No reason for these not to be const.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Suggested-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Print the content of current->comm in messages generated by lockdown to
indicate a restriction that was hit.  This makes it a bit easier to find
out what caused the message.

The message now patterned something like:

        Lockdown: <comm>: <what> is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

efivar_ssdt_load allows the kernel to import arbitrary ACPI code from an
EFI variable, which gives arbitrary code execution in ring 0. Prevent
that when the kernel is locked down.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Tracefs may release more information about the kernel than desirable, so
restrict it when the kernel is locked down in confidentiality mode by
preventing open().

(Fixed by Ben Hutchings to avoid a null dereference in
default_file_open())
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Disallow opening of debugfs files that might be used to muck around when
the kernel is locked down as various drivers give raw access to hardware
through debugfs.  Given the effort of auditing all 2000 or so files and
manually fixing each one as necessary, I've chosen to apply a heuristic
instead.  The following changes are made:

 (1) chmod and chown are disallowed on debugfs objects (though the root dir
     can be modified by mount and remount, but I'm not worried about that).

 (2) When the kernel is locked down, only files with the following criteria
     are permitted to be opened:

	- The file must have mode 00444
	- The file must not have ioctl methods
	- The file must not have mmap

 (3) When the kernel is locked down, files may only be opened for reading.

Normal device interaction should be done through configfs, sysfs or a
miscdev, not debugfs.

Note that this makes it unnecessary to specifically lock down show_dsts(),
show_devs() and show_call() in the asus-wmi driver.

I would actually prefer to lock down all files by default and have the
the files unlocked by the creator.  This is tricky to manage correctly,
though, as there are 19 creation functions and ~1600 call sites (some of
them in loops scanning tables).
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>
cc: acpi4asus-user@lists.sourceforge.net
cc: platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org
cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Systems in lockdown mode should block the kexec of untrusted kernels.
For x86 and ARM we can ensure that a kernel is trustworthy by validating
a PE signature, but this isn't possible on other architectures. On those
platforms we can use IMA digital signatures instead. Add a function to
determine whether IMA has or will verify signatures for a given event type,
and if so permit kexec_file() even if the kernel is otherwise locked down.
This is restricted to cases where CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING is set
in order to prevent an attacker from loading additional keys at runtime.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Disallow the use of certain perf facilities that might allow userspace to
access kernel data.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

bpf_read() and bpf_read_str() could potentially be abused to (eg) allow
private keys in kernel memory to be leaked. Disable them if the kernel
has been locked down in confidentiality mode.
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
cc: Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com>
cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Disallow the creation of perf and ftrace kprobes when the kernel is
locked down in confidentiality mode by preventing their registration.
This prevents kprobes from being used to access kernel memory to steal
crypto data, but continues to allow the use of kprobes from signed
modules.
Reported-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com>
Cc: davem@davemloft.net
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Disallow access to /proc/kcore when the kernel is locked down to prevent
access to cryptographic data. This is limited to lockdown
confidentiality mode and is still permitted in integrity mode.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

The testmmiotrace module shouldn't be permitted when the kernel is locked
down as it can be used to arbitrarily read and write MMIO space. This is
a runtime check rather than buildtime in order to allow configurations
where the same kernel may be run in both locked down or permissive modes
depending on local policy.
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
cc: x86@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Provided an annotation for module parameters that specify hardware
parameters (such as io ports, iomem addresses, irqs, dma channels, fixed
dma buffers and other types).
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Lock down TIOCSSERIAL as that can be used to change the ioport and irq
settings on a serial port.  This only appears to be an issue for the serial
drivers that use the core serial code.  All other drivers seem to either
ignore attempts to change port/irq or give an error.
Reported-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com>
Cc: linux-serial@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Prohibit replacement of the PCMCIA Card Information Structure when the
kernel is locked down.
Suggested-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

>From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):

  If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
  to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
  instrumented, modified one.

When lockdown is enabled, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space.  ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel,
so do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if the kernel is locked down.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <lcrosetto@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

This option allows userspace to pass the RSDP address to the kernel, which
makes it possible for a user to modify the workings of hardware. Reject
the option when the kernel is locked down. This requires some reworking
of the existing RSDP command line logic, since the early boot code also
makes use of a command-line passed RSDP when locating the SRAT table
before the lockdown code has been initialised. This is achieved by
separating the command line RSDP path in the early boot code from the
generic RSDP path, and then copying the command line RSDP into boot
params in the kernel proper if lockdown is not enabled. If lockdown is
enabled and an RSDP is provided on the command line, this will only be
used when parsing SRAT (which shouldn't permit kernel code execution)
and will be ignored in the rest of the kernel.

(Modified by Matthew Garrett in order to handle the early boot RSDP
environment)
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

custom_method effectively allows arbitrary access to system memory, making
it possible for an attacker to circumvent restrictions on module loading.
Disable it if the kernel is locked down.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Writing to MSRs should not be allowed if the kernel is locked down, since
it could lead to execution of arbitrary code in kernel mode.  Based on a
patch by Kees Cook.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
cc: x86@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration
registers, which in turn (on a lot of hardware) give access to MMIO
register space. This would potentially permit root to trigger arbitrary
DMA, so lock it down by default.

This also implicitly locks down the KDADDIO, KDDELIO, KDENABIO and
KDDISABIO console ioctls.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
cc: x86@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down in
order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to modify kernel code,
allowing them to circumvent disabled module loading or module signing.
Default to paranoid - in future we can potentially relax this for
sufficiently IOMMU-isolated devices.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

There is currently no way to verify the resume image when returning
from hibernate.  This might compromise the signed modules trust model,
so until we can work with signed hibernate images we disable it when the
kernel is locked down.
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: rjw@rjwysocki.net
Cc: pavel@ucw.cz
cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

When KEXEC_SIG is not enabled, kernel should not load images through
kexec_file systemcall if the kernel is locked down.

[Modified by David Howells to fit with modifications to the previous patch
 and to return -EPERM if the kernel is locked down for consistency with
 other lockdowns. Modified by Matthew Garrett to remove the IMA
 integration, which will be replaced by integrating with the IMA
 architecture policy patches.]
Signed-off-by: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

This is a preparatory patch for kexec_file_load() lockdown.  A locked down
kernel needs to prevent unsigned kernel images from being loaded with
kexec_file_load().  Currently, the only way to force the signature
verification is compiling with KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG.  This prevents loading
usigned images even when the kernel is not locked down at runtime.

This patch splits KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE.
Analogous to the MODULE_SIG and MODULE_SIG_FORCE for modules, KEXEC_SIG
turns on the signature verification but allows unsigned images to be
loaded.  KEXEC_SIG_FORCE disallows images without a valid signature.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Kexec reboot in case secure boot being enabled does not keep the secure
boot mode in new kernel, so later one can load unsigned kernel via legacy
kexec_load.  In this state, the system is missing the protections provided
by secure boot.

Adding a patch to fix this by retain the secure_boot flag in original
kernel.

secure_boot flag in boot_params is set in EFI stub, but kexec bypasses the
stub.  Fixing this issue by copying secure_boot flag across kexec reboot.
Signed-off-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

The kexec_load() syscall permits the loading and execution of arbitrary
code in ring 0, which is something that lock-down is meant to prevent. It
makes sense to disable kexec_load() in this situation.

This does not affect kexec_file_load() syscall which can check for a
signature on the image to be booted.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Allowing users to read and write to core kernel memory makes it possible
for the kernel to be subverted, avoiding module loading restrictions, and
also to steal cryptographic information.

Disallow /dev/mem and /dev/kmem from being opened this when the kernel has
been locked down to prevent this.

Also disallow /dev/port from being opened to prevent raw ioport access and
thus DMA from being used to accomplish the same thing.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

If the kernel is locked down, require that all modules have valid
signatures that we can verify.

I have adjusted the errors generated:

 (1) If there's no signature (ENODATA) or we can't check it (ENOPKG,
     ENOKEY), then:

     (a) If signatures are enforced then EKEYREJECTED is returned.

     (b) If there's no signature or we can't check it, but the kernel is
	 locked down then EPERM is returned (this is then consistent with
	 other lockdown cases).

 (2) If the signature is unparseable (EBADMSG, EINVAL), the signature fails
     the check (EKEYREJECTED) or a system error occurs (eg. ENOMEM), we
     return the error we got.

Note that the X.509 code doesn't check for key expiry as the RTC might not
be valid or might not have been transferred to the kernel's clock yet.

 [Modified by Matthew Garrett to remove the IMA integration. This will
  be replaced with integration with the IMA architecture policy
  patchset.]
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

While existing LSMs can be extended to handle lockdown policy,
distributions generally want to be able to apply a straightforward
static policy. This patch adds a simple LSM that can be configured to
reject either integrity or all lockdown queries, and can be configured
at runtime (through securityfs), boot time (via a kernel parameter) or
build time (via a kconfig option). Based on initial code by David
Howells.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Add a mechanism to allow LSMs to make a policy decision around whether
kernel functionality that would allow tampering with or examining the
runtime state of the kernel should be permitted.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

The lockdown module is intended to allow for kernels to be locked down
early in boot - sufficiently early that we don't have the ability to
kmalloc() yet. Add support for early initialisation of some LSMs, and
then add them to the list of names when we do full initialisation later.
Early LSMs are initialised in link order and cannot be overridden via
boot parameters, and cannot make use of kmalloc() (since the allocator
isn't initialised yet).

(Fixed by Stephen Rothwell to include a stub to fix builds when
!CONFIG_SECURITY)
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Pull block fix from Jens Axboe:
 "Just a single fix for a patch from Greg KH, which reportedly break
  block debugfs locations for certain setups. Trivial enough that I
  think we should include it now, rather than wait and release 5.2 with
  it, since it's a regression in this series"

* tag 'for-linus-20190706' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block:
  blk-mq: fix up placement of debugfs directory of queue files

Pull MIPS fixes from Paul Burton:
 "A few more MIPS fixes:

   - Fix a silly typo in virt_addr_valid which led to completely bogus
     behavior (that happened to stop tripping up hardened usercopy
     despite being broken).

   - Fix UART parity setup on AR933x systems.

   - A build fix for non-Linux build machines.

   - Have the 'all' make target build DTBs, primarily to fit in with the
     behavior of scripts/package/builddeb.

   - Handle an execution hazard in TLB exceptions that use KScratch
     registers, which could inadvertently clobber the $1 register on
     some generally higher-end out-of-order CPUs.

   - A MAINTAINERS update to fix the path to the NAND driver for Ingenic
     systems"

* tag 'mips_fixes_5.2_2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mips/linux:
  MAINTAINERS: Correct path to moved files
  MIPS: Add missing EHB in mtc0 -> mfc0 sequence.
  MIPS: have "plain" make calls build dtbs for selected platforms
  MIPS: fix build on non-linux hosts
  MIPS: ath79: fix ar933x uart parity mode
  MIPS: Fix bounds check virt_addr_valid

Pull dmaengine fixes from Vinod Koul:

 - bam_dma fix for completed descriptor count

 - fix for imx-sdma remove BD_INTR for channel0 and use-after-free on
   probe error path

 - endian bug fix in jz4780 IRQ handler

* tag 'dmaengine-fix-5.2' of git://git.infradead.org/users/vkoul/slave-dma:
  dmaengine: qcom: bam_dma: Fix completed descriptors count
  dmaengine: imx-sdma: remove BD_INTR for channel0
  dmaengine: imx-sdma: fix use-after-free on probe error path
  dmaengine: jz4780: Fix an endian bug in IRQ handler

Pull SCSI fixes from James Bottomley:
 "Two iscsi fixes.

  One for an oops in the client which can be triggered by the server
  authentication protocol and the other in the target code which causes
  data corruption"

* tag 'scsi-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/scsi:
  scsi: iscsi: set auth_protocol back to NULL if CHAP_A value is not supported
  scsi: target/iblock: Fix overrun in WRITE SAME emulation

Pull vfs fixlet from Al Viro:
 "Fix bogus default y in Kconfig (VALIDATE_FS_PARSER)

  That thing should not be turned on by default, especially since it's
  not quiet in case it finds no problems. Geert has sent the obvious fix
  quite a few times, but it fell through the cracks"

* 'fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  fs: VALIDATE_FS_PARSER should default to n

When the blk-mq debugfs file creation logic was "cleaned up" it was
cleaned up too much, causing the queue file to not be created in the
correct location.  Turns out the check for the directory being present
is needed as if that has not happened yet, the files should not be
created, and the function will be called later on in the initialization
code so that the files can be created in the correct location.

Fixes: 6cfc0081 ("blk-mq: no need to check return value of debugfs_create functions")
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: linux-block@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

This reverts commit 5fd4ca2d.

Mikhail Gavrilov reports that it causes the VM_BUG_ON_PAGE() in
__delete_from_swap_cache() to trigger:

   page:ffffd6d34dff0000 refcount:1 mapcount:1 mapping:ffff97812323a689 index:0xfecec363
   anon
   flags: 0x17fffe00080034(uptodate|lru|active|swapbacked)
   raw: 0017fffe00080034 ffffd6d34c67c508 ffffd6d3504b8d48 ffff97812323a689
   raw: 00000000fecec363 0000000000000000 0000000100000000 ffff978433ace000
   page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(entry != page)
   page->mem_cgroup:ffff978433ace000
   ------------[ cut here ]------------
   kernel BUG at mm/swap_state.c:170!
   invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
   CPU: 1 PID: 221 Comm: kswapd0 Not tainted 5.2.0-0.rc2.git0.1.fc31.x86_64 #1
   Hardware name: System manufacturer System Product Name/ROG STRIX X470-I GAMING, BIOS 2202 04/11/2019
   RIP: 0010:__delete_from_swap_cache+0x20d/0x240
   Code: 30 65 48 33 04 25 28 00 00 00 75 4a 48 83 c4 38 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 48 c7 c6 2f dc 0f 8a 48 89 c7 e8 93 1b fd ff <0f> 0b 48 c7 c6 a8 74 0f 8a e8 85 1b fd ff 0f 0b 48 c7 c6 a8 7d 0f
   RSP: 0018:ffffa982036e7980 EFLAGS: 00010046
   RAX: 0000000000000021 RBX: 0000000000000040 RCX: 0000000000000006
   RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000086 RDI: ffff97843d657900
   RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffffa982036e7835 R09: 0000000000000535
   R10: ffff97845e21a46c R11: ffffa982036e7835 R12: ffff978426387120
   R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffd6d34dff0040 R15: ffffd6d34dff0000
   FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff97843d640000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
   CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
   CR2: 00002cba88ef5000 CR3: 000000078a97c000 CR4: 00000000003406e0
   Call Trace:
    delete_from_swap_cache+0x46/0xa0
    try_to_free_swap+0xbc/0x110
    swap_writepage+0x13/0x70
    pageout.isra.0+0x13c/0x350
    shrink_page_list+0xc14/0xdf0
    shrink_inactive_list+0x1e5/0x3c0
    shrink_node_memcg+0x202/0x760
    shrink_node+0xe0/0x470
    balance_pgdat+0x2d1/0x510
    kswapd+0x220/0x420
    kthread+0xfb/0x130
    ret_from_fork+0x22/0x40

and it's not immediately obvious why it happens.  It's too late in the
rc cycle to do anything but revert for now.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CABXGCsN9mYmBD-4GaaeW_NrDu+FDXLzr_6x+XNxfmFV6QkYCDg@mail.gmail.com/Reported-and-bisected-by: Mikhail Gavrilov <mikhail.v.gavrilov@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Kirill Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: William Kucharski <william.kucharski@oracle.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
 "x86 bugfix patches and one compilation fix for ARM"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
  KVM: arm64/sve: Fix vq_present() macro to yield a bool
  KVM: LAPIC: Fix pending interrupt in IRR blocked by software disable LAPIC
  KVM: nVMX: Change KVM_STATE_NESTED_EVMCS to signal vmcs12 is copied from eVMCS
  KVM: nVMX: Allow restore nested-state to enable eVMCS when vCPU in SMM
  KVM: x86: degrade WARN to pr_warn_ratelimited

Pull mtf fixes from Miquel Raynal:

 - Fix the memory organization structure of a Macronix SPI-NAND chip.

 - Fix a build dependency wrongly described.

 - Fix the sunxi NAND driver for A23/A33 SoCs by (a) reverting the
   faulty commit introducing broken DMA support and (b) applying another
   commit bringing working DMA support.

* tag 'mtd/fixes-for-5.2-final' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mtd/linux:
  mtd: rawnand: sunxi: Add A23/A33 DMA support with extra MBUS configuration
  Revert "mtd: rawnand: sunxi: Add A23/A33 DMA support"
  mtd: rawnand: ingenic: Fix ingenic_ecc dependency
  mtd: spinand: Fix max_bad_eraseblocks_per_lun info in memorg