- 29 Aug, 2019 32 commits
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Thiago Jung Bauermann authored
Secure guest memory is inacessible to devices so regular DMA isn't possible. In that case set devices' dma_map_ops to NULL so that the generic DMA code path will use SWIOTLB to bounce buffers for DMA. Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190820021326.6884-14-bauerman@linux.ibm.com
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Sukadev Bhattiprolu authored
Normally, the HV emulates some instructions like MSGSNDP, MSGCLRP from a KVM guest. To emulate the instructions, it must first read the instruction from the guest's memory and decode its parameters. However for a secure guest (aka SVM), the page containing the instruction is in secure memory and the HV cannot access directly. It would need the Ultravisor (UV) to facilitate accessing the instruction and parameters but the UV currently does not have the support for such accesses. Until the UV has such support, disable doorbells in SVMs. This might incur a performance hit but that is yet to be quantified. With this patch applied (needed only in SVMs not needed for HV) we are able to launch SVM guests with multi-core support. Eg: qemu -smp sockets=2,cores=2,threads=2. Fix suggested by Benjamin Herrenschmidt. Thanks to input from Paul Mackerras, Ram Pai and Michael Anderson. Signed-off-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190820021326.6884-13-bauerman@linux.ibm.com
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Ryan Grimm authored
User space might want to know it's running in a secure VM. It can't do a mfmsr because mfmsr is a privileged instruction. The solution here is to create a cpu attribute: /sys/devices/system/cpu/svm which will read 0 or 1 based on the S bit of the current CPU. Signed-off-by: Ryan Grimm <grimm@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190820021326.6884-12-bauerman@linux.ibm.com
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Ram Pai authored
A new kernel deserves a clean slate. Any pages shared with the hypervisor is unshared before invoking the new kernel. However there are exceptions. If the new kernel is invoked to dump the current kernel, or if there is a explicit request to preserve the state of the current kernel, unsharing of pages is skipped. NOTE: While testing crashkernel, make sure at least 256M is reserved for crashkernel. Otherwise SWIOTLB allocation will fail and crash kernel will fail to boot. Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190820021326.6884-11-bauerman@linux.ibm.com
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Anshuman Khandual authored
Secure guests need to share the DTL buffers with the hypervisor. To that end, use a kmem_cache constructor which converts the underlying buddy allocated SLUB cache pages into shared memory. Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <khandual@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190820021326.6884-10-bauerman@linux.ibm.com
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Anshuman Khandual authored
LPPACA structures need to be shared with the host. Hence they need to be in shared memory. Instead of allocating individual chunks of memory for a given structure from memblock, a contiguous chunk of memory is allocated and then converted into shared memory. Subsequent allocation requests will come from the contiguous chunk which will be always shared memory for all structures. While we are able to use a kmem_cache constructor for the Debug Trace Log, LPPACAs are allocated very early in the boot process (before SLUB is available) so we need to use a simpler scheme here. Introduce helper is_svm_platform() which uses the S bit of the MSR to tell whether we're running as a secure guest. Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <khandual@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190820021326.6884-9-bauerman@linux.ibm.com
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Thiago Jung Bauermann authored
Helps document what the hard-coded number means. Also take the opportunity to fix an #endif comment. Suggested-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190820021326.6884-8-bauerman@linux.ibm.com
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Sukadev Bhattiprolu authored
Protected Execution Facility (PEF) is an architectural change for POWER 9 that enables Secure Virtual Machines (SVMs). When enabled, PEF adds a new higher privileged mode, called Ultravisor mode, to POWER architecture. The hardware changes include the following: * There is a new bit in the MSR that determines whether the current process is running in secure mode, MSR(S) bit 41. MSR(S)=1, process is in secure mode, MSR(s)=0 process is in normal mode. * The MSR(S) bit can only be set by the Ultravisor. * HRFID cannot be used to set the MSR(S) bit. If the hypervisor needs to return to a SVM it must use an ultracall. It can determine if the VM it is returning to is secure. * The privilege of a process is now determined by three MSR bits, MSR(S, HV, PR). In each of the tables below the modes are listed from least privilege to highest privilege. The higher privilege modes can access all the resources of the lower privilege modes. **Secure Mode MSR Settings** +---+---+---+---------------+ | S | HV| PR|Privilege | +===+===+===+===============+ | 1 | 0 | 1 | Problem | +---+---+---+---------------+ | 1 | 0 | 0 | Privileged(OS)| +---+---+---+---------------+ | 1 | 1 | 0 | Ultravisor | +---+---+---+---------------+ | 1 | 1 | 1 | Reserved | +---+---+---+---------------+ **Normal Mode MSR Settings** +---+---+---+---------------+ | S | HV| PR|Privilege | +===+===+===+===============+ | 0 | 0 | 1 | Problem | +---+---+---+---------------+ | 0 | 0 | 0 | Privileged(OS)| +---+---+---+---------------+ | 0 | 1 | 0 | Hypervisor | +---+---+---+---------------+ | 0 | 1 | 1 | Problem (HV) | +---+---+---+---------------+ Signed-off-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> [ cclaudio: Update the commit message ] Signed-off-by: Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190820021326.6884-7-bauerman@linux.ibm.com
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Ram Pai authored
These functions are used when the guest wants to grant the hypervisor access to certain pages. Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190820021326.6884-6-bauerman@linux.ibm.com
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Ram Pai authored
Make the Enter-Secure-Mode (ESM) ultravisor call to switch the VM to secure mode. Pass kernel base address and FDT address so that the Ultravisor is able to verify the integrity of the VM using information from the ESM blob. Add "svm=" command line option to turn on switching to secure mode. Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> [ andmike: Generate an RTAS os-term hcall when the ESM ucall fails. ] Signed-off-by: Michael Anderson <andmike@linux.ibm.com> [ bauerman: Cleaned up the code a bit. ] Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190820021326.6884-5-bauerman@linux.ibm.com
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Benjamin Herrenschmidt authored
For secure VMs, the signing tool will create a ticket called the "ESM blob" for the Enter Secure Mode ultravisor call with the signatures of the kernel and initrd among other things. This adds support to the wrapper script for adding that blob via the "-e" option to the zImage.pseries. It also adds code to the zImage wrapper itself to retrieve and if necessary relocate the blob, and pass its address to Linux via the device-tree, to be later consumed by prom_init. Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> [ bauerman: Minor adjustments to some comments. ] Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190820021326.6884-4-bauerman@linux.ibm.com
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Thiago Jung Bauermann authored
Introduce CONFIG_PPC_SVM to control support for secure guests and include Ultravisor-related helpers when it is selected Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190820021326.6884-3-bauerman@linux.ibm.com
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Michael Ellerman authored
Merge our ppc-kvm topic branch to bring in the Ultravisor support patches.
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Michael Ellerman authored
This branch has some cross-arch patches that are a prequisite for the SVM work. They're in a topic branch in case any of the other arch maintainers want to merge them to resolve conflicts.
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Claudio Carvalho authored
The ultravisor (UV) provides an in-memory console which follows the OPAL in-memory console structure. This patch extends the OPAL msglog code to initialize the UV memory console and provide the "/sys/firmware/ultravisor/msglog" interface for userspace to view the UV message log. Signed-off-by: Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190828130521.26764-2-mpe@ellerman.id.au
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Claudio Carvalho authored
This patch refactors the code in opal-msglog that operates on the OPAL memory console in order to make it cleaner and also allow the reuse of the new memcons_* functions. Signed-off-by: Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190828130521.26764-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au
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Sukadev Bhattiprolu authored
When an SVM makes an hypercall or incurs some other exception, the Ultravisor usually forwards (a.k.a. reflects) the exceptions to the Hypervisor. After processing the exception, Hypervisor uses the UV_RETURN ultracall to return control back to the SVM. The expected register state on entry to this ultracall is: * Non-volatile registers are restored to their original values. * If returning from an hypercall, register R0 contains the return value (unlike other ultracalls) and, registers R4 through R12 contain any output values of the hypercall. * R3 contains the ultracall number, i.e UV_RETURN. * If returning with a synthesized interrupt, R2 contains the synthesized interrupt number. Thanks to input from Paul Mackerras, Ram Pai and Mike Anderson. Signed-off-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190822034838.27876-8-cclaudio@linux.ibm.com
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Claudio Carvalho authored
LDBAR is a per-thread SPR populated and used by the thread-imc pmu driver to dump the data counter into memory. It contains memory along with few other configuration bits. LDBAR is populated and enabled only when any of the thread imc pmu events are monitored. In ultravisor enabled systems, LDBAR becomes ultravisor privileged and an attempt to write to it will cause a Hypervisor Emulation Assistance interrupt. In ultravisor enabled systems, the ultravisor is responsible to maintain the LDBAR (e.g. save and restore it). This restricts LDBAR access to only when ultravisor is disabled. Signed-off-by: Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Ryan Grimm <grimm@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190822034838.27876-7-cclaudio@linux.ibm.com
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Claudio Carvalho authored
In ultravisor enabled systems, PTCR becomes ultravisor privileged only for writing and an attempt to write to it will cause a Hypervisor Emulation Assitance interrupt. This patch uses the set_ptcr_when_no_uv() function to restrict PTCR writing to only when ultravisor is disabled. Signed-off-by: Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190822034838.27876-6-cclaudio@linux.ibm.com
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Michael Anderson authored
When Ultravisor (UV) is enabled, the partition table is stored in secure memory and can only be accessed via the UV. The Hypervisor (HV) however maintains a copy of the partition table in normal memory to allow Nest MMU translations to occur (for normal VMs). The HV copy includes partition table entries (PATE)s for secure VMs which would currently be unused (Nest MMU translations cannot access secure memory) but they would be needed as we add functionality. This patch adds the UV_WRITE_PATE ucall which is used to update the PATE for a VM (both normal and secure) when Ultravisor is enabled. Signed-off-by: Michael Anderson <andmike@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> [ cclaudio: Write the PATE in HV's table before doing that in UV's ] Signed-off-by: Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Ryan Grimm <grimm@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190822034838.27876-5-cclaudio@linux.ibm.com
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Claudio Carvalho authored
In PEF enabled systems, some of the resources which were previously hypervisor privileged are now ultravisor privileged and controlled by the ultravisor firmware. This adds FW_FEATURE_ULTRAVISOR to indicate if PEF is enabled. The host kernel can use FW_FEATURE_ULTRAVISOR, for instance, to skip accessing resources (e.g. PTCR and LDBAR) in case PEF is enabled. Signed-off-by: Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@linux.ibm.com> [ andmike: Device node name to "ibm,ultravisor" ] Signed-off-by: Michael Anderson <andmike@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190822034838.27876-4-cclaudio@linux.ibm.com
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Claudio Carvalho authored
The ultracalls (ucalls for short) allow the Secure Virtual Machines (SVM)s and hypervisor to request services from the ultravisor such as accessing a register or memory region that can only be accessed when running in ultravisor-privileged mode. This patch adds the ucall_norets() ultravisor call handler. The specific service needed from an ucall is specified in register R3 (the first parameter to the ucall). Other parameters to the ucall, if any, are specified in registers R4 through R12. Return value of all ucalls is in register R3. Other output values from the ucall, if any, are returned in registers R4 through R12. Each ucall returns specific error codes, applicable in the context of the ucall. However, like with the PowerPC Architecture Platform Reference (PAPR), if no specific error code is defined for a particular situation, then the ucall will fallback to an erroneous parameter-position based code. i.e U_PARAMETER, U_P2, U_P3 etc depending on the ucall parameter that may have caused the error. Every host kernel (powernv) needs to be able to do ucalls in case it ends up being run in a machine with ultravisor enabled. Otherwise, the kernel may crash early in boot trying to access ultravisor resources, for instance, trying to set the partition table entry 0. Secure guests also need to be able to do ucalls and its kernel may not have CONFIG_PPC_POWERNV=y. For that reason, the ucall.S file is placed under arch/powerpc/kernel. If ultravisor is not enabled, the ucalls will be redirected to the hypervisor which must handle/fail the call. Thanks to inputs from Ram Pai and Michael Anderson. Signed-off-by: Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190822034838.27876-3-cclaudio@linux.ibm.com
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Sukadev Bhattiprolu authored
Protected Execution Facility (PEF) is an architectural change for POWER 9 that enables Secure Virtual Machines (SVMs). When enabled, PEF adds a new higher privileged mode, called Ultravisor mode, to POWER architecture. Along with the new mode there is new firmware called the Protected Execution Ultravisor (or Ultravisor for short). POWER 9 DD2.3 chips (PVR=0x004e1203) or greater will be PEF-capable. Attached documentation provides an overview of PEF and defines the API for various interfaces that must be implemented in the Ultravisor firmware as well as in the KVM Hypervisor. Based on input from Mike Anderson, Thiago Bauermann, Claudio Carvalho, Ben Herrenschmidt, Guerney Hunt, Paul Mackerras. Signed-off-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Guerney Hunt <gdhh@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Anderson <andmike@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Thiago Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190822034838.27876-2-cclaudio@linux.ibm.com
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Maxiwell S. Garcia authored
The ELF note documentation describes the types and descriptors to be used with the PowerPC namespace. Signed-off-by: Maxiwell S. Garcia <maxiwell@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190829155021.2915-3-maxiwell@linux.ibm.com
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Claudio Carvalho authored
Add the PowerPC name and the PPC_ELFNOTE_CAPABILITIES type in the kernel binary ELF note. This type is a bitmap that can be used to advertise kernel capabilities to userland. This patch also defines PPCCAP_ULTRAVISOR_BIT as being the bit zero. Suggested-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org> Signed-off-by: Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@linux.ibm.com> [ maxiwell: Define the 'PowerPC' type in the elfnote.h ] Signed-off-by: Maxiwell S. Garcia <maxiwell@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190829155021.2915-2-maxiwell@linux.ibm.com
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Alexey Kardashevskiy authored
As now we have xchg_no_kill/tce_kill, these are not used anymore so remove them. Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190829085252.72370-6-aik@ozlabs.ru
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Alexey Kardashevskiy authored
This is the last implementation of iommu_table_ops::exchange() which we are about to remove. This implements xchg_no_kill() for pseries. Since it is paravirtual platform, the hypervisor does TCE invalidations and we do not have to deal with it here, hence no tce_kill() hook. Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190829085252.72370-5-aik@ozlabs.ru
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Alexey Kardashevskiy authored
Invalidating a TCE cache entry for each updated TCE is quite expensive. This makes use of the new iommu_table_ops::xchg_no_kill()/tce_kill() callbacks to bring down the time spent in mapping a huge guest DMA window. Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190829085252.72370-4-aik@ozlabs.ru
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Alexey Kardashevskiy authored
Invalidating a TCE cache entry for each updated TCE is quite expensive. This makes use of the new iommu_table_ops::xchg_no_kill()/tce_kill() callbacks to bring down the time spent in mapping a huge guest DMA window; roughly 20s to 10s for each guest's 100GB of DMA space. Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru> Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190829085252.72370-3-aik@ozlabs.ru
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Alexey Kardashevskiy authored
At the moment updates in a TCE table are made by iommu_table_ops::exchange which update one TCE and invalidates an entry in the PHB/NPU TCE cache via set of registers called "TCE Kill" (hence the naming). Writing a TCE is a simple xchg() but invalidating the TCE cache is a relatively expensive OPAL call. Mapping a 100GB guest with PCI+NPU passed through devices takes about 20s. Thankfully we can do better. Since such big mappings happen at the boot time and when memory is plugged/onlined (i.e. not often), these requests come in 512 pages so we call call OPAL 512 times less which brings 20s from the above to less than 10s. Also, since TCE caches can be flushed entirely, calling OPAL for 512 TCEs helps skiboot [1] to decide whether to flush the entire cache or not. This implements 2 new iommu_table_ops callbacks: - xchg_no_kill() to update a single TCE with no TCE invalidation; - tce_kill() to invalidate multiple TCEs. This uses the same xchg_no_kill() callback for IODA1/2. This implements 2 new wrappers on top of the new callbacks similar to the existing iommu_tce_xchg(). This does not use the new callbacks yet, the next patches will; so this should not cause any behavioral change. Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190829085252.72370-2-aik@ozlabs.ru
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Alexey Kardashevskiy authored
H_PUT_TCE_INDIRECT handlers receive a page with up to 512 TCEs from a guest. Although we verify correctness of TCEs before we do anything with the existing tables, there is a small window when a check in kvmppc_tce_validate might pass and right after that the guest alters the page with TCEs which can cause early exit from the handler and leave srcu_read_lock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu) (virtual mode) or lock_rmap(rmap) (real mode) locked. This fixes the bug by jumping to the common exit code with an appropriate unlock. Fixes: 121f80ba ("KVM: PPC: VFIO: Add in-kernel acceleration for VFIO") Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190826045520.92153-1-aik@ozlabs.ru
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Alexey Kardashevskiy authored
The existing code uses bunch of hardcoded values from the PCI Bus Binding to IEEE Std 1275 spec; and it does so in quite non-obvious way. This defines fields from the cell#0 of the "reg" property of a PCI device and uses them for parsing. This should cause no behavioral change. Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru> [mpe: Unsplit some 80/81 char lines, space the code with some newlines] Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190829084417.71873-1-aik@ozlabs.ru
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- 28 Aug, 2019 8 commits
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Christoph Hellwig authored
This switches to using common code for the DMA allocations, including potential use of the CMA allocator if configured. Switching to the generic code enables DMA allocations from atomic context, which is required by the DMA API documentation, and also adds various other minor features drivers start relying upon. It also makes sure we have on tested code base for all architectures that require uncached pte bits for coherent DMA allocations. Another advantage is that consistent memory allocations now share the general vmalloc pool instead of needing an explicit careout from it. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Tested-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> # tested on 8xx Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190814132230.31874-2-hch@lst.de
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Nicholas Piggin authored
There is support for the kernel to execute the 'sc 0' instruction and make a system call to itself. This is a relic that is unused in the tree, therefore untested. It's also highly questionable for modules to be doing this. Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190827033010.28090-3-npiggin@gmail.com
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Nicholas Piggin authored
Commit 3033f14a ("clone: support passing tls argument via C rather than pt_regs magic") introduced the HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS option. Use it to avoid a subtle assumption about the argument ordering of clone type syscalls. Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190827033010.28090-2-npiggin@gmail.com
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Christophe Leroy authored
Only 601 and E200 have CPU_FTR_COHERENT_ICACHE. Just use #ifdefs instead of feature fixup. Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/5f3e92ccd64d06477b27626f6007a9da3b8da157.1566834712.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr
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Christophe Leroy authored
Only 601 and e200 have unified I/D cache. Drop the feature and use CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_601 and CONFIG_E200. Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b5902144266d2f4eed1ffea53915bd0245841e02.1566834712.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr
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Christophe Leroy authored
Use CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_601 instead of reading PVR to know if it is a 601 or not. Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/909c26db9facd7fe454695b303f952e019dd9eda.1566834712.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr
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Christophe Leroy authored
CPU_FTR_USE_RTC feature only applies to powerpc601. Drop this feature and replace it with tests on CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_601. Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/170411e2360861f4a95c21faad43519a08bc4040.1566834712.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr
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Christophe Leroy authored
Now that 601 is exclusive from other 6xx, CPU_FTR_601 and associated fixups are useless. Drop this feature and use #ifdefs instead. Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ecdb7194a17dbfa01865df6a82979533adc2c70b.1566834712.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr
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