The code wasn't exactly wrong, but it was very odd, and it used
FOLL_FORCE together with FOLL_WRITE when it really didn't need to (it
only set FOLL_WRITE for writable mappings, so then the FOLL_FORCE was
pointless).

It also pointlessly called __get_user_pages() even when it knew it
wouldn't populate anything because the vma wasn't accessible and it
explicitly tested for and did *not* set FOLL_FORCE for inaccessible
vma's.

This code does need to use FOLL_FORCE, because we want to do fault in
writable shared mappings, but then the mapping may not actually be
readable.  And we don't want to use FOLL_WRITE (which would match the
permission of the vma), because that would also dirty the pages, which
we don't want to do.

For very similar reasons, FOLL_FORCE populates a executable-only mapping
with no read permissions. We don't have a FOLL_EXEC flag.

Yes, it would probably be cleaner to split FOLL_WRITE into two bits (for
separate permission and dirty bit handling), and add a FOLL_EXEC flag
for the "GUP executable page" case.  That would allow us to avoid
FOLL_FORCE entirely here.

But that's not how our FOLL_xyz bits have traditionally worked, and that
would be a much bigger patch.

So this at least avoids the FOLL_FORCE | FOLL_WRITE combination that
made one of my experimental validation patches trigger a warning.  That
warning was a false positive (and my experimental patch was incomplete
anyway), but it all made me look at this and decide to clean at least
this small case up.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>