• Ilya Leoshkevich's avatar
    mm: slub: disable KMSAN when checking the padding bytes · adea9876
    Ilya Leoshkevich authored
    Even though the KMSAN warnings generated by memchr_inv() are suppressed by
    metadata_access_enable(), its return value may still be poisoned.
    
    The reason is that the last iteration of memchr_inv() returns `*start !=
    value ?  start : NULL`, where *start is poisoned.  Because of this,
    somewhat counterintuitively, the shadow value computed by
    visitSelectInst() is equal to `(uintptr_t)start`.
    
    One possibility to fix this, since the intention behind guarding
    memchr_inv() behind metadata_access_enable() is to touch poisoned metadata
    without triggering KMSAN, is to unpoison its return value.  However, this
    approach is too fragile.  So simply disable the KMSAN checks in the
    respective functions.
    
    Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240621113706.315500-19-iii@linux.ibm.comSigned-off-by: default avatarIlya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
    Reviewed-by: default avatarAlexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
    Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
    Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
    Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
    Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
    Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
    Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
    Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
    Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
    Cc: <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
    Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
    Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
    Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
    Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
    Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
    Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
    Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
    Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
    Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
    Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
    adea9876
slub.c 182 KB