The attribute fork scrubber can optionally scan the reverse mapping
records of the filesystem to determine if the fork is missing mappings
that it should have.  However, this is a very expensive operation, so we
only want to do this if we suspect that the fork is missing records.
For attribute forks the criteria for suspicion is that the attr fork is
in EXTENTS format and has zero extents.

However, there are several ways that a file can end up in this state
through regular filesystem usage.  For example, an LSM can set a
s_security hook but then decide not to set an ACL; or an attr set can
create the attr fork but then the actual set operation fails with
ENOSPC; or we can delete all the attrs on a file whose data fork is in
btree format, in which case we do not delete the attr fork.  We don't
want to run the expensive check for any case that can be arrived at
through regular operations.

However.

When online inode repair decides to zap an attribute fork, it cannot
determine if it is zapping ACL information.  As a precaution it removes
all the discretionary access control permissions and sets the user and
group ids to zero.  Check these three additional conditions to decide if
we want to scan the rmap records.
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>