crypto: fips - only panic on bad/missing crypto mod signatures
Per further discussion with NIST, the requirements for FIPS state that we only need to panic the system on failed kernel module signature checks for crypto subsystem modules. This moves the fips-mode-only module signature check out of the generic module loading code, into the crypto subsystem, at points where we can catch both algorithm module loads and mode module loads. At the same time, make CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS dependent on CONFIG_MODULE_SIG, as this is entirely necessary for FIPS mode. v2: remove extraneous blank line, perform checks in static inline function, drop no longer necessary fips.h include. CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> CC: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> CC: Stephan Mueller <stephan.mueller@atsec.com> Signed-off-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Showing
Please register or sign in to comment