the requested one. However, this causes inexact matching of asymmetric keys to fail. The solution to this is to select iterative rather than direct search as the default search type for asymmetric keys. As an example, the kernel might have a key like this: Magrathea: Glacier signing key: 6a2a0f82bad7e396665f465e4e3e1f9bd24b1226 and: keyctl search <keyring-ID> asymmetric id:d24b1226 should find the key, despite that not being its exact description. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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David Howells authored
Add KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED to indicate that a key either comes from a trusted source or had a cryptographic signature chain that led back to a trusted key the kernel already possessed. Add KEY_FLAGS_TRUSTED_ONLY to indicate that a keyring will only accept links to keys marked with KEY_FLAGS_TRUSTED. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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David Howells authored
Separate the kernel signature checking keyring from module signing so that it can be used by code other than the module-signing code. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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David Howells authored
Have make canonicalise the paths of the X.509 certificates before we sort them as this allows $(sort) to better remove duplicates. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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David Howells authored
Load all the files matching the pattern "*.x509" that are to be found in kernel base source dir and base build dir into the module signing keyring. The "extra_certificates" file is then redundant. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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David Howells authored
Remove the certificate date checks that are performed when a certificate is parsed. There are two checks: a valid from and a valid to. The first check is causing a lot of problems with system clocks that don't keep good time and the second places an implicit expiry date upon the kernel when used for module signing, so do we really need them? Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> cc: Alexander Holler <holler@ahsoftware.de> cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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David Howells authored
Handle certificates that lack an authorityKeyIdentifier field by assuming they're self-signed and checking their signatures against themselves. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
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David Howells authored
Check that the algorithm IDs obtained from the ASN.1 parse by OID lookup corresponds to algorithms that are available to us. Reported-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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David Howells authored
Embed a public_key_signature struct in struct x509_certificate, eliminating now unnecessary fields, and split x509_check_signature() to create a filler function for it that attaches a digest of the signed data and an MPI that represents the signature data. x509_free_certificate() is then modified to deal with these. Whilst we're at it, export both x509_check_signature() and the new x509_get_sig_params(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
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David Howells authored
struct x509_certificate needs struct tm declaring by #inclusion of linux/time.h prior to its definition. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
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David Howells authored
Store public key algorithm ID in public_key_signature struct for reference purposes. This allows a public_key_signature struct to be embedded in struct x509_certificate and other places more easily. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
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David Howells authored
Modify public_key_verify_signature() so that it now takes a public_key struct rather than a key struct and supply a wrapper that takes a key struct. The wrapper is then used by the asymmetric key subtype and the modified function is used by X.509 self-signature checking and can be used by other things also. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
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David Howells authored
Store public key algo ID in public_key struct for reference purposes. This allows it to be removed from the x509_certificate struct and used to find a default in public_key_verify_signature(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
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David Howells authored
Move the public-key algorithm pointer array from x509_public_key.c to public_key.c as it isn't X.509 specific. Note that to make this configure correctly, the public key part must be dependent on the RSA module rather than the other way round. This needs a further patch to make use of the crypto module loading stuff rather than using a fixed table. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
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David Howells authored
Rename the arrays of public key parameters (public key algorithm names, hash algorithm names and ID type names) so that the array name ends in "_name". Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
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- 24 Sep, 2013 8 commits
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David Howells authored
Add support for per-user_namespace registers of persistent per-UID kerberos caches held within the kernel. This allows the kerberos cache to be retained beyond the life of all a user's processes so that the user's cron jobs can work. The kerberos cache is envisioned as a keyring/key tree looking something like: struct user_namespace \___ .krb_cache keyring - The register \___ _krb.0 keyring - Root's Kerberos cache \___ _krb.5000 keyring - User 5000's Kerberos cache \___ _krb.5001 keyring - User 5001's Kerberos cache \___ tkt785 big_key - A ccache blob \___ tkt12345 big_key - Another ccache blob Or possibly: struct user_namespace \___ .krb_cache keyring - The register \___ _krb.0 keyring - Root's Kerberos cache \___ _krb.5000 keyring - User 5000's Kerberos cache \___ _krb.5001 keyring - User 5001's Kerberos cache \___ tkt785 keyring - A ccache \___ krbtgt/REDHAT.COM@REDHAT.COM big_key \___ http/REDHAT.COM@REDHAT.COM user \___ afs/REDHAT.COM@REDHAT.COM user \___ nfs/REDHAT.COM@REDHAT.COM user \___ krbtgt/KERNEL.ORG@KERNEL.ORG big_key \___ http/KERNEL.ORG@KERNEL.ORG big_key What goes into a particular Kerberos cache is entirely up to userspace. Kernel support is limited to giving you the Kerberos cache keyring that you want. The user asks for their Kerberos cache by: krb_cache = keyctl_get_krbcache(uid, dest_keyring); The uid is -1 or the user's own UID for the user's own cache or the uid of some other user's cache (requires CAP_SETUID). This permits rpc.gssd or whatever to mess with the cache. The cache returned is a keyring named "_krb.<uid>" that the possessor can read, search, clear, invalidate, unlink from and add links to. Active LSMs get a chance to rule on whether the caller is permitted to make a link. Each uid's cache keyring is created when it first accessed and is given a timeout that is extended each time this function is called so that the keyring goes away after a while. The timeout is configurable by sysctl but defaults to three days. Each user_namespace struct gets a lazily-created keyring that serves as the register. The cache keyrings are added to it. This means that standard key search and garbage collection facilities are available. The user_namespace struct's register goes away when it does and anything left in it is then automatically gc'd. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com> cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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David Howells authored
Implement a big key type that can save its contents to tmpfs and thus swapspace when memory is tight. This is useful for Kerberos ticket caches. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
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David Howells authored
Expand the capacity of a keyring to be able to hold a lot more keys by using the previously added associative array implementation. Currently the maximum capacity is: (PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(header)) / sizeof(struct key *) which, on a 64-bit system, is a little more 500. However, since this is being used for the NFS uid mapper, we need more than that. The new implementation gives us effectively unlimited capacity. With some alterations, the keyutils testsuite runs successfully to completion after this patch is applied. The alterations are because (a) keyrings that are simply added to no longer appear ordered and (b) some of the errors have changed a bit. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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David Howells authored
Add a generic associative array implementation that can be used as the container for keyrings, thereby massively increasing the capacity available whilst also speeding up searching in keyrings that contain a lot of keys. This may also be useful in FS-Cache for tracking cookies. Documentation is added into Documentation/associative_array.txt Some of the properties of the implementation are: (1) Objects are opaque pointers. The implementation does not care where they point (if anywhere) or what they point to (if anything). [!] NOTE: Pointers to objects _must_ be zero in the two least significant bits. (2) Objects do not need to contain linkage blocks for use by the array. This permits an object to be located in multiple arrays simultaneously. Rather, the array is made up of metadata blocks that point to objects. (3) Objects are labelled as being one of two types (the type is a bool value). This information is stored in the array, but has no consequence to the array itself or its algorithms. (4) Objects require index keys to locate them within the array. (5) Index keys must be unique. Inserting an object with the same key as one already in the array will replace the old object. (6) Index keys can be of any length and can be of different lengths. (7) Index keys should encode the length early on, before any variation due to length is seen. (8) Index keys can include a hash to scatter objects throughout the array. (9) The array can iterated over. The objects will not necessarily come out in key order. (10) The array can be iterated whilst it is being modified, provided the RCU readlock is being held by the iterator. Note, however, under these circumstances, some objects may be seen more than once. If this is a problem, the iterator should lock against modification. Objects will not be missed, however, unless deleted. (11) Objects in the array can be looked up by means of their index key. (12) Objects can be looked up whilst the array is being modified, provided the RCU readlock is being held by the thread doing the look up. The implementation uses a tree of 16-pointer nodes internally that are indexed on each level by nibbles from the index key. To improve memory efficiency, shortcuts can be emplaced to skip over what would otherwise be a series of single-occupancy nodes. Further, nodes pack leaf object pointers into spare space in the node rather than making an extra branch until as such time an object needs to be added to a full node. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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David Howells authored
Drop the permissions argument from __keyring_search_one() as the only caller passes 0 here - which causes all checks to be skipped. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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David Howells authored
Define a __key_get() wrapper to use rather than atomic_inc() on the key usage count as this makes it easier to hook in refcount error debugging. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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David Howells authored
Search for auth-key by name rather than by target key ID as, in a future patch, we'll by searching directly by index key in preference to iteration over all keys. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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David Howells authored
Search functions pass around a bunch of arguments, each of which gets copied with each call. Introduce a search context structure to hold these. Whilst we're at it, create a search flag that indicates whether the search should be directly to the description or whether it should iterate through all keys looking for a non-description match. This will be useful when keyrings use a generic data struct with generic routines to manage their content as the search terms can just be passed through to the iterator callback function. Also, for future use, the data to be supplied to the match function is separated from the description pointer in the search context. This makes it clear which is being supplied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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