commit 0bfc96cb upstream.

[ Changes with respect to 3.3: return -ENOTTY from scsi_verify_blk_ioctl
  and -ENOIOCTLCMD from sd_compat_ioctl. ]

Linux allows executing the SG_IO ioctl on a partition or LVM volume, and
will pass the command to the underlying block device.  This is
well-known, but it is also a large security problem when (via Unix
permissions, ACLs, SELinux or a combination thereof) a program or user
needs to be granted access only to part of the disk.

This patch lets partitions forward a small set of harmless ioctls;
others are logged with printk so that we can see which ioctls are
actually sent.  In my tests only CDROM_GET_CAPABILITY actually occurred.
Of course it was being sent to a (partition on a) hard disk, so it would
have failed with ENOTTY and the patch isn't changing anything in
practice.  Still, I'm treating it specially to avoid spamming the logs.

In principle, this restriction should include programs running with
CAP_SYS_RAWIO.  If for example I let a program access /dev/sda2 and
/dev/sdb, it still should not be able to read/write outside the
boundaries of /dev/sda2 independent of the capabilities.  However, for
now programs with CAP_SYS_RAWIO will still be allowed to send the
ioctls.  Their actions will still be logged.

This patch does not affect the non-libata IDE driver.  That driver
however already tests for bd != bd->bd_contains before issuing some
ioctl; it could be restricted further to forbid these ioctls even for
programs running with CAP_SYS_ADMIN/CAP_SYS_RAWIO.

Cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: James Bottomley <JBottomley@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[ Make it also print the command name when warning - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>